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Innovation has long been described anecdotally as something that comes from individual 
genius. Successful innovators have often been heralded as a special class of people with rare 
talents and unique capacities to “think different” to deliver world changing innovation. This view 
is reflected in innovation literature, notably with the linear model, which more recently has been 
widely criticised on account of this almost exclusive focus on individual action and personality 
as the sole determinant of innovation success. 
The technological innovation systems literature is a response, describing the achievement of 
any technological innovation as a result of a ‘system’ made up of things like individuals, 
resources, culture, intellectual property, working in complex ways to collectively achieve a 
specific technological innovation. 
Whilst the theory of innovation systems is acknowledged as valuable, this thesis argues the 
systems theory is problematic as explanatory tool specifically for technological innovation. 
Primarily this is due to the strong boundary conditions required of systems theory- To recognise 
a system, there is a need to demarcate the system from its environment.  These boundaries 
create a strong ‘inside’ - those individuals, technologies, resources identified to be within the 
system, working specifically on the technology, and ‘outside’-those technologies, people, 
resources and all other things viewed as external, not related or relevant. The limitation of 
technological innovation systems is that by necessity, research often becomes an almost 
exclusive investigation of those internal components as the source of innovation, leaving the 
wider environment largely ignored. 
In contrast to this, other important innovation theory, including viewing innovation as a 
‘recombination’ process, and significantly the recent theory of ‘technological exaptation’ 
suggest that this wider environment ignored by technological innovation system theory is 
potentially critically important to the achievement of technological innovation itself. The 
theories of combination and exaptation suggest that it is precisely things in the environment- 
the events, technologies or people that the technological innovation systems theory often 





The broad environment for a specific technological innovation is the focus of this research. 
Rather than use the term environment though, this research uses the expression of ‘lifeworld’ 
to describe the concept environment, with justification for this terminology offered in the thesis. 
This research then explores how lifeworld conditions change over time, and how these 
conditions impact the performance of those attempting to create a specific technological 
innovation.  In doing so, the research uses the lifeworld concept to further explore and 
articulate innovation theories of combination, exaptation, uncertainty and accumulation.   
These issues were explored with an in-depth single qualitative case study of portable digital 
music players. The case utilised extensive archival and secondary data (over 4,000 articles) 
as well as primary interviews with expert protagonists (23 hours of interview data).  This 
resulted in a detailed chronology of events for the development of digital music players over 
an extended time (60+ years).   This event history was then used to explore the lifeworld 
concept, combination, exaptation, uncertainty and accumulation.  
The study finds that the lifeworld, representing the wider environment, is critical to the creation 
of technology as well as the achievement of innovation: Portable digital music player innovation 
did not emerge only from a designated system, or individuals working on portable digital music 
player technology, but instead, often new events would spring from wider sources in the 
lifeworld, from domains previously unrelated to the specific pursuit of portable digital music 
player innovation.  The lifeworld appeared an important tool to capture this detail, with 
recognition those working on the technology were often constrained or enabled by the wider 
conditions of the lifeworld in which the where placed.  As the lifeworld changed, so too did the 
performance of those seeking to achieve portable digital music technology innovation. This 
was further expressed by Jon Rubinstein who described Apple’s method for creating the iPod 
as principally one of combination, drawing quickly from common available conditions and 
technologies.  
With these insights, the study provides a number of theoretical contributions, ranging from 
refining the theories of technological exaptation and combination, exploring the trajectory of 
the lifeworld and the stages of a development of a technological innovation, as well as 
recognition of the role of uncertainty and accumulation that makes possible technological 
innovation at one time and not another.  From a practical perspective, the study offers a range 
of insights for individuals in respect to innovation timing, and how to look beyond ideas for 
technological innovation but instead to look for conditions that make technological innovation 
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Today, innovation is a driving force in business and society (Fagerberg, Fosaas & Sapprasert, 
2012, p. 1). Innovation is no longer of speculative relevance to individuals, companies and 
economies, and its development is no longer left to chance by entrepreneurs, managers, and 
governments (Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2006, 2009). Technological innovation particularly is 
viewed as both a major opportunity and threat for individual companies and entrepreneurs –  
the creator and destroyer of industries. However, our understanding of innovation is 
complicated. Despite increasing recognition, its complex nature has made it a particularly 
difficult research phenomenon (Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2006, 2009). There are many 
theories of innovation, with a literature both complicated and messy, and overlapping across 
individual theories and theoretical domains (Godin, 2015). This research will leave many of 
these wider issues of innovation theory aside. Instead, this research will focus on technological 
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innovation and explore a specific real world problem for entrepreneurs and investors, as well 
as a specific set of issues in theory. 
This research explores the role of the “lifeworld” in the achievement of a particular 
technological innovation: How the context and environment available at any given time 
constrains and enables the capacity of those within it to create a particular technological 
innovation, and how this environment changes over time to make a once impossible 
technological innovation more likely. This research is process research using the methodology 
of a single in-depth case study: Portable digital music players, known colloquially as MP3 
players. As part of this case study, wider events recognised as “digital music” are also 
explored. 
The rest of this chapter will provide an overview of the study, documenting the detail of 
methodology, research process, findings, and implications, and offer a road map for the rest 
of the thesis. But it will begin more specifically, with a description of the focus of this research 
both as a practical problem from the case and as a theoretical problem from the technological 
innovation literature, culminating with the presentation of the four specific research questions 
of this study. 
1.1 Practical problem focus 
Kane Kramer had the idea for the first digital music player in 1979. He created drawings of his 
music player, established a company in the UK, and registered patents on parts of his design. 
But, after a few years of toil, the company failed, and Kramer never released a functioning 
product. 
In 1995, 15 years later, researchers at NEC announced a working prototype of a portable 
digital music player using the newly developed flash memory. This 32 MB memory prototype 
had capacity for approximately eight songs, with the memory costing US$2,000 (Woudenberg, 
1995). Acknowledging the prohibitive cost of the prototype, NEC said they would watch 
development of the technology closely, but they were never cited in the portable digital music 
player market again. 
In 1997, Nathan Schullhof led a company that created an internet-connectable prototype music 
player called the Listen Up. He demonstrated it at the Consumer Electronics Show in 1997, 
announcing it with a projected retail price of US$299. It received an innovation award at the 
event and recognition in the press as a “big innovation in internet appliances” (Chiefet, 1997). 
Despite the recognition – and his company called Audio Highway listing on the stock exchange 
– two years later, Schullhof and the company failed. 
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In 1998, new players were released to the public for the first time. The Saehan MPMan and 
the Diamond Rio, both 32 MB flash players, retailed for between US$299 and $399. They were 
soon followed by a wave of entrants, with companies like Creative, Sony, Intel, and Samsung 
among others all offering similar portable digital music players between 1999 and 2001. Some 
of these companies achieved temporary success, but most of them ultimately failed. At the 
same time, other events like mp3.com, Napster, and Kazaa thrust digital music into a dramatic 
public spotlight, making digital music downloading a worldwide technological and cultural 
curiosity. Despite the intrigue and the occasional brief glimpse of success, these companies 
ultimately failed too. 
In 2001, Apple released iTunes and the iPod, and in a few years became a worldwide 
consumer phenomenon. The potential of digital music and the portable digital music player 
that so many entrepreneurs had previously forecast and grasped at appeared to materialise 
all at once with the iPod, and almost the entire pool of success went to one company –  Apple. 
By this stage, many high-profile entrepreneurs, recording industry figures, independent 
journalists, and others had all promoted, forecast, invested in, and pursued a digital music 
future, yet for all of them innovation remained elusive. For Apple the outcome was entirely 
different. They entered the market with a very short R&D lead time and very quickly achieved 
what no other company had: A revolution in the music industry and in music listening for 
consumers. 
When reaching this juncture in describing a successful innovation, often the default is to extol 
the virtues of the successful protagonist.  In this case, it would retrace the story of iPod as the 
story of Steve Jobs himself, presenting his personality as the source of innovation. For 
example, how Jobs sitting in on a calligraphy course at college later resulted in Apple’s focus 
on design (Rosoff, 2016), or how Jobs’ preference for the simple elegance of black turtleneck 
jumpers (Issaccson, 2011) manifest in the characteristics of the iPod, with its chic elegance a 
feature.  This type of analysis suggests a rare capacity for startling innovation was hardwired 
into Jobs, and that achievements like the Macintosh, the iMac, and iPod all tumbled out as 
proof of this ready made genius.  
The argument that the iPod is an outcome of genius is is hard to refute because the success 
of the iPod is not circumstantial but historically absolute: The iPod was a staggeringly dramatic 
success, and by obvious implication Steve Jobs was the most high- profile, tangible source of 
its genesis. But if Apple’s achievements are viewed in the context of the long line of preceding 
failed entrepreneurs and companies, the simple assignment of the iPod to Jobs’ unique genius 
without regard to the effort of others appears potentially disproportionate. Below the surface of 
the iPod there were thousands of people pursuing these ideas prior to Apple, often with 
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incredibly similar insights and incredibly similar product features, often offered to the market 
first, but that ultimately, somehow, became hallmark achievements of Apple. 
This issue becomes more intriguing the deeper this context of the iPod is explored. There were 
over a hundred portable music players already available in the market prior to Apple releasing 
the iPod, with many of them having individual features similar to the iPod (although no 
competitor had the entire feature set), and with the iPod relying on similar if not identical 
common technologies (steel, glass, electricity, digital music, the internet, system-on-a-chip 
computing) that Apple didn’t create or uniquely control. 
Additionally, many of the specific components of the iPod were off-the-shelf products from 
external suppliers. The iPod’s hard drive (Toshiba), battery (Sony), AD converter (Wolfson), 
flash components (Sharp), and operating middleware software (Pixo) all came from external 
sources, where Apple either purchased the components from these suppliers or purchased 
these companies themselves. For example, in 2000 Apple purchased SoundJam (a music 
library software), then adjusted and improved it and released it as iTunes in 2001. In 2006, 
during a court case against burst.com, Apple’s lawyers flew Kane Kramer out to California as 
a defence witness to describe how the iPod utilised similar ideas to Kramer’s drawings and 
lapsed patents from 1979. 
Even some of the most distinctive features of the iPod can be described as ideas influenced 
by existing products. For example, in conceiving the iPod scroll wheel, Apple acknowledged 
that it imitated the scroll wheel design of an existing Bang and Olufsen BeoCom telephone, 
and the iconic white exterior of the iPod was inspired from a transistor radio design from Dieter 
Rams released in 1958. Below the surface, it seems as though those things external to Apple, 
which they did not initiate and were generally available to everyone, were very important to the 
unique achievements of the iPod. 
How did Apple achieve a revolutionary outcome when other entrepreneurs, companies, and 
journalists that claimed to be working on many of the same ideas utterly and unambiguously 
failed? What role did they play in the achievement of iPod? How did these people, events, and 
technologies contribute to the iPod?  More specifically, did they need to happen prior to the 
iPod to make it possible? 
These issues are the focus of this research which will investigate the success of the iPod not 
by focusing on the characteristics of Steve Jobs but, instead, by exploring this surrounding 
activity of portable digital music players. Were there particular conditions that made dramatic 
innovation in portable digital music players more likely for Apple compared others? And if so, 
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how did Apple recognise, contribute, and then uniquely capitalise on these conditions when 
most other entrepreneurs failed? 
1.2 Theoretical focus 
Models of technological innovation and evolution reflect the expression that opportunity for a 
particular innovation is not evenly distributed. Innovation lifecycle models describe that 
technologies have long development processes (Dosi, 1982; Lispey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005, 
location 1573; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Perez, 1983, 2002, 2004, 2010; Schumpeter, 1942, 
location 1837). Successful technologies emerge first as invention, proceed through 
development, and eventually transform into innovation (Garud, Tuertscher & Van de Ven, 
2013, p. 777). This process takes time, to the extent that technological innovation lifecycle 
theory often describes this process in a number of distinct phases.  Summarising these phases 
in popular lifecycle models (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982; Nelson & Winter 1982; 
Ogburn, 1950; Perez, 2010; Suárez, 2004; Usher, 1954; Utterback, 1978), the following 
appears to be the development process of a technology: 
– Gestation of prior technologies occurs in the environment. 
– At some point, the technologies offer conditions that lead to the invention of a new 
technology. 
– This new technology is initiated as adolescent in performance but spurs a large volume 
of new entrants sensing potential for dramatic innovation. 
– The large volume of entrants offer products as variations on the initial design. These 
reveal preferences and problems, but despite momentary glimpses of success, 
innovation proves elusive. 
– At some point, a new product is released that becomes widely accepted by customers 
and becomes recognised as the dominant design and defining product of the category. 
– This results in a large shakeout as competitors leave the market, and there emerges 
an oligopoly structure where the creator of the successful design will capture the 
majority of value for the entire market. 
This lifecycle is credible (Garud et al. 2013), with a significant amount of empirical support 
(Stubbart & Knight, 2006, p. 86). These models suggest a reliable and predictable path of 
development to a particular technology, with the implication that there will exist only a brief 
moment where innovation is possible, capitalised on by a single victor to close off opportunity 
for all others. 
Despite the empirical strength of these models, they do have current limitations. First, many of 
them offer representation of process (Checkland, 1981; Checkland & Scholes, 1990), 
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describing process by way of markers of change, rather than mechanisms. Firm entry and exit 
rates at certain times in development, for example, appear a strong empirical marker of the 
process (Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Horvath, Schivardi & Woywode, 2001; Jovanovic & 
MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996; Klepper & Miller, 1995). Whilst this is useful, it doesn’t 
particularly address why these events emerge at certain times and whether there are more 
fundamental mechanisms that cause these outcomes.  
A second criticism is one levelled at most linear innovation models (Freeman, 1991a, 1996; 
Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Martin, 2012; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Perez, 2010; Rosenberg, 
1994), as well as recently emerging in the technological innovation system literature (Smith, 
Voß & Grin, 2010, p. 438; Tigabu, Berkhout & van Beukering, 2015, p. 1). These models tend 
to isolate the technology in focus from its wider environment, viewing and explaining progress 
as one generated by the effort of those working on the technology, as opposed to the wider 
external context in which it is placed. This issue is the focus of this research. 
For many lifecycle models the wider environment is recognised sporadically, most often as the 
catalyst for initial conditions to spark invention (such as Usher’s description of “setting of the 
stage” (1954)). But after this, in later phases, the role of the wider environment becomes murky, 
and, instead, description shifts towards the actions of individual protagonists. Whilst there is 
continuing strong acknowledgement of the environment (e.g., Dosi, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 
1982) in the process of developing a particular technology, what specifically comes from the 
environment, and how and when, is not well described. 
In alternative innovation theory, the conditions of the environment outside of the technology 
are noted to be important. Specifically, a renewed interest in the importance of innovation as 
combination (Arthur, 2009; Garud et al., 2013; Van de Ven, Garud & Venkataraman, 1999, 
location 185), along with the theory of exaptation (Adner & Levinthal, 2002; Cattani, 2006; 
Gould & Vrba, 1982; Levinthal, 1998), both suggest that rather than innovation being achieved 
exclusively by effort within the domain, drawing things from the environment at certain times 
can be a strong determinant of development and ultimately innovation. Exaptation particularly 
identifies that utilising existing technologies and transferring them to new uses for which they 
were previously not intended can create dramatic innovation without long development 
processes characterised by innovation lifecycle models (Adner & Levinthal, 2002, Cattani, 
2006; Levinthal, 1998). This places emphasis on the general context outside of those working 
specifically on the technology as the source of dramatic advance for the technology itself. 
The environment in which an idea for a technology is conceived is important, and beyond 
technological components emerging from exaptation, there are non-technological conditions 
that impact the achievement of a particular innovation. Other innovation theory acknowledges 
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that at any given time there exists a broad frontier of socioeconomic and cultural influences, 
consumer preferences and familiarities, industry alignments, and relationships that all interact 
to present complex conditions that impact the value of a particular technology and its 
performance, as well as its likelihood of innovation (Bijker, 1997; Geels, 2005; Hughes, 1983; 
Unruh, 2000). In this way, the environment again is important – the value of a particular 
technology is not innate but relative to how it is perceived by the environment, where this 
environment may at times be particularly hostile to it, preconfigured with preference to another 
technology. How this environment changes, and how this presents difference in the potential 
of the same technology to achieve innovation at different times appears important. It also, as 
a consequence, ratchets up the difficulty of achieving innovation beyond what is controlled by 
those with ideas. 
Without refinement of the role of the environment through the innovation lifecycle, there is a 
conflict between current innovation lifecycle models and theories of exaptation and 
combination. Currently, innovation lifecycle models present innovation as an outcome of a 
graduating and predictable series of phases largely driven by the internal development of a 
technology. Exaptation, in contrast, suggests that drawing existing technologies from the 
external environment and applying them to a new purpose can create radical innovation 
quickly, without this development process. With recognition of this conflict and the broader 
importance of the role of the environment, the environment surrounding a particular technology 
is the focus of this research, summarised as follows: 
Recognising that ideas for technology are dependent upon more than 
themselves for innovation, this research explores the role of the environment 
surrounding a technology, how the environment changes, and how, with 
related concepts of combination and exaptation, changes in the environment 
can create differences in the likelihood of a particular technological innovation 
at different times. 
In an attempt to investigate this concept of environment, an array of terms appears relevant. 
Most notably, the above has referred to the concept as environment so far, but other terms like 
“context” (Autio et al., 2014), “milieu” (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Cooke & Morgan, 1994), “system” 
(Bergek et al., 2008), “ecosystem” (Adner & Euchner, 2014; Autio & Thomas, 2013) are all 
useful. Whilst these terms are relevant they often have a particular connotation which does not 
entirely match the concept of environment being expressed here. The focus is on the complete 
surrounding context of a technology at any given time, which includes people, things, 
technologies, and objects not obviously relevant to the technology in focus. The terms above 
don’t appear to capture the essence of this. Terms like “environment” or “ecosystem”, for 
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example, evoke strong biological ecology connotations, while “milieu” has cultural or 
geographic connotations, and “system” clearly identifiable components and boundaries. 
The concept being explored here seems different to these, albeit with the possibility of 
shoehorning any one of these above terms to fit. Rather than do this, this research will describe 
the environment as the lifeworld surrounding a technology (Husserl, 1970).  The lifeworld 
comes from Husserl, who used it to describe “a coherent universe of existing objects” (Husserl, 
1970 p. 108); applied to this study, the lifeworld of a technology represents the universe of 
existing things surrounding the technology and the technological domain at any given time. 
1.3 The research questions 
Reflecting the above description of the lifeworld and the focus on its role in the development 
of a technology, the research questions for this thesis are:  
1. How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in the case study? 
2. How are combination and exaptation relevant in the development of innovation? 
3. What is the relationship between the internal domain and the external lifeworld? 
4. How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
1.4 Scope of the research 
The scope of the research is specific, but the concept of the lifeworld is broad and is an attempt 
to research something inherently difficult: to model and describe how the things surrounding 
an idea for a technology (events, other technologies, individuals, etc.), not at times obviously 
relevant to it, can impact its capacity to achieve innovation. Adding to the complexity, the 
research also focuses on the importance of viewing this lifeworld as a process – how it changed 
over time and how this leads to different conditions that enable and constrain innovation. 
Despite this broad focus, the guiding scope here for events to be included are those relevant 
specifically to the achievement of technological innovation, with this study consistent with the 
broad scope of other prominent innovation lifecycle models (Klepper, 1996; Usher, 1954), 
except for an increased focus on this wider lifeworld. Whilst the concept of the wider lifeworld 
as the condition under which ideas for a technology are conceived, and attempts at innovation 
are made, is intrinsically ambiguous, it is this ambiguity that appears important to the concept 
itself, with reference that a too tightly defined scope can potentially miss important phenomena 
as the source of innovation. 
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More general scope issues for this research recognise its purpose: This research has been 
designed and presented exclusively as a thesis for submission for PhD. It has been 
constructed with all the usual limitations and constraints of this process. 
1.4.1 Research design 
This research will use this concept of lifeworld, representing the broad environment, to analyse 
the development of portable digital music player technology through its history, culminating in 
the success of the iPod. Providing more detail to the scope above, the figure below outlines 
the research design of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1  Research Design 
Literature review: This thesis will present a review of the innovation literature, including a 
critique of the perspective of innovation as ideas, as well as technological innovation systems 
theory, leading to the identification of usefulness of innovation process theory, and in particular 
innovation lifecycle models. An identification of current limits, particularly with reference to 
external conditions is identified, framing the need for a new model. This literature review 
culminates in the presentation of the research questions provided earlier. 
Technological lifeworld model: Chapter 3 presents an innovation lifeworld model, which 
explores and articulates the role of the environment through phases of prominent innovation 
lifecycle literature. This model presents four alternative lifeworlds, with a number of markers to 
each lifeworld, covering the innovation lifecycle of a particular technology. The four lifeworlds 
presented are prehistory, establishment, development, and innovation. This lifeworld model is 
not a new theoretical model but instead more generally organises existing technological 
innovation theory in a way that articulates the environment more clearly through existing stages 
of the innovation lifecycle. 
Case study stage 1, event history analysis: A detailed event history analysis is created for the 
case study. This event history analysis is a chronology of events in the development of portable 
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digital music players and the related domain of digital music. Data is utilised from extensive 
existing secondary sources, triangulated against expert opinion, as will be shortly described in 
more detail. This event history narrative describes events that occurred through the history of 
portable digital music player technology. This history is extensive and presented as a second 
volume; a shorter summary is offered in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Case study stage 2, lifeworld analysis: Events of the case are explored through the lens of the 
lifeworld model of chapter 3, exploring how the capacity to achieve innovation in portable digital 
music players differs over time. This analysis chapter presents the development of portable 
digital music player technology as occurring through four lifeworlds, where conditions in each 
lifeworld offered differing opportunities for innovation. 
Discussion: The discussion chapter then answers the research questions, drawing from both 
previous chapters as well as salient theoretical concepts to articulate the role of the lifeworld 
in the achievement of innovation and offering further insight into the nature of exaptation and 
combination for technological innovation. 
1.5 Methodology 
This research presents a detailed longitudinal single in-depth case study of portable digital 
music players. Case study research is a dominant methodology in the field of innovation and 
technology studies, as well as specifically in innovation lifecycle research (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Klepper & Simons, 1997). More than just a recent popular trend, longitudinal 
case studies have been the marker of some of the most seminal references in the innovation 
literature. Detailed case studies of steamboats (Gilfillan, 1935), radio (Maclaurin, 1950), 
electricity supply networks (Hughes, 1983), turbojet design (Constant, 1980), typewriters 
(David, 1985), bicycles and bakelite (Bijker, 1997), disk drives (Christensen, 1997), and the 
innovation process at 3M (Van de Ven et al., 1999) are a sample of the research that has 
informed and shaped the innovation literature through the lens of specific detailed case 
studies.  Case studies have also been utilised in innovation PhD research, with examples such 
as fibre optics (Cattani, 2004) and the rigid disk drive industry (Christensen, 1992) being the 
early training for later well-recognised innovation researchers. 
Justification for the case of portable digital music players 
Digital music and portable digital music players were responsible for some of the most stunning 
dramatic and transformational events in the recording industry’s history. Wider than that, these 
events became a cultural phenomenon. Protagonists such as Shawn Fanning, from Napster, 
and Steve Jobs, from Apple, were featured on the cover of Time magazine. Entrepreneurs 
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such as Michael Robertson of mp3.com made fortunes, and others such as Sony lost them. 
Along with this, there were lawsuits and senate inquiries, and, for a brief time, digital music 
became a focus of mainstream news around the world.  
Justifying his choice of study of steamboats in 1929, Obgurn identified that “Mechanization is 
one of the most striking and pervasive phenomena of our times” (Ogburn, 1929, p. 1). In 1983, 
Hughes justified his choice of study of electricity in similar concepts (Hughes, 1983, p. 1). 
Today, the internet, software, and computer hardware have similarly become high profile 
technologies responsible for some of the most dramatic stories of innovation of our time, across 
an increasing number of industries.  Digital music was one of the first, and still perhaps one of 
the most, searing examples in what is now a long series of industries that have been 
reconfigured around these digital technologies. This case study offers relevance to all those 
industries who have similarly confronted these technologies since, as well as those who have 
yet to. 
These events also marked the start of the transformation of Apple from the verge of bankruptcy 
in 1996 to the world’s largest company in 2011. The iPod initiated a sequence of success that 
later brought the iPhone, the iPad, and beyond. Offering insights about the innovation process 
at Apple during this time is to offer insights about innovation more generally. No other high- 
profile company in the world was as successful at innovation as Apple at this time. 
Sources of data 
The second reason the portable digital music player was selected as the case study was the 
availability of data. This research is innovation process research, where the focus is on 
describing and investigating the unfolding temporal pattern of events (Poole & Van de Ven, 
2004; Van de Ven et al., 1999). The availability of data is a strength in this regard. As the case 
study’s development occurred after the emergence of the internet, and with tools such as the 
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, there exist large complete repositories of web articles 
that document developments in portable digital music players in real time as they occurred. 
The vast amount of web articles remains completely intact from their date of publishing, 
allowing for the creation of an event history narrative that chronicles developments as they 
occurred. The event history utilised over 4,000 of these articles to build a narrative that 
documents not only successes but also the environment, including the many failed avenues of 
advance that at various times prior to the iPod appeared as potential innovation. 
This large volume of secondary data was triangulated with a range of primary interviews with 
expert protagonists. The interviews conducted for this study are listed in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Expert Interviews 
Expert Position/Expertise  
Professor Karl Brandenburg Creator of the MP3 file format, member of Secure Digital Media 
Initiative. 
Hank Barry CEO, Napster (peer-to-peer music trading software). 
John Chowning  Creator of digital frequency modulation (FM) synthesis. 
Thomas Dolby Grammy Award-winning synthesiser artist, founder of multiple 
multimedia companies. 
Julie Gordon Copywriter for Apple’s iMac and iPod campaigns, creator of “Rip. 
Mix. Burn.” Headline. 
Ken Hertz Artist lawyer representing clients such as Alanis Morissette during 
this time. A member and attendee of the Secure Digital Music 
Initiation. 
Andy Hill IBM employee, and later founder of Multimedia Archive and 
Retrieval System (MARS). 
Jeff Levy University student prosecuted for copyright infringement due to 
online file sharing by the U.S. government. 
Joanne and Tom Marino  Co-founders of online digital music news website 
www.webnoize.com, along with related yearly Webnoize 
conference. 
Phil Morle  CTO, Kazaa (peer-to-peer music trading software). 
Jeff Patterson  Co-founder of the Internet Underground Music Archive (IUMA), 
recognised as one of the first websites to download music on the 
internet and top 10 website worldwide for traffic during the mid-
1990s. 
Jon Potter Founder of Digital Music Alliance (DiMA), a Washington-based 
political advocacy and lobbyist group for digital media 
entrepreneurs. 
Kelli Richards A&R at various major labels, PatroNet co-founder (the music 
distribution and fan interaction software created by high-profile 
Todd Rundgren in the early 1990s). 
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Expert Position/Expertise  
Jon Rubinstein  Vice president of engineering at Apple Computer. Recognised as 
critical to the creation of Apple products between 1997 and 2006, 
including the iMac, the iPod, and the iPhone. Leader of the initial 
iPod project, then subsequently head of iPod at Apple when it was 
established as a separate division in 2004. Left Apple in 2006, 
became CEO of Palm in 2008 until it was purchased by HP in 2010. 
Current board member of Amazon.com, Qualcomm, and co-CEO 
of Bridgewater, the largest hedge fund in the world. 
Cary Sherman  Current chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA), previously President of RIAA 2001–2011.  
Zak Zalon  President Radio Free Virgin, Virgin Digital. 
Case study boundaries – date range/focus 
The event history analysis created from this data is very detailed and has both a large date 
range as well as breadth of focus. First, the date range is very broad. To capture detail in the 
prehistory lifeworld, some brief events are recorded from as far back as the 11th century 
(related to some imaginative science fiction descriptions of music players), then moves through 
the 20th century and onwards, with portable vinyl, cassette tape, and CD players all covered. 
But the majority of the detail of the narrative covers the major events of portable digital music 
players (from 1994 on). The end date boundary for this study is the end of 2007, when portable 
digital music players had stabilised around the iPod as the powerful dominant design. 
Along with the length of focus, breadth of focus was also a characteristic of the event history 
narrative. In an attempt to capture wider lifeworld and avoid viewing the portable digital music 
player as an isolated trajectory, the event history narrative includes developments that 
occurred in wider fields of computing, consumer electronics, and the music recording industry, 
documenting changes in these fields over time. This means that whilst the focus is portable 
digital music players, the wider environment from which they emerged is recognised and 
events chronicled. This also means that the case study follows the twists and turns of 
developments as they occurred, rather than skips forward to the path of successful selection. 
It captures the uncertainty, multiple available pathways at any given point, momentum, shocks, 
and failures as they occurred. 
The combination of both breadth and depth result in an expansive case study. Due to its large 
size it is presented in a separate volume. For the reader, please note:  
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It is not necessary to read this second volume completely or in detail. It is offered 
instead as support material for this thesis. Reference will be made to particular sections 
and events described in this second volume at times, and the reader is free to look these 
events up in the second volume for supplementary detail. 
1.6 Research outcomes 
Summarising the discussion chapter, the research questions were answered as follows: 
1. How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in the case study? 
The case study suggests that the external lifeworld was important to the development of 
portable digital music player technology. Many of the events that proved critical to the 
development of portable digital music players did not originate for the specific purpose of 
portable digital music players or from the preceding history of development of portable digital 
music players. Rather, often events, actors, and technologies that initiated dramatic events in 
the development of digital music players would have no previous relevance or recognition in 
the domain, instead emerging from their own trajectory of development more broadly occurring 
externally in the lifeworld. 
The discussion chapter offers many examples of this: How, for example, events such as 
Napster (created by a university student), mp3.com (created by an entrepreneur watching 
popular search terms on the internet), Diamond Rio, MPMan (created by computer component 
companies), and the iPod (created by a PC company), emerged from the lifeworld. And in 
contrast, why previous events within the domain of portable music were not the source of 
innovation – Sony, for example, a powerful authority with the innovative legacy of the Walkman 
and Discman, was not the source of initiation of the portable digital music player market, with 
the first players emerging from computer component companies such as Diamond and 
Creative. Apple too is a notable example of the importance of the lifeworld – despite their 
dramatic achievements of innovation, prior to 2001 Apple was not particularly involved in digital 
music at all, and their engagement came as a surprise to those who were working on portable 
digital music players prior to their entry.  
The discussion chapter discusses significance of the lifeworld as manifest in the ongoing state 
of uncertainty for all involved within the domain. For all actors, digital music and portable digital 
music players constantly developed under pervasive conditions of uncertainty, where new 
events would emerge not from existing understanding and narrative, but from externally-driven 
events. New events such as Napster, Kazaa, iTunes, and the iPod constantly emerged as 
“shocks” similar to those described by Van de Ven et al. (1999), where assessment and 
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analysis did not account for these coming events prospectively. This promotes the relevance 
of the lifeworld, and that innovation was dependent on and in part driven by the lifeworld, rather 
than the previous history of the domain in focus. In further describing this concept, the 
discussion chapter identifies the theory of the time sequence trap (McMullen & Dimov, 2013) 
to be particularly useful to describe the role of the lifeworld in this regard. 
2. How are combination and exaptation relevant in the development of innovation? 
Consistent with the literature review, where a range of authors are noted to describe exaptation 
as something pervasive to radical innovation (Arthur, 2009, location 848; Constant, 1980, p. 2; 
Dew, Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2004, p. 70; Mokyr, 2002; Rosenberg, 1983, p. 75; Usher, 
1954, p. 50), the case study quickly surfaces recombination and exaptation as common and 
important. Combination and exaptation were the ‘mechanisms’ by which individuals drew 
available things (technologies, concepts, people) from the lifeworld and connected them to the 
use of digital music or portable digital music players. There are many examples of exaptation 
and combination in the case study, but the most prominent example is the iPod itself, which is 
described in detail as a combination of available technologies, as well as a combination being 
specifically identified as the creation strategy employed by Apple, as identified by Jon 
Rubinstein, who initiated and led the iPod project at Apple (see case study section 10.5 as well 
as discussion chapter). 
Beyond recognising the significance of combination and exaptation, the discussion chapter 
further explores a number of theoretical issues of both combination and exaptation that arise 
from the case study. These are summarised briefly as:  
• There is current theoretical ambiguity regarding the difference between combination 
and exaptation in respect to technological innovation. The discussion chapter describes 
the concept of “multiple adjacent developments” to highlight this issue.  
• There is opportunity to explore and refine the description of the significant role of 
incremental improvement in existing technologies that create windows of opportunity 
for exaptation and combination.  
• The case study presents examples of exaptation that are not well described in theory 
– both exaptation of “concepts” rather than just technologies, and also examples of 
“failed” exaptation where exaptation did not lead to significant innovation, suggesting 
the need to further articulate combination and exaptation as mechanisms of creation 
rather than exclusively mechanisms of innovation. 
These issues represent avenues of future research for the theories of both combination and 
exaptation, with both viewed as important concepts of technological innovation. 
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3. What is the relationship between the internal domain and the external lifeworld? 
The third question explores the relationship between the internal domain and the external 
lifeworld. In an attempt not to isolate the external lifeworld, this question recognises that the 
domain itself also had a critical role in the achievement of innovation, and the lifeworld did not 
achieve all things exclusively. Whilst new events would often emerge from actors in the broader 
lifeworld, these new events too would interact with and draw from the domain.  
The discussion chapter describes the interaction between the internal domain and the lifeworld 
in two concepts. First, recognising that the internal domain is dynamic and would respond to 
events, accumulation is explored as an important concept. Second, and extending this, the 
theory of “compressed algorithms” (Langley et al., 2013) is used to describe how those external 
to the lifeworld would draw from the accumulation that had occurred in the domain. Rather 
than having to create concepts from scratch, new events could build on previous 
experimentation. The discussion chapter extends this concept to describe how previous 
experimentation within the domain not only provided Apple with components to use that they 
didn’t need to reinvent (MP3, downloading, CD burning, etc.), but just as significantly previous 
portable music players released to the market offered Apple a set of problems to solve – the 
limitations (or reverse salient; Hughes, 1983) with existing players represented a compressed 
algorithm for Apple to address, such as the frustration at clicking through menus (leading to 
creation of the scroll wheel). Addressing problems and limitations in existing players became 
the source of much of Apple’s innovativeness. 
4. How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
The final question is the major focus of much of both the model chapter as well as the analysis 
chapter, which explore the lifeworld as a process. It explores the dynamics of the lifeworld, and 
much like innovation lifecycle models that describe the development of a technology in a 
number of stages, similarly describes a number of lifeworlds through which a successful 
innovation must pass. The four lifeworlds are summarised as follows: 
Prehistory lifeworld (pre–1994): The lifeworld does not offer the required technologies to 
create the technology in focus. Imaginative descriptions, such as Kane Kramer’s IXI player in 
1979 or the Chippy Hoax emerged, but the failure of these ideas reflects that the lifeworld did 
not offer capacity to create the technology yet. 
Establishment lifeworld (1994–1997): The first working portable digital music technologies 
were created as prototypes, most notably the NEC Silicon Audio player. This technology 
emerged from a range of sources but most notably relied on flash storage components from 
computer component manufacturers.  The creation of the NEC Silicon Audio player relied upon 
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the accumulation of technology in the lifeworld, and the achievement of particular thresholds 
of performance in existing technologies. For example, this player emerged after MPEG audio 
formats had been released, and after the trajectory of analog-to-digital converter technology 
had incrementally improved to make it fit in a portable device. 
Development lifeworld (1997–2001): These years represent the most dramatic events in the 
trajectory of portable digital music players. The release of the Diamond Rio and the Saehan 
MPMan in 1997/1998 triggered a large volume of new entrants based around similar designs. 
Through this time, the technology was immature, but the trial and error revealed problems and 
preferences of the lifeworld, with many elements (support industries such as the recording 
industry, legal precedent) giving favour to the competing technology of compact disc. At the 
same time as these developments in portable digital music players, dramatic events were 
occurring more generally in the wider but related lifeworld of digital music. This time was 
characterised by a large amount of failure, but the accumulated failures both dynamically 
changed the domain and soon offered enabled conditions for dramatic innovation. 
Innovation lifeworld (2001–2008). Apple released the iPod in 2001 and it was an initial 
success in comparison to other portables in the niche of the portable music player market. It 
would transfer this success to mainstream consumer markets worldwide by 2004, and by the 
end of this case study in 2007 was a worldwide consumer phenomenon. The lifeworld 
presented Apple with opportunities for innovation that were not available at previous times. 
The record labels that had previously resisted licensing, and had weathered turbulent 
conditions arising from peer-to-peer file sharing, now agreed to licenses with Apple to create 
the iTunes Music Store. Equally, the lifeworld offered new exaptation opportunities, with Apple 
utilising a new 1.8 inch prototype laptop hard drive from Toshiba to create the iPod. The 
availability of many of these conditions were outside the control of Apple, and the study finds 
that the enabling conditions of the lifeworld were a large contributor to Apple’s success.  
However, the study also finds that Apple didn’t stumble upon these conditions. The iPod was 
not a simple extension of previous players, but instead a new unique combination where Apple 
drew deftly and diversely from the lifeworld, creating a product that offered superior value. 
Whilst the lifeworld offered conditions that made dramatic innovation possible in 2001 
compared to previous or later times, the study also finds that Apple was unique in their ability 
to achieve this combination. Apple too appeared cognisant of these conditions and they were 
important criteria for Apple’s entry into the digital music player market. From the primary 
interview for this research, Jon Rubinstein head of Apple’s iPod division explains:  
Anything we did at Apple we did in a heartbeat, right, we did with a sense of 
urgency, but we never did a product before it’s time. Or we tried not to. So I 
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think we waited a while till the technologies would really support the kind of 
product we wanted to build, so we waited quite a few months, until I found the 
1.8 inch hard drive, and during that time displays had matured, battery 
technology had matured, so it was kind of just the right moment in time to go 
do it. (J. Rubinstein, personal communication, July 9, 2013)  
Overall the lifeworld was dynamic and offered varying capacity to achieve innovation at 
different times. Limitations of the lifeworld are discussed in the conclusion, but the description 
of lifeworld as a process had merit, and reflects how wider conditions at any given time offer 
either constraints or opportunities to achieve innovation, but as the lifeworld changes so too 
does the potential to achieve innovation.  
1.7 Summary of contributions 
This research presented the development of the technological innovation of portable digital 
music players as a process that occurs through a number of lifeworlds. It explored the 
conditions surrounding the technology as critical to the creation of the technology as well as 
the achievement of innovation. The theoretical and practical implications of this are discussed 
below.  
Theoretical contributions 
The lifeworld concept is useful when attempting to more clearly articulate the external 
conditions that impact the achievement of innovation, which appear important in the case 
study. More specifically, this research also offers a number of theoretical refinements and 
promotion of particular theories viewed as significant post the case study:  
• The study offers a number of potential research directions in the theories of 
technological exaptation and combination. 
• The study has highlighted the importance of a number of theories in the development 
of technological innovation, including accumulation, the time series trap, and the 
importance of incremental innovation.  
• The study highlights the importance of viewing innovation as a process and as a 
temporal set of conditions that offer potential for innovation not possible at other times. 
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Practical considerations 
The pursuit of innovation is a modern entrepreneurial and management imperative. This 
research suggests though, that a particular technological innovation is not possible at all times, 
but dependent on particular conditions. With this recognition, entrepreneurs and managers 
would do better to try to avoid attempts at radical innovation at certain times, looking to wider 
conditions rather than ideas for a particular technology themselves. If they move too early, 
when the wrong lifeworld exists, they may offer products that are difficult to create and that 
ultimately miss the mark for consumers, becoming entangled in a mix of potential and 
frustration. Later, under different lifeworld conditions, the same innovation may become 
achievable as entrepreneurs utilise a process of combination, drawing things from the lifeworld 
to create technologies that deliver value.  There appears general acknowledgement of these 
ideas in common practitioner parlance, such as describing innovation as ‘being in the right 
place at the right time’, but, beneath this, practitioner short hand also reveals the lack of 
articulation in these ideas, defaulting to other expressions of timing as ‘more art than science’.  
Whilst a complete understanding of innovation timing with predictive capacity for practitioners 
is perhaps an impossible quest, this study highlights and explores key mechanisms of timing, 
such as the lifeworld concept, exaptation and combination which all offer practitioners a deeper 
set of tools and a specific focus for thinking about innovation timing, which otherwise will 
remain a well acknowledged and ill described practitioner concept.    
1.8 Thesis overview 
This thesis is presented in eight chapters, with a references section, and a second volume as 
the event history analysis. 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Context for the Research: This chapter has provided an overview 
of the research, including the problem statement, theoretical focus, case study, leading to the 
presentation of research questions, outcomes, and contributions. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review: This provides the context for this study. Specifically, it compares 
alternative perspectives of innovation as both created by ideas and systems, identifying 
criticism of these perspectives. In response, it describes the value of innovation process 
theory, and, within this, more specifically the stream of innovation lifecycle models. 
Recognising the limits of these models, and acknowledging the emergence of new theories 
such as exaptation, the need to further explore the role of external factors is identified. 
Chapter 3 Technology Lifeworld Models: Drawing from existing lifecycle models (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ogburn, 1950; Perez, 2002; Suárez, 
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2004; Usher, 1954; Utterback, 1978), a lifeworlds model is presented that covers four lifeworlds 
that a successful innovation must pass through.  
Chapter 4 Research Methodology and Method: This study is recognised as process research 
and fits within process, ontological, and epistemological lenses. Specifically, the use of a 
phase-based description of innovation is recognised as a specific category of process research 
(Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Process research is viewed as different from the traditional 
conception of variance research more common in the scientific method, with its own measures 
of reliability. After a discussion of these, this chapter moves on to discuss the details of the 
case study of portable digital music players. The case study has been constructed and 
presented in accordance with the guidelines of Yin (2013). 
Chapter 5 Analysis: This chapter is a summary of the event history analysis presented in full 
in the second volume. This chapter summarises key events, offering a condensed overview 
and guide to the full event history analysis of the case study presented in the second volume.  
Chapter 6 Analysis: The case study is presented using the innovation lifeworlds model. The 
four lifeworld are applied to the case, offering a lens through which to describe the development 
of portable digital music players. 
Chapter 7 Discussion: The discussion chapter discusses the research questions in detail, 
highlighting the role of the lifeworld, as well as a range of theoretical issues emerging from the 
case study introduced above.  
Chapter 8 Conclusion: This chapter summarises the research. Research limitations are 
identified, the contribution to both theoretical and practical knowledge are discussed, along 
with suggestions for further research. 
Appendix – Event history analysis of Portable Digital Music Players: This is the detailed event 
history analysis of the case study. This is very detailed, and this is parsed to be presented as 
a lifecycle in chapter 5. 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
This introduction chapter provides the foundation of this thesis. The research is framed as a 
study of the environment impacting the creation and innovation of a particular technology, with 
this environment conceptualised as the lifeworld. The lifeworld is explored as a process, 
identifying how conditions change and how this makes a particular technological innovation 
possible at one time and not another.  
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This chapter describes the practical research problem and the theoretical problem at the heart 
of this research endeavour, an overview of the scope and research design, description and 
justification of the case study, a summary of the research outcomes and implications, and 
offers a synopsis of each chapter of the thesis. The next chapter, Literature Review, describes 












This chapter provides the context for this research which seeks to better process 
understanding of innovation, one that explores and better articulates the role of the external 
environment. This literature review leads to the presentation of both the research questions, 
and subsequently the lifeworld model of this research in the following chapter. The literature 
review first explains and critiques the theoretical and popular expression of innovation as an 
outcome of unique ideas and individuals. Then, recognising the value of viewing innovation as 
both an individual and collective act, the usefulness of innovation systems theory is described, 
with a focus on technological innovation systems. However, there are a number of identified 
weaknesses of systems theory, particularly in respect to dynamics and system boundaries, 
and a critique of technological innovation systems leads to the recognition of a need to view 
innovation from a process perspective. Reviewing a large amount of innovation process theory, 
and particularly focusing on innovation lifecycle models, there appears to be theoretical 
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usefulness in exploring and more clearly articulating the role of the external environment 
throughout the lifecycle of technology, with recognition of its importance described via the 
competing theory of combination and exaptation. Articulating the role of environment 
throughout the lifecycle is the ambition of this research, leading to the presentation of research 
questions at the end of this chapter.  
2.1 Innovation as ideas 
For much of the 20th century, the predominant view of innovation in popular culture and theory 
was that it was an act of genius (Eysenck, 1979; Glynn, 1996; Lubinski, 2000).  Innovation was 
recognised as “something that originates in the acts of the inventor” (Tuomi, 2002 p. 105), 
where great individuals relying only on wit and ingenuity cast from their minds the 
achievements of the world. 
This notion of innovation as simply the achievements of great individuals remains a popular 
myth in culture (Silbey, 2014) – that a lone technical genius working in isolation (Hargadon, 
2003), or a dogmatic entrepreneur pursuing a problem (Seabrook, 1993), will conceive of a 
revelatory idea as a eureka moment (Gaughan, 2010; Silbey, 2014). The individual then 
implementing the idea will rally against forces of existing industry, culture or science, 
experiencing moments of peril before eventually triumphing when the value of their idea, intact 
from the moment it was first conceived, is finally recognised and accepted (e.g., Landrum, 
1993), shifting the entire culture forward. This narrative and variations of it persist in modern 
times, with Gates, Jobs and others marked as “The Innovators” (Isaacson, 2014), but this 
perspective has a long history. The obituary of Thomas Edison, published in 1931 in the New 
York Times, for example, describes Edison’s achievements as his “inner self” brought forth to 
the world, suggesting, unintended or otherwise, that if it was possible to replay the tape of life, 
and Edison did not exist, neither would electricity: 
So it comes about that he was the last and greatest of a long line of 
experimenters who followed only the dictates of their inner selves and who 
were as willful and unrestrained as poets. With him the heroic age of invention 
probably ends. (Kaempffert, 1931, p. 22) 
Innovation as the act of an individual conceiving of and refining ideas was also supported by 
some of the most prominent innovation theories of the 20th century. Both the linear model of 
innovation (Maclaurin, 1950, 1953) as well as the demand–pull theory of innovation (generally 
attributed to Schmookler (1966) as identified by Godin & Lane, 2013) frame innovation as 
individual genius. The linear model particularly, recognised as the cornerstone of science and 
innovation policies for the larger part of the 20th century (Godin, 2006; Freeman & Soete, 1997, 
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location 6837; Mowery, 1983), places the individual conceiving of and then refining ideas as 
the basis of all innovation success.  The popularity of this model was such that it led to 
perspectives like that of Harvard president James Bryant Conant, who claimed that the key to 
creating world changing innovation was “picking a man of genius, giving him money, and 
leaving him alone” (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006, p. 5). 
Retracing the formation of the linear model, Godin identifies its history as the cumulative work 
of a long list of researchers (Godin, 2015, 2011, 2008, 2006). The essence of all variations is 
a series of steps from individual idea generation through to successful innovation (e.g., pure 
science→ invention→ innovation→ finance→ diffusion). There have been attempts at 
theoretical addition, offering recognition of sophisticated feedback loops (Niosi, 1999) for 
example, or the effect of particular mechanisms like public funding (Hindle & Yencken, 2004), 
but, fundamentally, the linear model has remained consistent for 70 years now, underpinned 
by the recognition that conceiving ideas and then developing them creates innovation (Gelijns 
& Rosenberg, 1994; Godin, 2006). 
More recently, there has emerged significant criticism of the linear model (Freeman, 1991b, 
1996; Freeman, Clark & Soete, 1982 Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Martin, 2012; Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1979; Perez, 2010; Rosenberg, 1994). Empirically too, the linear model has 
proved problematic as an explanatory tool (Kline, 1985; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998). Whilst 
the recognition of change over time or in phases is identified as useful, the criticism of the 
linear model, as well as demand–pull perspective of innovation, is its presentation of a “single 
factor causality of innovation” (Walsh, 1984, p. 212). Criticism suggests that describing 
innovation as an exclusive action of a genius individual is problematic. Whilst the lure of the 
eureka myth and innovation hero remains deep and strong (Silbey, 2014, location 101), there 
appears to be a need to view conditions in which the individual is situated as important 
contributors if not determinants of innovation. There appears to be a need to look “outside” the 
individual in order to further our understanding of innovation. This is the focus of this research, 
which aims to explore the role that the dynamic environment has on the development of a 
particular technological innovation. A deeper critique of the innovation as heroic individual 
perspective will be offered in a series of points below. As much of this theory is represented 
as retrospective studies of successful innovators, the critique below will be also framed from 
the perspective of these individual cases. 
2.1.1 Individuals have a history of failure and success 
The genius model of innovation appears to break down when viewing the careers of recognised 
geniuses over an extended time. Often revolutionary innovators, those that are famed for their 
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ability to think differently to the rest of culture, are, on other issues, or at other times, 
dramatically conservative. 
Edison was an acclaimed innovator for his achievements in respect to electricity, but later in 
his career, with the emergence of the alternating current electricity system chiefly promoted by 
Westinghouse, Edison became a “staunch and then rabid defender” of the direct current 
system (Hughes, 1986). Rather than accepting the progressive alternating current system, 
Edison launched a dramatic and often deplorably graphic attack on alternating current, 
electrocuting animals to promote the alternating current system as dangerous and unsafe 
(Hughes, 1986; Millard, 1992). Edison’s commitment to direct current led to what was referred 
to in the press as “the battle of the systems”, and it damaged the perception of Edison as a 
forward-thinking radical innovator (David, 1992).  By the end of the battle, and with alternating 
current emerging as the new dominant standard, Edison was described as “having lost touch 
with the rapidly changing technology” (Hughes, 1986, p. 193), changing some of the public’s 
view of him: “In 1879, Edison was a brave and courageous inventor; in 1889, he was a cautious 
and conservative defender of the status quo” (Passer, 1972, p. 72). Another example of this is 
Henry Ford, acclaimed innovator responsible for the Model T Ford, the mass-production 
method (Hounshell, 1985), and five-dollar-a-day wages (Raff, 1988). Later in life he was also 
known for his strong anti-Semitic views (Ribuffo, 1980) as well as heavy-handed staff abuse 
caused by Ford’s appointment and endorsement of Harry Bennett, who had strong Mafia 
connections and was only removed after Ford himself was replaced (Brinkley, 2003). Whilst 
Ford has proven dramatically innovative in some ways, in other ways his methods and thinking 
have proved dramatically wrong. 
These examples show that whilst we think of great innovations as the achievements of great 
minds, it seems incomplete to assign their innovation achievements entirely to their own 
genius. Over the long course of careers of heroic innovators, often they have displayed 
characteristics that are anything but innovative, uncharacteristic (and refreshingly) as normal 
as anyone else of their time. It was a view shared by Henry Ford himself: “To teach that a 
comparatively few men are responsible for the greatest forward steps of mankind is the worst 
sort of nonsense” (cited in Hardagon, 2003, pp. 45–46). Whilst the individual remains chief 
actor, there is a need to look outside the individual for further refinement of our understanding 
of innovation. 
2.1.2 Genius ideas are not unique to recognised “geniuses” 
Furthering this perspective, often world-changing ideas are recognised by many people prior 
to the emergence of a single innovator. Through history, it appears that often the same or very 
similar ideas are recognised by multiple independent people over time (Arthur, 2009; Merton, 
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1973). In science fiction and in arts, history is replete with examples of individuals who have 
presciently identified innovative technologies long prior to the individual who became the 
recognised innovator. Da Vinci provided primitive drawings of airplane concepts long before 
the airplane developed (Fagerberg, 2004), a Tintin comic book about travelling to the moon, 
Destination Moon (Hergé & Turner, 1953), was written before NASA was founded. Describing 
these phenomena as “technological visions”, Basalla (1988) acknowledges that these types of 
successful forecasts are common, and today we are living in a world surrounded by many 
technologies forecast by science fiction (Basalla, 1988, pp. 75–76). 
This phenomenon is not limited to science fiction. Inventors and entrepreneurs too actively 
have attempted to build radical innovations and failed badly, only for other entrepreneurs to 
pursue the same or similar ideas at a later stage and achieve radical innovation success. In 
1821 for example, Charles Babbage began work on his analytical engine, which was a steam-
driven mechanical calculator (Arthur, 2009). Despite the device being cited as a precedent to 
modern computing (Swade, 2001), Babbage was a failure in his own time. One hundred years 
after his death, what Babbage had envisioned and spent so much time pursuing became a 
relatively straightforward creation, with the later vindication of Babbage’s ideas leading Clarke 
to identify that his failure was “not one of imagination: it lay in being born a hundred years too 
soon” (Clarke, 1973, pp. 15–16). 
These accounts are problematic for the linear model, as by marking ideas as the initiator of 
inevitable innovation, the linear model cannot address why the first person to conceive of an 
idea fails to achieve innovation success. In contrast, many individuals have had world-
changing ideas but have not achieved innovation (Cusumano, Mylonadis & Rosenbloom, 
1992; Bijker, Pinch, Hughes & Douglas 2012, p. 58). Most people, despite having the right 
ideas, have been lost to history. And as a consequence, it appears that some of the most 
recognised innovators of history directly or inadvertently copied failed ideas that preceded 
them (Freeman, Clark & Soete, 1982; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Stigler, 1980; Tuomi, 2002, 
location 2380). At a fundamental level, this discussion suggests that innovation is something 
more than a spontaneous consequence of great individuals (Tushman & Anderson, 1986, p. 
440). 
2.1.3 At certain times, ideas appear not to rely on any one particular individual 
A final reason to reconsider the role of the individual, and also to explore the concept of 
environment, is that often innovative, world-changing ideas are identified by many people in 
independent contexts at eerily similar times (Arthur, 2009). There appear certain times when 
the conditions of a discovery for a particular idea appears “in the air” (Godin, 2014; Taymans, 
1950), and in such conditions the idea is quickly crystallised and fully expressed by many 
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independent people. This phenomenon has been recognised and explored in a number of 
theories. Kuhn described this phenomenon as “simultaneous discovery” (Kuhn, 1959), and 
Merton similarly described it as “multiple independent discovery” (Merton, 1961, 1963). The 
conclusion from this is to describe new creation as not individual genius but instead as a social 
phenomenon, where at certain times conditions reveal a particular idea to all those within a 
particular context. 
There are many examples of ideas that can be described as simultaneous discoveries. 
Calculus (created independently by Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Hall 1980)) 
and the theory of natural selection (Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace presented jointly 
on the same findings in 1858 (Darwin & Wallace, 1958)) are prominent examples in scientific 
theory. A detailed Wikipedia entry on multiple discoveries includes a long list of many 
independent discoveries of the same phenomena at identical times by independent individuals, 
including scientific description of oxygen and helium, the telegraph, the Bessemer process, 
and the recognition of the stratosphere, among many others. 
The recognition of simultaneous discovery again further promotes the need to view conditions 
external to the individual as a significant contributor to innovation. The individual, whilst 
certainly the catalyst and certainly the spokesperson of individual discoveries, is operating in 
conditions that have an influence on their achievement. 
2.1.4 Summary 
Summarising this argument, there is a recognised need to look outside the individual as the 
source of innovation. There are many people who throughout history have conceived of ideas 
for product innovation, yet most don’t achieve innovation. Whilst this points to the 
discriminating factor being the individual involved, in successful cases of world-famous 
innovators, often their thinking on other issues or at other times does not display the thinking 
befitting of the title of genius, suggesting there is perhaps more to innovation than personality. 
Whilst the individual has been a focus of our understanding and theory of innovation 
historically, particularly in the linear model, there is a need to look beyond a single factor to 
advance our understanding. Exclusively individualist perspectives of innovation, whilst 
certainly capturing something fundamental about individual human achievement, in other ways 
appear deficient to describe the phenomenon of innovation in a complete way. To advance 
beyond this isolated individualist perspective, this study seeks to explore the role of the 
dynamic external environment in the achievement of a particular technological innovation. 
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2.2 Innovation as systems 
The innovation systems perspective has emerged as a response to the linear model and offers 
advance by recognising that ideas and individuals are dependent on more than just themselves 
to create innovation (Fagerberg, 2004; Tuomi, 2002 p. 105).  The systems perspective instead 
recognises that any idea is embedded in a surrounding context or structure, which has the 
capacity influence and perhaps even determines the utility and performance of the idea. 
The innovation systems perspective addresses the deficiencies of the heroic individual 
perspective by acknowledging that any individualist perspective viewing any single factor (be 
it individuals or infrastructure or anything else) as the sole determinant of innovation is 
problematic (Rosenberg, 1995). The innovation systems concept describes innovation as “both 
an individual and a collective act” (Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Kehlmann & Smits, 2007, p. 415) 
where the individual remains recognised as a prime actor but is operating in a complex mix of 
technological, social, economic, and political enablers and constraints (Bertalanffy, 1968 
location 327; Fagerberg, 2002; Hekkert & Negro, 2009; Landau & Rosenberg, 1986; Suurs & 
Hekkert, 2009). This system in which the individual is embedded has the capacity to both 
enable and cajole ideas, bringing some outcomes forward and restraining the potential of 
others. 
The importance of systems is reflected in a great deal of analysis of technological innovation 
(Lundvall, 2007; Nelson & Nelson, 2002; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). Freeman and Soete 
(1997, location 6725), for example, provide a summary of the successful industrialisation of 
the British economy, acknowledging it to be best understood as a result of a complex system: 
“Historians (von Tunzelmann, 1993; Mathias, 1969) are generally agreed that no single factor 
can explain this British success. Rather it can be attributed to a unique combination of 
interacting social, economic and technical changes within the national economic space”. 
Extending this example of Freeman and Soete (1997, location 6725), in contrast to the linear 
model, it suggests that if Watt, the famed genius who created the steam engine, lived and 
worked in Outback Australia instead of being embedded in the British economy, he may not 
have conceived of the steam engine, despite having the same neurological capacity for ideas.  
Innovation systems theory has become a significant component of the innovation literature 
(Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmen & Rickne, 2002; Chaminade & Edquist, 2006; Fagerberg & 
Srholec, 2008) and a popular innovation policy tool (Balzat & Hanusch, 2004; Hekkert et al., 
2007). As Hekkert et al. (2007, p. 414) identify, “Both science and policy community recognize 
ever increasingly that technological change and its resulting innovations are best understood 
as the outcome of innovation systems”. Because of its suggestion that the innovation capacity 
of an idea lies outside of the idea itself, much of the focus of theory addresses similar concepts 
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to this research focus: What conditions influence and perhaps lead to innovation? In 
comparative studies, how do systems differ and how does this manifest in different 
performance outcomes? These questions are certainly relevant to the research questions of 
this study. 
2.2.1 What is a system? 
There are three important concepts that help identify systems: Components, boundaries, and 
purpose (Bertalanffy, 1968). The first is the identification that a system is made up of a network 
of interactive components – also called elements (e.g., Musiolik & Markard, 2011), subsystems 
(e.g., Schnabl, 1995), or nodes (e.g., Cooke, Roper & Wylie, 2003). These components do 
things. Using the example of the human body as a system, the components are the organs 
(heart, lungs, etc.), each of which exhibits some specific characteristic that contributes 
performance to a larger system. For the larger system to work effectively, the components 
need not only to perform their role effectively but must also be balanced against other 
components; the lungs need the heart which needs the lungs, and so forth (Ackoff, 1994). The 
second concept is boundary. Systems are not universal – they have a boundary. A boundary 
is like a skin: It creates an inside and outside. The boundary makes the distinction to the wider 
environment in which the system is placed (Ackoff, 1994; Carlsson et al., 2002; Carlsson & 
Stankiewicz, 1991). The third important concept of systems is purpose. A purpose defines the 
difference between a network and a system. The components must be working together to 
achieve a purpose or exhibit a performance that is different or greater than any individual 
component (see also ‘wholism’ of Kuhn, 1962). The purpose of a system is not teleologically 
predetermined but rather may emerge from the presence and characteristics of the connected 
components. 
2.2.2 Different types of innovation systems  
Innovation systems are a particular application of the more general systems concept 
(Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, Joseph, Chaminade & Vang, 2011; Nelson, Mowery & Fagerberg 
2005), attempting to specifically describe systems that influence and lead to the outcome of 
innovation (Chaminade and Edquist, 2006). As a result of theoretical and empirical research, 
four specific innovation system types have emerged (Carlsson et al., 2002, p. 234): National 
innovation systems (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall & Bengt-Ake, 1992; Nelson, 1993), regional 
innovation systems (Cooke, Gomez Uranga & Etxebarria, 1997; Saxenian, 1996), sectoral 
innovation systems (Breschi & Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002), and technological innovation 
systems (Bergek et al., 2008; Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007). These can 
be viewed as a series of levels, moving from the macro (national innovation system) to the 
meso (regional and sectoral level systems) to the micro level (technological innovation 
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system). With recognition that these different systems do different things (Edquist, 2006; 
Carlsson et al., 2002, p. 233), each level offers a different conceptual lens through which to 
view phenomena, with each having a particular focus and explanatory capacity. 
This research is concerned exclusively with the individual technological level. This study is 
specifically investigating the environmental and timing conditions for a particular technology 
and, as such, the micro level of the technological innovation system theory is relevant.  The 
other levels – national, regional and sectoral – are not relevant to the research question. As 
such, national, regional, and sectoral innovation systems will no longer be discussed, and the 
following section will now exclusively investigate the technological innovation system level. 
2.3 Technological innovation systems 
The definition of a technological innovation system shares a similarity with other system 
definitions and should be seen simply as a specific application of the innovation system 
concept to the level of individual technology. Defining technological innovation systems, 
Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991, p. 94) identify that the level offers insight into technological 
social, economic and political factors involved in the generation, diffusion and utilisation of a 
technology (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991, p. 94).  
2.3.1 Recent developments in technological innovation system theory  
As a result of its individual technological focus, unique theoretical concepts to this level have 
emerged. Specifically, in recent years there have been some significant developments in 
Technological Innovation System (TIS) theory with the creation of the TIS functions model 
(Bergek, 2002; Edquist, 2006). The TIS functions model is an advance on the TIS concept and 
attempts to describe the activities that occur within any TIS that impact its innovation 
performance, which is contrasted to previous systems research which stopped with the 
identification and analysis of system structure (Bergek, 2002; Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et 
al., 2008). Bergek, Carlsson, Lindmark, and Rickne (2005) note that for a technology to achieve 
innovation, the seven functions of the TIS model need to be served. If a particular function is 
not served or is inadequate in its performance, this can constrain the innovation performance 
of the TIS as a whole (Bergek, Jacobsson & Sandén, 2008; Negro, Hekkert & Smits, 2007; 
Suurs, 2009, p. 65). 
Originally nine functions were presented (Bergek, 2002), which have now been parsed (Bergek 
et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007), resulting in a model that includes seven functions. These 
seven functions are summarised from Bergek et al. (2008) and the related Hekkert et al. (2007) 
in the following table: 
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Table 2.1. Technological Innovation Systems Functions model 
Function name Description  Examples of Indicators/Data types (Bergek, Hekkert & 




The state of tacit and codified 
knowledge specific to the TIS, 
including different types such 
as technical, design, 
distribution and others.   
R&D Projects, Patents, Bibliometrics, Investments in R&D, 
Learning curves, Number of workshops and conferences, Size 
and intensity of learning networks. 
2. Influence on 
the direction of 
search  
Search processes that 
happen within the TIS. Clarity 
and consensus of 
expectations about the 
direction of the TIS.   
Factor/product prices, regulatory pressures, 
government/industry targets regarding the use of a specific 
technology, estimates of future growth potentials, articulation of 
interest by leading customers. 
3. 
Entrepreneurial 
experimentation   
Amount of TIS specific 
entrepreneurial activity.   
Number of new entrants, number of diversification activities of 
incumbent actors, number of experiments with the new 




TIS specific consumer 
market. 
Number size and type of markets formed, timing of market 
formation, drivers of market formation (e.g. support schemes). 
5. Legitimation  Strength of relationships and 
alignment with key institutions 
in comparison to competing 
technologies.  
Volume of capital  and venture capital, volume and quality of 




Capacity of the TIS to marshal 
relevant human, financial and 
physical resources.   
Attitudes towards the technology among different stakeholders, 
rise of growth of interest groups, extent of lobbying activities, 




Momentum of the TIS as a 
whole, as well as the 
development of support 
industries such as press and 
complimentary products.  
 
Strength of political power of TIS actors, activities aiming at 
uncertainty resolution, existence/development of clear division 
of labour, specialised intermediaries and/or a pooled labour 
market information and knowledge focus. 
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The function model has been recognised as an important theoretical development in the 
innovation systems literature (Edquist, 2005; Markard, Raven & Truffer, 2012, p. 959) and has 
proved a popular empirical tool (Bergek, 2012; Flangan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011) used to 
investigate individual technologies from a range of industries (Fogelberg & Sanden, 2008; 
Foxon, Hammond & Pearson, 2010; Gebreeyesus & Sonobe, 2012; Negro et al., 2007; van 
Alphen, Noothout, Hekkert, & Turkenburg, 2010; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009; Suurs, Hekkert, 
Kieboom, & Smits, 2010). Bergek (2012) identified 60 functions of specific research papers, 
with seven of these being conceptual (primarily Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007), and 
53 being empirical. 
2.3.2 Technological innovation system dynamics 
Along with the empirical work exploring the functional characteristics of individual technological 
innovation systems, there is also acknowledgement within the TIS literature of the importance 
of systems dynamics.  A TIS is acknowledged not to be static but instead dynamically changing 
over time, which impacts its characteristics and innovation performance. This was identified in 
the TIS literature from some of the earliest research (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Johnson, 
2001). Whilst it hasn’t been a major focus in the empirical work, more recently there has been 
a renewed call for the importance of understanding system dynamics (Bergek, Hekkert, & 
Jacobsson, 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009). Hekkert et al. (2007), for 
example, suggest that understanding dynamics is a critical task that must be addressed in the 
TIS functions literature: “In order to understand technological change, one needs insight in 
innovation system dynamics. New laws, entry of new actors, and other events change the 
character of an innovation system over time” (Hekkert et al., 2007, p. 417). More recently, 
Suurs and Hekkert (2009, p. 1006) further this, by offering TIS functional analysis which 
attempts to understand “the logic of a sequence of events”, focusing centrally on dynamics. 
Systems dynamics are recognised in a specific way in TIS theory. Drawing from the lifecycle 
model literature (Klepper, 1996; Williamson, 1973), two identified system phases are 
presented that represent dynamics (Bergek, 2002). Adolescent systems are described as 
being in a “formation phase” (Bergek et al., 2008; Hellsmark, 2010) characterised by 
“uncertainty in terms of technologies, markets and regulations; by institutional change, small 
niche markets; entry of many firms; and the formation of ‘political networks’ or advocacy 
coalitions” (Bergek et al., 2005, p. 16-17), and those systems closer to maturity are described 
as being in a “growth phase” (Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004; Bergek & Jacobsson, 2003, p. 7), 
where the “focus shifts to system expansion and large-scale technology diffusion through the 
formation of bridging markets and subsequently mass markets; hence the need for ‘resource 
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mobilization’ increases by orders of magnitude” (Bergek et al., 2008, p. 420). By identifying 
what phase the system is in, it allows for analysts to make appropriate recommendations about 
how to improve performance (Hellsmark, 2010; Suurs, Hekkert, Kieboom & Smits, 2010). To 
make the distinction between the two phases, Bergek et al. (2008) stress that the formative 
phase “is not characterised by a rapid growth rate of diffusion or rapid growth in economic 
activities. On the contrary, the volume of activities is small and many experiments take place 
– the TIS is in a process of formation” (Bergek et al., 2008, p. 416). 
The recognition of system dynamics, and the recognition of two different system phases, offers 
the most relevant tool so far for this research. Having the capacity to differentiate a system in 
a formative phase, compared to a growth phase, offers the capacity to potentially describe why 
innovation only emerges briefly, rather than being possible at all times. However, with more 
specific analysis, the identification of only two system phases appears limited. With only two 
different system states there appears only limited capacity to describe the cause of change. 
Related to this, there are some fundamental limitations of how the TIS functions model 
addresses dynamics and boundaries that have seen it receive recent critique (Markard & 
Truffer, 2008). 
2.3.3 Critique of technological innovation systems function model 
Despite the recognition of the need to acknowledge dynamics with the TIS literature, currently 
the model doesn’t have a particularly strong capacity to do so. Recognising only two different 
system phases is thought inadequate as currently the model does not describe what leads to 
system formation or what initiates transition between phases (Markard & Truffer, 2008). Whilst 
the TIS literature promotes the importance of dynamics (Bergek, Tell, Berggren & Watson, 
2008; Hekkert & Suurs 2009; Suurs, 2009), the toolkit the model offers to investigate and 
describe dynamics is limited. Bergek et al. (2008) identify that the phase concept, and 
dynamics more generally, is an area of the model which is underdeveloped and which needs 
further theoretical advance: “We acknowledge that more research is needed to establish the 
nature of the different phases” (Bergek et al., 2008, p. 420). Whilst it is described in the 
literature that the need for a better expression of dynamics is on the agenda for future research, 
it is suggested that there are two more fundamental reasons why this aspect of the model has 
remained underdeveloped and perhaps can never be resolved: Quasi-static methodologies 
and internal orientation problems arising from system boundaries. 
2.3.4 Quasi-static methodologies 
Despite the recognition of the importance of dynamics (Hekkert et al., 2007), in the TIS 
literature there is limited application of methodologies to capture dynamics, and it is 
 Literature Review 51 
 
acknowledged that the main empirical methodologies employed within TIS functions literature 
to describe dynamics are quasi-static (Hekkert et al., 2007; Suurs, 2009). This methodology 
describes dynamics through variance – comparing two cross-sectional snapshots of the 
system at two points in time (Hekkert et al., 2007; Langley, 2007). This methodology suggests 
the presence of change – how a system is different at different points in time without a more 
detailed perspective on what caused the change. 
The application of cross-sectional methods to describe system dynamics was recognised to 
be problematic from some of the earliest stages of the TIS functions literature. Carlsson et al. 
(2002, p. 234) identified that, “In a system with built-in feedback mechanisms, the configuration 
of components, attributes, and relationships is constantly changing. Thus, a snapshot of the 
system at a particular point in time may differ substantially from another snapshot of the same 
system at a different time” (Carlsson et al., 2002, p. 234). The problems with cross-sectional 
system research – and by contrast the need instead for longitudinal understanding – also 
reflects a similar early methodological directive of Schumpeter (1942) for system researchers: 
Since we are dealing with a process whose every element takes considerable 
time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects, there is no point in 
appraising the performance of that process ex visu of a given point of time; 
we must judge its performance over time, as it unfolds through decades or 
centuries. A system- any system, economic or other- that at every given point 
of time fully utilises its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long 
run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point of time, because the 
latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run 
performance. (Schumpeter, 1942, location 1837) 
This issue may be addressed in future research. Hekkert et al. (2007) and Suurs (2009) have 
strongly promoted the need to further investigate TIS dynamics and suggest longitudinal 
process methodologies such as that of Van de Ven et al., (1999) as a way to advance the 
theory (Suurs 2009). Despite this, most empirical research remains cross-sectional, and there 
appears to be resistance to a further advance of the model as a longitudinal process theory 
(Bergek 2012), leading to the TIS functions model being described as “myopic with regard to 
the explanation of technological transitions” (Makard & Truffer, 2008, p. 610). 
2.3.5 Internal orientation 
The second criticism of the functions model is the way in which the system concept creates a 
strong internal and external environment for the purposes of analysis, largely disregarding the 
external environment (Markard & Truffer, 2008). In much of the TIS literature, system 
52 Chapter 2 
 
development is described as a process driven by things inside the system, where the system 
operates independently of the environment, and by improving the performance of the internal 
components of the system, the performance of the innovation system as a whole will improve. 
There is, however, little guidance as to the role that things external to the system have on the 
systems performance, or if, how, and when things cross the boundary to move from external 
to internal. The TIS functions model consequently has been recognised as inwardly orientated, 
omitting the impact of the system’s environment on the performance of the system itself 
(Makard & Truffer, 2008, p. 610). In response, Bergek (2012) suggests that whilst the functions 
model does have the capacity to include the external environment (see, for example, the 
application of the concept of cumulative causation (Suurs & Hekkert 2009), for the most part 
this has not occurred in existing TIS research. 
The focus on internal attributes of the system is marked in the foundations of the model. 
Reviewing the definitions of the TIS functions model offered in the literature, the focus on 
internal components appears prominent: “Inherent in a systems view is a notion that all system 
components contribute to the ‘goal’ of the system or they would not be considered part of that 
system. The contribution of a component or set of components to the goal is what is here called 
a function” (Bergek, 2002, p. 21). Hekkert et al. (2007) too suggest: “The analysis of 
technological change should focus on systematically mapping the activities that take place in 
innovation systems resulting in technological change” (Hekkert et al., 2007, p. 415). 
This internal orientation of the TIS functions model is proving problematic (Markard & Truffer, 
2008), reflected in uncertainty at the empirical level. Smith et al. (2010) for example, suggest 
that with respect to the existing sustainable energy TIS analysis (biogas, wind farms, etc.), with 
no recognition of the effect of the external environment (technologies, consumer preferences 
to competing technologies, etc.), the TIS functions model does not provide any capacity to 
identify what is missing from TIS in focus to achieve innovation and where solutions to 
weaknesses can be found: 
It remains unclear where these absent functional capabilities come from, or 
how they develop… Much of that explanation rests in the broader societal 
contexts in which specific innovation systems operate, and which tend not to 
be considered. (Smith et al., 2010, p. 438) 
Extending these ideas, Tigabu et al. (2015) recently investigated the evolution of renewable 
energy TISs in East Africa, progressing further than Smith et al. (2010) to suggest more 
definitively that the determinants of innovation appear to lay outside analysis provided by the 
TIS function model: 
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Development is determined more by national and international contextual 
factors than by specificities related to technologies or internal dynamics. 
(Tigabu et al., 2015, p. 1) 
The internal focus appears to be a characteristic of the TIS functions model that has significant 
implications for its capacity. Much like the linear model and demand–pull theories that have 
been rendered ineffective because they problematically isolate ideas from the wider context in 
which they emerge (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Rosenberg, 1994), the TIS functions model 
in its current form appears to repeat the same problem, largely isolating the TIS from the 
environment in which it is embedded. Like the criticism of the linear model presented earlier in 
the chapter (Freeman, 1991a, 1996; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Martin, 2012; Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1979; Perez, 2010; Rosenberg, 1994), it is suggested any particular TIS, like any 
particular idea or individual, is dependent on more than itself to create innovation. 
2.3.6 Problems of applying the system concept at the micro level 
In analysing the cause of the lack of recognition of the external environment, it is suggested 
that the largely exclusive internal focus of the TIS functions model is not an oversight of TIS 
researchers, but instead a more fundamental problem related to the application of the systems 
concept to the micro individual technological level, specifically related to the issue of 
boundaries (Carlsson et al., 2002). As discussed in the section above, boundaries represent 
a central element of the systems concept (Ackoff, 1994), requiring distinction between an 
internal and external environment. To define a system, a requirement is to define a boundary 
to that system. At macro system levels, such as the regional or national innovation system 
level, boundary conditions are less dynamic and more obvious. There is less dynamic transfer 
of components between the inner and outer environment which makes the systems in focus 
more stable and makes analysis easier. 
The components of national level innovation systems for example (such as economy-wide 
R&D spending, monetary policy, or population education levels), are comparatively stable 
(Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen & Dalum, 2002; Malerba, 2002), as national systems have much 
more organic or obvious boundaries that do not quickly change- Australia’s and Denmark’s 
national innovation systems have obvious geographic limits which make boundaries to these 
national systems easy to define. In comparison, at the micro individual technological level, 
technological innovation systems are much more dynamic. A technology can change rapidly, 
drawing or combining with many different new capacities from the external environment at a 
much greater and faster frequency (Adner & Levinthal, 2002; Arthur, 2009; Basalla, 1988; 
Constant, 1980; Levinthal, 1998). A component that exists in the external environment may be 
rapidly deployed and transferred to the internal environment, making the separation between 
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internal and external environments much more difficult and critical as a conceptual issue. 
Components, people, ideas that were for the longest time not evenly remotely relevant to the 
technological system in focus may become relevant, perhaps in dramatic fashion. The drawing 
in of these things previously external and irrelevant to the system may result in a fundamental 
change in the nature of the system, rather than being describable simply as an obvious stage 
of development of the previous system, and with this fundamental change, it calls into question 
the recognition of a system at all, if this system is entirely reconfigured and dependent upon 
things external to it. Discussing the impact of the external environment on aircraft technology, 
for example, Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) and Rosenberg (1979) identify that through its 
development, aircraft technology relied on new technologies developed in external industries 
which were not initially designed specifically for the purposes of aircraft (such as steel and 
petroleum). Similarly, Utterback and Suárez (1993, p. 2) contend that the external environment 
appears so important to the source of innovation for individual technologies that often, internal 
firms are at a disadvantage compared to external firms: “Innovative firms often come from 
outside the industry in question” (Utterback & Suárez, 1993, p. 2). This suggests that the 
problems of dynamism and interaction between the internal and external environment are not 
significant at macro system levels such as the national innovation system level or regional 
level; however, at the micro technological innovation system level the external environment is 
critical. 
Drawing sharp boundaries between the external and internal environment, or largely excluding 
the external environment, which appears central to the systems concept as well as its 
application in the TIS functions model, inherently misses much of the important dynamic 
activity that the TIS functions concept attempts to capture. What is external to the system at 
any point in time, and outside the bounds of TIS functions analysis, may be what is constraining 
development. A particular technology may entirely rely on things external to the system in order 
to achieve innovation, marking the systems concept only useful after these things have 
emerged. By the time a clearly definable system emerges for a particular technology, and 
where a boundary has stabilised, the system may have reached a state of stasis, where much 
of the important creation work has already concluded (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). 
2.3.7 Assessment of the Technological Innovation Systems Function model 
With its almost exclusive focus on describing system dynamics as an internal process (Markard 
& Truffer, 2008), in its current form the TIS functions model has limited capacity to offer 
guidance to address the research questions. Due to sharp boundaries it draws between the 
internal and external environment, the model fails to capture important environmental 
phenomenon which impact the creation and diffusion of individual technology and has little 
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capacity to describe how transfer between the internal and external environment occurs. 
Equally, despite the acknowledged significance of dynamics (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et 
al., 2008), there is a limited range of conceptual tools to describe them, with the two phases to 
represent dynamics acknowledged to need further advance (Bergek et al., 2008), which is also 
manifest in the large amount of variance research rather than longitudinal research within the 
literature (Hekkert et al., 2007). For these reasons, despite the focus on viewing factors outside 
the individual as the source of innovation which suggested strong relevance to the research 
question of this study, the TIS functions model, and the TIS concept more generally, is viewed 
as limited and will not be utilised. 
2.4 Innovation as process 
So far, the literature review has presented a number of issues. First, it identified that the heroic 
innovator perspective is limited in isolation, and there is a need to look outside of the individual 
in order to more deeply describe the determinants of innovation. Pursuing this, the innovation 
systems theory was identified. With its focus on describing innovation as both an individual 
and collective act, the theory appeared useful for this research, having a similar ambition of 
describing the wider context of ideas. However, exploring the technological innovation systems 
level, it was noted that there were a number of problems in implementing this theory. 
Specifically, that the requirement of boundaries makes a strong distinction between the system 
and the environment, with the theory not adequately accounting for the environment’s role in 
development or eventually in innovation. Along with this, the importance of dynamics, how the 
innovation changes over time, whilst noted as important, was not a strong theoretical or 
empirical focus of technological innovation systems functions literature. 
Innovation process theory offers capacity to address these issues and is the focus of this 
research. Process theories offer capacity to explore both the dynamics of innovation and how 
opportunities change over time, as well as the role of the environment as an influence on 
innovation. This section will identify why process theory is most suitable to address the 
research questions as well as identify the deficiencies in current process theory with respect 
to environment, which this research can address. 
Innovation process theory has become an important stream of the innovation literature (Garud 
et al., 2013). In process theories, innovation is not seen as a discreet event but, instead, as a 
process of development with innovation being an outcome of extended evolution of a set of 
variables (Basalla, 1988; Perez, 1983). In contrast to most of the technological innovation 
systems empirical research, as well as more generally static equilibrium-style models that 
discuss innovation by referencing its effect (Rosenberg, 1994), process theories represent and 
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focus on how innovation occurs by acknowledging it as an unfolding sequence with a temporal 
pattern (Garud et al., 2013; Van de Ven & Poole 2005). Under conditions of uncertainty (Perez, 
2010, p. 36), innovations are constructed based on complex sequences that are dynamic, 
path-dependent at times (Arthur, 1989), interacting at multiple levels (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2005; 
Rip & Kemp, 1998), historically connected (Basalla, 1988; Unruh 2000), complementary-
dependent (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998), and displaying their own maturity processes 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982; Klepper, 1997; Utterback, 1978). 
There is a large amount of innovation theory that can be classified as process theory (Garud 
et al., 2013; Geels, Hekkert & Jacobsson, 2008, p. 526; Pavitt, 1984; Van de Ven, 1992, p. 
171). These individual theories describe many different aspects of innovation as processes. 
These process theories have been used to describe how economies change (Kuznets, 1940; 
Perez, 1983; Schumpeter, 1939), the individual process of creation (Ogburn, 1955; Usher, 
1954), the changing role of users in the development of innovation (Bijker, 1997; Rogers, 
1995), the process of technology creation (Nelson & Winter, 1977, 1982), technological 
competition (Christensen, 1997; Suárez, 2004), and technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982, 
1988), among others. 
One branch of innovation process theory particularly relevant to this research is the innovation 
lifecycle literature. Rather than focus on processes influencing a technology at a particular 
stage, lifecycle models attempt to map the complete development process from inception of a 
technology to achievement of innovation (Dosi, 1982; Klepper, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1977; 
Perez, 2002). These models explore the process of how successful innovative technologies 
emerge first as invention, proceed through development, and eventually transform into 
innovation (Garud et al.  2013, p. 777). Innovation lifecycle models present this in a number of 
phases. Summarising these phases in popular lifecycle models (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ogburn, 1950; Perez, 2002, 
2010; Suárez, 2004; Usher, 1954), the following appears to be the development process of a 
technology: 
1. Gestation of prior technologies occurs in the environment. 
2. At some point the technologies offer conditions that lead to invention of a new 
technology. 
3. This new technology is initiated as adolescent in performance but spurs a large volume 
of new entrants sensing potential for dramatic innovation. 
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4. The large volume of entrants offers products as variations on the initial design. These 
reveal preferences and problems, and, despite momentary glimpses of success, 
innovation proves elusive. 
5. At some point a new product will be released that becomes widely accepted by 
customers and becomes recognised as a dominant design and defining product of the 
category. 
6. This results in a large “shakeout” as competitors leave the market, and there emerges 
an oligopoly structure where the creator of the successful design will capture the 
majority of value for the entire market. 
These theories offer a description of these phases often with similar yet distinct terminology, 
presented as sequential phases. Abernathy and Utterback (1978), for example, describe a new 
technological innovation development in three phases: A “fluid phase”, “transition phase”, and 
a “specific phase”.  Perez (2002, 2009) describes how technologies become embedded in the 
economy in a four-phase process: “Irruption”, “frenzy”, “synergy”, “maturity”. Ogburn (1950) 
describes innovation from the perspective of the individual as a four-phase process: Invention, 
accumulation, diffusion, adjustment (Ogburn, 1950, p. 393). This is similar to Usher (1954), 
who also offers a four-phase model: Perception of an incomplete problem, setting the stage, 
act of insight, critical revision and full mastery. 
These lifecycle models are viewed as credible (Garud et al. 2013), with a significant amount 
of empirical support (Stubbart & Knight, 2006, p. 86). These models suggest a reliable and 
predictable path of development to a particular technology, with the implication that there will 
exist only a brief moment where innovation is possible, capitalised on by a single victor, to 
close off opportunity for all others. These theories recognise and promote the recognition of 
innovation as dependent on conditions at a particular time that create or are recognised by a 
particular or small subgroup of individuals or firms who prove successful. 
Despite the empirical strength of these models, there remains opportunity for further advance, 
and there are some identified criticisms. First, many of them offer representation of process 
(Checkland, 1981; Checkland & Scholes, 1981), describing process by way of markers of 
change, rather than mechanisms. Firm entry and exit rates at certain times in development, 
for example, appear a strong empirical marker of the process and a focus of research (Agarwal 
& Gort, 1996;  Horvath et al., 2001; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996; Klepper & 
Miller, 1995; Maine, Thomas, Bliemel, Murira & Utterback, 2014). This is a useful tool, and one 
that offers articulation of what is otherwise a very difficult process to identify. However, there 
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remains possibility to explore further markers, particularly of the environment, if not attempt to 
describe what is causing the change, rather than offer tools that allow for its recognisability. 
A second criticism is one levelled at most linear innovation models (Freeman, 1991a, 1996; 
Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Martin, 2012; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979; Perez, 2010; Rosenberg, 
1994) and recently at technological innovation system literature (Smith et al., 2010, p. 438; 
Tigabu, Berkhout, & Beukering et al., 2015, p. 1). These models have a tendency to isolate the 
domain from its wider environment and view progress as generated by the effort of those 
working on the technology, as opposed to the external context or conditions in which it is 
placed. 
Lifecycle models do not discount the environment entirely. There is recognition of external 
environment at particular times in the development process in a number of these models. For 
many lifecycle models, the wider environment is most often the catalyst for initial conditions to 
spark invention (such as Usher’s 1954 description of “setting of the stage”). But post this, in 
later phases, the role of the wider environment becomes murky as focus shifts to describe the 
more obvious activity that emerges within the now established domain. Whilst there is 
continuing strong acknowledgement of the environment by some (Dosi, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 
1978), what specifically comes from the environment, and how, and when, and what effect that 
has on innovation is not well described.   
Responding to these issues and exploring the environmental context surrounding a 
technology, and what influence this has on innovation, are the focus of this research.  There 
is the possibility to explore and more clearly articulate the role of the environment throughout 
the innovation lifecycle phases of development. But, before exploring the role of environment 
more clearly, a number of key theories of innovation will be presented which describe the 
environment as critical to innovation, offering further justification and motive for reconciling this 
against lifecycle models. 
2.5 The importance of environment  
Environmental context appears a strong and important catalyst for both invention and 
innovation. In alternative theories to innovation lifecycle models, there is recognition of 
environmental conditions as important determinants of technological innovation. At any given 
time there exists a broad frontier of socioeconomic and cultural influences, consumer 
preferences and familiarities, and industry alignments and relationships, which all interact to 
present complex conditions that impact the potential to create a particular technology and the 
performance of that technology, as well as its likelihood of innovation.   
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Whilst many of these issues will be explored in the next chapter, with the presentation of the 
lifeworld model, to articulate the relevance of the environment the theories of combination and 
exaptation will be described which implicitly suggest that the contextual environment at any 
given time is a key determinant of what technologies are created as well as their potential for 
innovation. 
2.5.1 Combination 
Combination has a long history of recognition in the innovation literature as a central 
mechanism of new creation (Arthur, 2009; Basalla, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ogburn, 
1950; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Schumpeter, 1939; Tarde, 1903). Schumpeter (1939) viewed 
it as the central act of innovation, offering his definition of innovation as simply, “The carrying 
out of new combinations” (Schumpeter, 1939, location 2099). More recently, it has received 
renewed acknowledgement (Garud et al., 2013; Van de Ven et al., 1999, location 185) and 
has been described once more as central to technological evolution and innovation (Arthur, 
2009, location 2453). 
Whilst the focus of this study is technological innovation, more generally combination appears 
to be a pervasive mechanism of creation in many domains (Nelson & Winter, 1982, location 
1840). These range from the “nontechnical” aspects of technology creation (such as naming 
of technologies – e.g., Bell Lab engineers named the “Transistor” by combining the concepts 
“transconductance” and “varistor” (Gertner, 2013 p. 98)) to broader domains, such as artistic 
endeavour, science, and biology. With respect to artist endeavour, Brookes suggests 
combination is key to Picasso’s legacy as an innovator: “What Picasso did, for example, was 
take the concept ‘Western art’ and the concept ‘African masks’ and blend [combine] them 
together” (Brookes, 2011). Kirby (2013) too found similar outcomes in the field of music, 
identifying the primary means of creation for recognised innovators such as Bob Dylan and 
Led Zeppelin as a recombination of specific folk and blues pre-existing standards with different 
lyrics and electronic amplification (but apart from this, often with very little difference to the 
originals). In science, Tarde identified combination as the central process of theory building. 
Using the example of geometry, Tarde identified: “The development of a new theorem [occurs] 
in the mind of a geometrician through the combination of two old theorems” (Tarde, 1903, 
location 1160). Even earlier, Mary Sommerville in 1834 received acclaim (and was an influence 
of Thomas Kuhn) after writing about “connection” (combination) as the essence of science: 
“The progress of modern science especially within the last five years, has been remarkable for 
a tendency to … unite detached branches [of science, so that today] … there exists such a 
bond of union, that proficiency cannot be attained in any one branch without a knowledge of 
others” (Sommerville cited in Kuhn, 1969, p. 324). Whilst these examples have focused on 
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combination as a concept of human creation, combination has also been described as an 
important mechanism of novel creation for biological systems too. Ridley identifies that 
“Recombination is the essential procedure in sex, the mixing of genes from the two 
grandparents" (Ridley, 1994, location 638). The recognition of combination in these domains 
suggests, as Turner (2014, location 434) does, that combination is a central act of evolution, 
and our advanced capacity for it in comparison to other species is a primary reason why human 
creation is dramatically more pronounced compared to all other species. 
With respect to technological innovation, there are many examples of technologies that have 
been studied and described as combinations of previous technologies. Word processors 
(Drucker, 1986), telegraphs (Mokyr, 1990), CAT scanning technology (Adner & Levinthal, 
2002), calculators (Drucker 1986), primitive stone tools (Basalla, 1988), fiber optics (Granberg, 
1988), turbine jet airplanes (Constant, 1980), and automobiles (Basalla, 1988) are just a few 
of many examples (Arthur, 2009; Godin, 2008; Lipsey et al., 2005; Turner, 2014) that have 
highlighted the concept of combination (see table 2.2 below for further elaboration of these 
examples). With the range of these alternative perspectives all highlighting the critical role that 
combination has in new creation, there appears a compelling need and capacity to 
acknowledge, like Schumpeter does, the role of combination as a central mechanism of 
creation.  
Each combination can be explained as drawing on components from history. In this way, too, 
each new combination is generative and expands the capacity of history (Fagerberg, 2002; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982, location 1842; Tarde, 1903, location 1160). This dual capacity of any 
combination means ultimately that nothing is created in isolation and consequently reinforces 
the importance of history. In the view of Ogburn: “The pattern of causation is like that of a 
network: everything is connected” (Godin, 2010, pp. 291–292; Ogburn, 1957b, pp. 20–23). 
Like Usher (1954) and Darwin (1859), Dennett (1995) identifies that this interconnection also 
suggests that “accumulation” is a pragmatic strategy of evolutionary efficiency. Rather than 
constantly redesigning the entire world once more, instead evolution draws as much as 
possible from what has already occurred (Dennett, 1996, location 1409). Both of these points 
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Table 2.2  Technologies described as combinations of preceding components 
Jet Engine Both Constant and Arthur explore the jet engine: Constant: “The turbojet is 
heir to two centuries of turbine development, including water turbines, turbine 
water pumps, steam turbines, internal combustion gas turbines, and piston 
engine superchargers and turbosuperchargers” (Constant, 1980, p.3). Arthur 
too: “If you open p a jet engine (or aircraft gas turbine powerplant, to give it 
its professional name), you find components inside- compressors, turbines, 
combustion systems.  If you open up other technologies that existed before 
it, you find some of the same components.  Inside electrical power generating 
systems of the early twentieth century were turbines and combustion 
systems;  inside industrial blower units of the same period were compressors 
(Arthur, 2009, location 279).   
Motor-truck “For example, the internal combustion engine branch was joned with that of 
the bicycle and horse-drawn carriage to create the automobile branch, which 
in turn merged with the dray wagon to produce the motor truck” (Basalla, 
1988, pp. 138–139). 
Word Processor  “The word processor is not so much a “scientific” invention. It hooks up three 
existing instruments: a typewriter, a display screen, and a fairly elementary 
computer. But this combination of elements has resulted in a genuine 
innovation that is radically changing office work” (Drucker, 1986, p. 211). 
Telegraph “The telegraph, like the railroads, was a typical nineteenth-century invention 
in that it was a combination of separate technological inventions that had to 
be moulded together.  Just as the strength of a chain can never be greater 
than that of its weakest link, the efficiency and reliability of a system can 
never be greater than that of its weakest component. Long-distance 
telegraph required many subsequent inventions and improvements, which 
took decades to complete” (Mokyr 1990, location 1927). 
CAT Scanning  “CAT scanning (Trajtenberg 1990) drew upon X-ray technology, which was 
already applied in the medical imaging domain, and computer technology, 
which had been applied to data processing” (Adner & Levinthal, 2002, pp. 
11–12). 
Calculator “The internal processing elements of the original calculator were 
manufactured as discrete components that were electrically interconnected 
in the final design” (Merges  & Nelson, 1990, p. 859) 
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Fibre Optics   "Technical change often involves the combination of many knowledge fields 
and complementary products/services. For instance, the use of fiber optics 
in telecommunication required the development of laser technology 
(Granberg, 1988). 
 
2.5.2 What is combination 
Combination is the action of combining existing and known elements, be they material and/or 
nonmaterial, to form something new (Ogburn, 1950, p. 378). Combinations can be of physical 
components as well as concepts (Turner, 2014, location 255). Schumpeter reflected on this 
too, suggesting that apart from physical products, combinations can be the combination of 
existing products with new production methods, new markets, new supply sources, or new 
organisation structures (Schumpeter, 1934, location 2099). These examples are not 
exhaustive. Instead more general descriptions suggest that combination can be any form of 
existing knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ogburn, 1950; Usher, 1954). There are no 
inherent constraints (apart from physical) that limit what existing things can be combined. To 
use an example of Arthur (2009), it is possible to combine “jet engines with hen houses” 
(Arthur, 2009, location 2469), despite there not being any obvious value in doing so. 
Importantly for our understanding of innovation, combinations are viewed as an act of creation. 
With respect to the technological combination, the identification and alignment of components 
requires active design work by entrepreneurs (Adner & Levinthal, 2002, p. 12; Clark, 1985), 
marking the concept as important to innovation. The combination must draw from the 
environment to identify components which must be harnessed to work effectively together and 
be matched against a particular purpose (Arthur, 2009). It requires both “discovery” and 
“creation”, as the components that need active shaping and the alignment does not occur 
automatically (Dosi & Egidi, 1991). Dennett (1996, location 1329), using the example of a 
watch, acknowledges that this process of configuration of components represents “work done”. 
The intricate parts of a watch, as well as their relationship to each other, do not create and 
organise themselves but are an act of purposive creation (see also Nelson & Winter, 1977, p. 
49). 
The importance of this is that whilst combination suggests that drawing things from the 
environment is significant, new creation and innovation can still be viewed as an act of creation. 
In this way, the types of combination possible at different times, and when these potential 
combinations are recognised, can be explored as an act of creation and subsequent innovation 
by the individuals involved. 
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2.5.3 Exaptation as a tool of combination 
Offering an advance on the discussion of combination, and further suggesting the need to 
articulate how the dynamic environment has an impact on innovation, is the concept of 
exaptation (Gould & Vrba, 1982). Exaptation is a theory put forward by Gould and Vrba (1982) 
which identifies that using existing things for purposes they were not previously intended is an 
important mechanism of evolution. Giving a detailed example from biology, Gould and Vrba 
retrace how birds gained capacity and design for flight. Initially bird feathers were a tool of 
thermoregulation. As adaptive fitness increased feather density, some species, such as the 
black heron bird of Africa, utilised their dense feathers for new mantling wing techniques which 
gave an advantage in catching fish. This new use of feathers for an action for which they were 
not previously designed is recognised as an exaptation event. As the adaptive fitness of this 
mantling action became more pronounced in these birds, over time it created primitive wing 
structures. This led to a second exaptation event when these wing structures, which were 
originally giving advantage for catching prey, were utilised for the different and not originally 
intended activity of flight.  Gould and Vrba’s theory of exaptation suggests in this example and 
many others that existing species evolve through a series of adaptations which improves 
fitness (marked as times of stasis (Eldredge & Gould, 1972; Gould & Eldredge, 1977)), but the 
act of establishing a new species is initiated through an exaptation event which utilises existing 
characteristics for purposes they were previously not intended. 
The theory of exaptation has been applied to technological evolution too, and it appears to 
describe an important mechanism of radical innovation formation (Adner & Levinthal, 2002; 
Cattani, 2006; Levinthal, 1998). It suggests that rather than new technologies being created 
by purposeful R&D, utilising existing technologies for new uses can unlock dramatic innovation 
without long articulated development processes. In a detailed study of the history of the radio, 
Adner and Levinthal (2002) find similar conclusions to Gould and Vrba (1982) that new radical 
innovations are formed by applying existing technologies to new uses that they were not 
originally intended. 
Using the example of radio wave technology, Adner and Levinthal (2002, p. 51) identify 
exaptation events that achieve a number of dramatic innovations simply by changing the use 
of existing technologies. Describing the sequence, Adner and Levinthal (2002) recount that 
wireless radio began as a technology that was used only as a laboratory device by Hertz, who 
found it an effective tool to test Maxwell’s theories of electromagnetic waves. Later, learning 
of Hertz’s discoveries, another individual, Marconi, saw this radio laboratory device and, 
changing the technology only slightly, utilised it as a ship-to-ship communication tool, utilising 
Morse code to send messages overseas. This became a dramatic radical innovation for 
communication, with Marconi achieving this despite little direct investment in developing the 
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technology. In contrast to Marconi, Maxwell did not perceive the radio laboratory device to be 
of any use in ship-to-ship communication. Later, with the technology now well established as 
a communication tool between ships and on land, another exaptation event occurred, this time 
led by others (including both professionals as well as amateur ham radio enthusiasts), who 
used it to broadcast voice and music recordings, leading to the development of a major industry 
in broadcast radio. This new use (exaptation) was missed by Marconi, who by that stage had 
built a lucrative communication empire but “completely failed to envisage” the value of his 
technology for the new purpose of broadcast radio (Landau & Rosenberg, 1986, p. 25). At 
each exaptation event, the new development of a radical innovation was achieved easily by 
slightly adjusting existing technologies and changing their application, rather than undertaking 
long arduous and unique processes of research and development. Adner and Levinthal 
summarise this process as it occurred in radio and suggest that it is relevant to how all radical 
technologies are formed: 
A technology undergoes a process of evolutionary development within a given 
domain of application. At some juncture, that technology, or possibly set of 
technologies, may be applied to a new domain of application. The 
technological shift necessitated by this event is modest. … The revolution is 
in the shift of application domain. (Adner & Levinthal, 2002, p. 52) 
Exaptation appears significant to technological creation, and there are many authors who have 
noted it to describe something pervasive to new radical technological creation (Arthur, 2009, 
location 848; Dew et al., 2004, p. 70; Mokyr, 2002). The term “exaptation” provides the most 
decisive nomenclature for this concept, but the concept of exaptation, of utilising existing 
technologies for new uses they were not originally intended, has been recognised many times 
within the innovation and technology literature (e.g., Constant, 1980, p. 2; Rosenberg, 1983, 
p. 75; Usher, 1954, p. 50). There is identification of many practical examples in the history of 
technology (see Arthur, 2009; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998, p. 67). Basalla provides a summary 
of some of these examples: “The earliest steam engines pumped water from mines, the first 
commercial use of radio was for the sending of coded wireless messages between ships at 
sea and from ships to shore, and the first electronic digital computer was designed to calculate 
firing tables for the guns for the United States Army” Basalla (1988, p. 141). Medical devices 
too appeared to be created in a similar way, with Comroe (1977) highlighting that of the top 
technologies to treat cardiopulmonary disease, 41% of these technologies were being used 
for diseases that were different to what the technology was originally created for.  
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Exaptation and combination describe that what is available in the environment at any given 
time represents a strong determinant of the capacity to create technologies as well as achieve 
innovation. These theories suggest a need to explore the environment further.  
2.6 Research questions and summary 
Innovation lifecycle theories suggest that technological innovations have strong development 
processes, moving through a series of phases covering the invention of the initial technology, 
development, and ultimate innovation. Combination and exaptation in contrast suggest that 
the achievement of innovation is possible without any clear or obvious development process. 
This is a conflict, and one that can potentially be resolved by more explicitly exploring how the 
environment changes over the lifecycle of a technology.   
By utilising key concepts in innovation theory, a new technological lifeworlds model will be 
presented next. This model presents lifeworlds instead of phases, which represent and attempt 
to articulate the environment in which a technology is conceived and developed, and becomes 
an innovation. 
2.6.1 Research questions 
There is opportunity and need to reconcile external and internal theories, and to better 
articulate the role of external development throughout the development process of a 
technological innovation. This research does this with the presentation (in chapter 3) of a 
lifeworld model. It is also anticipated that the lifeworld model can offer a new range of new 
markers for the innovation process. Reflecting this, the research questions are:  
1. How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in the case study? 
2. How are combination and exaptation relevant in the development of innovation? 
3. What is the relationship between the internal domain and the external lifeworld? 
4. How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided the theoretical context for this study. It provided an overview of  
innovation theory, identifying that the historic perspective of innovation as ideas is problematic 
(Tuomi, 2002). In response, the recognition of innovation as an outcome of a system is deemed 
more effective. Extending these ideas, whilst the identification of the system is important, 
investigating system dynamics appears problematic at the level of individual technology, 
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manifest with the problems of dynamics and boundaries within the technological innovation 
system functions model (Bergek, 2012; Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007; Markard & 
Truffer, 2008; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009). The innovation process literature provides a way 
forward. Reviewing a large amount of innovation process theory, there appears theoretical 
usefulness in exploring and more clearly articulating the role of the external environment 
throughout the technology lifecycle. This is the ambition of this research and from which the 
research questions were described. A summary table of the argument of this literature review 
is provided below.  
Perspective  Existing argument   Criticism 
Innovation as genius Innovation has long been described as a 
consequence of great individuals with 
great ideas, who bring forward their ideas 
to the world to create world changing 
innovation. 
Criticism of this perspective suggests 
innovation is more than manifest 
individual genius, particularly when 
considering- the previous failures of 
recognised genius, that innovation ideas 
are not unique to those that are 
successful, and often more than one 
person can create the same idea at the 
same time, suggesting there are 
particular conditions that bring forward 
some ideas at certain times. 
Innovation as system  Looking outside of the individual, there is 
recognition of innovation as both an 
individual and collective act, and the 
innovation systems concept is an 
expression of this.  Innovation systems 
suggest it is a set of conditions/actors that 
impact innovation performance.  
Whilst the system concept is useful, it is 
problematic at the level of individual 
technology, largely due to the strong 
boundary condition requirements to 
identify a system, where focus becomes 
describing the internal system and 
disregarding wider conditions.  





There is need to explore the wider 
environment outside the system, with this 
environment referred to as ‘lifeworld’. 
Theories of combination and exaptation 
suggest it is specifically the conditions in 
this environment outside of a system, 
drawing new technologies in and 
combining them in new ways which is 
critical to innovation.   
Whilst the role of the environment is 
significant, this too doesn’t describe how 
the environment changes, and how this 
can lead to new innovation at different 
times.  
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Innovation as process How conditions change over time is 
important to innovation.  There is a large 
focus in the innovation literature on 
process research, which expressly 
focusses on methodologies to explore 
change over time. 
These process perspectives don’t explore 
the role of the environment (lifeword) with 
a specific focus on the role of combination 
and exaptation. 
 
This provides the context for the study, and particularly leads to the next chapter, which is to 
present a deeper description of what is meant both by the concept of lifeworld, and specifically 
utilising existing theory to explore it as a process. This is described as the ‘technological 
lifeworld model’ and its focus is to explore how the external environment changes over time, 
and how this impacts the likelihood and characteristics of innovation for a particular technology.  




  69 
 
Chapter 3 




This chapter argues that successful innovations can be seen to pass through four particular 
external environments, or lifeworlds, before being a commercial success – before the time and 
place will be right. These are as follows: (1) Prehistory where the lifeworld makes the 
technology not yet possible, (2) establishment, where the lifeworld offers enabling conditions 
for the creation of the technology, (3) development, where trial and error advances the 
technology, and (4) innovation, where the lifeworld makes the technology an innovation with 
strong socioeconomic alignment.  
The term “lifeworld” (Husserl, 1970; Ihde, 1990; Schutz & Luckmann, 1973) is used in this 
study to represent the collective experience and conditions, and the material characteristics 
and knowledge that enable and constrain the technology in focus. Similar terms used in the 
literature are environment, milieu, ecosystem, progress, and culture. The term “lifeworld” is 
used largely because it more broadly represents all conditions, even those not clearly or 
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obviously linked to the technology in focus, which at later times may prove critical to creation. 
A summary of the four-lifeworld model is offered in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Summary of the four-lifeworld model 
Prehistory lifeworld The lifeworld is characterised by inadequate technology. The required 
component technology does not exist, making creation impossible. Despite 
this, imaginative description may be found. 
Establishment 
lifeworld 
The lifeworld offers enabling conditions for new creation. There is sufficient 
component technology available, and via exaptation and combination a new 
technology is established. The new technology itself will be limited in 
performance but demonstrate working capacity. 
Development 
lifeworld  
A large volume of trial and error emerges, with a dramatic number of 
entrants. These resulting products reveal problems with technology and 
expose various socioeconomic design criteria, from inputs such as 
consumers, regulations, suppliers, etc. 
Innovation lifeworld A successful design emerges to address the problems of preceding designs 
and finds alignment across social, political, and economic conditions. The 
technology proves difficult to dislodge and there are a large number of exits 
from competitors. 
 
Each of these will now be discussed in detail. 
3.1 Prehistory lifeworld 
The first lifeworld is described as the “prehistory lifeworld”.  In this lifeworld, the technology is 
not possible yet, due to the lack of capacity of the lifeworld. Despite this, there may be 
imaginative descriptions of the technology. Overlaid in this same lifeworld there is expected to 
be a pre-existing parallel technology that is in a mature state with strong socioeconomic 
alignment. 
3.1.1 Capacity of the lifeworld 
As new technology is recognised as a combination of existing technologies (see literature 
review), at any given time, the availability and performance of existing technologies is a 
constraint to what new technologies can be created. The conditions to create a particular 
technology are not universal through time, but instead only become possible at certain times, 
dependent upon the accumulated state of available technology. 
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In the innovation technology literature there have been many attempts to describe how the 
capacity of available technologies is a determinant of new creation. In the technological 
literature, the role of history is a focus. Nelson and Winter (1982) for example, refer to the “vast 
storehouse of history” that provides tools for new creation, Heidegger (1977) refers to the 
“standing reserve” of all known knowledge, Ogburn (1950) refers to “material culture” from 
which all things draw, Usher (1954) refers to “setting of the stage”, which recognises that 
history provides accumulating capacity, Rosenberg (1994) refers to a “frontier” from which new 
developments emerge, Hughes (1987) refers to history as the “seamless web” that 
encompasses all things, Arthur (2009) refers to the “collective of technology”, and Kuhn (1962) 
and Perez (1983, 2004, 2009) in a similar way refer to a “constellation” of all knowledge. All of 
these descriptions are similar, reflecting wider recognition of accumulation in the biological 
evolution literature (Darwin, 1859; Dennett, 1996; Gould & Eldredge, 1977; Ridley, 1994, 
location 266), and all represent each author independently attempting to articulate 
accumulation or the role of history as an active constraint to what new technology can be 
created. 
The Table 3.2 summarises the language used in the literature around pre-existing 
technologies: 
Table 3.2 Summary of language around prehistory of technology 
Author Concept of history and accumulation 
Arthur (2009) “Imagine the entire collection of all technologies that have ever existed, past 
and present. Imagine, that is, all the processes, devices, components, modules, 
organizational forms, methods, and algorithms in use and ever used. If we were 
to list these in a catalog their numbers would be vast. This is the collective of 
technology” (Arthur, 2009, location 2379). 
Heidegger (1977) In a detailed, if not complicated theory of technology, Heidegger referred to the 
existing state of knowledge as the “standing-reserve”. He suggests that we draw 
out new technologies and reveal new truths about the world from this existing 
state of knowledge through the process of what he referred to as “enframing” 
(Heidegger, 1977, pp. 23-24) 
Ogburn (1950) Ogburn (1950) often referred to this premise as “culture”. Sometimes he referred 
to culture generally, but more often it was the term “cultural base” which he 
described as “where all new combinations comes from” (Ogburn 1950, 382, 
cited also in Godin, 2010, p. 295). 
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Author Concept of history and accumulation 
Usher (1954) Usher acknowledged that the state of knowledge at any point in time provides 
the technologies that can then be applied to new problems. Usher referred to 
this as the “Setting of the stage” on which creation takes place, and recognised 
the creation of new technologies as a process of cumulative synthesis. 
Discussing the loom, Usher says, “The history of this development has long 
been obscured by writers who were unwilling to recognised the essentially 




Schumpeter had a strong perspective on this without singling it out as a concept 
itself, rather acknowledging it as part of his other theories. But as Mokyr 
identifies, “the bulk of Schumpeterian economic growth comes from the 
application of old knowledge” (Mokyr, 1990, location 242). Some examples 
include where he has specifically made reference to the past. For example, “The 
fundamental notion that the essence of economic development consists in a 
different employment of existing services of labor and land leads us to the 
statement that the carrying out of new combinations takes place throughout the 
withdrawal of services of labor and land from their previous employments” 
(Schumpeter, 1934, location 2673). Also, making mention of things within our 
reach: “Technologically as well as economically considered, to produce means 
to combine the things and forces within our reach” (Schumpeter, 1934, location 
1202). 
Rosenberg (1994) “The body of presently available scientific knowledge imposes certain 
constraints on what is technologically possible and also, by the same token, 
permits a range of technological alternatives to be taken up within the frontiers 
imposed by that knowledge” (Rosenberg, 1994, pg. 12). 
Hayek (1960) “While the growth of our knowledge of nature constantly discloses new realms 
of ignorance, the increasing complexity of the civilisation which this knowledge 
enables us to build presents new obstacles to the intellectual comprehension of 
the world around us… The transmission in time of our accumulated stock of 
knowledge and the communication among contemporaries of information on 
which they base their action. They cannot be sharply separated because the 
tools of communication between contemporaries are part of the cultural heritage 
which man constantly uses in the pursuit of his ends” (Hayek, 1960, location 
1937). 
Hughes (1987)  Hughes (1987) provided the metaphor of a “seamless web” of physical artefacts, 
organisations, scientific understanding, and legal precedent which enable and 
constrain new creation.  
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Author Concept of history and accumulation 
Nelson and Winter 
(1982) 
Nelson and Winter (1982, location 1840) referred to the “vast storehouse” of 
components from which new novel combinations are created. 
Kuhn (1962) Kuhn in his theory of scientific revolutions, refers to the constellation of facts: “If 
science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current 
texts, then scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to 
contribute one or another element to that particular constellation. Scientific 
development becomes the piecemeal process by which these items have been 
added, singularly and in combination, to the ever growing stockpile that 
constitutes scientific technique and knowledge. And history of science becomes 
the discipline that chronicles both these successive increments and the 
obstacles that have inhibited their accumulation” (Kuhn, 1962, location 169). 
Perez (2002) and Dosi (1982, 1988) also deserve their own recognition here, 
but will be included with Kuhn as both offered similar terminology for discussing 
Kuhn’s concept of a “constellation” but applied it to technology. 
3.1.2 Components 
The importance of history is also found within any technology. Any technology can be 
described as a combination of component technologies, which themselves are often common 
technologies (Arthur, 2009; Freeman & Soete,1997; Hughes, 1983; Mowery & 
Rosenberg,1998; Perez, 2002).  
This perspective should be contrasted to the heroic innovator perspective. In the past, 
technologies were studied and described as complete creations, where the person responsible 
would deliver a unique technology independent from all others (Godin, 2008). From this 
perspective, the act of invention brought the technologies to life, and the person who created 
it also conceived of all requisite internal components required by the invention (Tuomi, 2002, 
location 190). In 1842, for example, a commentator on British industry described the steam-
engine as an artefact of inventive genius with no identified links to other technology or history:  
“The steam engine had no precedent … [it] sprang into sudden existence, like Minerva from 
the brain of Jupiter)” (Basalla, 1988, p. 35). 
In contrast, the recognition that any new technology is a combination of pre-existing technology 
suggests that any new technology is networked to a large range of other technologies, where 
creators draw extensively from available technologies in the lifeworld. Table 3.3. offers 
examples of particular technologies that have been described this way – not as unique 
creations delivered from the mind of a single individual, but as technologies that are full of 
component technologies and which come from a variety of wider available technologies. 
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Table 3.3 Technologies described as combinations 
Technology Reliance on history 
Jet engine “The turbojet is heir to two centuries of turbine development, including water turbines, 
turbine water pumps, steam turbines, internal combustion gas turbines, and piston 
engine superchargers and turbosuperchargers” (Constant 1980, p. 3).  
“If you open up a jet engine (or aircraft gas turbine powerplant, to give it its 
professional name), you find components inside—compressors, turbines, combustion 
systems. If you open up other technologies that existed before it, you find some of the 
same components. Inside electrical power generating systems of the early twentieth 
century were turbines and combustion systems; inside industrial blower units of the 
same period were compressors” (Arthur, 2009, location 279).  
Motor truck “For example, the internal combustion engine branch was joined with that of the 
bicycle and horse-drawn carriage to create the automobile branch, which in turn 




“The word processor is not much of a ‘scientific’ invention. It hooks up three existing 
instruments: a typewriter, a display screen, and a fairly elementary computer. But this 
combination of existing elements has resulted in a genuine innovation that is radically 
changing office work” (Drucker, 1986, p. 211). 
Telegraph “The telegraph, like the railroads, was a typical nineteenth-century invention in that it 
was a combination of separate technological inventions that had to be moulded 
together. Just as the strength of a chain can never be greater than that of its weakest 
link, the efficiency and reliability of a system can never be greater than that of its 
weakest component. Long-distance telegraph required many subsequent inventions 
and improvements, which took decades to complete” (Mokyr, 1990, location 1927). 
CAT 
scanning 
“CAT scanning (Trajtenberg, 1990) drew upon X-ray technology, which was already 
applied in the medical imaging domain, and computer technology, which had been 
applied to data processing” (Adner & Levinthal, 2002, p. 11-12). 
Calculator “The internal processing elements of the original calculator were manufactured as 
discrete components that were electrically interconnected in the final design” (Merges 
& Nelson, 1990, p. 859). 
Fibre optics “Technical change often involves the combination of many knowledge fields 
and complementary products/services. For instance, the use of fiber optics in 
telecommunication required the development of laser technology” (Granberg, 1988). 
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The examples in the table above isn’t extensive. Ultimately, it could be argued that with 
appropriate research any technology could be put in this table. As John Donne proclaimed that 
no man is an island, and Darwin added that neither is a clam or tulip (Dennett, 1996, p. 121), 
so is no technology an island either: any technology is connected to and made up of other 
technology. 
As a consequence, when considering how new technologies are formed, the state of available 
technologies should be viewed as a strong constraint (Basalla, 1988; Clark, 1985, p. 241; 
Constant, 1980; Gilfillan, 1927; Lipsey et al., 2005).  New technologies rely on more than 
imagination – they rely on the availability and performance of existing technologies. For this 
reason, different lifeworlds are used to represent how the availability of technologies changes 
over time, and how, due to growing accumulation, technologies not possible in one lifeworld 
become possible in a later one. The prehistory lifeworld describes the time before it is possible 
to create a technology, where the lifeworld does not offer the required accumulative capacity 
and availability of potential component technologies. There is, however, expected to be some 
particular activity in the prehistory lifeworld, despite the inability to create the technology in 
focus. 
3.1.3 Imaginative descriptions of technology 
The prehistory lifeworld identifies that there is likely a time where the lifeworld does not yet 
offer the capacity to create the technology. The components and conditions to create the 
technology in focus remain outside the capacity of this lifeworld. 
Despite this, humans have a capacity for imagination, and, as a result, it may be possible to 
identify imaginative descriptions of the technology prior to it being possible to build. The 
phenomenon, described by Basalla (1988) as “technological visions”, describes how prescient 
individuals can sometimes describe a technology long before there emerges the possibility for 
its creation. These descriptions may remain imaginative, or individuals may attempt to build, 
but, in doing so, will fail, revealing a lack of capacity of the lifeworld. 
If these predictions are found, however, it is expected that, whilst offering a generalised 
similarity to the eventual technology, these predictions will be lacking in detail, or have the 
wrong technological components. Poe, for example, writing in 1844, describes a world that has 
come to pass with air travel: “The air, as well as the earth and the ocean, has been subdued 
by science, and will become a common and convenient highway for mankind!” (Poe, 1844). 
However, Poe suggests this will be achieved by transatlantic hot air balloon travel, not airplane 
travel. Also, whilst William Gibson is credited with predicting the internet, in reflecting upon the 
similarity between his concept of cyberspace and the actual internet, Gibson identifies that 
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they have little in common. For example, Gibson notes that in Neuromancer phone booths are 
used, with Gibson identifying that he did not envisage smartphones or anything similar to it at 
all, and this appears common in science fiction (Gibson, 2014; Bassett, Steinmueller & Vos, 
2013). It is expected that these imaginative descriptions will not enact the technology or provide 
direction towards its achievement. 
The recognition of constraints has also emerged in the technology literature. The concept of 
timelags represents this, with Ogburn (1922) identifying that to create a technology, 
imagination must work within and to the constraints of the technology of the time: “The cave 
man, had he the ability of a modern genius, could not have invented the steam engine, living 
as he did on the plane of culture existing during the last ice age” (Ogburn, 1922, p. 34; see 
also Jewkes, 1958, pp. 28-–29). Freeman and Soete (1997) more recently make the same 
claim that, “[even if] the idea has clicked in the mind of an inventor or entrepreneur, there’s still 
a long way to go before it becomes a successful innovation, in our sense of the term. Rayon 
was ‘invented’ 200 years before it was innovated, the computer at least a century before, and 
aeroplanes even earlier” (Freeman & Soete, 1997, location 4300). 
In this prehistory lifeworld, when component technologies do not yet exist or are in an 
adolescent state, whilst imaginative description may emerge, attempts at innovation fail. The 
effect of preceding history is strong enough to constrain the potential of a particular idea to 
become a technology until such time as the capacity of technology “catches up” (Jewkes, 1958, 
p. 20). Without capable components many ideas lay dormant for extended periods, before 
such time as components arrive. 
This represents what will be explored and discussed with respect to the technology of the 
prehistory lifeworld. 
3.1.4 Parallel technology  
Along with the features of the prehistory lifeworld discussed above which relate to the capacity 
to build a new technology, overlaid in this same lifeworld are conditions of a mature parallel 
technology that later will have to compete with the emergence of the new technology. In the 
prehistory lifeworld the pre-existing technology is expected to be in a strong state, with strong 
socioeconomic alignment. This will be explored below. 
Today, the cultural base of a technology is large (Arthur, 2009), and, depending on the maturity 
of the industry in focus, there may be a history of discontinuities where there is a recognisable 
sequence of technologies that, whilst based around a particular technology (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), offer a similar form of consumer value.  An 
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example is the progression of airplanes from propeller piston engines to turbine jet engines 
(Constant, 1980). In isolation each technology is discontinuous; in sequence they represent a 
lineage of tools for flight. Another example for gaming: Pinball arcade games, to video games, 
to smartphone games, to perhaps soon virtual reality gaming, in many ways represent a 
lineage, albeit one full of discontinuous innovation. 
The significance of this is that for a new technology to be widely adopted, it must also cause 
the discontinued adoption of an existing technology.  The prevalence of this has led to terms 
such as disruption (Christensen, 1997) which describe how world leading companies capitulate 
to new technologies.  As a result, overlaid in the same environment for the new technology, 
are parallel conditions related to an existing one. These conditions are often the inverse, and 
a prehistory lifeworld for a new technology represents the mature lifeworld of an existing one. 
There is a need to describe how a new technology first emerges, competes with, and then 
supersedes an existing technology, where the lifeworld offers a different likelihood of 
innovation to each technology.  As the lifeworld surrounding these technologies changes, so 
too does the likelihood and possibility of innovation for both. In the prehistory lifeworld, there 
is recognition that conditions are conducive to the older technology being a strong innovation 
with a strong socioeconomic alignment. This technology may be in a state of “normal science”, 
where effort is applied to its incremental improvement and extending this as far as possible 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Kuhn, 1962). At this stage, whilst there is not yet any threat 
from the new technology, it is useful to identify this pre-existing parallel technology. 
3.1.5 Summary of prehistory lifeworld 
The prehistory lifeworld describes a time before the technology is possible. The lifeworld does 
not offer the requisite component technologies required to create the technology in focus. 
Despite this, in this lifeworld there are expected to be imaginative descriptions of the 
technology, and within the lifeworld, there exists a parallel technology in a strong state of 
maturity. 
Imaginative descriptions and parallel technologies to mark this prehistory lifeworld will be 
explored in the case study. A number of markers summarising these concepts, and which will 
be used to explore the case study, are provided in Table 3.4: 
Table 3.4 Summary of markers for the Prehistory lifeworld 
Marker 1 It may be possible to identify imaginative descriptions of the 
technology. 
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Marker 2 These imaginative descriptions reveal an inability to create the 
technology.  
Marker 3 There may be a history of discontinuities of similar forms of parallel 
technologies. 
Marker 4 There is expected to be a particularly strong parallel technology that 
the new technology will later compete against. 
 
3.2 Establishment lifeworld 
The second lifeworld is described as the establishment lifeworld. In the establishment lifeworld, 
the first products are offered, establishing the domain in focus. Compared to the prehistory 
lifeworld, accumulation has advanced to a point where there are now components that make 
it possible to create the technology in focus. Despite the emergence of these technologies, 
they are not expected to achieve significant innovation due to adolescence of technology, 
lacking performance, and the strength of parallel technologies. 
The literature review section on combination identified that each new technology can be 
viewed as a combination. Extending this, the previous prehistory lifeworld literature identified 
that each new technology should be viewed as a combination of wider components, where 
these components must exist prior to being used in the technology in focus. This frames the 
creation of novel things as a process of applied familiarity, taking what already exists in the 
lifeworld, and recombining it in new ways to create new things (technologies, concepts, 
knowledge). 
The description of this next establishment lifeworld will focus on the dynamics of the lifeworld, 
and how the conditions to create the technology emerge as a result of accumulation. The 
establishment of a technology is dependent upon the availability of components, and it is 
expected that, for a successful creation of technology, accumulation at one point offers 
conditions to create the technology that was previously not possible in the prehistory lifeworld. 
How these conditions emerge through accumulation will be a focus in describing the 
establishment lifeworld. 
There are two ways to describe how the lifeworld accumulates enabling conditions for the 
creation of a new technology: accumulation as a result of new technologies, and accumulation 
as a result of incremental improvement in existing technologies. These will both be discussed 
below. 
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3.2.1 Accumulation via new technologies 
One way that the capacity of technology advances is through accumulation through new 
technologies. Each new technology, whilst being a combination of existing technology, also 
itself becomes a potential component in further combinations. The combustion engine, for 
example, can be viewed as a technology and a combination of preceding components, such 
as steel, petroleum, etc., – but in becoming available as a technology, the combustion engine 
could then be used itself as a component in new technologies, such as motor cars or tractors. 
In this way, the material base of the lifeworld is ever expanding (Arthur, 2009), with each new 
combination both drawing from and adding new capacities. 
3.2.2 Incremental improvement creating combination and exaptation opportunities 
The second way accumulation builds to create enabling conditions for the creation of a new 
technology is through incremental innovation in existing technologies. Incremental innovation 
is commonly viewed in the technology literature as the powerful force of improvement of 
existing technologies (Dosi, 1982, 1988; Enos, 1962; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Rosenberg, 
1994). Technology arrives as initially crude and adolescent, but over time develops a more 
reliable and effective performance capacity as effort is applied to improve the technology (Dosi, 
1982; Hughes, 1983, p. 43; Lispey et al., 2005, location 1573; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Perez, 
2009; Rosenberg, 2005; Schumpeter, 1942, location 1837). Exploring this concept deeply, 
there is recognition that technologies have trajectories (Dosi, 1982, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 
1982) where, as a result of incremental improvement, the characteristics and performance of 
a technology dramatically differ over time. Viewing a technology at different times (t0-t1), it will 
be possible to identify clear differences in exhibited capacity, where the technology itself 
becomes powerful and capable of things at previous times not possible.  
 
Incremental improvement has been acknowledged to be the bulk of the work of innovation 
(Bessant, 1992; Sahal, 1981, p. 37). It represents the “slow plodding progress” of development 
(Rosenberg, 1983, p. 64) that over time enables dramatic change in performance.  Whilst not 
recognised with the same fervour as dramatic innovative breakthroughs, and often viewed as 
inconspicuous or undervalued (Enos 1962, p. 180; Landau & Rosenberg, 1986, p. 282), the 
effects of incremental innovation are extremely powerful (Rosenberg, 1983, p. 64). For 
example, forecasting the future adoption of the cellphone at its inception in 1983, AT&T 
predicted that by 1999 subscriptions might reach one million (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998, 
location 942). In reality, by 2000 US subscriptions had reached approximately 92 million in the 
U.S. and 500 million worldwide (Lehrer, Green, & Stock, 2011). The discrepancy between the 
forecast and the outcome was attributed to the underestimation of the effect of incremental 
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improvement on the cost of the device (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998, location 942) with the 
cost of a cellphone decreasing from $3,000 to approximately $200 as a result of improvements 
in performance of components in this time (Hausman, 1999). 
Incremental improvement is important to the concept of the lifeworld, as existing technologies 
may reach thresholds in performance that enable new combinations. Perez (2002) discusses 
this concept, suggesting that the emergence of new powerful technologies (techno-economic 
paradigms in her language) are based not only on the presence of new components but 
importantly on the attainment of new performance in existing technologies. Perez suggests 
that it was not only the presence of steel that lead to the industrial revolution, but reliable 
access to cheap steel. It was not only microelectronics that led to a computing paradigm but 
cheap microelectronics that exhibited reliable cost and performance improvement (Perez, 
2002; see also Freeman, 1991, p. 83). Cost is one performance criteria, but others may be 
weight, size, memory capacity, efficiency, and so forth. Other researchers have made similar 
recognitions (see Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 Example of required performance of components 
Technology Example of required performance of components 
Steam engine “The compound steam engine had to await cheap, high quality steel. Higher 
pressures (and therefore greater fuel economy) in power generation required 
high-strength, heat resistant alloy steels. Hard alloy steels, in turn, were of 
limited usefulness until appropriate new machine tooling methods were 
developed for working them” (Rosenberg, 1983, p. 62).  
Bicycle  “Another new consumer product which owed its rapid growth in the 1890s partly 
to cheap quality steel was the bicycle. The techniques used for their 
manufacture before the 1920s were not yet Fordist mass production techniques, 
but they were certainly high volume production, taking advantage of the new 
potential of steel intensive products” (Freeman & Soete, 1997, location 1370). 
  
In this way, it is possible to suggest that the lifeworld at any given time is made up of 
technologies that have particular performance characteristics, which exist in particular niches 
based on these characteristics (Levinthal, 1998). Due to incremental innovation in these 
technologies, these same technologies at another time may have different performance 
capacities that enable new combinations that utilise the technology. 
Levinthal (1998) and Adner and Levinthal (2002) explore this with the concept of exaptation, 
discussed in the literature review, which identifies that often the establishment of radical new 
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technology can be achieved not necessarily with new technology but, instead, the application 
of an existing technology to an entirely different domain: 
A technology undergoes a process of lineage evolutionary development within 
a given domain of application. At some juncture, that technology, or possibly 
set of technologies, is applied to a new domain of application. (Levinthal, 
1998, p. 223) 
With respect to the enabling conditions for a particular technology, exaptation would suggest 
it is the performance capability of technologies of other domains that at some point leads to 
the creation of a new technology. As these existing technologies incrementally improve, they 
may reach a performance “threshold” (inflection point, tipping point) that creates an exaptation 
opportunity for the creation of new combinations. 
The capacity of these technologies is viewed as dynamic, and at any time it is their current 
capacity that defines what types of combination they can be used for.  Recognising the role of 
exaptation, it is possible to suggest that as the capacity of these technologies changes, they 
enable new exaptation opportunities, being applied to new purposes far distant from their 
original or previous roles. For example, whilst the first computers were used as a military tool 
to calculate firing tables (Basalla, 1988, p. 141), they have gone on to be used in a great deal 
of industries that are distant to this original use. And the availability of electricity in homes, 
originally as a source of lighting, was soon put to a different use, with electric motors becoming 
a key technology of the kitchen appliance industry (Hughes, 1983). Put differently, the capacity 
to create new radical technologies “grows” out of these existing technologies as their 
performance expands, rather than being the result of distinct unique attempts at innovation. 
This further advances the recognition of combination and exaptation as critical markers of new 
creation, and it also leads to the recognition of the role of incremental improvement in existing 
technologies as a key characteristic of what creates the establishment lifeworld, where new 
technology is possible that previously was not. 
The discussion of the prehistory lifeworld identified that there may exist a strong parallel 
technology offering a similar form of value to the one about to be created. Exaptation would 
suggest that the new technology will not emerge from the existing industry but, instead, 
somewhere far removed from it. This might have consequences for how the new technology 
is viewed by the existing industry, as well as perhaps creating special conditions for the act of 
insight to link the disparate technology to a new domain of application. 
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3.2.3 Summary of establishment lifeworld 
The establishment lifeworld describes the conditions that lead to the creation of a technology. 
It recognises that new technology is a combination of pre-existing technologies, and that for 
the technology to be created there must be a build-in capacity in this lifeworld compared to the 
previous prehistory lifeworld. In describing these conditions in the establishment lifeworld, the 
focus has been on describing how accumulation in available technologies occurs to offer 
particular enabling conditions for the creation of the new technology. Table 3.6 presents a 
number of markers summarising the ideas of the establishment lifeworld which will be used to 
explore the case study. 
Table 3.6 Summary of markers for the establishment lifeworld 
Marker 1 The domain will be established with the release of a new product. 
Marker 2 The new technology can be described as a combination of pre-existing 
technology. 
Marker 3 The component technologies that are utilised will have a traceable 
history in other domains.  
Marker 4 There are some tangible new performance characteristics of these 
component technologies, represented as “combination thresholds” 
that make the new technology possible. 
Marker 5 The new technologies will emerge as adolescent with limited 
performance and will now compete against a parallel technology in a 
stronger state. 
 
3.3 Development lifeworld 
The early technologies of the previous establishment lifeworld do not lead to significant 
innovation immediately. The third lifeworld, marked as the development lifeworld, describes 
the most dramatic design work of the technology. The technology is initiated as crude, 
adolescent, and uncertain (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, p. 42; Clark, 1985, p. 238; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990, p. 14) but improves through processes marked collectively as 
development in this lifeworld. 
There are three key processes used to describe the development lifeworld. First, there is 
expected to be a recognisable increase in entrepreneurs offering new products (Klepper, 
1996). These products initiate a process of variation and selection, where the selection 
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environment (Nelson & Winter 1982) of the wider lifeworld reveals constraints and limitations 
of the technology over a number of socioeconomic influences. Second, the technology faces 
significant competition in this lifeworld. It has now emerged as a distinct technology but remains 
one of many parallel alternatives, with recognition that there will be pre-existing alternatives 
with stronger performance and alignment that it must now compete with. With the problems of 
the technology revealed by trial and error in this lifeworld, the capacity of the technology to 
achieve innovation fluctuates and remains uncertain. Finally, accumulation in capacity of the 
lifeworld, discussed previously, continues, offering a larger range of technology with greater 
levels of performance that weren’t previously available. It is likely that there are continued 
exaptation events that bring new component technologies in the domain into focus. 
These concepts will be discussed in detail below. 
3.3.1 New entrants 
There is expected to be a dramatic number of new entries from competitors. Consistent with 
innovation lifecycle models (Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 
1996; Klepper & Miller, 1995; Maine et al., 2014), the launch of first technologies initiates a 
wave of new entrants who sense an opportunity for dramatic innovation. Borrowing a metaphor 
from Jewkes, if the previous establishment lifeworld is where the scent has been picked up, 
the development lifeworld is where “the hunt is in full cry” (Jewkes, 1958, p. 28). 
New entrepreneurs are expected to come from a variety of industries and backgrounds. As 
described previously, in the establishment lifeworld an exaptation event is expected to 
establish the technology. If this is the case, then the technology will have a history in an 
industry that is different from the new application. Using Basalla’s (1988) example, the 
combustion engine was created in the mining industry but was applied to transport, leading to 
the development of motor cars, with inventors also drawing from the bicycle industry, such that 
Ford called his first ever car the “Quadricycle” (Doeden, 2007). Cattani’s discussion of “pre-
speciation” (Cattani, 2006) and O’Reilly and Tushman’s (2016) discussion of organisational 
“ambidexterity” highlight that exaptation events favour some firms over others based on their 
history of skills and experience. Whilst those who establish the technology in the previous 
lifeworld may have some unique industry experience or vantage point to identify the 
combination and exaptation opportunity, once the technology is established in this 
development lifeworld there is expected to be engagement from entrepreneurs from a wider 
variety of impacted industries, from those who have experience in the new technology to those 
who have a history and understand the industry of application. 
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The large volume of competitors offering products creates a variation and selection process 
that further develops the technology. These variation and selection processes will be 
discussed below. 
3.3.2 Variation and selection 
The products offered from the variety of entrants create a process of variation and selection 
(Clark, 1985). Each product offered to the market by entrepreneurs can be seen as a 
hypothesis (Arthur, 1994, p. 407), and, based on feedback from the selection environment 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), entrepreneurs refine their understanding of the performance of 
different designs. An understanding of better performing designs accumulates probabilistically 
rather than deterministically, and even entrepreneurial failure, which is expected to be common 
during development (Arthur, 1994, p. 407; Garud et al., 2013, p. 777), offers valuable feedback 
to the marketplace with respect to uncovering critical problems in design, referred to as 
“bottlenecks” (Clark, 1985; Gatignon, Tushman, Smith & Anderson, 2002, p. 1106) or “reverse 
salient” (Hughes, 1983). These problems or limitations of particular types of design become 
more obvious with a greater amount of feedback (Simon, 1962, p. 472). 
It is expected that selection does not only reveal problems at a technical level but 
socioeconomic constraints as well. For the technology to achieve innovation there is a 
recognition of socioeconomic factors within the lifeworld having an influence on the 
development and design of the technology (Campbell, 1969; Constant, 1980; Dosi, 1982, 
1988; Geels, 2004; Geels & Schot, 2007; Kemp, Rip, & Schot, 2001; Simon, 1962). These 
factors are not passive receivers of new technology in the sense that they accept whatever 
characteristics are presented by the technology, but, instead, they themselves actively 
contribute to the design (Sahal, 1981) and selection. There are a number of these factors within 
the lifeworld that are engaged and have a direct influence on the design of products. 
– Component level variation and feedback  
The products of the establishment lifeworld offer a technical design, and whilst this is expected 
to be popular with entrepreneurs, it is also expected that entrepreneurs will explore and 
experiment with different types of components and configurations within the technology. In the 
early stages of the automobile industry, for example, cars were offered with gasoline, 
electricity, and steam engines, as well as wood and aluminium bodies (Abernathy & Utterback, 
1978; Henderson & Clark, 1990, p. 14). In the design of steamboats, there was a choice 
between wood and iron hulls (Gillfillan, 1935), and in the early stage of railways there were a 
number of varied track width designs (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). This type of variation 
appears common in the early stages of the design of a technology (Geels, 2002, 2005). 
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– Consumer feedback 
Consumers play a central role in the development and configuration of technology. The 
technology is not delivered readymade with meaning articulated prior to consumer use (Tuomi, 
2002, p. 9), but instead consumers actively define and shape its meaning (Fischer, 1992, p. 
84-85). The role of consumers has been recognised as so central to the development of 
technology that their role has been acknowledged to be the most important: “The single 
measure which discriminated most clearly between success and failure was ‘user needs 
understood’” (Freeman & Soete, 1997, location 4501). As a consequence, much of the design 
task relates to understanding user needs and translating these into the design of the artefact, 
ensuring the design offers particular features that appeal to user preference. 
The reliance on the consumers to shape the technology leads to a paradox in this development 
stage. The technology is adolescent, and its performance is limited or not entirely reliable, but 
it still requires consumer input to be shaped into something useful. For example, the early 
performance of automobiles (described as horseless carriages) was bad enough to limit 
widespread adoption (Levinthal, 1998, p. 221), despite the fact that the performance of the 
automobile would improve if it were widely adopted. If the technology does not achieve minimal 
thresholds of functionality (Basalla, 1988; Levinthal, 1998) for mass markets, the technology 
is not likely to be selected in these markets. For these mass markets, the technology itself may 
be too expensive, too operationally complex, or too unreliable to offer enough value in 
comparison to pre-existing technologies. 
Despite the technology not meeting performance requirements of mass markets, meaning and 
configuration of the technology remain something that must come from consumers (Geels, 
2002), and their feedback is central to reducing uncertainty about the configuration of the 
technology (Pinch & Bijker, 1984). This paradox is addressed by the development of the 
product in niche markets (Christensen, 1997; Rip & Kemp, 1998; Geels & Schot, 2007). Niche 
consumer markets are not simply early adopters of a mature technology (Rogers, 1995), but 
instead niche markets actively develop the technology (Clark, 1985, p. 246; Fichman, 2000). 
Despite having incomplete performance, the niche market application can utilise the current 
performance offered in the technology at this early stage, whilst navigating the limitations or 
missing features. Early automobiles, for example, were used primarily as a recreational 
technology for the rich (Basalla, 1988) and public entertainment in the form of motor races 
(Colt, 1996). Pneumatic air-filled tyres are another example – they were first adopted by bicycle 
racers before eventually migrating to mass markets as the performance (cost, durability) of 
designs improved (Bijker, 1997). 
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The recognition of the importance of niche markets highlights the expectations that consumers 
place on performance. Preference with respect to retail cost, usability, branding, and consumer 
learning curve (Perez & Soete, 1988, pp. 468–469) all represent criteria that can impact the 
perceived value of a technology (Rogers, 1995; Bijker, 1997). Each new product offered to the 
market should be seen as a hypothesis that both reveals and shapes this criterion. To be 
successful, entrepreneurs must understand with precision what that market has a value 
preference for and embed this into their product, even when the preference itself may not at 
first appear entirely rational (Cusumano et al., 1992). For example, the persistence of 
popularity of the QWERTY keyboard layout, despite there being clearly superior design 
alternatives (such as the DVORAK design, which offers faster typing efficiency), is a case 
where entrepreneurs in the computer market must offer a less than optimal technological 
feature in order to satisfy consumer value criteria (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; David, 1985). 
Those entrepreneurs that have attempted to optimise for other levels and disregard this 
consumer preference have failed, including Dvorak himself (David, 1985; Liebowitz & Margolis, 
1990; Utterback, 1996). The many new products in this development lifeworld reveal and 
shape these consumer criteria with respect to designs that deliver the most consumer value. 
– Complementary alignment and feedback 
The technology does not exist in isolation but is dependent upon a range of complementary 
technologies, suppliers, and distribution channels (Rosenberg, 1983, p. 59). In this lifeworld, 
development also extends to the identification and alignment of these complementarities. The 
performance of the technology is dependent on entrepreneurs’ ability to coordinate these 
complementarities. The automobile, for example, as Unruh (2000, p. 822) notes, was 
dependent upon industry coordination of complementarities such as petroleum, glass, rubber 
and steel. Externally, the value of the automobile was also dependent upon the coordination 
of industries (and governments) related to availability and production of roads – asphalt, 
concrete, and steel industries, and subsequent complementarities such as service stations, 
repair workshops, and, at an even more distant level, motels and drive-in movie theatres (Flink, 
1988). This process of emergence and configuration of these complementarities is difficult, but 
one that is central to the performance of a particular technology (Geels, 2002, p. 1270). In the 
development lifeworld, the complementarities relevant to the new technology are likely to either 
be in their own adolescent state or, if in a mature state, likely to be coordinated and configured 
around an alternative technology. In these conditions, the new technology will have to 
overcome the sting of illegitimacy (Garud et al., 2013) to disrupt these established relationships 
and form new ones. 
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– Cultural feedback 
A technology is embedded within a culture that has a direct impact upon its value and 
configuration. The use of the term “culture” here is consistent with what is introduced by Garud 
et al. (2013, p. 797) and broadly represents the economic, political, and legal environment in 
which the technology is placed. These conditions have an impact on the design criteria and 
value of the technology. 
Garud et al. (2013, p. 797) use the example of Bikram Yoga to highlight the difference that 
culture can have on the configuration of a technology. In the U.S. copyright was granted for 
the postures of Bikram Yoga, which subsequently was exploitable for profit by the copyright 
holder in these conditions. In India, however, the same Yoga postures have been practiced for 
centuries, and any claim for personal ownership would be rejected. A similar concept was 
identified by Basalla (1988) with respect to the renouncement of gun weaponry in Japanese 
military culture in the early 19th century due to the symbolic artistic and cultural values imbued 
in sword weaponry of the samurai warrior class (Basalla, 1988, pp. 188–189). This highlights 
how the cultural context actively shapes the political and legal environment in which the 
technology is embedded, and that “innovation is culturally induced” (Garud et al., 2013). 
Consistent with this, there are expected to be particular unique cultural factors that manifest 
as a result of the technology and that influence its development, where the new technology 
may not initially align with existing cultural conditions and may require adjustment to these 
conditions or to the technology itself. 
3.3.3 Summary of the variation and selection work  
The various products as part of this variation and selection process reveal and induce feedback 
from the lifeworld across these factors. This feedback reveals “reverse salient” (Hughes 1983) 
of design across these multiple criteria, including all technological and socioeconomic factors. 
The puzzle-solving activity (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p. 605; Kuhn, 1962; Wooten & Ulrich, 
2016) of this development creates an accumulating understanding of better performing 
designs. This understanding does not simply arrive all at once but unfolds over time (Arthur, 
2009; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Schumpeter, 1942, location 1837; Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995), where both the lifeworld and the internal technology (as a combination of components) 
develop and shift to find alignment. It takes time to engage the lifeworld, establish and 
coordinate complementarities, find agreement regarding standardisation of components, 
identify and address problems of design or performance across levels (as reverse salients; 
Hughes, 1983), and gain legitimacy in comparison to competing technologies. 
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Whilst variation is not constrained, and entrepreneurs can offer combinations of any 
configuration, previous selections offer feedback about what is effective and what can be 
discarded (Arthur, 1994, p 407), with this being used to create more complex designs. This 
has been referred to as the Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896) in biology, where successfully 
selected designs are often imitated by others seeking selection (Dennett, 1996, location 1565), 
algorithmic compressibility (Tsoukas, 2004, location 1715), or accumulation (Usher, 1954). 
The development process becomes one of selective trial and error (Simon, 1962, p. 472), 
where the best designs accumulate probabilistically rather than deterministically (Van de Ven 
et al., 1999; Rosenberg, 1983). Through selective trial and error, many paths of the maze are 
explored but a direction results, driven by the emergence of higher performing designs that are 
then utilised by entrepreneurs for the next stage of development (Simon, 1962, p. 472). This 
leads to an accumulated understanding of both the problems of configuration and appreciation 
for demonstrated and expected performance (Dosi, 1982; Perez, 2009; Usher,1954; Van de 
Ven et al., 1999).   
Competition 
Due to the adolescence of the technology with limited performance and the process of trial and 
error in this development lifeworld, which further reveal problems and limitations of the 
technology, expectations of the innovative potential of the technology may fluctuate. The 
emergence of the technology in the establishment lifeworld might bring with it unbridled 
enthusiasm for it as an innovative technology of the future, but in this development lifeworld, 
this potential is replaced with failure, problems, and limitation as the technology struggles 
towards performance. Whilst capacity is developing, the innovative capacity may no longer be 
clear, and there may be newly developed uncertainty regarding the technology. 
The uncertainty regarding the innovative potential of the technology will be exacerbated by 
parallel technology.  The technology in focus will not have an exclusive path to innovation. It 
is competing for selection against other parallel technologies, and there is expected to be a 
pre-existing technology in a mature state that continues to have strong momentum (Dosi, 1982; 
Hughes, 1969; Milgrom, Qian & Roberts, 1991). The embeddedness and reliable performance 
of this existing technology has the capacity to slow down development and adoption of the 
new technology. The existing technology has the advantage of lock-in and path dependency 
(Arthur, 1989), which is expected to demonstrate significant resistance to the new technology, 
regardless of its performance and development. In this way, the consistent adoption of a 
mature technology represents a rational choice, but one which later can prove to be the source 
of disruption (Christensen, 1997). 
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Ongoing accumulation 
Amidst this development process, the lifeworld continues to accumulate new capacities.  The 
accumulation process that was discussed in the prehistory and establishment lifeworlds 
continues in this one. Through both new combinations and incremental innovation, new 
technologies and new performance become available in the lifeworld that weren’t previously 
possible. As a result of this continuing accumulating capacity, it is expected that there will be 
further examples of new exaptation or combination as new capacities are drawn into the 
domain from the external lifeworld. These new capacities may be drawn in as solutions to 
emerging identified reverse salient in existing designs. 
3.3.4 Summary of development lifeworld 
The development lifeworld describes the difficult work to develop the technology. The 
technology emerges as adolescent but with the potential for innovation in the establishment 
lifeworld. In this development lifeworld, spurred by a large number of entrepreneurs who create 
a process of variation and selection, problems of the technology are revealed, and the potential 
of the technology to achieve innovation remains uncertain. There is not yet any dominant 
product, with available alternatives having a range of limitations or problems that inhibit 
adoption, particularly in light of parallel technologies that have more reliable performance. The 
variation and selection process of this lifeworld is where the bulk of the work of future 
innovation is done, and where the enabling conditions of dramatic innovation are built, but 
attempts during this development lifeworld are often marked by failure, and innovation remains 
elusive. The products of this lifeworld accumulate a better understanding of optimum design 
characteristics that will be capitalised on in the next lifeworld. Accumulation also continues as 
the lifeworld offers new levels of performance and new types of technologies that were not 
possible previously or not available.  The markers to summarise the discussion of this lifeworld 
are offered in Table 3.7: 
Table 3.7 Summary of makers for the Establishment lifeworld 
Marker 1 There is a dramatic number of new competitors, from a variety of 
industries, offering new products around the new technology. 
Marker 2 These new products initiate a variation and selection process, which 
reveals problems and limitations with the new technology across 
socioeconomic criteria of the lifeworld.  
90 Chapter 3 
 
Marker 3 The new technology represents one of many alternative pathways to 
innovation and must compete against parallel technologies. Due to 
emerging limitations of the technology, its recognition as a potential 
innovation will fluctuate, particularly compared to established 
technology that offers reliable performance. 
Marker 4 Accumulation in capacity of the lifeworld continues, and this creates 
further opportunities for exaptation and combination, with components 
of greater capacity becoming available. 
 
3.4 Innovation lifeworld  
The fourth and final lifeworld is when dramatic innovation is achieved. A new design emerges 
in this fourth lifeworld to achieve dramatic innovation.  
The dominant design is a single product that comes to achieve widespread adoption, capturing 
the vast majority of value of the innovation of the entire domain, having the effect of disrupting 
many previous entrepreneurs from the domain (Abernathy & Utterback, 1979; Sahal, 1981).  
Whilst relying on the accumulated learning and capacity of the previous lifeworld, which 
provides many conditions critical to the creation of the dominant design, the dominant design 
is an extension of this, and requires new insight and advance – what Usher refers to as the 
task of “critical revision and mastery” (Usher, 1954). The design may emerge as a result of 
furthering accumulation where the lifeworld offers new components or new performance not 
possible at previous times. This design, once released, emerges amidst uncertainty and a 
great deal of alternative designs, but as a process will establish dominance over the entire 
class of products, to then become recognised as a dramatic innovation becoming difficult to 
dislodge. 
3.4.1 Emergence of a dominant design 
The recognition of a dominant design is a common stage in process models of technological 
evolution (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p. 613; Dosi, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Sahal, 
1981; Utterback & Abernathy, 1979). Dominant designs have been identified in a range of 
different industries, emerging after a time of intense competition. Dominant designs have been 
identified in industries such as airplane design (the Douglass DC 3 airplane design; Abernathy 
& Utterback, 1978; Nelson & Winter, 1982), automobiles (the Model T Ford; Teece, 1986, p. 
288), computing (the IBM Personal Computer; Suárez & Utterback, 1995), bicycles (the safety 
bike design; Bijker, 1997), synthetic dyes (Van den Belt & Rip, 1987), machine tools (Noble, 
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1986), photolithography (Henderson & Clark, 1990), and typewriters (David, 1985), just to 
name a few. An example description is that of the Underwood Model 5 typewriter, which was 
an early dominant design in typewriter technology. It became the standard configuration of 
typewriters:  
With its single QWERTY keyboard, visible type, tab feature, shift-key 
capitalisation, carriage cylinder, and so forth, this particular design brought 
together a number of market-proven innovations into a single machine and 
very quickly came to command the typewriter industry. It remained the 
dominant design for decades, defining how the typewriter was supposed to 
look and operate in the minds of both typists and other typewriter producers. 
(Utterback, 1996, pp. 24–25)  
3.4.2 How dominant designs are formed 
Why a particular product becomes a dominant design when previous products have failed 
appears more complicated than simply ascribing it to be a superior technological product. 
Technologically, whilst the dominant design achieves uncommon success, it is expected to 
rely on many common components also utilised by competitors (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
David, 1985; Utterback, 1996, p. 24). Despite using many common components, the dominant 
design will be unique as a combination, and will deliver innovation performance previously 
unseen in the domain (David 1985).  
Whilst relying on many standard components, the design may also make use of continuing 
accumulation – there may be new components available in the lifeworld, or continued 
incremental improvement in technologies, that offer new performance that at previous times 
wasn’t possible. This may manifest in continuing examples of exaptation where new 
components are drawn from the lifeworld that have a history in alternative product categories. 
This accumulation may be the source of a new form of performance that now enables a new 
design that addresses problems and limitations with previous designs. 
Beyond technological components, the success of the dominant design is attributable to its 
performance across non-technological factors. Acknowledging that innovation is influenced by 
a range of technological, economic, social, and cultural conditions discussed in the previous 
lifeworld, research has identified that often dominant designs emerge as a result of being the 
most effective design across these multiple criteria, rather than simply being the most 
advanced technology (Cowan, 1990; David, 1985; David & Bunn, 1988; Hughes, 1983; 
Murmann & Frenken, 2006, p. 936; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). For example, in discussing 
the Douglass DC-3 airplane that became a dominant design, Abernathy and Utterback point 
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out that it was the best at balancing a range of criteria, rather than being optimised for any 
single criterion in isolation: “It was not the largest, or fastest, or longest-range aircraft, it was 
the most economical large, fast plane, able to fly long distances” (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, 
p. 43). This appears important to the concept of a dominant design, and it is expected that 
there will be identifiable trade-offs made to achieve optimum full alignment performance as 
opposed to optimisation on one criterion in isolation. 
3.4.3 Dominant design as a process 
The achievement of a dominant design is recognised as a process rather than an event. This 
has some particular effects with respect to recognition, competition, and its own incremental 
improvement over time. 
When the product is first released, its innovative capacity remains initially contestable due to 
its use of a large number of common components. However, over time, consumer adoption is 
follows a similar sequence of Rogers’ diffusion model (1995) proving the technology to be a 
dominant design, leading to its recognition as a powerful innovation. 
There is expected to be fierce competition before the emergence of a dominant design, and 
with respect to which entrepreneur capitalises on this, there are expected to be particular 
characteristics that allow for certain firms to have an advantage (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2016). 
Equally, the role of co-specialised assets (Teece, 1998) becomes important and can be a 
source of advantage for particular entrepreneurs. Co-specialised assets are defined as those 
assets of an individual company, such as control of market channels, brand image, and product 
range inducing switching costs (Utterback, 1996, pp. 27–28), that offer an advantage in 
contrast to other companies offering the same product. For example, in analysing why IBM 
became the dominant design for the personal computer market, Utterback (1996, p. 27-28) 
identifies that whilst there were many PCs on the market, “to the buying public, the name IBM 
had tremendous brand value; as a huge firm, its entry meant that replacement parts and 
service would be available and that applications software would begin to appear, encouraged 
by industry standards that would conform to IBM’s machine”. Co-specialised assets are 
expected to play a role in entrepreneurial competition for a dominant design. 
The emergence of a dominant design has a dramatic effect on competition, and there is 
expected to be a shakeout over time as a large volume of entrepreneurs exit the market due 
to a lack of consumer response to their products (Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Horvath et al., 2001; 
Klepper, 1996; Klepper & Miller, 1995). Those that remain have a positive effect on efficiency 
(Perez, 2002), by imitating features of the dominant design or looking to service niche 
audiences with different features. 
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The dominant design does not also remain static after it is first released. Instead, it is expected 
that the incremental innovation will improve the dominant design over time. Whilst the core 
configuration will remain unchanged, it is expected that incremental innovation will change the 
capacity of the dominant design after its release (Teece, 1986, p. 288). For example, after the 
lightbulb was released, its performance continued to be dramatically improved as an effect of 
ongoing incremental innovation: better metal alloys for the filament, coiling of filaments, frosting 
glass options, along with a dramatic decrease in retail price, were all exhibited improvements 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, p. 43). It is expected that the incremental innovation process 
will be reflected in a series of price or performance improvements of the dominant design that 
occur after its release. 
These improvements, and what becomes almost default adoption of the product by widespread 
consumers, makes the design “difficult to dislodge” (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, p. 614), and, 
after reaching this state of maturity, the product will only become susceptible under the 
pressure of a new parallel technology (Christensen, 1997). 
3.4.4 Summary of the innovation lifeworld  
The final lifeworld discussed is when a dominant design emerges to become a dramatic 
innovation, eclipsing all previous attempts. This dominant design is a unique combination, but 
one which relies on common components of other products, as well as new components 
offering performance not previously available. Utilising the accumulating selection feedback 
from products released in the development lifeworld, the configuration of the dominant design 
addresses problems and outperforms other designs over multiple socioeconomic criteria. 
The dominance of this product emerges as a process over time, and whilst performance is 
initially uncertain, with increasing and then dramatic adoption the product becomes recognised 
as a powerful innovation. As this dominance is established, it has an effect on competition, 
with a large shakeout of entrants and a movement towards imitation.  
Once this dominant product emerges, it becomes further improved through incremental 
innovation, which further makes the design difficult to dislodge. The development process of 
the product is complete, and it only becomes susceptible to a new competing parallel 
technology. The markers to summarise the discussion of this lifeworld are offered in the table 
below: 
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Table 3.8 Summary of markers for the innovation lifeworld 
Marker 1 A new product will be released which becomes recognisable as a 
dominant design. 
Marker 2 The design delivers superior performance by using both common and 
new components in a unique combination, as well as being more 
effectively configured across wider socioeconomic criteria.   
Marker 3 The new design becomes successful as a process. Its performance is 
initially contestable, but over time dramatic adoption proves it to be a 
powerful innovation. 
Marker 4 The design has a significant impact on competition. The successful 
entrepreneur will capture the majority of value of innovation for the 
entire domain, and over time the product proves difficult to dislodge. 
Competitors leave the market due to failed attempts or offer products 
that imitate the dominant design or are designed for niche audiences. 
   
3.5 Chapter summary 
The lifeworld model presented in this chapter is an attempt to recognise conditions outside of 
and surrounding an idea that have a direct impact on the likelihood of its achievement of 
innovation. This model chapter provided a description of four alternative lifeworlds – sets of 
conditions that those attempting to create innovation face. These four lifeworlds describe the 
process of development of a particular idea from impossible to dominant world-changing 
innovation, recognising that the potential to create innovation is not evenly distributed but 
instead emerges briefly, when the lifeworld offers a moment of kairos (Sipiora & Baumlin 2012), 
viewed as the availability of powerful enabling conditions.  The table below is a summary of 
the four alternative lifeworlds along with a brief summary of the markers of each lifeworld as 
presented in this chapter.   
Prehistory lifeworld The idea may emerge for the technology, but the lifeworld is characterised 
by inadequate conditions to create it.  As a consequence, the technology 
remains one limited to imaginative prediction, and markers for this lifeworld 
relate to this. At the same time as these imaginative predictions emerge, 
there is likely an alternative parallel technology in a powerful state that will 
later compete against the technology in focus.   




The lifeworld offers enabling conditions for the creation of the technology in 
focus. Markers relate to the formation of the new technology, with reference 
to combination and exaptation. Despite a new technology being created, it’s 
performance is limited.  
Development 
lifeworld  
The technology becomes a recognised technology of potential.  Markers 
focus on the large volume of new entrants which initiate a large amount of 
trial and error in product design. This trial and error reveals innovation is 
difficult, with a range of socioeconomic design criteria emerging. 
Innovation lifeworld The problems that limited innovation previously are overcome with a product 
that achieves dramatic innovation. Markers relate to the emerge of a 
dominant design that captures the majority of value of innovation, resulting 













This chapter provides an overview of the methodology of this study. With the research question 
concerned with the role fo the environment impacting the nature of a specific technological 
innovation over time, this research is process research, and this will be explored and explained 
in this chapter.  
A summary of the research methodology of this study is presented as follows. This is a single 
case study of digital music player technology, with the end boundary condition of 31 December 
2007. Using extensive secondary documentation (over 4,000 published articles) and archival 
data (45 hours of secondary interviews and keynote presentation video footage), triangulated 
with 17 one-on-one semi-structured interviews with recognised protagonists and experts (over 
20 hours of interview recording), an event history narrative of the development process of 
digital music player technology has been produced. This event history narrative is extensive 
and spans events from the 11th century up to 31 December 2007, but the major focus of this 
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event history narrative is January 1995 to December 2007. A summary of this narrative is 
provided in the next chapter, followed by the findings chapter, which maps this history against 
the lifeworld model to explore the research questions. 
This chapter will provide an overview of this process methodology, providing both the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of this study, a description of the case study, a 
description of data and collection methods, and a description of analysis methods employed. 
It will begin with a brief discussion of the nature of innovation and the impact upon 
methodological decisions. 
4.1 Philosophy of innovation 
There are some fundamental characteristics of innovation that make it a difficult phenomenon 
to research, and represent a broad collection of epistemological and ontological issues. Before 
moving on to discuss the particular methodology of this research, the following section will 
explore some of these characteristics of innovation, reflecting upon how they impact 
methodological tendencies in the innovation literature. This will provide context for the 
methodological choices of this research. 
4.1.1 Problem of abstraction 
Innovation research is complicated due to the observational difficulty of innovation. Innovation 
is an abstract characteristic, which means that comparison between innovations is difficult. 
The airplane and the telephone, for example, look nothing alike and are used for purposes that 
are nothing alike, yet both have been described as innovation (Constant, 1980; Fischer, 1992). 
The same can be said of all innovation – implicitly, every recognised innovation will be unique 
in some way, different from all others. 
This observational uniqueness creates complexity for theory. In contrast to the problems of 
deduction identified by Popper (1959), where in some cases observational repetition can lead 
to fragility of conclusions (Taleb, 2012), innovation has the inverse problem. In Popper’s 
famous example, a large volume of recorded observations of white swans led to the conclusion 
that all swans are white, with science written around this, until this characteristic was proven 
entirely wrong with a later observation of a black swan (Popper, 1959). In contrast, for 
innovation each observable case of innovation is different and unique from all other 
innovations. Using Popper’s swan example, it would be as if one swan were red, another didn’t 
have wings, one looked like a frog, and on and on, until the only useful conclusion is that no 
two swans look the same. Two innovations can be distant dissimilar objects and yet both be 
classified as innovation. 
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As a result, to capture the large diversity of all innovation, innovation theory can become very 
general and abstract. Johannessen, Olsen, and Lumpkin (2001), for example, focus on the 
concept of “newness” defining innovation as something that hasn’t been done before.  This 
concept of newness is abstract enough to represent the many different examples of innovation 
through history but becomes problematic and subjective in interpretation when attempting to 
apply this concept to any particular example. 
– The popularity of case study research 
In-depth case study research is a methodological response to this problem. Case study 
research largely avoids the general in favour of a deep focus on the specific. Rather than 
seeking abstract generalisations to describe innovation, case study research explores deeply 
the conditions and characteristics of a particular case. This approach has proved to be 
powerful, with some of the most seminal references in the innovation literature being examples 
of case study research. Detailed case studies of steamboats (Gilfillan, 1935), radio (Maclaurin, 
1950), electricity supply networks (Hughes, 1983), turbojet design (Constant, 1980), 
typewriters (David, 1980), bicycles and Bakelite (Bijker, 1997), disk drives (Christensen, 1997), 
and the innovation process at 3M (Van de Ven, Polley Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999) are 
samples of a research methodology that has proved powerful to the understanding of 
innovation and shaped the innovation literature. 
4.1.2 Failed innovation and successful innovation may be similar 
Another complicating characteristic of innovation is that just as two artefacts may have no 
physical resemblance and both be recognised as innovation, it is possible for two artefacts to 
be almost identical, sharing a great deal of the same attributes and components, but only one 
recognised as an innovation. 
This creates the risk of innovation research of abduction, whereby theory affirms the success 
of a particular artefact (Flach & Hadjiantonis, 2013; Magnani, 2003; Peirce & Turrisi, 1997), 
with little regard for how similar characteristics or actions are found in examples of failure. This 
has been a direct criticism of the linear model of innovation, which, as described in the literature 
review, explains successful innovation as the specific actions of the individual who succeeds, 
with little acknowledgement for others who may have undertaken similar actions and failed. 
– A need to explore failure 
There is a resulting methodological imperative to not isolate successful innovation but, instead, 
explore innovation success in the context of similar examples of failure. Bijker notes that this 
hasn’t always been the focus of innovation research, which at times has been susceptible to 
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survivorship bias, with a more exclusive focus on success: “Most innovation studies have been 
carried out by economists looking for the conditions for success in innovation” (Bijker, 1997, p. 
21). Response to this has been a strength of the innovation systems perspective, with 
recognition of innovation as both an individual and collective act (Hekkert et al., 2007). Despite 
this useful intention, as also mentioned in the literature review, the technological innovation 
systems level repeats the problems of isolation of the linear model by viewing innovation as 
something achieved by a particular system with little regard for how this system interacts with 
its wider environment. There remains a need to explore the context and to capture both failure 
and success more completely. 
4.1.3 Innovation emerges over time 
The final characteristic of innovation that increases its research difficulty is that innovation is 
not an obvious characteristic of a particular technology at its inception, but instead innovation 
emerges over time. A well-documented characteristic of technology is that technologies have 
trajectories (Dosi, 1983; Freeman & Soete, 1997; Lipsey et al., 2005). Even technologies that 
prove dramatically innovative first emerge as crude and adolescent at the time of their creation 
(Rosenberg, 1976). Few would dispute the recognition of electrical lighting as a powerful 
innovation today, for example, but early in its development the innovativeness of this 
technology was speculative at best and viewed as unlikely by some due to problems: 
“Countless other problems plagued the station during the breaking-in period. Current leaked 
from conductors and junction boxes under the streets” (Hughes, 1983, p. 73).  Inversely, the 
difficult journey from raw technology to innovation is not assured, and, just as there are 
examples of later world-changing innovations that have not resembled this earlier in their 
trajectory, there have also been many new technologies birthed as expectant world-changing 
technologies, only for this to never eventuate. This problem of how innovation changes over 
time is central to this research and creates some particular methodological issues. 
– The importance of historical research 
The trajectory of innovation makes identifying a potential innovation prospectively or in real 
time very difficult. An acknowledged problem of selecting a developing innovation is that the 
outcomes may not yet be obvious or complete. For example, the expansive real time 
longitudinal innovation research of Van de Ven et al. (1999), which attempted to explore the 
innovation process at 3M in real time, later required an update to capture events that occurred 
after the research was complete: “Some innovations being studied did not reach their natural 
conclusion until 1991 (when they were implemented or terminated). Hence the book was 
written before we knew the end of the story” (Van de Ven et al., 1999, location 54).   
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For this reason, historical research is an important methodology of innovation research. Rather 
than selecting a developing innovation, instead it is common for research to explore a past 
innovation,  where events have already occurred (e.g., Basalla, 1988; Bijker, 1997; Constant, 
1980; Hughes, 1983). Methodologically the strength of this method is that it avoids premature 
conclusions. The weakness though, is the potential for increased unreliability on account of 
biases of hindsight and historicism (Popper, 1954). The availability of data is critical. 
– Innovation as process 
The recognition of change over time as something critical to the nature of innovation also 
promotes the particular philosophical and methodological perspective known as process 
research. Process research explores longitudinal change over time, rather than events or 
variance at a particular point in time. Process research is focused on capturing the unfolding 
temporal pattern of events with the view that it is this pattern that represents something 
fundamental to the nature of innovation (Garud et al., 2013).   
Process methodology is central to this research, and prior to a description of specific choices 
and characteristics of the case study, a brief description of process philosophy will be provided, 
with particular focus on relevance to this research. This will then be followed by an overview 
of the case study. 
4.2 Philosophy of this research 
This research is process research; it is an attempt to explore the sequence of events – a 
temporal pattern that creates conditions of innovation at certain times. A brief overview of 
process philosophy and how it is relevant to this research will be described below. 
4.2.1 Ontology – what things are 
Process research describes change as the most essential nature of reality. From this 
perspective, all things are in flux: “The river is not an object but an ever changing flow; the sun 
is not a thing, but a flaming fire” (Rescher, 1996, p. 10). Everything can be viewed as its own 
process of activity and change. This view comes initially from Heraclitus who explored these 
concepts in antiquity, viewing change as the more important part of objects themselves: “What 
was cold soon warms, what was wet dries, what was scattered gathers and what was gathered 
blows apart” (Heraclitus, 2001, location 315). By the 20th century, process became a 
perspective of pragmatist philosophy and an alternative to objectivism (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), 
as authors such as James (1907), Pierce (1965), and Dewey (1909) continued to expand the 
perspective of reality as fundamentally a process (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005, pp. 2–3). 
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In the innovation literature, process ontology has been increasingly advocated for (Mohr, 1982; 
Poole, Holmes, Dooley & Van de Ven, 2000; Van de Ven, 2007; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), 
and even previous to this advocacy, whilst not formally described ontologically as process 
research, process appears as something essential to innovation research. From the earliest 
theoretical manifestations, by Schumpeter (1939, 1942), Ogburn (1922), and Gilfillan (1945), 
innovation researchers have offered insight into processes of change (Godin, 2010).  
Schumpeter, for example, contrasts innovation sharply with static equilibrium models and 
describes capitalism as a process: “Capitalism then is by nature a form or method of economic 
change and not only never is but never can be stationary” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 83). 
Recognising objectivist (things as objects) and process (things as processes) ontologies, Van 
de Ven and Poole (2005) bridge the two and describe alternative increments between them. 
Table 4.1 (adapted from Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) summarises four alternative approaches 
bridging the view of all things as processes to the view of all things as objects. 
Table 4.1 Four alternative approaches to ontology of Processes / Objects 
Approach I  
All things are 
processes. 
All things can be explained as processes. This is the 
most radical process perspective. It reflects the 
Heraclitean perspective that the river is an ever-
changing flow. 
Approach II  
Processes are 
primary, but they 
create objects. 
Processes are primary, but objects exist. Processes 
engender, determine, and characterise things, but 
objects exist independent of processes. Phase-based 
models of change, such as the lifecycle approach, are 
a common representation of this. 
Approach III 
Objects are primary, 
but they are impacted 
by processes. 
Objects are primary but enact processes. Objects are 
the focus of and are described as the centre point of 
analysis. This reflects Aristotle’s perspective of reality 
and is the common ontology of most organisational 
theory. 
Approach IV All things are objects.  
Objects are primary. There are no processes, and all 
representations of process offer only surface 
description of objects. This reflects Plato’s perspective 
of reality. 
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The position of this research  
This research adheres to the ontological position of Approach II, where processes are primary 
but create objects. This aligns with the suggestion of Van de Ven and Poole (2005, p. 22) that 
phase-based process models fit within Approach II. 
4.2.2 Epistemology – the way we know things 
The literature provides much discussion of the differences between process research and 
variance research (Langley, 1999; Mohr, 1978; Poole & Van de Ven, 2004; Van de Ven, 2007). 
These two types of research differ as modes of explanation (Mohr, 1982, p. 36). Process 
research investigates unfolding sequences over time, looking for patterns of change (Langley 
et al., 2013, p. 1), with a strong focus on narrative as a central component of description. 
Variance research instead investigates the relationship between variables (what effect does X 
have on Y) and is the more common representation of the scientific method (Mohr, 1982).  The 
choice between these two methods represents what Van de Ven (2007) refers to as a fork in 
the road and requires distinctly different methods as well as related expectations.  Whilst both 
types of research are valid, they are also methodologically distinct, where research should be 
designed with reference to the selection made (Van de Ven, 2007). 
This research has been designed as process research and fits within the methodological 
expectations and criteria of this perspective. 
4.2.3 The role of models in innovation research and the generalisability of knowledge 
The presentation of theoretical models has a long history in innovation research.  Godin notes 
that within the innovation literature, models make things visible, serving a pragmatic purpose 
of organising knowledge, and giving social existence to particular ideas (Godin 2017, location 
151).  Reviewing the long history of models within the innovation literature, Godin also notes 
the role of both analytical and mathematical models.  This research clearly provides an 
analytical model rather than mathematical, and Godin notes that the purpose of analytical 
models is to offer a rhetorical device, a focussing lens through which to see phenomena.  From 
this perspective, the generalisation claims of this thesis reflect the nature of the model it utilises 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).  This thesis and the model within, are primarily a tool to 
describe particular characteristics of phenomena as it emerged in the case study, and for the 
model to bring forward the focus on particular characteristics of innovation.  As discussed with 
references to the problems of abstraction (in section 4.1.1), the generalisability claims of this 
thesis are consistent with other prominent innovation case studies, limited primarily to the case 
in focus.  
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4.3 Case study overview 
This research is an in-depth single case study. The rationale for the choice of case study 
research comes from existing innovation process research (Suurs, 2009; Van de Ven et al., 
1999) as well as from Yin (2013, location 640–962), who identifies that case study research is 
a suitable method where the research questions are “how” or “why” questions and the 
researcher is motived to understand a real world case where there exist important contextual 
conditions. 
4.3.1 Case study overview and choice 
The case study for this research is portable digital music players (recognised colloquially as 
MP3 players). This study retraces the history of this technology, describing its prehistory 
through to maturity and using this to explore why innovation was possible at one time and not 
others. This particular case study was chosen for the following reasons.  
1. Historical case study 
With reference to the problems of prospective innovation previously discussed in this chapter, 
a successful innovation from the past was chosen. Historical research is a well-accepted style 
of research in the innovation literature (e.g., Basalla, 1988; Constant, 1980) and avoids the 
complications of selecting a technology developing in real time or prospectively before the 
story is complete, or indeed selecting a technology that may not lead to innovation. 
2. Availability of data  
Acknowledging the need to cover both successful and unsuccessful attempts at innovation 
also discussed in section 4.2, a strength of the selected case is that despite being historical, 
there is a large amount of high quality data. The development of digital music had a high profile 
internationally, resulting in a vast amount of web articles, blog posts, user forum discussions, 
interviews, and keynote addresses all published on the internet in real time during 
development. Thanks specifically to the Internet Archive (http://archive.org/web/), almost all of 
these websites, including published articles, blog posts, forum discussions, and recorded audio 
and video, have been preserved and remain intact in chronological order. This represents a 
powerful archive. 
The combination of a high-profile case resulting in a large volume of data, along with the almost 
complete preservation and maintenance of this real time data by the Internet Archive, provides 
a vast and rich data set for analysis that avoids biases of retrospective recall and survivorship 
(Yin, 2013). 
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Supplementing this data, primary expert interviews were completed for this study. With the 
research primarily investigating events between 1995 and 2008, there are many expert 
protagonists alive and available for interview who have strong recollections from this time and 
provide important insights and reflections to supplement the large volume of secondary data. 
3. The birth of the internet  
Another reason that this case study was chosen is the impact of the internet. Digital music was 
one of the first and is still one of the most dramatic accounts of industry disruption caused by 
internet-enabled computing. Prior to digital music, the internet was new, and its value to 
consumers was largely unclear. The emergence of the ability to download music has been 
cited as the catalyst for initiating consumer adoption of broadband internet (see case study 
sections 8.3, 9.24) and the subsequent verve with which consumers did so resulted in dramatic 
change to much of the existing record industry. 
Since this, computing has become a more powerful example of an epochal technology 
(Kuznets, 1966; see also Freeman, 1992; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Lipsey et al., 2005), and 
disruption (Christensen 1997) is now commonplace. Waves of industries have followed the 
music industry to becoming similarly disrupted and reorganised around digital technologies 
(Perez, 2009).  With the capacity of computing continuing to advance and reaching 
unprecedented levels of performance, this trend is set to continue (Andreesen, 2011). 
Industries that were only distantly connected to the computing industry, much like the music 
industry once was, such as education (Christensen et al. 2008a) and health care (Christensen 
et al., 2008b), now find themselves susceptible to disruption due to digital technology, in much 
the same way that it occurred with music. Offering analysis of how internet-enabled innovation 
occurred for digital music has relevance for new industries being reconfigured around these 
and similar technologies. 
4. An important time for the record industry, and wider relevance 
A final reason for the choice of case study is the relevance of music. In his keynote address 
when first publicly releasing the iPod in 2001, Steve Jobs justified Apple’s decision to enter the 
digital music market by acknowledging music’s pervasive relevance: “Music’s a part of 
everyone’s life. Everyone. Music has been around forever. It will always be around. This is not 
a speculative market. And because it’s a part of everyone’s life it’s a very large target market 
all around the world. It knows no boundaries” (Jobs, 2001). Consistent with this, music 
represents a universally relevant and familiar case, and one that will continue to be an 
important part of culture that further offers relevance in light of expected ongoing industry 
change. 
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4.3.2 Boundary conditions 
The establishment of boundary conditions is an important task in process research (Van de 
Ven, 2007; Poole et al., 2000). The boundary conditions are important to give clarity to the 
scope of relevance to the study. 
4.3.2.1 Single case study 
This research is a single case study of portable digital music players and does not offer 
multicase comparison to other industries (Yin, 2013, location 4480). Within the innovation 
literature, both multicase and single case designs are common, with both accepted research 
designs (Dewald & Truffer, 2011; Jacobsson, 2011; Suurs, 2009).  
4.3.2.2 Date boundaries 
The date boundaries of this case study are broad. To establish the role of context and 
accumulation that preceded the emergence of portable digital music players, the initiation 
boundary of this study is particularly early. The case study acknowledges events in history as 
far back as, briefly, the 11th century. More consistent data events are identified from the 1950s 
to the 1990s, utilising the emergence of music industry trade journals. Precedent technologies 
such as transistor radios, Walkmans, and portable CD players are all acknowledged in the 
narrative. The narrative also traces similar developments in the computing industry related to 
computer music from the 1950s on, including the emergence of mainframe computers, 
microcomputers, and personal computers.  
The majority of data for this study comes from the emergence of the first portable music players 
prototypes in 1994 to the end boundary of this study, which is 31 December 2007. This end 
date was chosen because whilst the iPod (classic) continued to be sold until 9 September 
2014, it slowly receded in sales from 2008 on. The end of 2007 was chosen to end the study 
because in June 2007 Apple released the iPhone, which was seen as a “convergence device”. 
Further research opportunities exist to describe the development that occurred to the 
technology from 2008 on, but this is outside the scope of this study. 
4.3.2.3 Retrospective case study  
This study is a retrospective case study. Data collection and analysis did not occur in real time. 
This study began in 2010, after events had already occurred. As Poole et al. (2000) note, 
retrospective analysis has a range of benefits and risks. The benefits are that due to the 
completeness of the process, the narrative has the benefit of hindsight, which lends 
perspective to analysis. It also takes less time to collect data, allowing for an expanded date 
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range to be offered in the narrative. Much like Knudson and Ruttan’s (1989) research, this 
research has resulted in a vast narrative that spans events over a number of decades. 
The risks of a retrospective case study relate primarily to awareness of outcomes. Whilst all 
actors and events unfold in real time under conditions of uncertainty, the construction of a 
retrospective narrative can lead to bias as the researcher can distort or omit data that doesn’t 
reflect the uncertainty of the process (Poole et al., 2000, location 1590), resulting in a narrative 
that appears deterministic. This has been countered in this study by tracking the broadest 
possible generic search terms of “digital” in music industry data, and “music” in computer 
industry data to capture and describe uncertainty and development as it occurs. Rather than 
starting with more specific terms such as “MP3” or “Napster”, tracing generic terminology 
highlighted precedent technology and a variety of explored avenues, including failed ones, as 
well as momentum shifts in the nature of experimentation and expected success over time. 
The event history narrative is over 500 pages long, with a strong focus on the detail of this 
experimentation rather than only outcomes of success. Another known disadvantage of 
retrospective case studies is that this method has limited data flexibility, as “researchers must 
make do with what has been preserved” (Poole et al., 2000, location 1870). As mentioned 
above – and as will be further explained in the data section –This case study was chosen 
because of the vast amount of data that is available via both the internet archive, as well as 
through primary interviewees. 
4.3.2.4 Boundaries of focus 
To describe the cumulative causation that preceded the emergence of the first portable digital 
music player, this research traces the history of emergence and awareness of digital music 
technologies in both the computer and the music industries. In practice, as developments were 
connected it was difficult to instigate boundaries, and, as a consequence, it was decided for 
thoroughness to go back to the start of both industries and retrace digital from its inception. 
This meant a great deal more work, but it has produced a more complete narrative. It has a 
focus on tracing the history of “digital” technologies in the music industry, as well tracing the 
history of “music” applications in the computer industry. This also incorporates related 
developments referenced in both industry source data that includes the consumer electronics 
industry, as well as the more general radio and electronics industries. Retracing these separate 
histories provides a strong foundation for a description of how and when these industries began 
to intersect, leading to the emergence of portable digital music players. 
108 Chapter 4 
 
4.4 Data Overview 
This case study utilises three main sources of data: secondary documentation, archival data, 
and in-depth primary interviews. Whilst there are many alternative types of data and directives 
regarding collection (see, for example, Berg & Lune, 2004; Bouchard, 1976; Merriam, 1998; 
Patton, 2005), as this is specific case study research, it will use the guidance of Yin (2014), 
who provides a discussion of data specifically from a case study perspective. This is also 
supplemented with directives offered within the process research literature (Poole et al., 2000; 
Van de Ven, 2007; Langley, 1999). An overview of the data will now be provided. 
4.4.1 Secondary Data 
4.4.1.1 Documentation 
This research employs extensive secondary documentation data.  As part of this study a large 
volume of articles were collected and analysed (more than 4,000 individual articles). This data 
is vast enough to describe the prehistory through to maturity of portable digital music player 
technologies. Over this progression, a number of alternative data sources emerged at different 
times, and trade publications of both the music and computer industries are utilised, as well as 
specific digital music sources as these sources emerged. The digital archives of these 
publications are searchable by key term. For music industry publications, the search term used 
was “digital”. For the computer industry, the search term used was “music”. This gave a large 
amount of references that were then read and coded.  As digital music technologies emerged, 
so too did a range of digital music technology-specific websites, which provide a large number 
of articles that document the issues of development that occurred for digital music player 
technologies. The use of four separate website archives provides a large amount of data (over 
2,000 articles) to document the process of development. Each of these sources will be 
discussed individually below, beginning with digital music technology-specific websites. 
4.4.1.1.1 Digital music technology-specific news websites 
As digital music technology emerged, it brought with it a range of websites that documented 
the development of the technology in real time. These websites, which started in the late 
1990s, now represent a large archive of articles that document the development of digital music 
in real time between 1998 and 2008. Four specific websites – MP3 Rocks the Web, MP3 
Newswire, Music on the Internet, and MiniDisc.org. – offer over 2,000 published articles on 
digital music technologies. A summary is provided in the table below. 
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Table 4.2 Specific news website sources 
Publication Title  Publisher Summary Date range  
MP3 Rocks the 
Web 
Wired.com  
An Wired.com website 
dedicated to publishing 
MP3-related news. 
Established: 1999 
Last entry: 2005 
MP3 Newswire Richard Menta  




Last entry: ongoing  
Music on the 
Internet  
New York Times 
A Times website 
dedicated to publishing 
MP3-related news.  
Established: 1999 
Last entry: 2001 
MiniDisc.org 
Sumit Shah and Eric 
Woudenberg 
An independent website 
dedicated to minidisc 
related news. 
Established: 1998 
Last entry: ongoing 
 
4.4.1.1.2 Computer industry–specific publications 
Prior to the emergence of digital music technology-specific publications, a number of computer 
industry publications were accessed and searched. These magazines capture development 
that occurred from the 1970s through to the 1990s. They were accessed through either the 
Factiva database or via the large volume of computer industry magazines that have been 
digitised by the Internet Archive. (See the table below for a summary of these sources.)  
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Table 4.3 Computer industry publications sources 
Publication Title  Publisher Summary Date range  Accessed via: 
Byte Magazine UBM 
Leading micro- and 
home computing 
magazine through the 






PC Magazine Ziff Davis 
A leading personal 
computer magazine, 
focusing on product 
reviews, upcoming 
releases, and computer 
commentary. 









similar to that of 
PC Magazine but with an 






Search results from 
computer magazine 






4.4.1.1.3 Record industry–specific publications 
Record industry publications were also searched for references to digital music. Because of 
its recognition as the longest standing industry magazine, Billboard was selected as the 
primary source and a detailed search and study of Billboard was produced, with over 700 
articles included for the search terms. (See table below for a summary of these sources.)  
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Table 4.4 Record industry-specific publication sources 
Publication Title  Publisher Summary Date 
range  
Number of articles 
used in this study 







700 individual articles 
 
4.4.1.1.4 Radio-specific publications 
To supplement the use of Billboard, a number of radio technology trade and hobby magazines 
were utilised. This captures audio technology development from the 1920s onwards. See the 
following table for a summary of these sources.) 
Table 4.5 Radio-specific publication sources 






A leading magazine on 
the radio and electronics.  
1929–2003 
Radio Attic Archive 
 
Steven Adams 









A history of headphone 
technology, which provided 
references for further research 
from other locations 
Single publication 
 
4.4.1.1.5 Science fiction-specific publications 
Investigating the recognition of music in science fiction, a range of science fiction databases 
were utilized. These offer history related to the prediction of music/portable music in science 
fiction. (See the table below for a summary of these sources.) 
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Table 4.6 Science fiction-specific publication sources 
Publication Title  Publisher Summary 
Technovelgy.com Bill Christensen 
A website dedicated to technology 




Open source  
A user generated encyclopaedia of 
references in science fiction about 
music. 
 
4.4.1.2 Secondary interviews 
Due to the high-profile nature of digital music, there are a number of recorded individual 
interviews and panel discussions that are available online with key protagonists. Some were 
recorded during particular developments, while others are more recent retrospective interviews 
that recall and reflect on events. (See table below for a summary of these sources.) 
Table 4.7 Secondary interview sources 
Publication 





Kane Kramer The Guardian 
Interview with 
Kane Kramer, 
creator of the IXI 
digital music 
player. 
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Publication 










Music Archive  















computing, in a 
talk titled “The 
Future Isn’t What 
It Used to Be” 






4.4.1.3 Product launch material 
A range of recorded Apple keynote addresses are available that relate to relevant portable 
digital music player product launches and company strategy. (See table below for a summary 
of these sources.) 
Type Date Summary Location 
Apple keynote: Steve 
Jobs 
Jan 2001 
Macworld 2001: iTunes, digital hub 














Macworld 2001 (same presentation 
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Type Date Summary Location 
Apple keynote: Steve 
Jobs 
23 Oct 2001 









Apple keynote: Steve 
Jobs 
2002-2008 
Yearly or half yearly keynote 
addresses, with product releases of 
various iPod products 
Various 
  
4.4.1.4 Archival Data 
In addition, a range of archival data is available and has been utilised. (See the table below for 
a summary of these sources.) 
Table 4.8 Archival data sources 





Summary of WebNoize attendee list, programs, 




Internet active  Various web pages for individual products.  
Apple Inc. 
Apple Inc. financial 
statements  
Breakdown of iPod sales per year, Oct 2001–
Dec 2012; all information sourced from Apple 




Made publicly available 
during court case 
A number of internal emails 
between management of Microsoft which 
discuss the iPod were made public as evidence 
in Combes v. Microsoft. 
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4.4.1.5 Consumer forums 
There are a number of archived consumer forums that provide insight into consumer 
perspectives, particularly at the launch of the iPod. These represent an archive sample of 
consumer sentiment at the time of the iPod launch. (See table below for a summary of these 
sources.) 
Table 4.9 Consumer forum material and sources 
User Forum  Slashdot.org 
A user forum with entries made by 
consumers who discuss their reaction to the 
iPod soon after its release.  
User Forum Macrumours.com 
A user forum covering both the release of 
the iPod and the early weeks following. 
Table 4.10 Consumer forum material and sources 
This summarises the secondary data utilised in this study. All data is stored in an Evernote 
account.  
4.4.2 Primary data 
To supplement the secondary data above, and to increase the validity of the research by using 
a diverse range of data (Yin, 2013), a series of one-on-one semi-structured interviews were 
conducted specifically for this study. One-on-one interviews were deemed appropriate as they 
offer means to gain insight and understanding (Gillham, 2000) above that of the secondary 
data alone. Purposive expert sampling was employed (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 1994) for 
the selection of participants. The selection criteria employed required respondents to be 
directly acknowledged within the secondary data (articles) as experts or primary protagonists 
in the development of digital music. 
4.4.2.1 Completed expert interviews 
Fifty-two experts were approached via email, and of these 17 agreed to and completed 
interviews. This represents a 30.7% acceptance rate, with the total of 16 completed interviews 
also within the range suggested by Polkinghorne (1989), who identifies that between five and 
25 individuals with experience in a phenomenon under investigation is a suitable basis for 
interview data collection. The combination of both the achievement of this benchmark as well 
as the use of interviews as a secondary data source strengthens the reliability of this study. A 
complete list of approached experts including declines and nonresponses is provided in the 
case study protocol. The list of completed interviewees is provided in the table below. These 
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experts offer a direct account of the development of digital music, offer unique perspective on 
this development as its protagonists, and offer informed insight and opinion with respect to key 
developments. 
Table 4.11 Completed primary expert interviews 
Expert Position/Expertise  
Professor Karl Brandenburg Creator of the MP3 file format, member of Secure Digital Media 
Initiative. 
Hank Barry CEO, Napster (peer-to-peer music trading software). 
John Chowning  Creator of digital frequency modulation (FM) synthesis. 
Thomas Dolby Grammy Award-winning synthesiser artist, founder of multiple 
multimedia companies. 
Julie Gordon Copywriter for Apple’s iMac and iPod campaigns, creator of “Rip. 
Mix. Burn.” headline 
Ken Hertz Artist lawyer representing clients such as Alanis Morissette during 
this time. Member and attendee of the Secure Digital Music 
Initiation. 
Andy Hill IBM employee, followed by founder of Multimedia Archive and 
Retrieval System (MARS) 
Jeff Levy University student prosecuted for copyright infringement due to 
online file sharing by the U.S. government. 
Joanne and Tom Marino  Co-founders of online digital music news website 
www.webnoize.com, along with related yearly Webnoize 
conference. 
Phil Morle  CTO, Kazaa (peer-to-peer music trading software). 
Jeff Patterson  Co-founder of the Internet Underground Music Archive (IUMA), 
recognised as one of the first websites to download music on the 
internet and top 10 website worldwide for traffic during the mid-
1990s. 
Jon Potter Founder of Digital Music Alliance (DiMA), a Washington-based 
political advocacy and lobbyist group for digital media 
entrepreneurs. 
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Expert Position/Expertise  
Kelli Richards A&R at various major labels, PatroNet co-founder (the music 
distribution and fan interaction software created by high-profile 
Todd Rundgren in the early 1990s). 
Jon Rubinstein  Vice president of engineering at Apple Computer. Recognised as 
critical to the creation of Apple products between 1997 and 2006 
including the iMac, the iPod, and the iPhone. Leader of the initial 
iPod project, then subsequently head of iPod at Apple when it was 
established as a separate division in 2004. Left Apple in 2006, 
became CEO of Palm in 2008 until it was purchased by HP in 2010. 
Current board member of Amazon.com, Qualcomm, and co-CEO 
of Bridgewater, the largest hedge fund in the world. 
Cary Sherman  Current chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA), previously President of RIAA 2001–2011  
Zak Zalon  President Radio Free Virgin, Virgin Digital. 
  
Nine interviews took place in the U.S. between August and September 2013.  For face-to-face 
interviews, I went to the location of the expert (Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
New York) and conducted the interview in a one-on-one, face-to-face setting (apart from the 
Kelli Richards interview, which also included Hank Barry for the first 10 minutes, and Tom and 
Joanne Marino, who were interviewed together). The choice of location was suggested by the 
respondent, ensuring the data collection environment was as comfortable as possible for the 
respondent (Yin, 2013, location 2488). The remaining interviews were conducted over Skype 
(Professor Karl Brandenburg, Ken Hertz, Jeff Levy, Zack Zallon, Thomas Dolby, John 
Chowning, Andy Hill, and Julie Gordon). 
Interviews were semi-structured, and questions were open-ended and unique to each 
respondent. A list of guiding questions was created beforehand, but often these were not used 
sequentially during the interview. The questions would be asked from memory and in the 
sequence of conversation, and at the end of each interview, I would consult the original list to 
ensure completeness (Bryman, 2004). 
4.4.2.2 Transcription 
The interview data was transcribed by two parties. The researcher transcribed interviews 
directly, and a professional transcriber cross-checked and time-stamped these transcriptions. 
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4.5 Data analysis  
As this research is process research, the primary method of analysis is the creation of a 
qualitative event history analysis. This method is an explanation building method (Yin, 2013, 
location 3760), which results in the development of a narrative. This narrative emerges through 
coding of data into key events and into a final temporal narrative that describes development. 
4.5.1 Event history analysis  
Event history analysis offers a method for constructing a narrative that explains the unfolding 
of the temporal sequence of events. The method is common in process research (Van de Ven 
et al., 1999) and is also employed occasionally in technological innovation systems research 
(Suurs, 2009). The narrative is built through a process of “meaningful parsing” (Pool et al., 
2000, location 1794) of data. Through the identification and coding of “events”, a narrative 
emerges and is refined. Events are not necessarily individual raw data points (although they 
can be) but are seen as important thematic changes or developments in the narrative (Poole 
et al., 2000, location 1752). 
4.5.1.1 Development of narrative 
Data was preliminary coded chronologically with events identified in sequence beginning with 
the earliest data first through to the end boundary of 31 December 2007 last. The narrative 
data is not evenly distributed through this range, but instead the profile of the data reflects the 
emergence of the technology, with the majority of data occurring between 1994 and 2007. In 
this way, the narrative does not reflect a uniform time sequence; instead, the narrative is event-
driven. 
4.5.1.1.1 Key assumptions of process research narrative production 
There are guidelines regarding a number of key assumptions of narrative that are explored in 
the process methodological literature (Poole et al., 2000, location 560–679). These are 
identified and described for the case study in the table below. 
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Table 4.12 Key assumptions of this process research, Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000, 
location 560-679 
Process theory 
assumption  Description  Example This study  
Unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is an 
evolving central subject 
that makes events happen 
and to which events 
occur. While attributes of 
a central subject may 
change, the entity itself 
may also change through 
a number of processes. 
y may change its attributes 
as a result of particular 
events in its development. 
At the end of the studied 
time, y has merged with x 
to create z, and y is 
qualitatively different to 
itself at the start. 
Portable digital 
music player is the 
unit of analysis, and 
the central subject of 
the narrative. 
However, to capture 
the prehistory of this 
technology, the 
narrative offers 
detailed coverage of 
preceding events 
more generally 







accumulative and exhibit 
path dependent 
characteristics. However, 
human agency and 
decisions are the cause of 
process and path. As 
such, events are 
probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. 
The precursor x is a 
necessary condition for the 
outcome y, but it cannot be 





are acknowledged to 
emerge in 
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Process theory 
assumption  Description  Example This study  








employs efficient causality 
to explain the influence 
imparted by particular 
events and often, to 
explain the mechanics of 
transitions between 
events and between 
microlevel units, such as 
phases (location 549). 
Final causality posits an 
end or goal that guides 
the unfolding of 
development and change. 
The final goal of y is __, 
and it was achieved 
through development 
which included events a, b, 
c. 
Final and formal 
causality for the 
narrative is 
the widespread 
diffusion of portable 
digital music players. 
This is used as the 
basis for the end 
date of 31 December 
2007. 
The generality of 
explanations 
depends on their 
versatility. 
Similar to variance 
theories, process theories 
are evaluated on the basis 
of their generality. 
However, the generality of 
a narrative explanation 
stems not from its 
uniformity and consistency 
but from its versatility, the 
degree to which it can 
encompass a broad 
domain of developmental 
patterns without 
modification of its 
essential character.  
The narrative of y is similar 
to that of z, or the narrative 
of y is not appropriate to 
represent that of z. 
The narrative is used 
in the application of 
the technological 
lifeworld model, with 
the versatility of the 
narrative explored in 
the discussion 
chapter.   
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Process theory 






The order in which causal 
forces come to bear is 
crucial in narrative 
accounts. The order in 
which events occur in 
narrative determines when 
efficient causes come into 
play, while the duration of 
envoys and the continuity 
across events determines 
how long these causes 
operate. Stagewise 
models of development 
posit that differences in 
order can make large 
differences in outcomes 
(location 655). 
x began with this event, 
which lead to this direction 
and effect. Without x the 
direction would be 
different. 
 
y began with this event, 
which lead to this direction 
and effect. Without y 
the direction would be 
different. 
This is a critical 
characteristic of the 
narrative. Events 
related to portable 
digital music players 
were investigated 




impact of events as 
they emerged, rather 
than focusing on end 









If variance theories are 
“causally shallow”, 
process theories are 
“causally deep”. They 
explain the state of 
development at any point 
in time in terms of the 
prior historical events and 
associated causal 
influences. In process 
theories, history cannot be 
encapsulated in the 
immediate past state of 
the entity, because the 
ordering and context of 
previous events is critical 
to narrative explanation 
(location 667).  
The presence of event f 
was short but had an 
extended influence in the 
narrative of development 
for y. 
Coding of event 
occurred chronology 




significance to the 
narrative. 
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Process theory 







The process approach 
presumes that the unit of 
analysis may undergo 
metamorphosis over time. 
So the entity may be 
fundamentally 
transformed into a 
different type of unit, 
merge with another unit, 
or go out of existence over 
the course of the 
narrative. 
Event f proved critical in y’s 
narrative, halting all 
development or causing y 
to merge with z. 
The co-development 
and combination of 
components in 
related fields of 
personal computing, 
the internet, and the 
consumer 
electronics industries 
are all critical 
characteristics of the 
narrative.  
 
4.5.1.2 Narrative construction process  
The narrative was constructed by three pass construction. Each will each be described below.  
4.5.1.2.1 First pass 
The first pass occurred in the data collection stage, with identification of relevant large archives 
of data (such as the complete archive of Billboard Magazine, PC Magazine, etc.). For each 
large archive, a search term was selected that was both sufficiently broad as well as 
appropriate for the nature of the publication. The diversity of the data chosen (from alternative 
industries that proved relevant to digital music) required a number of individual search terms. 
Table 4.13 below presents a summary of the first pass terms used. 
Table 4.13 First pass narrative exploration terms 
Source  Search term  
Billboard Magazine Digital  
Computer archives  Music  
Radio magazines Portable/portable music 
Science fiction references Music/Portable music/Portable entertainment 
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The search results returned a large volume of articles through a large time scale. Each article 
was individually read and assessed for inclusion in the Evernote database. The first pass 
provided a large volume of relevant articles included in Evernote.  Due to the general search 
terms, and the large volume of articles returned, the narrative was not yet formed, and key 
events were not yet clear, but this data provided the basis for further exploration. This collection 
method took 12 months. 
4.5.1.2.2 Second pass 
Once all data was in Evernote, the search for key events was applied as a second pass of 
data. This had a focus on the emergence of themes, terms, protagonists, concepts, 
identification of stakeholders within data, and identification of data that provided summaries 
and forecasts. This too was done in chronological order, with events identified in sequence 
beginning with the earliest data first through to the end boundary of 31 December 2007 last. 
This second pass was an inductive method. That is, detailed analysis of all data was 
undertaken and coding categories were identified from the ground up. As both Yin (2013) and 
Poole et al. (2000, location 1952) identify, this method is one of two legitimate alternatives. 
The other is to code deductively, specifically from the perspective of preceding theory, looking 
for events that are relevant to the propositions. Both methods are seen as valid. The inductive 
method was applied largely due to the exploratory nature of the study.  
Again, as stated, the unit of analysis was the technology itself, rather than any particular 
individual. Poole et al. (2000) make the distinction between uni-focal and multifocal coding and 
suggest that the researcher must make a choice between the two. As the name suggests, 
unifocal coding is the focus on one key concept; multifocal coding is the development of 
multiple concepts. Due to the complexity of the technology, as well as the number of 
independent actors, unifocal coding was not appropriate, and multifocal coding was employed; 
in this second pass, a large volume of tags emerged for data. 
At the same time, primary expert interviews were being conducted. For the most part, expert 
respondents were not prompted on particular issues, but occasionally these interviews 
explored emerging themes from the secondary data. 
As the narrative reached stages where the technology had been created, the technology itself, 
as well as the protagonists, began to have a higher profile, with a large amount of press 
coverage and analysis. MP3newswire and Music Rocks the Web became news websites that 
chronicled development, releasing a high volume of articles almost daily. As these sources 
emerged, the search for wider documentation became less significant, and narrative 
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construction shifted to an exploration of key themes from these sources, exploring differences 
and similarities in reporting of these key sources. 
4.5.1.2.3 Third pass 
The third pass was the construction of the final event history narrative. This is the second 
volume. With the nature and order events clear, and the availability of expert primary insight, 
the task became writing about events in the narrative. Due to the expansiveness of the 
narrative, as well as the amount of detail, this was a laborious process that took 18 months. 
This final narrative is approximately 176,000 words (with references). 
4.5.1.2.4 Fourth pass 
The final stage was to apply the lifeworld model to the complete narrative, with the lifeworld 
model providing a lens through which to view the narrative. Similar to the method employed by 
Suurs (2009), the fourth pass mapped the event narrative derived in the third pass against the 
presented lifeworld model of the previous chapter. 
Poole et al. (2000) citing Nutt (1984) in identifying that the application of the phase model is 
appropriate at this stage of analysis, after the creation of the narrative: “Narrative descriptions, 
such as Nutt’s translation of case study stories into phases, are already compound 
representations of complex combinations of activities and typically require no further parsing” 
(Poole et al., 2000, location 3208). 
This fourth pass is the analysis chapter. It presents the process of innovation of portable digital 
music players using the lifeworld model. 
4.5.1.3 Reliability of coding method 
There are risks of reliability associated with the creation of narrative. Citing from Bakeman and 
Gottman (1986, p. 3), Poole et al. (2000) identify that “narrative reports depend mightily on the 
individual human doing them, and judgments about the worth of the reports are inextricably 
bound up with judgments about the personal qualities of their author”. This risk is 
acknowledged, and it has been mitigated using real time data and multiple source data. The 
majority of the data in this study is real time archival data accessed via web sources. This 
eliminates the biases of hindsight. Also, this data has been triangulated with primary expert 
interviews. These interviews offer further depth and insight into issues. 
Research texts offer alternative ways to ensure reliability (Yin, 2013). Particularly, these 
methods include having an independent coder review the data and having an expert review 
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the narrative. In light of the triangulation strategies employed, as well as the expansive detail, 
an independent coder was not used. 
4.5.2 Ethics and participant review 
Ethics approval for this research was granted on 13 June 2013 and expires 30 June 2020. 
Ethics approval was granted before the commencement of in-depth expert interviews. 
Please note, there are also some sensitivities as a result of the public profile of many of the 
experts interviewed for this study.  The expert respondents currently or have previously 
represented large scale industry bodies with constituents, public traded companies, research 
institutes, or more generally have a profile related to their expertise. Agreeing to be identified 
in this research at the time of the interview brings participants risks to their profile, institutions 
and positions based on what the outcomes of the research are.  As a consequence, each 
expert will be offered capacity to review this research prior to publishing.  Each participant has 
been given the opportunity to review the study with the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time with no consequence.  Whilst it is not anticipated that any expert will choose this outcome, 
for ethical transparency this may occur, and if so there will be some revision to the expert list 
of interviewees as well as related sections of the study. To further offer assurance to these 
experts, an embargo period for this research of 18 months post-submission will occur. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an outline of the research method for this study. It identified the process 
methodology of this research and provided an overview of the data, the collection methods, 
and the analysis methods employed. The next chapter presents the narrative. 
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Chapter 5 





This chapter presents a summary of the case study presented as the second volume. Each 
event discussed in this analysis chapter has a corresponding section in the case study, with 
the case study providing a significant amount of further detail. 
Events in the case study and this analysis chapter are presented chronologically and cover 
events related to portable digital music players from prior to 1877 through to the end of 2007. 
This is an extensive timeframe, in part to cover much of the precedent history of portable digital 
music players. The majority of events though, emerge with the majority of activity, which 
occurred between the years 1994 and 2008.  
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5.1 Before 1877 
Music is described as a deep habit of humanity, a universal language traceable back to the 
earliest of historical cultures (Byrne, 2012). From the 11th through to the 19th centuries, music 
became codified, and with this “classical” music emerged iconic composers such as Wagner, 
Beethoven, Mozart, and Bach. This music was created prior to recording technology being 
available; it was exclusively a live experience. 
At the same time, there were imaginative descriptions of recorded music in science fiction (see 
Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Science fiction descriptions of recorded music 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1626 Science fiction  Francis Bacon describes the 
concept of sound houses in New 
Atlantis.  
2.0 
1888 Science fiction Bellamy describes recorded 





Edison’s 1877 “talking machine” and Emile Berliner’s gramophone, patented in 1887, 
eventually led to the recorded music industry, but it took time to advance the designs beyond 
raw technology and even to find the application of music. The first 10 to 20 years after the 
invention saw much experimentation with the technology: first, cylinders were used to record 
sound, then shellac, and then, finally, vinyl, which offered superior durability. The use of the 
technology for recorded music was not obvious at first. Edison initially identified the 
gramophone as a tool not for music but as a supplement to the telephone; to him, it was 
principally a tool to record speeches, conversations, and sermons. Musicians who attempted 
to record through the early technology viewed it as a poor parody of live performance. 
But, with time, music began to emerge as a powerful use of the gramophone, with both Edison 
and Berliner being responsible for two of the largest record labels of the time. The first 
recording artist was Italian tenor Enrico Caruso, who signed to Victor in 1902. By 1949, RCA, 
Victor, Columbia, Decca, and Capitol had become major labels, built around pop, classical, 
and early jazz (Heffernon, Lebowitz, & Stratton 1984, p. 9). By this stage, too, a range of 
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smaller, niche “independent” labels had been created, such as Atlantic, Elektra, and Blue Note 
(Heffernon, Lebowitz, & Stratton 1984, p. 9). 
Early record labels sold records as well as the record players themselves, but an independent 
industry of gramophone manufacturers soon developed. Portable gramophone players, too, 
quickly became a niche focus for some manufacturers. 
The record industry was soon aided by the creation of broadcast radio, which drew from the 
ship-to-ship Morse code technology of Marconi (Levinthal, 1998). This spurred the growth of 
the recording industry to the extent that by 1949, revenues had reached $183 million annually. 
Whilst not yet popular, magnetic reel-to-reel tape (1935) and headphone technology were also 
created in this time, as was the first electrified amplification method (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 The initialisation of the record industry 
Date Event Description Case study 
section 
1877 Creation of 
gramophone/phonograph 
In the same year, Berliner and Edison 
independently create similar recording 
technologies. 
3.1 
1904 Recording industry First recording artist signed in 1902. 3.2 
1935 Magnetic tape First magnetic tape created, demonstrated 
in the Magnetophone. 
3.5 




Entering the 1950s, both radio technology as well as recorded music technology continued to 
strengthen, and recorded music grew in size dramatically in this period (for example, record 
sales revenues increased from $213 million in 1954 to $603 million in 1959) (Garofalo, 1999, 
p. 336). The vinyl record was a strong technology of the record industry in this period. There 
were significant developments that soon added to this. The emergence of transistor radios and 
cassette tapes further developed the industry (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 Growth in the recording industry 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1954 Creation of the transistor 
radio. 
Based on technologies from Bell 
Labs, the transistor radio 
precipitates the entrance of a 
range of new companies into the 
market and becomes a popular 
consumer device. 
4.1 





Record industry. The recording industry continues 
to grow: The RIAA is formed in 
1953, and in 1960 the first Tower 
Records opens. 
4.4 
1963 Cassette tape.  Phillips introduces the cassette 
tape, initially thought of as a tool 
for business dictation. 
4.3 
1979 Bone Fone. Attempts to create a portable 
transistor radio continue, notably 
with the Bone Fone, a radio in a 
sleeve that sits around the neck. 
4.1 
 
The creation of the transistor at Bell Labs soon led to new applications being found elsewhere, 
such as at Shockley Semiconductor (where Gordon Moore worked), and IBM, which began to 
offer mainframe computers that would be used by NASA and the airline industry (see Table 
5.4). 
Table 5.4 Initialisation of computing 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1946 Creation of 
ENIAC. 
The U.S. government funds research to 
design the first digital computer, a 
calculating machine of artillery firing tables 
for the U.S. Army. 
4.5 
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1952 IBM  IBM, then the largest producers of punch-
card technologies, shifts to manufacturing 
electronic digital computers. 
4.5 
1962 IBM 9090 IBM creates the 9090 mainframe computer, 
which is used by NASA and is the basis for 
American Airlines’s SABRE reservation 
system, which by 1968 handles 100,000 
flight reservations a day. The computer 
earns IBM $30 million. 
4.6 
1965 Moore’s law  Gordon Moore publishes his thesis, which 
describes the transistor counts of 
computers doubling every 18 months – a 
thesis that holds true for over 30 years. 
Others, like Ted Nelson, also recognise the 
decreasing price and increasing 
performance of computers at the time. 
4.6 
1974 Minicomputers Digital Equipment Corp dominates the 
microcomputer category. Their first 8-bit 
model, released in 1957, had 4 KB of 
memory and cost $18,000. By 1974, DEC 
has sales close to $1 billion annually. 
4.6 
1977 Altair  The TV typewriter concept initiates the 
concept of home computing and leads to 
the Altair home computer kit. The Altair 
becomes a landmark product that launches 
the home computer category as well as the 
now-famed Homebrew Computer Club, a 
group of computer enthusiasts that includes 
the founders of Microsoft, Apple, 
Commodore, Oracle, and IBM. Other 
computers soon follow, such as the IMSAI 
8080, Radio Shack’s TRS-80, and the 
Apple I and Apple II. 
4.7 
 
During this time, there were a number of developments in computers specifically in the field of 
music. These will be discussed below (see Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.5 Digital computers and music 




MacLean publishes a story in Amazing 
Science Fiction about computers being 
used for music. 
4.8 
1957 Max Mathews at 
Bell Labs creates 
the first digital 
music using a 
computer. 
Mathews writes Music I software for the 
IBM 704 and uses it to create the first 
digital piece of music, called “In the Silver 
Scale”, an arpeggio piece lasting 17 s. In 
1961, Mathews updates the software, using 
an IBM 7094, and creates a digital cover of 
“Daisy Bell”. Mathews works with others at 
Bell Labs, including Laurie Spiegel. 
4.8 
1967 John Chowning 
creates FM 
synthesis. 
John Chowning, a Ph.D. student at 
Stanford with an interest in music 
percussion, visits and works with Mathews 
and others at Bell Labs. He subsequently 
returns to Stanford to create FM synthesis, 
a new algorithm that uses digital computers 
to create complex music timbres. For the 
first time, computers can be used for 
sophisticated sound. Yamaha subsequently 
licenses FM synthesis and uses it in their 
DX7 synthesiser, which becomes the 





A new digital recording method, created by 
researchers in Japan, creates the 
possibility of recording to a digital format. It 
is viewed as vastly superior in quality to 
previous analog methods like magnetic 
tape. By 1969, both Sony and Nippon have 
released PCM recorders to the market, 
aimed at professional studios. 
4.9 
1971 Digital analog 
converters, and 
growing industry 
With the availability of PCM recorders, 
digital recording becomes a new potential 
direction for the industry. Articles in 
Billboard in 1971 discuss analog-to-digital 
4.9 




converters for the first time. In 1974, digital 
music recording is discussed at a panel 




The Sony Walkman was released in 1979 and quickly became a consumer phenomenon, 
bringing portable music to life. Within 10 years, 50 million Walkmans were sold; by 1995, that 
number had increased to 150 million, and the Walkman had become a cultural icon. Created 
using relatively simple technology, the Walkman brought together Sony’s experience in other 
products, such as business dictation cassette recorders and its new prototype headphones 
(created independently by another division at Sony). Sony founder Akio Morita brought them 
together to create the Walkman, the success of which made Sony a dominant global brand. 
As a consequence of the Walkman, the cassette became a second parallel technology of the 
recording industry, which continued to grow in revenues. Blank cassettes revealed the deeper 
problem of piracy, as home taping became a focus of discussion for those in the industry. 
Digital recording also became a focus for the major labels. Continuing on from earlier 
developments with PCM recording and analog-to-digital converters, there emerged a 
competition between the major labels as they began to embrace digital. Viewed as superior in 
quality to analog, digital audio became a popular topic for the industry, with progressive 
investments in the technology made by the major labels. Table 5.7 below highlights some of 
these major achievements.  
Table 5.6 The birth of the Walkman, continued growth of the Recording Industry 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1979 Sony releases 
the Walkman 
Akio Morita and the team at Sony bring 
together a number of existing technologies 
to create the Walkman, which invents a 
new category of consumer electronics and 
becomes a consumer phenomenon. 
5.1 




CBS Records uses digital PCM recorders 
to store Ornette Coleman’s Of Human 
Feelings LP on “software cassette”. All 
5.3 
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major labels invest in and pursue digital 
recording technology. 
1981 Vinyl record 
sales  
In 1981, 1.14 billion vinyl record units are 
sold, an all-time high for vinyl unit sales. 
From 1982 onwards, vinyl sales retract as 
cassette sales emerge. 
5.2 
1982 Home taping  Cassette sales reveal the rising threat of 
piracy as home taping becomes a 
recognised issue. 
5.2 
1981/1982 Major labels The major labels explore the concept of a 
home music store, where music is offered 
via cable service. With pressure from 
music retailers, the trial does not progress. 
5.5 
1979-1983 Kane Kramer British entrepreneur Kane Kramer creates 
drawings for a prototype portable digital 
music player. The device looks similar to 
players that emerge much later. Kramer, 




At the same time as these developments in the record industry, the personal computer became 
a more fully fledged product category (see Table 5.7 below), with a range of landmark releases 
from a range of companies, such as Commodore, IBM, and Apple. The growth in the PC 
category was due to a new range of hardware products as well as clearer utility. The PC 
became a business tool, with applications like word processing and spreadsheets proving 
popular. But it didn’t yet have relevance or ability as a media tool. 
Table 5.7 Establishment of the PC category 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1981 Growth in the PC 
category. 
The PC begins to become a substantial 
category. Apple revenues for 1981 are 
$350 million, up 200% from the previous 
year. 
5.4 
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1981 IBM 5150 Utilising a range of common parts, IBM 
releases the IBM 5150 PC. It quickly 
dominates the market. 
5.4 
1983 Time magazine 
declares the PC 
machine of the 
year. 
Recognition of the significance of PC 
continues to grow. Time magazine calls 
1983 “the year the computer moves in”. 
5.4 
1984 Apple releases 
the Macintosh. 
Apple releases the Macintosh, the first 
product to popularise the use of a mouse as 




Many of the trends above continued to develop between 1985 and 1990 (see Table 5.8 below). 
Both the record industry and the PC industry continued to grow in strength, largely independent 
of each other. The record industry remained in strong partnership with the consumer 
electronics industry, and this relationship was further strengthened with the creation of the 
compact disc, the major landmark development between 1985 and 1990. During this period, 
the recording industry continued to embrace digital audio recording tools, with the technology 
becoming cheaper, supplemented with the new introduction of digital audio professional-level 
music creation tools such as digital synthesisers and samplers. At the same time, more general 
computing precedents emerged for later developments. Tim Berners Lee created the hypertext 
protocol in 1989, and the development of digital audio compression techniques appeared to 
gain momentum, with the Digital Audio Broadcast project in Europe and the establishment of 
the Motion Pictures Expert Group (MPEG). 
Table 5.8 Events related to digital audio 






Sony and Phillips in partnership create the 
compact disc format. It is quickly embraced 
by the recording industry and subsequently 
by consumers. By 1985 terms like 
“avalanche” and “set to explode” are being 
used to describe the emerging consumer 
response to the CD. 
6.1 
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1987 Sony purchases 
CBS Records. 
In 1987, when six major record labels own 
approximately 90% of the historical 
catalogue of recorded music, consumer 
electronics giant Sony stuns the 
entertainment world by purchasing major 
label CBS Records, making Sony the first 
consumer electronics company to own 
creative content. 
6.2 
1984 Sony Sony creates the Discman, a portable CD 
player, which becomes a successful 
extension of their Walkman brand. 
6.3 
1980s  New digital 
instruments. 
The Fairlight digital sampler, released in 
1979, is added to new instruments like the 
Yamaha DX7 and becomes a popular tool 




Professional recording studios widely 
record digitally, with digital mixing and 
mastering equipment common. The 
Synclavia II (1985) offers a cheaper version 





PCs continue to gain significant capacity 
and incremental growth, with new 
developments such as the CD-ROM. A 
range of PC software for music also 
emerges (music notation, MIDI composers). 
With 8-bit audio capacity, computers are 
only capable of beep-style sounds 
popularised in video games. 
6.5, 6.6 
1988 MPEG formed. MPEG is formed in 1988 and charged with 
the task of developing compressed video 
and audio standards for multimedia 
technology such as the CD-ROM. In 1989, 
MPEG calls for standards submissions and 
receives 14. One such submission is from 
Karlheinz Brandenburg and others at the 
6.7 
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Fraunhoffer Institute; it later forms the basis 
of the MP3.  
1989 Chippy Hoax British TV show Going Live broadcast an 
April fool’s joke describing ‘The Chippy’ a 
computer chip the size of a credit card that 




The early 1990s represent a continuation of many of the previous themes and events (see 
Table 5.9). There was a growing proliferation of CD formats, leading to new levels of success 
for the recording industry as the CD became an increasingly strong and embedded technology. 
At the same time, personal computers continued to advance in capacity. The availability of the 
CD-ROM, the creation of the HTTP protocol, early analog-to-digital (and digital-to-analog) PC 
sound cards, precedent work on file compression standards, and file sharing on FTP sites all 
occurred at this time, leading to increasing recognition of the PC as a multimedia tool. Amongst 
these developments, other events and paths appeared, such as Sony’s release of the 
MiniDisc, Phillips and Matsushita’s digital cassette, IBM and Blockbuster’s experimenting with 
in-store kiosks, and high level industry discussion about and recognition of the potential for 
looming dramatic change due to digital distribution. 
Table 5.9 Record industry – CD sales continue, new technologies explored 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1991 CD sales With the falling cost of CD players and 
increasing catalogue availability, consumer 
adoption of the format is rapid. In 1991, CD 
sales surpass vinyl and cassette for the first 
time. 
7.1 




The Home Recording Act was passed, and 
with this announcement the then head of 
the RIAA, Jason Bergman, announces a 
new threat: “The digital transmission of 
sound recordings is no longer science 
fiction, nor is it the technology of the future. 
It is here now. It is being advertised, it is for 
sale, and it is here to stay. Digital 
7.2, 7.3 
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transmission of music through cable, 
telephone wire, satellite, and broadcast will 
transform the way music is delivered to the 
home. It will transform the music industry 
as we know it, and it could soon entirely 




IBM and Blockbuster create a kiosk system 
where consumers can create personalised 
CDs of major label songs. It receives no 
support from the recording industry. MCA 
Music Group chairman Al Teller states: “We 
will not, under any circumstances, license 
our music for use in any system of which 
we are not proprietors. We in no way, 
shape, or form support this venture, and I 
mean that unequivocally”. Other labels also 
note their disapproval at not being 
consulted: “No one representing either 
Blockbuster or IBM has approached WMG 
to discuss obtaining our permission to 
reproduce our copyrighted works”. 
7.4 
1992 Sony MiniDisc 
and digital 
cassette tape 
In 1992, Sony releases the MiniDisc format, 
hoping to reinvent the industry once more. 
At the same time, Phillips and Matsushita 
create the portable digital cassette. Both of 
these technologies are described in 
Billboard as having the potential to shift the 
music industry once again. 
7.5 
1992 Release of 
MPEG Layer 3 
Karlheinz Brandenburg and others at the 
Fraunhoffer Institute create and release the 
audio protocol MPEG Layer 3. Little 
adoption of the format occurs to begin with 
due to limited PC performance. 
6.7, 7.7 
 
Personal computers had largely been used for word processing and similar business tasks. 
With the new availability of a number of different hardware components such as sound cards, 
CD-ROM drives, and higher performing processors, PCs began to be seen speculatively as 
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media tools. Multimedia became a topic in the music industry, and a range of new products 
emerged from entrepreneurs and artists exploring the domain (see Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 PC technology – new media capacities emerge 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1989 Tim Berners Lee 
creates hypertext 
transfer protocol. 
In 1989 Berners Lee creates HTTP, setting 
the foundation for the modern internet.  
7.7 
1990 Sound card 
technology. 
Prior to 1990, PCs were limited to making 
polyphonic beep tones. This changes with 
the release of the Creative Labs Sound 
Blaster sound card in 1990.  For the first 
time, the PC can play recorded music. 
7.6.1 
1993 FTP sharing of 




University of Santa Cruz computer science 
student Jeff Patterson, of the band the Ugly 
Mugs, buys encoding software and digitises 
his band’s demo songs, uploading them to 
an FTP site. Overnight, people from around 
the world download the music, revealing to 
Patterson and friend Rob Lord a profound 
new capacity of the internet.  With another 
friend, John Luini, the three soon set up the 
Internet Underground Music Archive, a 
website where bands can send in music for 
the group to digitise it and make available. 
7.7 




At the beginning of 1993, fewer than 
500,000 PCs have CD-ROM drives. The 
first CD-RW drives are also released in 
1993 but remain expensive and 
complicated. Sound cards also are not yet 
common. 
7.6.1, 7.6.2 
1994 Multimedia  By 1994, there is a growing awareness of 
the PC’s capacity for “multimedia” and 
“interactive” content; it becomes a strong 
theme in parts of the record and PC 
industries. Early pioneering artists such as 
Todd Rundgren, David Bowie, Peter 
7.6.4 
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Gabriel, and Thomas Dolby begin to 
explore interactive CD-ROMs. 
 
5.6 1994–1997 
The key events between 1994 and 1997 primarily related to the growing capacity and 
proliferation of PCs (see Table 5.11). With the increasing performance and decreasing cost of 
sound cards, CD-ROMs, and the nascent internet, the PC began to demonstrate powerful 
performance as a media device. Whilst the PC was not initially created as a media device, the 
concept of “multimedia” that emerged in the early 1990s appeared to capture the widespread 
imagination of media industries.  Amidst competing visions of the future, such as Sony’s 
MiniDisc and Digital Compact Cassette, it was the multimedia PC that became increasingly 
recognised (at least for a short time in this period) as the most promising direction for the music 
industry’s advance. 
The emergence of other PC hardware and software in this period supplemented the prominent 
recognition of multimedia. It was between 1994 and 1997 that CD burners (PC optical drives 
with the capacity to copy CDs) and the consumer internet began to be important. CD burners 
decreased rapidly in price through this period and were on the cusp of widespread affordability 
by 1997. With respect to the internet, whilst it was new and uncertain as a consumer application 
between 1994 and 1997, there was a large amount of experimentation with music products 
and services online in this time. Online band marketing, music industry analysis websites, band 
websites established by fans, forum discussions related to music, and preliminary attempts at 
music distribution over the internet all occurred in this period. The source of this 
experimentation was varied, from individuals and small startup companies to small and major 
record labels. 
For those in the music industry, the changes brought with them uncertainty. In contrast, for 
advanced computer users, almost without trying, their PCs now had the ability to digitise, 
distribute, and listen to music – soon, almost any recording from the entire history of recorded 
music. Whilst this capacity didn’t become widely distributed until the emergence of mp3.com 
and Napster in the next period, it is in this one that the direct precedents to these events 
emerge. 
Finally, it was also in this period that prototype portable digital music players first emerged. 
Whilst no portable digital music player was yet released by the end of 1997, the prototypes 
that emerged in this time highlighted the future possibility of this type of technology. 
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Table 5.11 PC technology as recognised media tool 







1994 is recognised as a year of posturing 
and positioning by PC manufacturers as PC 
prices of PCs reduce and media capacity 
becomes standard.  Media becomes an 
advertised character of PCs: “Compaq’s 
Presario line is billed as a CD player, video 
game machine, answering machine, 
speaker phone, fax – and oh yeah, 
computer – all in one box. All for under 




Forecasts for CD 
burning increase. 
CD burning is still a niche activity but was 
forecast to become a mainstream 
behaviour before 1998 due to “plummeting 
drive prices and inexpensive, well designed 
software” (Louderback, 1995). By the end 
of 1996, drives breach sub-$400 retail 
prices for the first time, a 10-fold decrease 






Between 1993 and 1997, the consumer 
internet comes alive. In January 1993 there 
are 1.3 million U.S. internet users. By July 
1997, that number increases to 
approximately 19.5 million. Total users 
double every 12 months between 1993 and 
1997. 
8.3 
1997 PC as a music 
tool. 
Professor Brandenburg describes when the 
MP3 and the PC became popular: “At that 
time [1992–1995], the complexity was still 
too high for widespread application for 
distribution and so on. It was really once 
every PC was fast enough on one hand, 
and did have the soundcard built in on the 
other hand, that this [mp3/digital music] 
really took off. And that again technically 
was the case in 1995, but, really the 
6.7, 7.3, 7.7 
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avalanche was going in 1997”. (K. 
Brandenburg, personal Communication 
May 27, 2013)  
 
Reflecting the growing presence and capacity of the internet and PCs, there was a large 
amount of analysis and forecasting in the record industry regarding the impact of these 
technologies on the distribution of music. Whilst popular perspectives suggest the record labels 
were slow to identify the threat of the internet, in Billboard there was early recognition of the 
potential of digital audio and the internet to cause profound change to the record industry from 
industry leaders. Opinions of a range of prominent record industry leaders cited in Billboard in 
various articles between 1994 and 1995 highlight how the internet and, more generally, digital 
audio were viewed at the time. A selection of quotes from prominent Record Label executives 
cited in Billboard articles of the time are included below in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 Opinions of record industry leaders in 1994 
Executive Insight 
Gary Gersh, 
President, Capitol Records 
“[The industry] is on the verge of a massive 
revolution that will rewrite the ways we receive 
and relate to all forms of entertainment." He says 
Capitol is using "all of the various technologies" 
to collect information each week to better market 
its records. He says Capitol localizes and micro-
markets by cross-referencing the data. The label 
also relies on computer technology for its art 
department (for digital download and 
transmission of art files) and for improved 
communication between field and national staff” 
(Lieb, 1994). 
Michael Schulhof, 
President, Sony Music 
“The executive told retailers it takes a customer 
about one hour to drive to a music store, 
purchase a CD, bring it home, and put it into his 
or her player. The transmission of that same 
recording to the home via fiber optics – so-called 
‘music on demand’ – will take less than five 
seconds” (Jeffrey, 1994, p. 6). 





EMI Music Publishing UK 
“The potential is enormous. It’s only a matter of 
time before other people take this on” (Clark-
Meads, 1995, p. 12). 
Danny Goldberg, 
President, Atlantic Records 
“In general, I think these technological advances 
have served the music business wonderfully well 
… Each development in technology has caused 
a growth in our business and expanded music. … 
Suppose everything becomes cyberspace … 
People are still going to have to be experts at 
making things look interesting. There will be 
limitless options, so how will we market ideas? 
People can only look at a small fraction of the 
possibilities, so it will take a lot of strategizing 
about how to expose music” (Lieb, 1994). 
  
Supporting this, there emerged a range of new products and behaviour that utilised the internet 
and software for audio- and music-related activities (see Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13 PC technology – proliferating digital music capacity 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1995 Internet radio. Cybercasting and webcasting become an 
early use of audio over the internet. 
Approximately 50,000 people download 
the RealAudio player in the first two 
months of its release in 1995, and in 
September 1995 live audio commentary of 
the New York Yankees vs Seattle Mariners 
baseball game is streamed online using 
the software, leading to widespread 
recognition of this as a new capacity for 
the internet (David Letterman, for example, 
discussed the streaming event on his show 
at the time). 
8.3 
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1995 Internet and 
music discussed 
on MTV. 
MTV profiles music activity on the internet 
in a news segment. The segment 
discusses the popularity of major label 
artist webpages, where fans can get 
information about upcoming tours. 
8.3 




The Geffen label begins to explore internet 
distribution. At the end of 1994, as part of 
the marketing promotion for the release of 
Aerosmith’s latest album, Geffen offers 
users the ability to download a previously 
unreleased Aerosmith track. The 
technological limitations of the download 
process are cited as impacting consumer 
response: “getting it [downloading] took 
more time than it would have to catch a 
bus to the local record store (connect-time 
charges were, however, waived for the 
promotion)” (Gillen, 1994). Jim Griffen, the 
director of technology at Geffen Records, 
suggests that due to the limited sound 
quality of internet audio streaming at the 
time, the technology is not yet effective for 
the broadcast of music, but instead 
streaming is better suited to speech 
(Atwood, 1995). 
8.4 
1997 Major labels use 
the internet for 
increased 
efficiency. 
Despite concerns and problems with the 
distribution of music, the major labels 
embrace the internet as an efficiency tool 
themselves. An article in Billboard on 23 
August 1997 titled “Majors Cut Costs Via 
Industry-only Sites” (Atwood 1997) 
describes industry-only, password-
protected websites established by Capitol 
Records and Sony Music that allow 
industry members from around the world, 
such as distributors and promoters, to 
access visual assets, graphics, and ad 
copy of bands for advertising and 
8.4 
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promotion, rather than this material being 
sent by post (Atwood, 1997). 
  
By 1997, the sentiment of some within the labels regarding the role of the internet had shifted 
somewhat. Perhaps as a measure of wider awareness, and whilst there was still a recognised 
sense of the internet as an important technology, there was also increasing recognition and 
description of the internet primarily as a new marketing tool for the labels rather than as a 
distribution tool. At the time a number of record label executives were cited in Billboard 
describing the virtues of the internet to help sell content. Table 5.14 offers these quotes from 





“The number of hits at Atlantic’s Web site has 
exploded from slightly more than 2 million a 
month a year ago to more than 8 million [a month] 
now.” 
Mark Ghuneim, 
VP of Online and Emerging Technologies for 
Columbia Records Group 
“The Internet is a key word-of-mouth marketing/ 
promotional tool.” 
Chris McQuown, 
Senior Director of New Media, 
Universal Music Group 
“It [the internet] helps disseminate information to 
a potentially huge number of people in a relatively 
inexpensive way. And as more people get on, the 
value increases dramatically."  
  
Along with music industry interest and use of the internet, 1994 to 1997 was an important time 
for music software and hardware. Utilising the growing capacity of PCs, with the availability of 
sound cards increasing, new software emerged to offer new ways to listen to and manage 
music.  Table 5.15 describes some of the major software of the time. 
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Table 5.14 Music library software and online music search 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1997 Winamp  Winamp becomes a popular early library 
software, with 3 million people downloading 




With CD burning increasing, Musicmatch 
Jukebox emerges; it is the first ‘complete’ 
software that offers uses tools to manage 
their digital music library on their pcs, as 
well as create playlists, and also easily 
burn CDs. Brandenburg refers to it as a 
landmark: “I think still MusicMatch is a 
milestone because they built the first 
software which bundled together ripping of 
a cd, mp3 encoding, and then having smart 
ideas about how to play it, having it 
organized and so on.” (Professor K. 
Brandenburg, personal communication, 
May 27, 2013). 
9.2.3 
1999 Online MP3 
searching 
With the popularity of MP3s, a range of 
online websites emerged that focussed on 
helping users find them. Scour.net, 
mp3meta, and Mp3.lycos are leading MP3-
file search engines and indexes (PC 
Computing, 1999), and it is the later 
unreliability of these services that prompts 
Shawn Fanning to create Napster. 
9.2.4 
1997 Online piracy  Online piracy is becoming a significant 
problem for the recording industry. 
Software and music is shared in new 
Internet Relay Chat groups like the popular 
Warez. 
9.2.4 
1997 Mp3.com Reviewing popular search terms, 
entrepreneur Michael Robertson 
recognises that the term ‘MP3’ is growing 
in popularity. Not knowing what it is, 
Robertson buys the domain mp3.com for 
9.6 
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$1,000, turning it into an information 
website about the format and how to 
download music. Within the first 24 hours, 
and with no marketing, the website has 
10,000 unique visitors. Robertson goes on 
to build mp3.com into a powerful company. 
 
Amongst these developments, the first prototype portable digital music players were created 
using flash memory (see Table 5.16). The technology had limitations, and the 
price/performance characteristics still made the players experimental, but they did offer a 
tangible new technology of the future. At the same time, other technologies such as MiniDisc 
and Digital Cassette represented more viable paths, but they had not yet received significant 
adoption. 
Table 5.15 New technologies, including prototype portable digital music players 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1994–
1997 
MiniDisc/DAC MiniDisc and Digital Cassette (DAC) are 
the latest technologies to attempt to 
transform the record industry. Whilst these 
technologies have popularity in some 
markets (such as Japan), by the late 1990s 
it becomes increasingly clear that both 
MiniDisc and Portable Digital Cassette 
weren’t becoming the widespread media 
devices that manufacturers had hoped. 
The narrative in Billboard started to 
change, going from describing the 
technology as one with widespread 
potential to supersede the CD to relegating 
the technologies to a niche popularity 
(Christman & Jeffrey, 1997; McClure, 
1999). 
9.3 (Sony section), 
11.3.6 
1994 NEC Silicon 
Audio 
In 1994, the large electronics company 
NEC announced a prototype portable 
digital music player that used flash memory 
called Silicon Audio. The flash memory 
8.5 
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cards could hold 32 MB of data (two to 
three songs). 
1996  Almost two years after NEC’s Silicon Audio 
device, on 23 September 1996, Audio 
Highway, a small startup company based 
in Cupertino (Silicon Valley), announces 
the Audio Highway Listen Up Player, a 32 
MB player that connects to the internet 
overnight to download content. It is shown 
at the Consumer Electronics Show.  
8.5 
1997 AT&T FlashPAC  In a similar guise as the NEC Silicon Audio 
player, in 1997 AT&T announces plans for 
their own flash-based audio player. The 
AT&T FlashPAC will utilise Perceptual 
Audio Coding, developed at AT&T Bell 
Labs (Onufryk & Snyder, 1997). Whilst 
details of the player are not readily 
available, and it does not reach production, 
the player is profiled in a CNN Business 
Week segment on music on the internet, 
on 3 July 1997. No other information 
appears available, and no device is 
released. 
8.5 
1997 Hard drive 
systems 
Radio stations begin implementing hard 
drive storage for their music libraries. 1997 
is described in the article as an important 
threshold year for these systems. Whilst 
available from the early 1990s (originally 
as 1-2 GB systems), by 1997 a range of 
entrepreneurial companies (e.g., Broadcast 
Electronics, ENCO Systems, RCS, and 
Computer Concepts) are selling larger 9 
GB hard drive systems. The market leader 
is Broadcast Electronics, which has 25% to 
30% of the market share, with their 9 GB 
AudioVAULT system retailing for $20,000 
(Traiman, 1997). Despite the cost, radio 
stations particularly view the systems as 
8.5 
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cost-saving measures by saving on 
duplicate CD purchases. 
 
5.7 1998–1999 
During the previous section, increasing power and proliferation of PCs and the internet began 
to reveal a clearer capacity for digital music distribution, with sparks of niche interest by the 
end of 1997. Between 1998 and 2002, these and other factors ignited. In a staggering 
sequence of developments, many occurring concurrently, the recording industry – and it could 
be argued consumer electronics and computer industries – began to be reconfigured around 
new digital music computer software and hardware technology. It was between 1998 and 2002 
that most of the events or technologies emerged for the transition from widespread CD 
distribution to internet-based music distribution. In this four-year period, the following things 
happened:  
• The top selling year for CDs of all time was 1999, after which CD sales began to recede 
dramatically;  
• The RIAA and over 200 member companies from consumer electronics, computing, 
and the record industry formed a large industry group called the Secure Digital Music 
Initiative (SDMI), attempting to create a piracy-resistant digital music format (and 
ultimately disbanding after Napster);  
• “mp3” became the most popular search term on the internet in 1998 and grew in 
popularity between 1999-2001;  
• The major labels partnered with IBM to trial a new digital distribution system called the 
Madison Project prior to Napster;  
• Napster was released and became widely popular, leading to a dramatic confrontation 
with the record industry and making digital music a source of widespread international 
cultural intrigue;  
• A large amount of entrepreneurial experimentation emerged in digital music products 
such as library software, peer-to-peer products, and digital music hardware, and this 
was complemented by a large amount of press coverage of digital music events;  
• Some of these entrepreneurial companies such as eMusic and mp3.com briefly 
became billion-dollar companies after capturing the peak of the 1999 Nasdaq bubble;  
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• Entrepreneurial companies could not yet gain legitimate competitive licenses from 
major labels, with litigation being a common occurrence between the RIAA and 
entrepreneurial companies;  
• The first portable music player using flash memory was released and was soon 
followed by a raft of other players from companies such as Diamond, Creative, and 
Sony;  
• Researchers at Compaq established a new category of portable player, creating the 
first portable music player using a computer harddrive.   
• After all of this, and using a great deal from this previous experimentation, in 2001 
Apple released iTunes then 8 months later, the iPod. 
If these events occurred over a wider timeframe, they would remain dramatic. But amplifying 
their intensity, many of them emerged at the same time. As such, whilst it is difficult to separate 
out events that emerged together, to better cover the detail of the above, these events have 
been split into two smaller sections, one covering 1998–1999 and another covering 2000–
2002, with some overlap between the two. The following will begin with 1998 and 1999 (see 
Table 5.17). 
Table 5.16 PCs, the internet and music 
Date Event Description Case study section 
  By 1999, the personal computer is almost 
20 years old. It has become a common 
device, with almost 50% of U.S. homes 
having a computer by 2000 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2011, p. 7). 
9.1 
1999  Internet use continues to proliferate 
quickly, moving beyond niche 
demographics to become a common tool 
(Pew Research Centre, 1999), with a 
particularly sharp jump in use occurring in 
1998. Of those respondents in the survey, 
46% have started to use the internet 
consistently for the first time in 1998 (Pew 
Research Centre, 1999). High speed 
9.1 
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internet (broadband) also becomes 
increasingly common at universities. 
 E-commerce Reflecting this, in 1998 and 1999, e-
commerce fever strikes the industry. A 
survey of senior executives from the 
world’s 525 largest companies suggests 
that e-commerce is now a major strategic 
imperative (Electronic Commerce News, 
1999). 
9.1 
1998 iMac On 6 May 1998, Apple releases the iMac.  
It is the first product launch by Jobs (and 
Ive and Rubinstein) since returning to the 
company as CEO (interim CEO at the 
time). 
9.2.1 
 CD burning In 1998 and 1999 CD-R drives become 
increasingly standard PC hardware as 
blank discs fall in price. A single blank CD-
R disc capable of holding up to 650 MB of 
data, which previously cost upwards of 
$10, has decreased to $2 by 1998 




iMac DV, release 
of iMovie 
Jobs announces and updates the iMac with 
a focus on digital video (iMac DV) and 
iMovie, a new Apple software for desktop 
video editing to be used in conjunction with 
Apple’s Firewire transfer standard. 
The iMac DV and iMovie release is a 
prequel to Apple’s more complete digital 
hub strategy that is announced a little more 
than a year later. But, with this release in 
1999, Apple’s strategy now is on a more 
direct path towards media, even if not yet 
focused on music. 
9.2.1, 10.1.4 
  In October 1999, “mp3” becomes the most 
popular search term on the internet (Jones 
& Sul, 1999). 
9.2.4 
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Despite this, there remain acknowledged 
frustrations with download speed, and 
these were discussed in Billboard: 
“Practical obstacles, chiefly bandwidth, 
stand in the way. MP3 music files are just 
too big for speedy download from the Web 
at conventional modem dial-up speeds of 
28.8 kbps or 56 kbps. (Another reason why 
I find CD-ripping rather than Web 
downloads so much more gratifying)” 
(Lewis, 15 August 1999). Some specific 
timed examples: “The 49.41 MB Liquid 
Audio down-load would take about 15-16 
minutes with a T1 connection but more 
than 2 hours with a 56K modem” (Gillen, 
2000b). 
  
Despite the growing prevalence of MP3 downloads, CD sales continued to crescendo in this 
period rising from 753.1 million CD unit sales in 1997 to 847 million in 1998. They increased 
further in 1999, with 1999 becoming the top selling year for CDs of all time, with a total of 938.9 
million CD albums and 55.9 CD singles being sold (RIAA, 2016). Despite this background of 
the most lucrative years of the CD format and music industry as a whole, the uncertainty 
regarding the capacity of the internet as a tool for music distribution was quickly evaporating. 
Online music purchases jumped 400% between 1997 and 1998 to $142.9 million (Dyson, 
1999), and whilst this was a microscopic figure in comparison to CD sales and even smaller 
as a percentage of the $38 billion value of the music industry worldwide (New Media Age, 
1999), the growing public awareness and experimentation with MP3 and the significant amount 
of entrepreneurial activity, as well as forecasts for online music to be a $1.1 billion market by 
2003 (Atwood, 1999), was enough for the labels to initiate more substantial experimentation 
into online distribution. 
With the five major labels owning approximately 80% of the entire recorded music catalogue 
at this time (including the music from almost all high-profile artists; Dyson, 1999), the major 
labels still represented a large and critical element that was missing from online music; with 
their control, they represented an important authority in determining the direction that online 
music distribution would take. There was not yet any way for the public to legitimately buy and 
download music owned by the major labels. Online music distribution up until this point was 
centred upon content from independent musicians, music downloads for sale licensed 
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legitimately from small labels, and major label songs and albums that were transferred to MP3 
and shared illegally by consumers. But there was now a significant amount of entrepreneurial 
experimentation and discussion offering new products based on these new technologies. 
Within this context, the major labels explored a number of avenues for online distribution prior 
to the release of Napster.  
First, working in secret in early 1998, two of the major labels, Warner Music and Sony Music, 
initiated a partnership with IBM to explore and create new online music distribution software. 
The partnership between the labels and IBM became known as “the Madison Project”, and its 
mandate was to create a software program that would give consumers at home access to 
download major label catalogue albums. The software would allow PC users to download 
albums via the internet, and the software itself would explore features such as watermarking 
and encryption to prevent individuals from sharing music illegally (Price, 1999). 
When the plans were revealed publicly in mid-1998, it was described in the press as “one of 
the most ambitious tests of digital music distribution to date” (Rawsthorn, 1998), and the 
partnership between the world’s biggest computer company and, for the first time, major music 
labels who controlled mainstream music content was described as a significant step forward. 
The partnership was also a strong signal from IBM about the role they saw music having in the 
emerging commercial capacity of the internet. It was reported in a variety of sources that IBM 
invested $20 million in the project to build the software (Chadbourn, 1998; IBM Computer 
Today, 1999; Rawsthorn, 1998; Chadbourn, 1998). The software was tested on 1,000 homes 
in San Diego and allowed users to purchase and download major label albums. The test was 
described as a success, but during the trial the major labels began to explore a number of 
other avenues. 
Second, and at the same time as the Madison Project in late 1998, a large-scale trade group 
called the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) was established by the RIAA, representing 
the major labels. SDMI was established with the aim of creating a secure digital music format 
to replace MP3 that made piracy difficult. Creating a digital distribution system that included 
security measures would potentially provide record labels a way to build an online business 
model comparable to their CD channels, intercepting the staggering growth of the unsecure 
MP3 format. 
The announcement of SDMI occurred at Sony Music’s New York headquarters on 15 
December 1998 and included some of the most powerful individuals and companies in the 
recording industry, including RIAA President/CEO Hilary Rosen and then Vice President Cary 
Sherman, International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Chairman Jason Berman, 
BMG Entertainment President/CEO Strauss Zelnick, EMI Recorded Music President Ken 
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Barry, Sony Music Entertainment Chairman/CEO Thomas D. Mottola, and Universal Music 
Group Chairman/CEO Doug Morris (Reece & Jeffery, 26 December 1998). Over the next two 
years, SDMI worked on the task, culminating in the release of a technical standard with strong 
built-in protection and sharing restrictions. Once released (which occurred after the emergence 
of Napster), Stanford computer science professor Ed Felten cracked the secure standard, 
rendering the piracy controls ineffective and leading to the suspension of the SDMI program. 
These events, independent of and preceding Napster, demonstrated both the experimentation 
and uncertainty of the time. Table 5.18 outlines these key events. 
Table 5.17 Record labels, RIAA, SDMI 
Date Event Description Case study section 
1997–
2001 
Litigation With prominent examples of unauthorised 
use, litigation is a prominent response from 
the RIAA on behalf of the major record 
labels. 
9.4.1 
June 1999 Madison Project IBM spends $20 million on the 
development of a prototype home PC 
delivery software, partnering with the major 
labels. A 1,000-home experiment in San 
Diego is run in June 1999. The trial is 
described as a success, with users buying 
and downloading albums, but the program 





Other small-scale experimentation also 
occurs. Before the end of 1999, Atlantic 
Records releases the single “Bliss,” by Tori 
Amos, as a digital download for sale, 
Virgin Records offers David Bowie’s new 
album, Hours, as a downloadable 
purchase prior to its in-store release, 
Platinum Records offers Pete Townsend’s 
live album for free download, and TVT 
Records announces plans to make their 
entire catalogue available for download 
(Gillen, 1999). 
9.4 





SDMI Led by Leonardo Chaglioni, and with over 
200 member companies, including all the 
major labels, consumer electronics, and IT 
companies, SDMI is a working group that 
attempts to create a secure music format 
to counter online piracy. A standard is 
created but soon cracked, and in 2001 the 
effort is suspended. 
9.4.3 
 CD revenue, CD 
singles and 
albums 
Eclipsing cassette sales for the first time in 
1991, CD album sales grow dramatically 
through the rest of the 1990s, reaching 
unprecedented heights in 1998 and 1999, 
both with respect to the volume of sales 
(peaking at 938.9 million shipped units in 
1999- RIAA, 2016). CD albums have 
become the dominant format and revenue 
source, with CD singles not available for 
some popular titles.  
9.4.4 
  
In March 1998, the first generation of portable digital music players was created and sold to 
the public, moving beyond the preceding prototypes and demonstrations. The first ever 
recognised portable player released for sale to the public was the MPMan, created by Korean 
company Saehan. Within a few months, there emerged a range of similar flash memory 
portable music players from a variety of companies. The major success was the Diamond Rio, 
which dominated the early market (Sullivan, 1999). Despite the success of Diamond, there 
was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the direction of the technology and the market. Early 
players caused some frustration for users with poor design or technological performance 
constraints (such as limited memory capacity 32 or 64 MB flash cards). Equally, SDMI, the 
record industry’s attempt to establish a secure format as a legitimised alternative to MP3, was 
being coordinated at the same time, causing industry uncertainty with respect to the direction 
of the software standard for digital music. Whilst small early companies initially prospered, and 
whilst Sony had uncharacteristically missed the start of the market, there was a general 
expectation that they would come to dominate the portable digital music player market. Sony 
entered the market with the release of their player in late 1999 (over 18 months after the first 
players). Contrary to expectations, the Sony player received sharply negative consumer 
feedback, leaving the direction of the technology once more uncertain.  Table 5.19 describes 
the events related to portable music players of the time. 
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Table 5.18 The first commercially released Portable Digital Music Players 
Date Event Description Case study section 
March 
1998 
Saehan  Korean company Saehan releases the 
MPMan, a 32 MB flash memory player. 
9.3 
May 1998 Diamond Diamond released the PMP 300, with, 
similarly, 32 MB flash memory, running off 
a single AA battery, and with a retail price 
of $200. Diamond is quickly sued by the 




Sony  In 1998, the same year as the above 
portable music players were released, 
Sony spends $30 million advertising their 
MiniDisc format. It is the biggest advertising 
budget for any product in their history. The 
following year, on 21 December 1999, 
Sony then enters the portable digital music 
player market, releasing the Sony Memory 
Stick Walkman. It is based around Sony’s 
memory stick flash format and requires 
music to be formatted using Sony’s 
proprietary ATRAC music format. Naively, 
the player cannot play MP3. As a result, it 
receives widespread criticism and is largely 
derided by consumers. 
9.3 
July 1999 A growing range 
of players. 
An increasing volume of players from a 
variety of companies become available. 
Samsung, Audio Vox, Sensory Science, 
and Creative, among many others, all 
release similar players in this time. 
9.3 
June 1999 Expected 
consumer 
response. 
Forecasts emerge of expected rapid uptake 
of MP3 players, suggesting that within eight 
months approximately 1 million MP3 





Compaq  Compaq engineers create the Compaq 
Personal Jukebox PJB-100. A brand new 
9.3 
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design utilises a computer hard drive rather 
than flash, shattering previous storage 
limits. Where flash memory was 
constrained to 32 MB (8 to 12 songs), the 
PJB-100 has a 4.86 GB hard drive, capable 
of holding 1,000 songs. Despite creating 
the device, Compaq does not pursue the 
category, licensing the design to a 
company called HanGO. 
  
All of these events were dramatic, but they were soon to be eclipsed. In 1999, Shawn Fanning 
created Napster. Its release caused a dramatic, unprecedented new development for the 
record industry, revealing a new powerful capacity of the internet. Napster is covered in 
significant detail in the case study (section 9.7), including the creation, release, popularity, 
lawsuit, impact, and outcomes. But, Table 5.20 outlines the growth in users to demonstrate the 
sheer and striking scale of consumer response to the product. 






Users Key event  
June 1999 Beta launch 30 
Fanning sends out the beta link to 
30 friends, mainly on IRC 
(particularly the w00w00 
channel), instructing them to not 
send out the software to anyone 
else. 
(Ante, 2000) 
June 1999 2 days after 3,000–4,000 
IRC users do not follow Fanning’s 
directive, and a few days later, 
there are 3,000 to 4,000 users. 
(Ante, 2000) 





founder/Shawn’s uncle): “It has 
been hugely successful … We 
have doubled in size for the 
past five days”.  
(in Lemos, 
1999) 







Users Key event  
November 
1999 
4 months 100,000 
“Napster already had two hundred 
thousand registered users 
offering 3.5 million files. All of 
that, without having spent a dime 
on marketing”.  
(Menn, 2003, 
p. 98) 
January 1999 5 months 150,000 
Napster CEO Eileen Richardson: 
“It took ICQ 14 months to get to 





May 2000 9 months 11 million 
Reaches top 10 in internet search 
terms. An estimated 73% of 
students have used it (estimated 




July 2000 11 months 
20 million 
downloads, 





Recognised as “The fastest ramp-




October 2000 16 months 35 million 














“The fastest growing internet 
application of all time” – 
3 billion files being traded per 




2002, p. 802) 
  
The record industry was now under siege from digital technology. At the same time, with annual 
CD revenues over $900 million, there was now legitimate uncertainty regarding immediate 
survival. 
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5.8 2000–2002 
Digital music had progressed significantly from earlier times. The forecasts of the role of the 
PC as a multimedia tool that were common between 1994 and 1997 had disappeared by 2000. 
Intel’s 1997 advertisements announcing that the PC had a media capacity had also stopped. 
It was entirely obvious at this point that the computer was a powerful media device, and with 
the dramatic amount of developments between 1998 and 1999, even within the now 
overheating internet bubble, the Wall Street Times announced, “Music is the hottest commodity 
in the digital world” (Peer, 2000).  
Despite the dramatic number of developments, in this time there was not yet any one obvious 
direction music would take. Litigation resulted in a brief reprieve. Napster was shut down in 
2001, mp3.com was sued, and, after this, in 2000 and 2001, the direction and path of digital in 
many ways had become more opaque rather than more obvious in the wake of these services. 
The piracy threat that had been eased by the capitulation of Napster escalated once more as 
Kazaa and other second-generation peer-to-peer services quickly eclipsed Napster’s size. 
The major labels themselves became particularly busy through this time. It was a heavy time 
of jockeying for position by the labels themselves, with acquisitions of entrepreneurial 
businesses common at the same time as further experimentation in new products. As the 
labels engaged, perceptions of the entrepreneurial environment were also changing. Michael 
Robertson, for example, who was an adamant and vigorous competitor to the record labels 
until this time, had sold mp3.com to Vivendi Universal, the biggest record label in the world, 
and now Robertson worked for them. 
Despite the experimentation, this period ended with online distribution remaining elusive for 
the major labels; their own distribution services initiated in this period, MusicNet and Pressplay, 
eventually failed. By the end of 2002, there remained no user-friendly way to purchase all major 
record label content on the internet. Table 5.21 describes these issues. 
Table 5.20 Major record label developments 
Date Event Description Case study section 
2001 Napster  Napster court case ends, Napster is shut 
down due to inability to filter out copyright 
material and dwindling numbers. 
9.7 
2002-2003 Kazaa Second generation peer-to-peer software 
emerges, with Kazaa being the leader. It 
quickly eclipses Napster. Sixty-four million 
10.1.3 
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download the software in 2002, with over 
227 million copies downloaded by May 
2003. Kazaa and other second-generation 
peer-to-peer services like Grokster are 
sued in 2003. 
July 2000 Senate hearing  Led by Senator Orrin Hatch, a Senate 
judiciary committee is formed to investigate 
why entrepreneurial companies couldn’t get 








MusicNet and Pressplay are announced by 
the major record labels. These are online 
services offering major label content for 
stream and download for a monthly fee. 
These services encounter problems of 
antitrust, as well as poor reviews from 




This was also a dramatic time for the portable digital music player market.  Experimentation 
expanded, and there was a proliferation of portable digital music players from a variety of 
consumer electronics and computer companies. 
Memory capacity remained a problematic characteristic of players, and in this time there more 
clearly emerged two distinct categories of portable players with different types of memory. The 
first was a flash memory-based portable player following on from previous designs of the 
Diamond Rio and MPMan. These players were extremely light and small, but commonly had 
a capacity of 32-64 MB, capable of storing 6 to 12 songs. The second category was a hard 
drive-based “jukebox” player, following the PJB-100 from Compaq. These players utilised 
laptop hard drives that offered massively increased capacity but were bulky and not easily 
portable. These players commonly had a 4.86 GB capacity, capable of holding 1,000 songs. 
Of these categories, the smaller portable flash memory players were the dominant category, 
with almost all active manufacturers adopting this design at this time. Jukebox players in 
contrast were viewed by consumers as useful, but too big to be portable, and there were a 
relatively small number of manufacturers offering these types of products. 
For both categories, though, despite the large volume of activity, no particular player had 
emerged as dominant. Small players like Diamond (by this time renamed SonicBlue) had some 
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early success, but large companies like Sony had been consumer disappointments, meaning 
that there remained uncertainty regarding whether the technology itself would be adopted, and, 
if so, at what scale. As Steve Jobs soon would say, despite a large number of products 
available, of these companies “no one has found the recipe” (Jobs, 2001). The events are 
summarised in table 5.22. 
Table 5.21 Ongoing Portable Digital Music Player experimentation 
Date Event Description Case study section 





The 2000 and 2001 Consumer Electronics 
Shows are described both as a “frenzy” 
and an “explosion” of activity with respect 
to portable digital music players, with the 
announcement of a “dizzying number of 
next-generation players” (Garrity, 2001; 
Gillen, 2000). 
10.4 
2000/2001 Flash memory 
was viewed as 
critical. 
Flash memory is increasingly supported by 
the industry, despite current limitations of 
cost/storage performance. Players of 32 
and 64 MB are most common, capable of 
holding 6 to 12 songs. With falling prices 
expected, flash is the popular memory of 
most players. For example, after surveying 
the available players on CES, one record 
industry executive says: “I have seen the 
future, and it has a flash-card slot in it” 
(Gillen, 15 April 2000). 
10.4 
 Forecasts In 2000 approximately 880,000 players are 
sold (Garrity, 2001). Short-range forecasts 
suggest the market will grow by 54%, with 
1.8 million units sold in 2001 (Garrity, 
2001); middle-range forecasts expect the 
market to reach 15 million users by 2003 
(Marriott, 2000); and long-range forecasts 
predict that by 2005 the digital music 
market will be worth $3.2 billion in annual 
revenue, with 26 million to 37 million digital 
audio devices sold annually by this time 
(Gillen, 2000a; Shim, 2001). 
10.4 
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2000 Hard drive 
Jukebox players 
After the PJB-100, a range of new hard 
drive players are released, establishing the 
jukebox player as a more definitive 
category. The Creative Nomad Jukebox 
and the Archos Jukebox are leading 
alternatives, utilising 4.86 GB laptop hard 
drives. 
10.4 
2000 IBM Microdrive By 2000, IBM increases the capacity of its 
small Microdrive to 1 GB whilst maintaining 
its very small size dimensions, and with 
this, it comes to be recognised as a 
significant development for portable music 
players (Menta, 2000b). Retailing for $499, 
the 1 GB capacity hard drive offers the 
capacity to store over 300 songs, far 
exceeding flash capacity for the same 
price; also, in contrast to jukebox hard drive 




It was in this period that Apple engaged in digital music. They released iTunes in January 2001, 
and then followed this 10 months later with the release of the iPod in October 2001. Both 
iTunes and iPod’s creation are covered in detail in the case study, highlighting and exploring 
the choices Apple made to draw in available components from external vendors, as well as 
apply their own sensibilities to create the device. Table 5.23 describes Apple’s engagement in 
digital music. 
Table 5.22 Apple and digital music 2000–2001 
Date Event Description Case study section 
2000 CD-RW The iMac is a leading computer and has a 
focus on digital video, but it does not yet 
contain a CD-RW drive. In contrast, for PC 
manufacturers CD-RW drives have 
increasingly become a standard 
component. By this time in 2000, almost 30 
11.1.1 
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million PCs have been sold, with CD-RW 
drives as standard. 
2000 First iMac with 
CD-RW drive 
Seeing the dramatic consumer uptake of 
CD burning, Apple transfers their focus 
from digital video to music: “I felt like a 
dope,” says Jobs, thinking back to summer 
2000, when his fixation on perfecting video 
editing on the Mac distracted him from 
noticing that millions of kids were using 
computers and CD burners to make audio 
CDs and to download digital files called 
MP3s from illegal online services like 
Napster. “I thought we had missed it. We 







Jobs announces the digital hub strategy, 
recognising the role of the PC as a hub for 





iTunes  In the same keynote as the digital hub 
strategy, Jobs announces the release of 
iTunes. iTunes, like MusicMatch, offers a 
complete experience as a music library and 
includes ripping and burning software. 
Apple advertises this capacity with their 





iPod  With a development process of 
approximately eight months, and drawing 
together their expertise and available 
components from external suppliers, Apple 
creates the first iPod, a 5 GB hard drive 
player reaching a storage capacity of 1,000 
songs. This eclipses the 6 to 12 songs of 
flash players, and, with new components 
and design, Apple has been able to also 
make the device portable, with a much 
smaller profile than other jukebox players. 
10.5 





iPod reaction  There is a mixed reaction to the 
announcement of the iPod. The press 
reviews it positively, but, in consumer 
forums, many view it as an expensive 
imitation of the many available products 
already on the market (King & Manjoo, 
2001); for example, “No wireless. Less 






 As iPods become available to consumers, 
however, there is a more positive 
assessment in forums from those that try 
the device: “Now everybody's getting more 
into it’s now that they realize the potential 




The story from 2002 onwards becomes the story of iPod. The iPod became a worldwide 
consumer phenomenon comparable to Sony’s achievement with Walkman, but at a 
significantly larger and faster scale. In 2007, the final full year of this study, 52.6 million iPods 
were sold, responsible for 72.4% of all portable digital music player sales (Krazit, 2007). The 
iPod has subsequently been recognised as an iconic device, winning awards such as “gadget 
of the decade” and “best device of all time” in the technology press (Malik, 2007; Wired, 2009). 
This level of success was not cast or obvious with the first iPod model released in late 2001. 
Instead, Apple’s success between 2002 and the start of 2008 emerged as a result of new 
development and strategy. In this time, Apple pursued an aggressive product strategy, 
bifurcating iPod from a single product into a product range with a number of models, along with 
a constant stream of updates with improved performance. Added to this, Apple released 
iTunes on the Windows platform (the first Apple software ever released on Windows), and then 
Apple partnered with the major labels to create the iTunes Music Store, which itself also 
became a consumer phenomenon and established the first significant online revenue source 
for the record industry. 
These events are chronicled in detail in the case study, along with a number of events that 
emerged as a result of the impact of the iPod, including sharply receding CD sales leading to 
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closures of CD retailers and a change in the entrepreneurial environment as the iPod became 
a dominant design (see Table 5.24). 
Table 5.23 Apple and digital music 2002–2008 





Label revenues from CDs recede quickly, 
and the record industry changes. Major 
record merchandisers begin to suffer 
significantly. Famous businesses like Virgin 
Megastores and Tower Records are sold 






Apple reaches a landmark agreement with 
the major labels to begin offering their 
songs for sale. The iTunes Music Store is a 
dramatic success. In the first 18 hours 
online, approximately 275,000 tracks are 
sold at a cost of 99 cents per download 
(Newman & Garrity, 2003, p. 80). By the 
end of the first week, 1 million tracks have 
been sold (Knopper, 2013). The consumer 
response to a legitimate download service 
requiring payment is a staggering 
development in the context of the time. To 
give perspective, the combined total of 
downloads on other legitimate download 
services was approximately 1 million tracks 
sold in the previous two years (Newman & 






After the emergence of the first iPod, there 
is a significant shift in characteristics of the 
portable digital music player market. iPod 
first dominates the jukebox category, and 
then with the iPod Mini and Nano comes to 
dominate the flash memory category too. 
Apple dominates the entire market. Major 
new entrants such as Microsoft fail to make 
an impact on Apple’s success. Flash 
manufacturer Sandisk emerges as the 
11.3 
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second most successful company due to 
their price advantages with flash. 
Manufacturers that survive begin to focus 
on niche audiences. 
2003–
2008 
Sony  Sony remains bereft in the portable digital 
music player market. Viewing the iPod in 
2003, Keiji Kimura, senior VP at Sony, 
said, “We do not have any plans for such a 
product … But we are studying it”.  By 
2005, the head of Sony’s Computer 
Entertainment Division, Ken Kutaragi, 
acknowledged publicly that the company 
had made some major mistakes and 
admitted they should have released the 
iPod themselves (Menta, 2005). Sony 
release a range of products aimed at niche 
audiences. They also release their 
Playstation Portable, which does not have 
significant impact on iPod sales. 
11.3.6 
  
The above casts the backdrop to the larger narrative of this time, which was the progression 
of the iPod from initial technology to worldwide phenomenon. The iPod is covered in detail in 
the case study, including the strategic decisions of Apple through this time, reflections on the 
achievement of the iPod from those involved in its development, as well as how Apple built on 
the initial advantage to achieve outright domination of the portable music player market as it 
transitioned from a small niche consumer category to a widespread mainstream audience. 
Whilst the case study covers a great deal about Apple’s iPod strategy at this time (section 
11.4), the impact of this strategy is summarised in table 5.25, which describes iPod sales per 
year and cumulatively through this time. 
Table 5.24 iPod sales per year 
Year Yearly iPod unit sales Cumulative iPod sales 
2001 125,000 125,000 
2002 570,000 695,000 
2003 1,451,000 2,146,000 
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Year Yearly iPod unit sales Cumulative iPod sales 
2004 8,263,000 9,714,000 
2005 31,960,000 40,223,000 
2006 46,432,000 86,655,000 
2007 52,685,000 139,340,000 
2008 55,434,000 194,774,000 
  
The increase in iPod sales was also a result of the strong bifurcation strategy at this time, as 
Apple moved the iPod from a single product to a range, with a number of different models with 
different pricing and features. Overlaying the sales of iPod with the release of these models in 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the change in consumer response as new iPod models were 
released. 
 
Figure 5.1 iPod unit sales per quarter, overlaid with iPod product releases  
The case study ends in 2007, with Apple dominating the portable digital music player category. 
In 2007, Apple also released the iPhone, which soon had a noticeable impact on iPod sales. 
The top selling year of iPod of all time was 2008, after which sales began to recede as the 
iPhone began to emerge as another powerful consumer success. 
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5.10 Chapter Summary 
This concludes the summary of the case study of portable digital music players. Using both 
primary interviews and extensive secondary data, the case study provides a very detailed 
chronological overview of events related to portable digital music players from pre-1877 
through to 2008, with a main focus on events between 1994 and 2007, when the most tangible 
activity occurred. Over this time, the portable digital music player developed from imaginative 
description to early prototype and became a product of widespread experimentation from a 
large variety of entrepreneurs and, finally, found a dominant consumer product in the iPod. 
Whilst the amount of detail in the case study is extensive, and the timeframe broad, this detail 
now provides a basis for application of the lifeworld model from chapter 3. The next chapter 
will also utilise the case study, but now will describe these events through the four alternative 
lifeworlds, exploring how the likelihood and possibility of innovation in portable digital music 
players changed over time. 
 







This chapter presents the case study application of the technology lifeworld model. It details 
the development of portable digital music player technology applying the lifeworld model from 
chapter three. It begins with the prehistory lifeworld, describing the conditions prior to the 
emergence of the first portable digital music players. The establishment lifeworld is then 
presented, which describes the lifeworld where the first portable digital music players were 
created. This is followed by the development lifeworld, where a large number of new entrants 
is expected, leading to significant variation and selection. It then finally presents the innovation 
lifeworld, where innovation is finally achieved. 
The detailed case study to support this analysis chapter is presented as a separate volume. 
This volume provides a detailed chronological event history narrative of personal digital music 
players constructed for this research. This analysis chapter will draw from this event history 
narrative, making reference to particular sections of the case study, which can be referred to 
for greater detail. 
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Along with the presentation of the markers of each lifeworld, this will also include an analysis 
of events and the likelihood of innovation at different times. The prehistory lifeworld will now 
be discussed. 
6.1 Recap of the lifeworld concept  
The lifeworld concept which was described in chapter 3, describes the need to view innovation 
as both more than a consequence of heroic individuals with great ideas, as well as the limits 
of innovation systems, recognising that the need to identify strong boundary conditions to use 
a system, may miss the vital essence of what creates innovation itself.  It describes how the 
conditions of innovation change over time, and how these conditions impact the likelihood of 
success.  The lifeworld concept describes four separate lifeworlds, from prehistory, to 
innovation that represent the different conditions that characterise the development of a 
technology.  
The rest of this chapter, will apply the lifeworld concept to the case study, documenting and 
categorising the events of the case study of portable digital music players, into the four 
lifeworlds that describe how conditions of innovation changed. 
6.2 Prehistory lifeworld 
The first lifeworld is described as the prehistory lifeworld, where the technology is not yet 
possible. The lifeworld is not advanced enough to provide component technologies of creation. 
Despite this, in this prehistory lifeworld, there may be imaginative descriptions of the potential 
technology or failed attempts to build it using incorrect technology. Overlaid in this same 
lifeworld there is expected to be a pre-existing parallel technology that is in a mature state of 
normal science (Kuhn, 1962) with strong socioeconomic alignment. Providing the capacity to 
recognise this lifeworld for a particular technology, a number of markers were offered in the 
model chapter. These are repeated in Table 6.1: 
Table 6.1 Prehistory lifeworld markers 
Marker 1 It may be possible to identify imaginative descriptions of the 
technology. 
Marker 2 These imaginative descriptions reveal an inability to create the 
technology.  
Marker 3 There may be a history of discontinuities of similar forms of parallel 
technologies. 
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Marker 4 There is expected to be a particular strong parallel technology that later 
the new technology will compete against. 
 
These markers will be now be discussed and applied to the case study.  
6.2.1 Marker 1: It may be possible to identify imaginative descriptions of the 
technology. 
In exploring the prehistory lifeworld of portable digital music players, there were a number of 
references in science fiction and a number of “technological visions” from musicians and 
entrepreneurs who identified the potential to create portable digital music devices long prior to 
the capacity emerging to create them. 
In science fiction there were a number of early references to “recorded music” prior to any 
technology making this possible. Francis Bacon in New Atlantis (1626) wrote of the concept of 
recorded music and generally synthesiser music, referring to “soundhouses” where recorded 
music could be listened to by the public. Equally, Bellamy (1888), in a book called Looking 
Backward, 2000–1887 (1888), describes ubiquitous recorded music as a fundamental 
characteristic of the future (or “utopia” as he referred to it; case study reference section 2.0). 
These descriptions don’t directly describe portable music players, but they do offer imaginative 
description of the general concept of recorded music prior to technologies emerged to do so. 
There also exist some more specific fictional forecasts of portable and computer music. In 
1953, Ray Bradbury published the novel Fahrenheit 451 (Bradbury 2012). Within the book, 
Bradbury describes “seashell radios”, electric ear-bud-style music devices that allow 
individuals to isolate themselves from the external world and listen to music 
(http://technovelgy.com/ct/content.asp?Bnum=456). With respect to computer music too, in 
June 1950, four years after the initial development of ENIAC (first digital computer; case study 
section 4.5) and before development work occurred on tangible computer music technology, 
Kathleen Maclean published a science fiction story called “Incommunicado” that described 
computers as music instruments. The short story was published in Astounding Science Fiction 
and was also the focus of the cover illustration of the issue (Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 Computer music described in Astounding Science Fiction  
Closer to the emergence of portable digital audio devices, but still preceding them, a number 
of more specific fictional descriptions of portable digital music players were available. These 
descriptions appear to fit Basalla’s concept of “technological visions” (1988) and were not part 
of stylised narratives such as those of science fiction described above but instead those of 
particular individuals, such as entrepreneurs, musicians, or record label executives, who 
attempted to articulate new portable music products based around digital technology. These 
forecasted products will be described individually. 
6.2.1.2 1979 
In 1979, a British inventor named Kane Kramer drew a digital music player and in-store delivery 
system (see case study section 5.5). Recognising the impact of counterfeit vinyl records, Kane 
Kramer believed a solution was to build a system that sent music down the telephone line, for 
record stores to then program to audio to tape for in-store customers. He saw this as a way to 
make sure all record stores would always have stock. He produced a seven-page report 
detailing the advantages for music retailers. He also provided diagrams of what the concept 
would look like (Figure 6.2): 
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Figure 6.2 Kane Kramer’s Digital music player in-store delivery system 
Working for some years on these concepts, in 1981 Kane Kramer also produced a portable 
digital music player concept. 
 
Figure 6.3 Kane Kramer’s Portable digital music player concept (IXI) of 1969 
Kane Kramer attempted to build a company to sell the product. He also registered patents for 
the audio-limiting means for digital audio. However, within a number of years, the company 
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failed, and the patents became public domain after Kane Kramer later failed to renew them.  
These became public domain prior art, and in 2006 when Apple was taken to court for patent 
infringement by a company called Burst.com, Apple flew Kane Kramer to California to be a 
defence witness, highlighting some technical similarity between the iPod and the IXI player. 
Kane Kramer describes the similarity: 
There’s lots of aspects to do with iTunes and the iPod itself. From how it 
digitises music, how it lays it into memory. How it overcomes certain problems 
to do with the fact that electricity moves far quicker than we want. So if you 
were to play a track back without using limiting means you would hear the 
track, it might be a 3 and half minute track but you’d hear it in half a second. 
So to actually slow that down, those mechanisms. I’ve also drew the actual 
device, the style of the device, the four way scrolling control. I mean certainly 
if you took everything out that I did back then, [comparing to the iPod] what 
you’d have is a plastic box probably that didn’t play anything today. (Kramer, 
2004). 
6.2.1.3 1989 
In 1989, the British children’s TV show Going Live broadcast a segment as an April Fools’ joke 
(case study section 6.8). The segment described a new portable personal music player called 
“The Chippy” that people would soon be able to buy in stores. The Chippy was described as a 
computer chip (hence the name) no bigger than a credit card that could store hundreds of 
songs, offering users the ability to play back any song instantly. Viewers were invited to call in 
and request a song, and host Phillip Schofield said that soon artists’ entire back catalogues 
would be available on the device (Townsend, 2011). Schofield revealed to viewers that the 
segment was an April Fools’ joke, but the subsequent development of MP3 offers many of the 
same characteristics described in the Chippy segment. 
6.2.1.4 1990 
Apart from the above specific predictions and forecasts of digital music players, there were 
also a number of forecasts about the concept of home delivery of music and the impact it would 
have on the record industry. Frank Zappa was a prominent musician who described this. Like 
what motivated Kramer to explore the concept, Zappa described the problems of the existing 
technology of vinyl records and CDs, and suggested a more advanced system of sending 
music to consumers via telephone lines (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4 Frank Zappa’s Proposal for a System to Replace Phonograph Record Merchandising 
These are the imaginative descriptions that were identified in the case study that preceded the 
emergence of portable digital music players. 
Marker summary  
The case study revealed a number of imaginative descriptions of portable digital music 
technology, with these forecasts preceding the technology itself, often by a large margin.  The 
below will analyse these descriptions in greater depth with reference to the achievement of 
innovation, using other markers.   
6.2.2 Marker 2: These imaginative descriptions reveal an inability to create the 
technology. 
Comparing forecasts to the eventual emergence of portable digital music players, the above 
technological forecasts are vague in detail. Science fiction descriptions of the “seashell radio” 
of Ray Bradbury do not specifically reference any type of technology apart from electricity. 
Another discussed above, the “Chippy”, offered a description of a “computer chip” and a 
concept of size – “no bigger than a credit card that could store hundreds of songs” – but with 
no description of the specific mechanics of the technology. Both of these descriptions are void 
of technical specifics (which is not a criticism), due to their emergence in science fiction or 
children’s TV. 
Kane Kramer’s IXI player drawings could be viewed initially as the counterpoint to this absence 
of detail. Kramer registered patent on parts of his device (the audio limiting means), and more 
recently this design of Kramer’s has been acknowledged by Apple in their defence argument 
against another company’s patent infringement. This has led to recent suggestion of Kramer’s 
design being the determinant of the iPod: “Apple admit Brit invented iPod” (Boffey, 2008). 
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Kramer himself suggests a particularly strong link with his initial design and that of the later 
emergence of the iPod: 
I mean certainly if you took everything out [of the iPod] that I did back then, 
what you’d have is a plastic box probably that didn’t play anything today. 
(Kramer, 2004) 
However, there was a clear lack of capacity to create Kramer’s device in 1979–1982, and 
Kramer’s work remained an impossible technology of the time. Looking at technologies that 
were missing at the time that later emerged, reveal a clear absence of capacity that Kramer 
was confronted by.  For example, there was yet no consumer internet, digital audio standards 
such as the MP3 had not yet been created, and computer components were bulky, with the 
concept of a personal computer only starting to emerge in the public domain. When pressed 
in an interview, Kramer himself also gave insight into the limitations of technology at the time, 
and whilst suggesting many of his ideas were similar to the iPod, he more objectively identified 
the impossible constraints he was facing at the time too: 
“In any event, even if you had put a digital audio player in the hands of every 
man, woman, and child on the planet, they couldn’t have done much with it, 
because no one had digital audio tracks yet; the studios didn’t have any digital 
audio mastering equipment” (Kramer 2004). 
This insight is consistent with the concept of a prehistory lifeworld. The lifeworld does not yet 
provide conditions that allow for the creation of the technology in focus, and imaginative 
descriptions of the technology have little effect on binging this capacity forward. 
The above examples identify that whilst there existed imaginative forecasts of technology, 
these were constrained to imagination, with actual creation impossible. They did not initiate 
the technology and had little if any influence on the later development of the technology itself.  
How do these technologies get so close?  
If it is clear that so many of the later important enabling technologies of digital music were not 
available at the time, it also appears important to consider similarities.  These imaginative 
forecasts do offer some similarity to eventual technology like iPod.  Most specifically, Kane 
Kramer’s IXI player drawings from 1979 does appear similar in some ways the later successful 
iPod. It appears important to analyse this – how did these forecasts achieve similarity to later 
technology, despite the inability to build these technologies at the time? 
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It is suspected that the accuracy of Kramer’s forecasts particularly, as well as other concepts 
such as Frank Zappa’s description of home delivery, appear at the time more referencing the 
problems and limitations of the existing technologies of the time, including vinyl, cassette, and 
CD distribution rather than effectively describing the emergence of a new technology to solve 
these problems. 
Both Kramer and Zappa had expert-level familiarity with the problems of music distribution at 
the time. Describing the motive for the creation of his drawings, Kane Kramer identifies that 
his brother was the manager of Olivia Newton John at the time, and they were struggling with 
the problems of counterfeiting and returns of vinyl records. As a direct response to this, Kramer 
conceived of sending music down a telephone line, which was the catalyst Kramer identified 
for the creation of his IXI concept. Zappa too as a major-label musician appears to describe 
the problems with shipping of vinyl records, titling the manifesto “a proposal for system to 
replace phonograph recording merchandising”, focusing much of the discussion on problems 
with “back catalogues”. This description appears insightful and detailed regarding the limits 
and problems of merchandising, revealing a capacity to see the limits of the technology of the 
day as the driver of how they identified new technologies to overcome these limits.   
In contrast to their detailed understanding and description of the problem though, when 
describing the new technology both Zappa and Kramer use to address these issues, both 
Kramer’s and Zappa’s descriptions start to become vague or inaccurate. Zappa suggests that 
digital distribution is possible by using generic detail of “software” and “requiring the installation 
of a rentable D-A converter in the phone itself”, which misses a great deal of the detail and 
technical components that were required to make digital music work- the diffusion of personal 
computers (discussed in case study section 4.4, 5.1, 5.5, 5.6, 6.6, 7.1), the emergence of the 
internet (case study section 7.3, 8.2), the creation and proliferation of PC sound card 
technology (case study section 6.6.2), multimedia performance capacity of PCs (case study 
section 6.6.4), music on the internet (case study section 6.7), Napster (case study session 
8.5), and Kazaa (case study section 9.3.1) all occurred prior to the creation of the subscription 
services of MusicMatch and PressPlay (case study section 9.3.1.1), which offer a direct 
comparison to the subscription concept of Zappa. Each of these technologies and 
developments had their own trajectory, were often contested and emerged often in an 
unexpected manner.  With his forecast being made before these events, Zappa was not aware 
of all of this experimentation and technology prior to it occurring, and his technology forecast 
did not have this detail embedded within it, rendering it limited in all but the problem side of the 
forecast. The same can be said of Kramer – his drawing appears similar to the iPod, but his 
drawing lacks almost all of the detail that would allow Kramer to turn the product into an actual 
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device, including all of the technical components of the iPod (detailed in case study section 
##).   
The forecasts of Kramer and Zappa focus more on problems with existing technology and also 
use the technology available at the time to address them. This available technology available 
at the time represented constraints that no imagination could breach, rendering the products 
of Kramer and Zappa impossible. Perhaps the best way to articulate this issue comes from 
another expert interviewed for this study- Jeff Paterson, the creator of the IUMA (Internet 
Underground Music Archive- one of the first places to download music from the internet). 
Patterson describes the motivations for creating IUMA, identifying that whilst there was a grand 
vision, it was pragmatically using what was available at the time that made IUMA work: 
In the early days, I think there was a group of us that all had this idea of the 
celestial jukebox – access your music anywhere, any track, anything, and the 
middle-class musician – where anyone can post their stuff and get reimbursed 
and make their living off their own self-promotion, so that was like, we think 
that’s utopia. That’s where we want everything to be, and then we have these 
tools in front of us right now, so how can we use them to get us one step 
closer. And create glimpses of it right now, where if you have things configured 
properly, even, yes, you could get music on the go? (Jeff Patterson, personal 
communication June 26, 2013). 
This identifies that, in this case, imagination is driven by looking past the current limits of 
technology, and using whatever means within reach to offer an alternative to them. A similar 
insight was offered by William Gibson, who, whilst providing the description of cyberspace, 
also acknowledged more recently how much it was different to the eventual later creation of 
the internet: 
When people write imaginary futures they’re never about the future. They can 
only be about the moment in which they are written, and the known history 
before that. We don’t have anything else. We have no access to the future. 
We can try to extrapolate and we can spin scenarios and try to make future 
histories that seem intriguingly logical, but they aren’t going to be anything like 
what really happens. (Gibson, 2014) 
Overall, it appears imaginative descriptions in the prehistory lifeworld are more useful for 
revealing limits to existing technology of the time, rather than being insights into future 
technology. These imaginative forecasts reach beyond the capacity of the prehistory lifeworld, 
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and whilst they hint at a possible future, it is one of many alternatives, with no obvious likelihood 
that these imaginative descriptions will later be either a technology or innovation. 
6.2.3 Marker 3: There may be a history of discontinuities of similar forms of parallel 
technologies. 
The other element of the prehistory lifeworld is dedicated to discussion of existing technologies 
of the lifeworld. The model chapter identified that for the technology in focus, there may be a 
history of discontinuities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990) –  
previous technologies that offer a similar form of consumer value. An example is the 
progression of airplanes from propeller piston engines to turbine jet engines (Constant, 1980). 
In isolation each technology is discontinuous; in sequence they represent a lineage of tools for 
flight. 
The recording industry had just such a history of discontinuities, with a sequence of key 
technologies over time. Jac Holzman, the founder of Elektra Records, said with respect to the 
technology of the record industry in 1979: “The record business has always been in transit” 
(Holzman, 1979; case study section 5.3), and certainly throughout its over 100-year history 
there has been a number of key technologies. Vinyl records, cassette tapes, and compact 
discs represent the three major paradigms of the music industry in its history prior to the 
emergence of internet-based distribution and portable digital music players. The case study 
documents the history of these three technologies extensively (see case study section 3.0, 
3.1, 4.2, 4.8, 5.2, 6.1, 8.3), as well as the recording industry more generally. These 
technologies over the course of 100 years built up the recording industry to be powerful one, 
with each technology building on the previous to achieve new levels of success. Figure 6.5 
from the RIAA charts sales from 1973 highlighting the strength of vinyl, cassette tape, and then 
compact disc technologies as well as the transition that occurred between them (RIAA 2016). 
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Figure 6.5 The history of various music format sales from 1973 onwards 
With reference to the emergence of digital music technologies, and particularly portable digital 
music player technologies, these preceding technologies represent a history of development 
and investment in alternative technologies that occurred prior to the emerge of portable digital 
music technology.  Similar to Arthur’s concept of technological lock in (*##), these technologies 
provided a context that later influenced and constrained the development of portable digital 
music technology.   
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6.2.4 Marker 4: There is expected to be a particular strong parallel technology which 
later the new technology will compete against. 
In the prehistory lifeworld of portable digital music players, the record industry was a strong 
industry built around compact disc technology. The CD, which debuted on 17 August 1982 
(case study section 5.1), fast became a powerful technology eclipsing sales of both vinyl 
records and cassette tapes for the first time in 1991 (case study section 6.1). This would be a 
parallel technology to the eventual release of portable digital music players, and by the first 
time the portable digital music players were released in later lifeworlds, the CD was strong, 
with the recording industry coordinated as a range of elements, including manufacturers, 
logistics, distributors, and retailers, as well as support such as marketing and design, all 
dedicated to CD technology. The CD technological paradigm played an important role in the 
emergence of portable digital music players in coming lifeworlds, which will continue to be 
explored. 
If viewing the lifeworld, it is important to note that they are overlapping in some way, whereby, 
in this case, the prehistory lifeworld of portable digital music technology, is also the maturity 
lifeworld of CD technology.  
6.2.5 Prehistory lifeworld summary 
This concludes discussion of the prehistory lifeworld. Summarising this lifeworld, there does 
not yet exist capacity to build the technology.  Imaginative descriptions of portable digital music 
players were created, but these did not result in specific technology and are of little to no 
subsequent value with respect to the development of the later innovation. These forecasts fail 
because of what is missing from the detail of their descriptions; there is a lack of accumulative 
capacity, and these forecasts, whilst acknowledging limitations of existing technology, also 
overstate the current capacity of available technology for innovation. The lifeworld is also 
configured around an existing technology; in the case study, this was compact disc technology, 
which was a powerful technology improving in sales throughout the 1990s. It is from these 
conditions that the next lifeworld will be discussed. 
6.3 Establishment lifeworld 
The second lifeworld is the establishment lifeworld. In the establishment lifeworld, the first 
products are offered, establishing the domain in focus. Compared to the prehistory lifeworld, 
accumulation has advanced to a point where there are now components that make it possible 
to create the technology in focus. Despite the emergence of these technologies, it is expected 
that they do not achieve significant innovation due to the adolescence of technology, lacking 
performance and the strength of parallel technologies. 
182 Chapter 6 
 
The model chapter described the establishment lifeworld with a focus on accumulation leading 
to opportunities for new combination. It was described that the establishment of a technology 
is dependent upon the availability of components, and accumulation in performance available 
technologies will lead to the capacity to establish the technology in focus.  With a focus on this 
accumulation, combination, and exaptation, the model chapter offered these four markers of 
this establishment lifeworld (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Establishment lifeworld markers 
Marker 1 The domain will be established with the release of a new product. 
Marker 2 The new technology can be described as a combination of pre-existing 
technology. 
Marker 3 The component technologies that are utilised will have a traceable 
history in other domains. 
Marker 4 There are some tangible new performance characteristics of these 
component technologies that make the new technology possible. 
Marker 5 The new technologies will emerge as adolescent with limited 
performance and will now compete against a parallel technology in a 
stronger state. 
 
These markers will now be explored individually. 
6.3.1 Marker 1: The domain will be established with the release of a new product. 
In 1994, large electronics company NEC announced a prototype portable digital music player 
called Silicon Audio, with the device profiled in a range of sources, including Financial Times, 
Billboard, Popular Science, and minidisc.org. The device was described as the first computer-
chip-music idea to reach a working level (Woudenberg, 1995). It used the newly developed 
flash memory format to store music on self-contained cards. These memory cards (pictured in 
yellow in Figure 6.6) could hold 32 MB of data, and using the NEC-recommended MPEG layer 
2 audio compression format, this was advertised as approximately 24 min of audio. The 
memory cards were then insertable into the Silicon Audio portable music player, which was 
the card reader (the purple and grey readers pictured in Figure 6.6). The price of the newly 
released flash storage was restrictive at the time, with a 32 MB card described to have a retail 
price of around $2,000. NEC identified that this pricing placed the device outside the reach of 
a consumer (and therefore was only created as a prototype), but they expected flash to 
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decrease in cost, which would open up the consumer market: “NEC predicts, however, that 90 
minutes worth of memory card capacity will cost approximately $100 by the year 2000; 
playback-only cards will cost even less” (Normile, 1995, p. 48). 
 
Figure 6.6 NEC: Silicon Audio Prototype 
Almost two years after NEC’s Silicon Audio device, on 23 September 1996, a small startup 
company based in Cupertino (Silicon Valley) called Audio Highway announced the Audio 
Highway Listen Up Player (see Figure 6.7). Relying on technology and design common to 
cell/mobile phones of the time (such as display screens and black plastic design), the Listen 
Up Player was a portable digital sound device that included 12 MB flash storage. The device 
worked in conjunction with the Listen Up Player PC software called AudioWiz that downloaded 
audio (music and other audio content) from the internet and then allowed users to transfer this 
audio onto and off of the Listen Up Portable Player. The Listen Up Player also was suggested 
to have a battery life of 1 hr of continuous playing, making it a particularly portable device: “You 
can use it while you’re jogging, think of a Walkman for the internet” (Schulhof, 1998). The 
memory of 12 MB was a severe constraint, but one that reflected the cost of flash memory 
which, whilst still prohibitively expensive, had decreased significantly from the Silicon Audio 
prototype (Audio Highway, 1996). In 1997 the Audio Highway Listen Up Player won a 
Consumer Electronics Show innovations award, being described as a “big innovation in 
internet appliances” (Chiefet, 1997). Whilst the company contracted Fujistu to manufacture the 
device, only 25 units were ever released to the public (Ha, 2010). 
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Figure 6.7 Audio Highway Listen Up Player 
In 1998, the first widely available portable digital music players were released. The MPMan by 
Korean company Saehan (see Figure 6.8) is largely recognised as the first MP3 player and 
was first sold to the public in March 1998 (Buskirk, 2005; Camerani, 2012, p. 63; Knopper, 
2009, p. 166; Reece, 1998). It proved immediately popular with a niche audience of computer 
and music enthusiasts, with $30,000 worth of the players sold in the first three days of their 
availability online (Reece, 1998). 
In May 1998, two months after the release of the Saehan MPMan, a new portable music player 
called the Diamond Rio PMP 300 (Portable Music Player) was released by a U.S.-based PC 
component company called Diamond MultiMedia (Knopper, 2009, p. 166) (see Figure 6.8). 
Diamond was an established company with a profile selling computer components such as 
modems, sound and graphics cards, and multimedia accelerator cards (Wong, 13 January 
1998; Reece, 1998). The Diamond Rio was described as an immediate sales success as soon 
as it entered the market in time for Christmas 1998 (Menta, 2003b), and whilst sales figures 
are difficult to find, it has been reported in a number of sources that more than 200,000 units 
were sold over the lifespan of the device (Ha, 2010; Knopper 2009). 
Both the MPMan and the Diamond Rio had similar characteristics of 32 MB flash memory 
capacity, which was enough to hold approximately seven to eight songs at 128 kbps MP3 
compression. The virtues of flash-based memory were an advertised feature of the Diamond 
Rio, with the PMP 300 promoted as having no skipping errors during playback, making it ideal 
for activities such as walking, running, and cycling (Reece, 1998). Other shared features 
include AA battery power, liquid crystal display, and plastic casing. 
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Figure 6.8 MPMan and Diamond Rio 
These events will now be described with references to the markers offered in Table 6.2. 
6.3.2 Marker 2: The new technology can be described as a combination of pre-existing 
technology. 
The creation of the portable digital music player relied entirely on existing technologies 
available in 1997. Computers, as well as computing components such as memory, digital-to-
analog converters, the internet, software (including MP3), components from the consumer 
electronics industry such as liquid crystal displays, as well as general precedents such as 
plastic and electricity, were all available in 1997 before the MPMan and Diamond Rio first were 
created. That is to say, the portable players recognised above, the Listen Up Player, the 
MPMan, and the Diamond Rio all are combinations of pre-existing technologies. 
To contrast against the earlier prehistory lifeworld, many of these technologies weren’t 
available in 1979 at the time of Kane Kramer’s drawings for his IXI player. The lifeworld had 
changed; by 1998 a large number of new technologies emerged that hadn’t been available in 
the 1970s. Whilst it is not possible to identify all preceding technologies in depth, the 
development that occurred in a number of these technologies will be further explored with 
reference to the coming markers. 
These new technologies, whilst heralded as potentially dramatically new innovation, were 
created by applying familiar and available technological components. It was also the changing 
capacity of these components, such as the decrease in cost of flash storage, which also saw 
the shifting type of product that was introduced in this stage, moving from a costly prototype in 
the Slicon Audio Player, to the first small scale commercially successful portable player in the 
Diamond Rio.  The trajectory of component technologies is a focus of the next marker. 
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6.3.3 Marker 3: The component technologies that are utilised will have a traceable 
history in other domains 
The technologies utilised within portable digital music players had long trajectories of 
development prior to the creation of the first portable music players. During this time, the 
development of these component technologies occurred not for the specific intended purpose 
of digital music players. Drawing from the case study, there are many examples of this, but for 
efficiency the history of two central technologies will be explored prior to their use in portable 
digital music players: digital audio and the personal computer. 
6.3.3.1 Digitalisation of sound 
Reflecting on why he failed to create his IXI player in the late 1970s, Kane Kramer identified 
that at the time digital audio was not yet widely available, and the major recording studios did 
not yet have digital mastering equipment. In comparison, by the time the Diamond Rio was 
released in 1998, digital audio was common: the recording industry recorded digitally to 
compact disc, and “MP3” was a popular search term on the internet. Exploring the trajectory 
of digital audio during this time reveals characteristics that made it both impossible to create a 
portable digital music player in the late 1970s and likely in 1998. 
Digital music began with the pioneering efforts of Max Mathews and others at Bell Labs in the 
1950s, who used new IBM mainframe computers for the creation of music. The exploration led 
to the creation of the earliest digital music. It also influenced a number of subsequent 
developments, including the creation of Frequency Modulation synthesis by John Chowning, 
as well as offering precedent for the development of PCM analog-to-digital sound converters. 
PCM is a technique that produces a digital form of audio signal from an analog source, and by 
1969 both Sony and Nippon were selling PCM recorders to the professional music studio 
market (Baert, Theunissen & Vergult, 2013, p. 9). The quality of digital signal was described 
as higher quality compared to analog tape and, as a result, in the 1970s and 1980s there was 
an arms race as the major record labels embraced digital for this superior “pristine” audio 
quality characteristic (discussed in case study section 4.8, 5.3), fitting out a number of record 
studios with the advanced and at the time expensive digital audio technology. The rollout was 
slow due to expense, but by the 1980s the technology had become much cheaper and was 
increasingly utilised by smaller studios too. 
With the availability of digital audio, there were a number of subsequent developments in 
storage formats. Both the digital audio tape (DAT) and, more significantly, the compact disc 
were developed in the 1980s. The CD officially debuted on 17 August 1982 (discussed in detail 
in case study section 6.1). The CD was an advanced technology at the time, and, apart from 
 Lifeworld Analysis 187 
 
the new use of laser technology and digital audio, CD players themselves were also viewed 
as particularly advanced with respect to computing capacity, with the semiconductors utilised 
in CD players in the 1980s described as the most advanced ever used in a consumer product 
(see case study section  6.1), quickly becoming the recording industry’s most lucrative product.  
(case study section 7.1, 9.4). 
At the same time, compression techniques of digital audio were being explored, allowing for 
new broadcast products such as digital radio. Professor Karlheinz Brandenburg was a PhD 
student in the mid-1980s working on the compression of digital audio for the Digital Audio 
Broadcast project in Europe. After his PhD, Brandenburg worked with Jim Johnson at Bell Labs 
before returning to Europe to work with Leonardo Chagilioni of the newly formed Moving 
Pictures Expert Group (MPEG). MPEG was charged with the task of developing compressed 
video and audio standards for multimedia technology such as the CD-ROM.  During this 
process, Brandenburg worked on the compression algorithm that became MPEG layer 3, with 
the format finished in 1992. After releasing the MP3 format to the public, Brandeberg 
remembers that, to begin with, nothing happened. For two years, apart from sporadic use as 
a tool for audio feeder links for video broadcast at the Winter Olympics, as well as being used 
for recordings of station announcements on trains and busses, there was little interest in the 
format.   
If viewing the creation of portable digital music player as a product that relied on existing 
technologies, the above exploration reveals that in respect to one component- digital music 
and associated compression techniques- had a long trajectory of development that preceded 
the emergence of portable digital music players. This trajectory of digital music was not created 
explicitly for the purpose of portable digital music players, nor was it initiated after the concept 
of portable digital music players was known.   Another component technology will also be 
explored below.,  
6.3.3.2 PCs accumulate capacity to play digital music 
Along with the development of digital music formats and compression, computing hardware 
also dramatically changed between 1970 and 1997, providing new capacity that previously 
wasn’t possible. The difference in capacity is clear when comparing characteristics (size, 
weight, cost) of Kane Kramer’s IXI player drawings from 1979 with the Listen Up Player, 
MPMan, and Diamond Rio of 1997 and 1998, reflecting the more general changing 
characteristics of computing during this time. 
Computers began as military tools used for calculating firing tables with ENIAC in the 1950s, 
moving to becoming industrial machines with minicomputers costing $250,000, with the first 
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notable commercial application, the SABRE reservation system, used by American Airlines. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the minicomputer emerged as a multibillion-dollar category dominated 
by Digital Equipment Corp (this trajectory is described in detail in various case study sections). 
At this time in the 1970s, the trend in the changing performance of computing was first noticed 
– the performance of computing components was improving as their price dramatically 
decreased. This concept was described in a number of theories,  most notably as Moore’s law, 
which focussed on the reliable performance improvement in transistor counts (discussed in 
case study section 4.5), along with other more informal recognition of this process, including 
that of Nelson (1974) in Figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9 Ted Nelson’s 1974 thesis on the fall of computer Prices 
The increase in performance and decreasing price of mainframe and minicomputers not only 
made existing computer products and models more accessible for business, but the increasing 
performance soon enabled entirely new forms of computing, and in the early 1980s the 
personal computer market emerged. Hewlett-Packard, Apple, Tandy, and Commodore were 
small but quickly growing companies based on the increasing popularity of using a computer 
at home or in the office. In 1981, for example, Apple had grown over 200% from the previous 
 Lifeworld Analysis 189 
 
year, with sales of $350 million (Libes 1983, p. 314). By 1995, this had continued to grow, and 
PCs had become standard school and office machines and were increasingly common at 
home. 
6.3.3.3 PCs gain capacity to play recorded audio 
Referencing this development in the context of digital music, prior to 1990, PCs could not play 
recorded audio. Whilst PCs could generate polyphonic beep tones with the use of 8-bit FM 
synthesis, it was only with the emergence of hardware sound cards that included analog-to-
digital and digital-to-analog converters that made possible the playing of recorded music on a 
PC for the first time. Whilst these analog-to-digital converters had previously been sold as 
expensive recording equipment and products created by companies such as Sony, it was the 
computer component manufacturing industry that took this technology and created smaller 
versions that became components for computers. The earliest commercial success was 
Creative Labs’s Sound Blaster. It was a sound card that offered both a FM synthesis chip (with 
11 simultaneous voices), combined with the added functionality of an analog-to-digital 
converter, and a reciprocal digital-to-analog converter. The Soundblaster was sold as an after 
market component for PCs, that users could buy and install on their own home computers.  For 
the first time, the presence of these converters enabled the computer to play recorded digital 
music, which was recognised as a major achievement in 1992: “In just eleven years, PC sound 
has gone from beeps and boops to CD-quality audio” (English, 1992). 
Beyond the analog to digital converter, the performance of other PC components such as 
memory and processing performance were also initially below a functional capacity for digital 
music, and it took some time for this capacity both to emerge, and then to become widely 
available meaning even in the early 1990s, processing performance still was not quite powerful 
enough to make the PC a reliable music-listening tool. Professor Karlheinz Brandenburg 
identifies that it was not until 1994 that all components and capacity were available for the 
computer to become a reliable device: 
It was only in 1994 that MP3, or at that time we called it MPEG audio layer 3, 
could be stored on a PC, but you first always needed special hardware to do 
the decoding. The first PCs fast enough to do real time decoding were 100 
MHz 486 or the first Pentium devices … At that time, not all PCs had audio 
out yet and so if it had audio out, you could directly play MPEG audio layer 3 
from that PC. In fact that was when the file ending MP3 got into the picture … 
we still have the email which internally announced that from now on we will 
use the file extension MP3 in all our software and for all our files, and that was 
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on the 14th July 1995. (Professor K. Brandenburg, personal communication, 
May 27, 2013) 
Between 1993 and 1996 PC performance/price continued to demonstrate the improvement 
characterised by Nelson and Moore’s law. PCs continued to get faster and cheaper, and the 
capacity to play music, which was an experimental and expensive capacity in 1994, 
increasingly became a standard characteristic of computers. By 1995, Pentium processors 
were standard in new and lower priced computers, and with this, the PC was now being 
advertised to mass market consumers as a “multimedia” machine. Intel released and promoted 
their Pentium MMX (MMX standing for multimedia) chips in this time, with a range of TV 
advertisements that centered upon advertising the PC as a music-listening machine. 
At a similar time, PC drives with CD-replicating capacity began to fall in price. In 1995, after 
the release of the Creative Labs Digital Edge CD-R burner, a range of articles emerged 
describing the concept of CD-Rs, giving details about how the drives work, and when 
consumers could expect them to be available in PCs. The price of these drives dropped 
dramatically, and by 1997 the drives themselves began to be sold for under $400 for the first 
time, similarly becoming increasingly standard components of even basic model new PCs. 
The internet also emerged in the 1990s as a consumer tool, drawing from its own list of 
precedent technologies and insights. It was early in the internet’s consumer development that 
it was used for music, and one of the most prominent first websites to offer access to 
downloadable music was the IUMA. 
In 1997, the availability of MP3, sound cards, the internet, and PC-processing capacity was 
followed by software such as Winamp that now offered new tools for listening and organising 
MP3 music on a PC. Winamp was a music library software which offered new ways to store 
MP3 files, search for music, and create playlists. With 20 million people connected to the 
internet in 1997, and “MP3” becoming the most popular search term on the internet in 1998, 
Winamp captured this early behaviour to become an early success story in digital music. 
Winamp was then followed by new software that added to this capacity, making it also easy to 
copy (rip, burn) CDs, and it was MusicMatch that became the best reviewed of this new library 
software. 
The difficulty of lineage  
All of these developments represent the context, the lifeworld, which existed prior and amidst 
the creation of the first portable music players. The description above is also incomplete. It  
focuses on only a few key component technologies that proved important specifically to digital 
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music players – other components that could have been retraced include battery technology, 
LCD screen technology, flash memory, plastics, metals, electricity, and so on. And with this, 
the specific and unique trajectory of digital music players is difficult to identify – it appears a 
general availability of these technologies and wider things (science technique, ideas, 
processes, etc) at the time, where many of these things that had their own history, as a 
trajectory of specific development required before the new combination of portable digital 
music players were created. There are clear requirements for the audio formats, analog-to-
digital converters, and even related technologies like the internet to exist prior to the creation 
of portable digital music players, but almost all of these technologies were not created 
specifically for the use of portable digital music players, and much of this development didn’t 
appear to be working directly or clearly towards the iPod. 
Significantly too the source of these technologies and their trajectories is varied. Some 
emerged from the consumer electronics industry, others from the computer industry, others 
from the recording industry, and others too from wider scientific endeavours such as Bell Labs 
and MPEG. There doesn’t appear to be any clear path of development that one industry has 
over all others involved, and instead, portable digital music player technology emerged more 
generally from the available set of capacities at the time, which the concept of the lifeworld 
attempts to describe. That is to say, it was the availability of these technologies generally 
available in the lifeworld at the time that led to the creation of the portable digital music player, 
and not the other way around, where these technologies were created to be used in digital 
music players.   
6.3.4 Marker 4: There are some tangible new performance characteristics of these 
component technologies which make the new technology possible. 
Beyond the diverse amount of existing technologies the first portable digital music players 
utilised, the changing performance of these technologies also appears important. The 
emergence of portable digital music players relied on technologies that themselves had been 
incrementally improving for a long time and, importantly, had reached particular performance 
thresholds that allowed them to be utilised for the new combinations of portable digital music 
players. 
Rather than viewing the creation of the first portable digital music players as one made of 
entirely unfamiliar and new technologies, instead, it appears that the changing capacity of 
existing technologies allowed for new combination, and this was the source of creation for 
portable digital music players. Table 6.3 below presents the changing characteristics of some 
of these key technologies as utilised in portable digital music players. 
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Table 6.3 Changing characteristics of some key PC technologies 
Component Changing performance 
Analog-to-digital, digital-
to-analog converters 
Converters first emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as 
professional grade music studio tools utilised by the major labels as a 
superior technology to analog tape. By 1990, the converters themselves 
had decreased in size, allowing them to be added to PCs with the 
creation of the Sound Blaster, which resulted in the PC being able to 
replicate sound for the first time. With increasing size performance, by 
1997 converters were small enough to be included in portable players. 
Flash memory The MPMan and the Diamond Rio were both released with 32 MB flash 
storage capacity. These devices retailed for between $200 and $295. 
Flash storage was not a new technology in 1997; however, what was 
new was the price of performance characteristics. Compared to the 
earlier NEC Silicon Audio prototype in 1995, the same 32 MB flash 
storage capacity was described to have a cost of $2,000. NEC engineers 
in 1994 acknowledged this to be outside of the range of what consumers 
would be prepared to pay and offered a prediction for when this would 
occur: “NEC predicts, however, that 90 minutes worth of memory card 
capacity will cost approximately $100 by the year 2000; playback-only 
cards will cost even less” (Normille, 1995, p. 48). 
Internet  The internet was not a new technology by 1997 when the first portable 
music players emerged. However, the popularity of the internet had 
changed dramatically from 1.7 million users in 1993 to 20 million in 1997. 
This dramatically increased the demand for audio, and whist MP3 was 
created in 1991, it was not until 1997 and 1998 that consumer interest 
emerged: “A largely underground phenomenon in 1997, the 
controversial MP3 file-compression format burst from obscurity last year 
[1998]” (Reece, 1999b).   
  
This highlights the role of trajectories of existing technologies in the establishment of new 
technology. In the case of the portable digital music player, the first players released to the 
public like the Diamond Rio and the MPMan appeared to be made possible by the changing 
dynamic performance in a range of pre-existing technologies, which enabled them to be used 
as a new combination. 
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6.3.5 Marker 5: The new technologies will emerge as adolescent with limited 
performance and will now compete against a parallel technology in a stronger 
state. 
The final marker of the establishment lifeworld follows on from the points above. Just as the 
incremental improvement in existing technologies appeared important to offer establishment 
conditions for the new technology (as a combination), the technology also didn’t emerge as 
fully formed, but instead its performance was also constrained by the state of performance in 
components at the time. 
There is recognition in the literature that most innovations are relatively crude when they are 
first created (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, p. 42; Clark, 1985, p. 238; Henderson & Clark, 
1990, p. 14; Rosenberg, 1976), after which they are improved upon as their performance and 
range expands (Lipsey et al., 2005, p. 86). This was certainly the case with the release of the 
MPMan and the Diamond Rio. These players brought with them a sense of potential but soon 
also received polarised reviews from consumers. Some viewed the technologies as advanced; 
others described them as very frustrating new technologies, largely due to memory constraints 
(the flash memory size limited them to holding six to eight songs) and problems with software 
installation. A sample of consumer reviews for the MPMan on Amazon offered at the time are 
offered in Table 6.4 (see case study section 9.3 for more detailed reviews): 
Table 6.4 Consumer reviews of the MPMan 
“Okay, so I'm bitter. But after jumping through two hours’ worth of hoops trying to configure my 
system, the MPMan F20 still refuses to be recognized by the software it came with. Seems like poor 
design. I'm giving it an average star rating until their tech support gets back to me –  after that, even 
if it works there’s no way it deserves a 5. Too much frustration.”  
“I purchased The Eiger F20 about a month ago and I love it. The best thing about it is the unlimited 
amount of music that you can get online for free. It is smaller than a CD player and you don't have 
to buy CDs that have one song you like. If you listen to music a lot I definitely recommend getting 
this instead of buying new CDs all the time. It is a lot better than a RIO since you can swap out the 
Smartmedia cards. The only thing that it lacks is an equalizer (like the RIO) and an LCD screen that 
you can program to include the name of the track and the artist. Also, if you're going to buy this, buy 
some new headphones. Earbuds are fine for jogging and stuff, but if you want good sound quality 
get some good headphones. Overall I love this product.”  
“Don't waste your money on this product. It is a real piece of junk. I can't get mine installed despite 
repeated attempts. The documentation provided with the product is a joke. It is literally a photocopied 
four page piece of paper. I have called the support number for a week straight and never gotten a 
live person. Every time they email me in response to my inquiry they send the same automatic 
response message. Lastly the software provided is horrible. It is a bunch of clippings from 3rd party 
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web sites. I obviously can't tell you how this thing sounds since I've never gotten it working. Please 
save yourself the hassle – stay away from this product. Eiger Labs doesn't care about servicing its 
customers.” 
  
These limitations and frustrations were not isolated to portable digital music players but also 
were found in technologies of digital music more generally. The technologies that later proved 
critical to dramatic innovation didn’t yet have the capacity and characteristic required to enable 
products such as the iPod, iTunes, and the iTunes Music Store. Table 6.5 presents a number 
of references to this: 
Table 6.5 Technologies critical to dramatic digital music innovation 
Component Changing performance 
Downloading music in 
1995 
Jeff Patterson, pioneering co-founder of the IUMA (one of the first online 
source for downloadable music), describes the complexity of 
downloading music over the internet in 1995: 
So yeah we bought this MP2 encoder and MP2 player, and I think it was 
like a hundred bucks for the software to buy, and the player was freely 
distributable, so we could do that encoding, but not many people had 
the player and the MP2 codec wasn’t built into any other player at the 
time, so in order to listen to it, you actually had to download this player 
– a Windows machines couldn’t just play it. So that was definitely a 
hurdle. … And the problem too was that still even with the compression 
ratios we got it still took – you know, I had a 14.4 modem – so it took 
well over an hour to upload the song, and I don’t know if you’ve ever 
been on Usenet at all, so it’s a set of text posts, so to upload a binary 
file you have to do something called UUencoding, where it transforms 
the binary file into a text format, and then it splits it into parts because 
there’s a maximum file size for each post, so [to download and listen to 
the demo] you had to download 26 text posts, you had to stitch them in 
a text editor, and then you had to run it through an encoder. Then you 
could you play it if you installed the player, so it was pretty complicated 
… But eventually MP2 caught on, and then MP3 caught on. (Jeff 
Patterson, personal communication June 26, 2013). 
Due to the complexity, Patterson describes the first users at the time as, 
“tech savvy people with a high bandwidth connection, so people at 
universities were mostly it. … It was basically music-loving computer 
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Component Changing performance 
science students.” (Jeff Patterson, personal communication June 26, 
2013). 
PC performance Professor Karl Brandenburg creator of the MP3, reflects on the state of 
technologies in this time: 
“At that time [1995], the complexity was still too high for widespread 
application for distribution and so on. It was really only when every PC 
was fast enough on one hand and did have the soundcard built in on the 
other hand that this really took off. And that again technically was the 
case in 1995, but really the avalanche was going in 1997 in some 
sense.” (Professor K. Brandenburg, personal communication, May 27, 
2013) 
Download speeds  In 1997–2000, internet download speeds were frustrating. For example, 
using a common 56K modem, it could take more than 2 hrs to download 
an album of songs (Gillen, 2000b). Perhaps this is also what accounted 
for the popularity of MP3 in 1997 and 1998 – it was a compression 
standard that reduced file sizes, increasing efficiency of downloads 
relative to sound quality. Long download times also made CD burning a 
much more popular consumer behaviour in 1997 and early 1998. 
Hard drive capacity Hard drive performance, which later would also prove critical to the 
emergence of the iPod, was comparably limited for music-specific 
devices in 1997. Specifically, in the 12 April 1997 edition of Billboard 
there was an article that described the accelerating trend of radio 
stations implementing hard drive computer music systems to replace or 
supplement their CD collections. The article, first offering reflection on 
the growing awareness of digital music, said, “Digital continues to be an 
industry buzzword (to the point that it has crossed into the mainstream 
vernacular)”. Traiman (1997) describes the increasing popularity of hard 
drive systems at radio stations worldwide, with an estimated 1,500 radio 
stations having migrated their CD systems to hard drive libraries. 1997 
is described in the article as an important threshold year for these 
systems. Whilst they were available from the early 1990s (originally as 
1–2 GB systems), by 1997 a range of entrepreneurial companies (e.g., 
Broadcast Electronics, Enco Systems, RCS, and Computer Concepts) 
were selling 9 GB hard drive systems. The market leader was Broadcast 
Electronics, capturing 25%–30% market share, with their 9 GB 
Audiovault system retailing for $20,000 (Traiman,  1997). Despite the 
extreme expense of these systems, particularly in comparison to later 
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Component Changing performance 
portable players, even at these prices the systems were viewed as a 
cost-saving tool for radio stations. 
  
As a result of this adolescent performance, there was contested assessment of the value and 
potential of the technology. It wasn’t clear that portable digital music players were the obvious 
avenue of advance, nor that digital music downloading more generally would replace CDs. 
This appears common to most successful radical technology (Christensen, 1997). History 
appears replete with dismissive assessments of technologies based on early limitation, despite 
these technologies later proving to be powerful innovation. The turbine engine, for example, 
was initially dismissed by the U.S. government due to its preliminary inefficiencies: “There does 
not appear to be, at present, any prospect whatever that jet propulsion of the sort here 
considered will ever be of practical value, even for military purposes” (Buckingham, 1922, p. 
85). An internal memo at Western Union assessed the telephone similarly: “This telephone 
has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered as a means of communication. The 
device is inherently of no value to us” (Western Union internal memo, 1876). These 
assessments were factual at the time, but incremental improvement in the technological 
components with time revealed new performance that proved these assessments wrong. 
In the case of the portable digital music player, this resulted in considerable uncertainty 
regarding the potential of the technology. Portable digital music players, particularly flash-
based players, represented but one of many alternative avenues of advance. And at the time, 
for a recording industry that was achieving its highest revenue levels of any time in its history, 
the CD remained the dominant alternative. It wasn’t yet clear or obvious that downloads and 
portable digital music players were the correct strategies to pursue. The uncertainty is also 
captured in choices from the consumer electronics industry at the time– Sony, who had a 
history as the pioneering company of digital music, responsible for the Walkman and the CD, 
decided against entering the portable digital music player market initially. The same year as 
the MPMan and Diamond Rio were released, Sony initiated their largest and most expensive 
advertising campaign to promote their MiniDisc format, suggesting that the future remained 
contestable, and it wasn’t yet obvious what impact the portable digital music player was to 
have. 
6.3.6 Establishment lifeworld summary 
This concludes discussion of the establishment lifeworld. Summarising this lifeworld, there 
appear to be particular conditions of accumulation in availability and performance of existing 
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technologies that led to the creation of the first portable digital music players. These devices 
are combinations of component technologies, and these component technologies themselves 
had preceding trajectories, some developing for more than 20 years before the release of the 
first players. In analysing what made the portable digital music players possible in 1997 and 
1998 rather than earlier, it is the incremental improvement in these technologies that reach 
particular performance thresholds that made possible these players that at other times were 
not possible. The establishment created novelty, and this novelty emerged as uncertain in 
respect to future value. The next lifeworld, the development lifeworld, is where a significant 
amount of work emerges to improve and configure this initial technology. 
6.4 Development lifeworld 
The early technologies of the establishment lifeworld do not lead to significant innovation 
immediately. The third lifeworld, called here the development lifeworld, describes the most 
dramatic design work of the technology and appears at an important time between the 
emergence of the technology and the achievement of powerful innovation. In this time, the 
domain becomes more clearly established, and whilst the technology is initiated as crude, 
adolescent, and uncertain, it improves through processes marked collectively as development 
in this lifeworld. 
This development lifeworld between 1999 and 2001 was the most dramatic time of advance 
for portable digital music players. There was a large volume of market entry from companies 
offering new products, all of whom were experimenting with new players. Along with this, more 
broadly in digital music there were a number of dramatic events and developments that offered 
a wider context that also influenced development of digital music players. 
There are three key characteristics to describe the development lifeworld in the model chapter. 
First, there is expected to be a recognisable increase in entrepreneurs offering new products 
based around the new technology (Klepper, 1996). These products initiate a process of 
variation and selection, where the selection environment (Nelson & Winter, 1982) of the wider 
lifeworld reveals the constraints and limitations of the technology over a number of 
socioeconomic influences. Second, the technology faces significant competition in this 
lifeworld. It has now emerged as a distinct technology but remains one of many parallel 
alternatives, with recognition that there will be pre-existing alternative technologies with 
stronger performance and alignment that it now must compete with.  With the problems of the 
technology revealed by trial and error in this lifeworld, the capacity of the technology to achieve 
innovation fluctuates and remains uncertain. Finally, accumulation in capacity of existing 
technologies in the lifeworld discussed in the establishment lifeworld continues, and whilst trial 
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and error reveals problems and limitations, ongoing accumulation offers new forms of 
technology, with greater levels of performance that weren’t previously available. This has the 
effect of making assessments of the technology difficult and often being quickly proved 
erroneous on account of how quickly the characteristics and limits of the technology are 
changing quickly. 
To describe and summarise the detail and activity in this lifeworld, a range of markers are 
offered. These are presented in Table 6.6 and will be the focus of discussion in the coming 
section. 
Table 6.6 Development lifeworld markers 
Marker 1 There is a dramatic number of new competitors, from a variety of 
industries, offering new products around the new technology. 
Marker 2 These new products initiate variation and selection processes, which 
reveal problems and limitations with the new technology across 
socioeconomic criteria of the lifeworld.  
Marker 3 Accumulation in capacity of the lifeworld continues, and this creates 
further opportunities for exaptation and combination, with components 
of greater capacity becoming available. 
6.4.1 Marker 1: There is a dramatic number of new competitors, from a variety of 
industries, offering new products around the new technology. 
1999 to 2001 was a dramatic time for the portable digital music player market. There emerged 
a large number of new entrants to the market, offering a variety of new products that built upon 
initial designs offered by the MPMan and the Diamond Rio. These new players were released 
from a variety of companies from consumer electronics, computer component, and PC 
industries, and included a variety of prominent high profile brands (such as JVC, Toshiba, 
Samsung, RCA, and Compaq) as well as a number of smaller entrepreneurial efforts (i-Jam, 
Sensory Science, and Creative) (see Figure 6.19). 
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Figure 6.10 Large variety of flash memory portable players 
Whilst there were differences in design and technology choice (such as screen size and battery 
choice), most of these players were based around the same technological components as the 
MPMan and the Diamond Rio, most notably with all players of this style using flash storage as 
the key memory component. 
During this time, there was widespread acknowledgement and consensus that flash storage 
was the future product of the industry, reliant in part upon the expected and demonstrated 
trajectory of improvement in the technology. Whilst the MPMan and Rio Diamond were both 
released with 32 MB flash storage, by mid-2000, 64 MB memory players became increasing 
standard, with a number of others offering expanded memory, such as the Soul player by AVC 
Technologies, which was the first player to announce 128 MB flash memory (see case study 
section 9.3, 10.4). 
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The large volume of players released in this time not only explored technical features but also 
appeared to search for particular consumer niches. Players were designed and marketed for 
uses such as sports (Nike PSA player), fashion (Panasonic eWear, Casio Wrist Audio), 
industrial design and luxury (Bang and Olufsen BeoSound), and use in cars (Digiset Duo 
Casette MP3 player). A sample of these players is offered in Figure 6.11. 
 
Figure 6.11 Alternative design portable digital music players 
The increasing number of new entrants with a constant stream of new product releases brought 
with it increasing attention to the portable digital music player category as a whole. Consistent 
with the importance of selection feedback noted by Simon (1962, p. 473), there emerged 
particular news websites that chronicled developments and new releases. These websites 
offered reviews, interviews, and opinion on emerging developments. Websites such as 
mp3newswire.net, webnoize.com, and Wired’s Mp3 Rocks the Web are three prominent digital 
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music news websites that emerged at this time. Digital distribution news also became a focus 
at Billboard, the long-standing recording industry journal. Some of these sources were 
consumer facing, such as mp3newswire.net, which had a focus on reviews of new players for 
consumers. Others were hybrids, such as Mp3 Rocks the Web and Webnoize, which offered 
both industry-level analysis of trends (with purchasable reports) and information for 
consumers. Billboard remained largely a specific recording industry publication. 
Along with these new news sources, there were also a large amount of conferences dedicated 
to digital music in this time. The Mp3.com Summit was a yearly conference, Webnoize ran 
large-scale yearly conferences, and Harvard had a conference called Signal and Noise, among 
many others. The mix of conference events and news sources updated with new information 
daily or even hourly at times, played a critical role offering valuable feedback to entrepreneurs 
engaged in the marketplace during this time. The emergence of these “selection feedback” 
news sources and conference events appear a good marker of the development lifeworld, 
highlighting the importance of gaining new information about feedback as a critical source of 
competitive advantage at this time. 
6.4.1.2 Multiple developments 
Along with the increase in the amount of new portable digital music players, much like the 
component technologies that emerged from a wider context in the previous lifeworld, during 
this time there were a number of dramatic concurrent developments more generally in digital 
music. These relate to PC-based music tools such as library software, CD ripping and burning 
on PCs, MP3 search on the internet, and then Napster. Amidst these events, there was also 
significant major label experimentation, including the Madison Project partnership with IBM, 
the large-scale standard setting attempt in the SDMI, and the release of MusicNet and 
PressPlay, two online music services controlled by the major labels. These developments did 
not occur specifically on behalf of the development of portable digital music players, but they 
are related, and represent a general context, the lifeworld of the time, which had a profound 
impact on the subsequent direction of portable digital music players, with the later emergence 
of the iPod responding to many of the issues emerging in this time to provide one of the first 
integrated solutions across portable player and digital music library software. A number of the 
important developments that occurred during this lifeworld provided the direct context for the 
later emergence of the iPod, and these important precedents will be described separately 
below. 
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6.4.1.3 Music library software 
Following on from the recognition of the PC as a multimedia tool that occurred between 1992 
and 1996, between 1997 and 2001 this performance became widely distributed. CD Read 
Write drives (enabling CD ripping and burning) became increasingly standard components of 
PCs (see case study section 9.2.2, 10.1.1), as levels of internet connectivity continued to reach 
pervasive levels (case study section 9.1, 10.1). In the U.S., as of September 2001, the 
Department of Commerce Census Bureau estimated that 60.2 million U.S. households (or 
56.6%) owned a computer, and of these 80% were connected to the internet (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 2011; see also Crandall, Jackson & Singer, 2003, p. 5), with high speed internet 
most notably available at many U.S. universities. 
Using a PC for digital music became popular. Winamp, which was the leading MP3 library 
software in 1997 (see case study section 8.2.3) had increasingly been superseded by newer 
software aimed at offering music library capacity integrated with CD burning and ripping 
capacity (see case study 10.1.2). Winamp was soon eclipsed by newer products such as 
Windows Media Player and Real Audio’s RealJukebox Plus, along with other specific burning 
software such as Roxio Toast, which were all available at this time. But it was another product, 
MusicMatch, that offered a wider amount of product features, recognised as the first fully 
“integrated” solution that in a single software made it easy to import CDs, manage/listen to a 
music library on a PC, make playlists, and export music by burning to disc or to an external 
MP3 player (Business Wire, 2001). MusicMatch was recognised as the superior software of 
the time: “[it] does what you want, with the least hassle and the best results” (Mossberg, 17 
July 2001; see case study section 10.1.2). 
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Figure 6.12 PC music library and CD ripping software 
6.4.1.4 Online MP3 search tools 
Along with these developments in music library software, there were a range of internet-based 
tools that made it easy for internet users to search for and find MP3 files. At this time, MP3 
rapidly became dramatically popular as a consumer format. By October 1999 it had become 
the most searched term on the internet, as downloading music became a popular use case for 
internet-connected home and university PCs (Jones & Sul, 14 October 1999). 
There were a range of online websites and software tools that emerged to help users find MP3 
files online. The pioneering work of the IUMA, which avoided offering major label content on 
account of copyright issues, was quickly surpassed by a range of new products. Entrepreneur 
Michael Robertson recognised that “MP3” was becoming a popular search term on the internet 
and quickly purchased mp3.com for $1,000. Robertson initially made mp3.com an information 
website for the music format but quickly expanded to offer independent music. Mp3.com 
became a leading website for music from independent artists, and Robertson a prominent 
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advocate for online music. The company also listed on the stock exchange, riding the wave of 
the dot-com boom and making Robertson a billionaire briefly. Mp3.com then pushed the limits 
of intellectual property to gain access to major label content, offering new products such as an 
online locker service using their “beam it” technology. It resulted in a lawsuit from the major 
labels for copyright infringement which mp3.com lost, after which, in 2001, Robertson sold 
mp3.com to major label Universal Vivendi. 
With the popularity of CD burning and ripping and PC-based music library tools, there was a 
growing amount of major label songs that users had converted to MP3 and were storing on 
their PCs. With the rise of the internet, the next step was the sharing of these files, leading to 
a dramatic piracy problem for the major labels. There was small-scale activity and sharing of 
pirated material on Internet Relay Chat channels such as the popular “Warez” channel, which 
offered users access to pirated material. It led to one of the first prominent court cases for 
copyright infringement for illegal downloading with United States v. Jeff Levy (case study 
section 9.2.4). Levy was a student at the University of Oregon, where he had access to 
broadband, and, utilising this, started sharing his music and software collection, as well as 
downloading content from other users in the ISO Traders Channel: 
I'm like, oh, this is something I can do because I have a CD burner, and I have 
a really fast connection to where I can download a 600MB image file in 10, 15 
minutes … but what was interesting in a way, too, was that you no longer 
required any sort of knowledge of writing code or changing the packing [to] 
pirate the software.. … You didn't necessarily have to do that anymore. 
Because you have the CD burner to do that. (Jeff Levy, personal 
communication July 9, 2013) 
Whilst his university had first reported Levy to the government suspecting he was the organiser 
of an advanced online piracy ring due to the volume of downloads and uploads (estimated at 
10 GB a day), it was revealed in the court case he didn’t have a coordinating role on Warez or 
ISO Traders – more simply he was just a university student that had access to broadband and 
was using its capacity to share content. He was found guilty of copyright infringement and 
sentenced with a fine and a ban on internet connectivity. 
Along with this, a new raft of consumer-facing websites made it possible to search the internet 
for MP3 files. Specifically, mp3.lycos.com was a leading search engine where users could 
search the internet for a particular song. Sean Fanning, creator of Napster, suggests that in 
1998 and early 1999 he and university friends were using mp3.lycos but had found the service 
problematic. Fanning described that the service would often return search results that included 
broken links or links that would time out (Aydar, 2005). In response, Fanning conceived of a 
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peer-to-peer software architecture that he subsequently developed into Napster. Fanning 
spent a few months coding a prototype himself (Beato, 2000). Napster CEO Hank Barry 
describes the context that led to Napster’s creation: 
So you are in a dorm where everybody has broadband access, and you are 
in a mix where you’ve got people with big hard drives, MP3s – by the way, 
there’s no cable TV in the dorms, so you don’t have any cable TV, but you do 
have broadband access. So what are you going to do for fun? What are you 
going to do? And you don’t have any money, alright, you can’t buy any 
records. So in this mix, you have a powerful kind of soup. … Bored, no money, 
access to broadband, access to these MP3s. … you also had MP3 players 
around, so people listening to them [mp3s], but basically to get them you have 
to take somebody’s hard drive. You have to physically walk it over. (H. Barry, 
personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
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Figure 6.13 Internet based mp3 search tools 
Napster was launched in June 1999 and soon became a dramatic consumer and cultural 
phenomenon (Napster is discussed in detail in the case study section 9.6). Its adoption was 
sheer in scale and speed. The effectiveness of the peer-to-peer software design of Napster 
gave users free reliable access to almost the entire catalogue of music. RIAA CEO Cary 
Sherman discusses the popularity of Napster: 
[Napster] just unleashed a consumer free-for-all with respect to everybody 
having whatever music they wanted. A lot of people were collecting music just 
for the sake of collecting it – a lot of music that they downloaded, they never 
even listened to. I mean, it was a frenzy. It really was. (C. Sherman, personal 
communication June 27, 2013). 
On 7 December 1999, the RIAA, representing 18 record labels, including all the major labels, 
sued Napster for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement (Clark, 1999). The original 
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decision from Judge Patel was viewed as a clear win for the RIAA: “Napster had been legally 
eviscerated” (Ante, 2000). There were appeals, but ultimately the court case led to Napster 
having to filter out all copyrighted material from search responses, which proved difficult. On 1 
July 2001 Napster shut down its service, after losing 65%–70% of its users in the four months 
between February and June 2000 (Stone, 2001). The growth in the size of Napster is 
summarised in the previous analysis chapter, and Napster is also covered in detail in the case 
study.  
Following Napster, a wave of second-generation peer-to-peer products emerged, including 
Limewire, Morpheus, Scour, Red Swoosh, and most notably Kazaa. Kazaa quickly filled the 
void of Napster, and eclipsed it in user numbers both on account of the large migration of 
Napster users as well as increasingly mainstream familiarity with peer-to-peer products (Kazaa 
and other second-generation peer-to-peer services, which are discussed in detail in case study 
section 10.1.3). This too led to lawsuits against these second-generation services post-2001. 
These products represent a clear shift in the capacity of digital music.  Drawing on the 
increasing widespread access and familiarity with PC technologies and the internet, Napster 
particularly revealed the internet’s capacity as a tool for digital music distribution that was 
profound and shocking, with Napster itself transcending description as a product to become 
instead a major source of cultural intrigue and inflection. 
Variation and selection feedback  
Variation and selection increased as a result of the large volume of portable digital music 
players released as well events in digital music more generally. Reviews of these products, 
consumer feedback, experimentation by manufacturers, and critique and discussion from the 
available news and conference sources made expectations about better designs clearer, as 
well as exposed a range of reverse salients (Hughes, 1983) or problems with these new 
players. These problems emerged not only as technical challenges, but also problems at a 
range of socio-economic criteria. The model chapter discussed four alternative types of 
socioeconomic variation and feedback (component, consumer, complementary, and culture) 
and the activity and problems that emerged on these four levels will be discussed individually 
below. 
6.4.1.5 Component level variation and feedback 
The model chapter described that in the early stages of a technology there is likely to be 
experimentation with core component layout and configuration of the technology. In the early 
stages of the automobile industry, for example, cars were offered with gasoline, electric, and 
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steam engines, as well as wood and aluminium bodies (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990, p 14). 
There was experimentation with component design in this stage of portable music player 
development. As mentioned in the first marker, the technical component layout of the Diamond 
Rio and the MPMan became a popular base for other products, and there was a large variety 
of similar players based around 32–64 MB flash memory. Flash memory was viewed as the 
central technology for the future direction of portable players at this time, with enthusiasm 
emerging from consumer electronics, the recording industry and computer component 
manufacturers alike (see case study section 10.4). However, with the cost/capacity of flash 
memory still limited, at this time “memory format” components also became an important 
source of experimentation. 
Whilst there was acknowledgement that the trajectory of flash would eventually offer players 
better performance from industry as well as consumers, there emerged alternative memory 
formats that attempted to address the short term cost/performance problems of flash memory. 
Specifically, the “PocketZip disc” (originally named “Clik! Disc”) was released by Iomega, with 
discs that were larger than flash in terms of physical size but offered a storage capacity of 40 
MB and retailed for $10 (Menta, 2000a, 2000b). This offered a significant cost advantage over 
flash at the time (see case study section 9.4). These discs were used for some players, but as 
the cost of flash improved, these players lost their advantage. The PocketZip format failed 
three years after its debut. 
During this time of memory component experimentation, there emerged an entirely different 
alternative to flash and the PocketZip that offered dramatically different storage capacity, 
launching a category of portable players called “jukebox players”. These will be discussed 
below. 
6.4.1.5.1 Jukebox players 
Magnetic hard disk drives were an important component of PCs and laptops, which were both 
significantly growing product categories in 1998 and 1999. With this, there was continual push 
for incremental improvement in the performance of these PC and laptop disk drives by 
component manufacturers. As a result of this incremental improvement (marked by individual 
insights, such as IBM researcher Stuart Parkin and colleagues’ creation of the “spin drive” and 
“spintronics”, which gave the capability to alter the magnetic state of materials at the atomic 
level; Markoff 2007), by 1998 it became possible to create significantly smaller physically sized 
hard drives that retained a relatively high storage capacity. In 1998 and 1999, a range of 
manufacturers, including Compaq, IBM, and Toshiba were working on creating these smaller 
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drives. The first to market was Compaq, who initialised this new category of small hard drives 
with what it referred to as simply a “2.5 inch laptop hard disk” (Camerani, 2012, p. 63). IBM 
soon followed with their own “Microdrive”, which was a hard drive that had much smaller 
physical dimensions relative to the previous PC and laptop hard drives (see case study section 
9.3, 10.4). 
Soon the availability of these small drives led to new developments in portable digital music 
players. Utilising Compaq’s 2.5 inch laptop hard disk, engineers at Compaq’s Systems 
Research Centre created a dedicated music player called the Personal Jukebox 100 (PJB-
100; Wired News, 1999). The player utilised other components that were common to PCs and 
other MP3 players available in the market, such as the LCD screen, Ethernet interface, and 
rechargeable lithium battery (Rhode Island Computer Museum, 2014), but rather than use 
flash memory, Compaq used its own unique 4.86 GB hard drive, dramatically changing what 
was possible compared to flash memory. Whilst the PJB-100 was more bulky in physical size 
compared to flash memory players, where flash memory players could store a maximum of 
eight to 15 songs, using the Compaq hard drive, the PJB-100 could hold 1,000 songs. 
This was a dramatic advance, and by utilising the laptop hard drive, the research team at 
Compaq had created a new form of portable digital music player that was soon viewed as a 
distinct category marked “jukebox players”, as other competitors offered similar designs. The 
advertising of the PJB-100 zeroed in on the distinct value it offered users, calling it the most 
powerful MP3/audio CD player on earth, promoting that you could carry your CD collection in 
your pocket, (very similar to Jobs’ future tagline for the iPod of “Your entire music library fits in 
your pocket”). Figures 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 present the player as well as the initial marketing 
for the device. 
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Figure 6.14 Compaq PJB-100, the pioneering hard drive digital music player 
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Figure 6.15 PJB-100 website and advertising 
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Figure 6.16 PJB-100 website and advertising 
With the PJB-100 emerging from a specific research team in Compaq (with the team itself 
being a core group of previous Digital Equipment Corp. employees that transferred with 
Compaq’s previous acquisition of DEC), the higher leadership team at Compaq did not pursue 
the portable player. Instead after the prototype stage, Compaq stopped development on the 
device and withdrew from the category, focusing on the personal digital assistant category 
instead. Compaq then sold the PJB-100 design to an independent company called Remote 
Solutions, who released the same technology to the public as the Remote Solutions Personal 
Jukebox. When released as the Remote Solutions Personal Jukebox, the player was 
recognised as a landmark development. Mp3newswire founder Richard Menta, for, example 
described it as a breakthrough: 
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Remote Solutions Personal Jukebox is a milestone product. By that we mean 
any product whose breakthrough innovations are so significant, they influence 
the future course of its industry (Menta, 2000a). 
Soon after, a range of competition from companies such as Archos and Creative emerged that 
similarly utilised small PC hard drives to offer players the capacity to store over 1,000 songs 
(see Figure 6.17). This category of players soon came to be recognised as the jukebox 
category (see case study section 9.4). 
 
Figure 6.17 PC hard drive based Jukebox players 
These portable jukebox-style devices were well received on account of their storage capacity, 
but limitations were soon described. Reviews described the library capacity as fantastic but 
lamented issues with size, weight and portability, limited battery life, often complicated menus 
(Creative being the exception), and slow transfer speeds from PCs (see case study section 
9.4). 
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With both jukebox players, along with the much smaller flash memory players, being sold to 
the market, these two categories were viewed as related but ultimately independent 
categories, with the smaller flash-based players having the majority of manufacturer focus and 
being the more significant category on account of the expected fall in the price of flash memory 
in the years to come (see case study section 10.4). These two categories represent important 
trial and error at the component level during this time. 
6.4.1.6 Consumer feedback 
The second level or type of variation and selection feedback level was that from consumers. 
As noted in the model chapter, consumers play a central role in the development and 
configuration of technology. The technology is not delivered ready-made with meaning 
articulated prior to consumer use (Tuomi, 2002, p. 9), but instead consumers actively define 
and shape its meaning (Fischer, 1992, pp. 84–85). The role of consumers has been recognised 
as so central to the development of technology that their role has been acknowledged to be 
the most important: “The single measure which discriminated most clearly between success 
and failure was ‘user needs understood’” (Freeman & Soete, 1997, location 4501). 
Consumers were important during the development of portable music players through this 
time. Most notably, consumer reviews of existing players highlighted the problems with flash 
memory and usability, as well as the relationship with software. 
Despite the industry enthusiasm for flash memory, from a consumer perspective, flash memory 
players remained frustrating. The cost/capacity of flash storage at the time limited these 
devices to being able to play six to 15 songs only, and the cost of increasing this capacity by 
an extra six to 12 songs remained very restrictive (see case study section 8.3). Amazon 
customer reviews from this time acknowledge the memory constraints and cost of flash as a 
significant frustration with these players. See case study section 8.3 for an extended range of 
reviews, but a small section is offered in Table 6.7: 
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Table 6.7 Flash memory portable player consumer reviews 
Reviewer: Matthew 
Date of review: 26 
November 1999 
Player reviewed: Diamond 
Rio 
The Rio PMP300 is a great portable system if you have access to your 
own computer. Some advantages are that it's very small, very light, it 
doesn't skip, it only takes 1 battery which runs for at least 10 hrs, and 
the music can be free on the internet. You can also take tracks right 
off your favorite CDs. The 1 problem that I have with it is that it only 
holds 32 MB which is about 7 or 8 CD quality songs. It could hold more 
if you don't mind radio quality. If you want to get more memory on this 
thing it's not cheap. You can double your memory from 32MB to 64MB 
for about $100. 
Reviewer: Nick Paul 
Date of review: 12 July 
1999 
Player reviewed: Diamond 
Rio 
It plays perfectly, and I have no complaints with the performance. But 
if you are going to take this with you as a truly “portable” unit you are 
going to be stuck with only 30 minutes of storage for cd quality music. 
Maybe that's not a problem for you, but personally I need more of a 
variety of music when I take this on a trip. And the extra 32-meg flash 
memory cards cost $100!! 
Reviewer: E.K 
Date of review: 2 July 2000 
Player reviewed: Creative 
Nomad 
I'm not going to get all technical now, except the fact that NOMAD can 
support other future formats like WMA, and most of the other top-
selling ones do not. OKay...NOMAD has a limited memory of 64MB. 
Most of the others do too. Yeah, there are some that hold 96MB now, 
but who knows...wait a few years and it'll probably be a couple 
Gigabytes...that is, if future formats of music files do not make mp3s 
obsolete.  
  
Flash was a prominent technology, to the extent that major consumer electronics companies 
like Toshiba were prominent advocates for it, and even the record labels such as Universal, 
EMI, and BMG all invested in, released, and promoted their own flash card album format called 
Dataplay. There was a clear difference between consumer experience of these devices at the 
time, and the expectations of the format from industry. 
Further exploring the role of consumers in the process of variation and selection, the rise of 
file sharing is another powerful activity through this time. The embrace of first MP3 and then 
Napster was a significant consumer-driven behaviour that had a major influence on the 
development that occurred. The rapid consumer embrace of Napster particularly changed 
expectations and the timeframe for the development of digital music distribution. This 
consumer behaviour shifted the negotiating conditions for both the labels as well as the young 
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entrepreneurial companies, brought political pressure on the labels, and increased the rate of 
experimentation in digital music distribution. 
Consumer embrace of Napster also changed the expectations regarding usability. In the final 
stages of Napster, there was a clearer expectation that for software to compete with Napster 
it had to offer a similar friendly usability experience (see case study 10.3.3, 11.1), and the 
importance of consumers embracing MP3 was a major driver of industry decisions regarding 
the required usability of services, with an accumulating understanding that to compete with 
Napster, paid products had to do so on usability. 
Whilst there were many avenues explored through this time with new products, the response 
from consumers to these products was a powerful catalyst for further advance. It was 
consumers who had a strong, albeit not absolute, authority on the direction of advance, and 
products that failed to achieve consumer response were soon discarded. Products that did 
initiate strong consumer response, such as Napster, appeared to be embraced as offering 
feedback for further development. 
6.4.1.7 Complementary alignment and feedback 
The third type of variation identified through this lifeworld was at the level of complementarities. 
The model chapter described that the value of the technology does not emerge in creation, but 
its value is dependent upon a range of complementary technologies, suppliers, and distribution 
channels in order to function effectively and achieve innovation (Rosenberg, 1983, p. 59). The 
automobile, for example, as Unruh (2000, p. 822) notes, was dependent upon industry 
coordination of complementarities such as petroleum, glass, rubber, and steel, as well as the 
coordination of industries (and governments) related to availability and production of roads – 
asphalt, concrete, and steel industries. For any particular technology, the process of 
emergence and configuration of these complementarities is difficult, but one that is central to 
the innovative performance of a particular technology (Geels, 2002, p. 1270). 
This issue is one of complexity and importance for portable digital music players. 
Complementarities represented a critical determinant of performance in digital music. The 
major record labels, who owned and controlled approximately 80% of the catalogue of 
recorded music by this time, were a critical determinant, and the labels themselves were 
heavily aligned with the CD format (and associated partnerships with manufacturers and 
retailers of both CDs and CD players). This made the transition to portable digital music players 
difficult for both the industry and for new digital entrepreneurs dependent upon the industry for 
legitimacy. 
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The major labels had a strong existing relationship with the consumer electronics industry, and 
whilst many consumer electronics companies were engaged in the portable digital music 
player market, these companies were not ultimately the source of innovation.  Instead the 
major companies that created innovation emerged from new software entrepreneurs, PC 
component companies (Creative, Diamond, Sandisk), and PC companies (most notably with 
Apple). 
During this development there was a a significant adjustment to relationships. The recording 
industry at large had to initialise a separation with retailers, adjust the relationship with 
consumer electronics companies, and establish new relationships with IT companies. This was 
a complicated task, and one that was not obvious to begin with either, where instead the nature 
of required relationships became clearer on account of increasing precedent due to variation 
and selection. A number of perspectives of key suppliers and industries who confronted the 
shift caused by digital technologies will be discussed below. 
6.4.1.7.1 Major labels 
It was a very active time for the major labels, and from a very early stage the major labels 
engaged in experimentation regarding digital music distribution. Prior to Napster the labels had 
initiated a range of experiments. The Madison Project partnership from IBM and the major 
labels was a small-scale pilot of delivery of albums to home PCs (case study section 8.3.2), 
followed by the large scale SDMI (case study section 9.4.3), where over 200 member 
companies from the computing, music, and consumer electronics industries attempted to build 
a secure digital music format to replace the increasingly popular MP3. SDMI was announced 
in 1998 with Leonardo Chiariglione, who previously led the MPEG standardisation process, 
appointed as leader. The goal of SDMI was to create a secure technical standard, and the 
members spent the next three years engaged in the task. There was initial optimism, a release 
of a technical standard described as technically secure, which was then cracked by Ed Felten, 
a professor of computer science at Stanford, with SDMI eventually being put on hiatus on 18 
May 2001, unable to spur the widespread adoption of a secure technical standard. 
The relationship between entrepreneurs and the RIAA was hostile at this time. There was a 
range of unauthorised products which brought with it an initial legal offensive to curtail these 
unauthorised products, and at the same time, there was a lack of perceived reasonable 
licensing opportunities for entrepreneurial companies to access major label content (case 
study section 9.4.1). Lawsuits were common from the RIAA against these entrepreneurial 
efforts (case study section 9.4.1). 
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Amidst this public battle, privately, there appeared genuine attempts to explore digital 
distribution between the labels and entrepreneurs. Meeting the record label heads in private, 
for example, the CEO of Napster, Hank Barry, came close to achieving licensing agreements 
(see case study 9.7.7), but uncertainty regarding royalty rates, the business model, previous 
acrimony between parties, and impact upon CD sales all ultimately resulted in the major labels 
not engaging and legitimising digital products such as Napster and Kazaa. 
Along with the lawsuits, the major labels by 2000 had increasingly engaged in a significant 
amount of digital acquisitions (see case study section 10.3) and themselves were now 
jockeying for position with respect to the future of digital music, with examples such as 
Universal Vivendi’s purchase of mp3.com and Bertlesmann AG’s (owner of the major label 
BMG) alliance with Napster on 1 November 2000 (see case study section 9.7.8). The 
uncertainty of digital music distribution appeared to recede, and in its place the major labels 
were themselves attempting to control online distribution channels. 
Despite the activity, there was still yet no way to legally download the majority of major label 
content in 2000, leading to a Senate inquiry as to why young entrepreneurial companies were 
not able to get licenses to sell major label content online (see case study section 10.2). Under 
increasing pressure and also wanting to themselves capitalise on the opportunity of online 
digital music distribution (see case study section 10.2), the major labels launched their own 
music software products in MusicNet (launched 4 December 2001) and PressPlay (launched 
January 2002). 





Figure 6.18 MusicNet and Press Play advertisinb 
By mid-2002, these products had failed and revealed a range of problems, including the need 
to have a complete library of all major label content; antitrust concerns, with the major labels 
owning music and also controlling music distribution; and problems with this software with 
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respect to usability (see case study section 10.3.2). At the end of 2000, apart from sporadic 
attempts such as e-music and Real Audio, there were no compelling large catalogue major 
label online purchasing experiences yet available. 
Whilst a common perspective is that the major record labels were slow to see the future of 
digital music, based on the many opinions of the experts interviewed in this research (including 
many competing entrepreneurs) as well as the detail of the case study, this view is not 
supported. The major labels from a very early time began to explore the capacity of digital 
music (see case study sections 7.1, 7.2, 8.4, 9.3), but, due to a number of characteristics, the 
transition took longer than some commentators and entrepreneurs anticipated or expected. 
There are a number of reasons for why the transition took longer. These are summarised in 
this research as follows: 
1. The source of innovation did not emerge from the music industry’s existing partnerships 
with retailers or the consumer electronics industry. This required the major record 
labels first to adjust these existing relationships and create new ones with IT companies 
such as Apple (case study sections 8.4, 9.4.3, 10.4, 10.5). As a consequence, neither 
industry had familiarity or sensibility with the other, and the new technology required 
dramatically different relationships. 
2. The transition required establishing new digital contracts and standards with their own 
artists, with little direct precedent and widespread artist scepticism regarding 
acceptable royalty rates (case study 9.4.3). 
3. There are also perhaps fundamental differences in the speed of innovation between 
the music industry and the IT industries, which slowed down the transition. For the 
music industry, innovation was not related to the release of new products but instead 
to maximisation of value from existing products via back catalogues. The top selling 
CD between 2000 and 2010 was the Beatles 1 album, a collection of songs recorded 
and released in the 1960s and by 2001 at least 50 years old. Highlighting the difference 
between the record industry and IT and computing industries, by contrast, Apple or IBM 
could not rerelease a 50-year-old computer (case study section 9.4.3). 
4. Significant control and authority issues impacted negotiations between the major labels 
and entrepreneurs. The RIAA and the major labels viewed entrepreneurial startups with 
a sense of ambush, as illegitimate, and initially as competitors (case study sections 
9.4.1, 9.7.6, 10.3). Hostility was also promoted by entrepreneurs such as Michael 
Robertson, who described the labels as slow to change (see case study 9.6). This 
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impacted negotiations and made finding agreement more difficult than what it would 
prove with latter products such as Spotify, who were not engaged in this activity. 
5. Perhaps more than any other issue that made the transition difficult for the major labels 
was that online distribution did not offer the major labels any clear or obvious business 
model. And particularly, online distribution did not offer a business model that was 
comparable in revenues to the CD model (see case study section 9.4, 10.3). Despite 
the record industry having a long history of being able to transition to new technologies, 
this particular transition was extremely negative in respect to revenues – from the CD, 
which was the most lucrative format of all time, at its all-time highest revenues, to a 
new distribution technology with almost zero revenues, and one that even in best 
projections would not offer revenues anywhere near comparable to the CD. This made 
the transition a difficult one for the major labels. 
6.4.1.7.2 The consumer electronics industry 
Another complementary perspective to consider is the consumer electronics industry. Prior to 
the emergence of online music, the consumer electronics industry had a strong relationship 
with the record industry. The clearest example of this was Sony. Sony had a history of 
compelling and powerful innovation, particularly in portable music. The Walkman, the CD, and 
the DiscMan were all Sony technologies, which had both defined the success of the record 
industry and what portable music meant for much of the world. The strength of Sony was such 
that in 1998 it was voted as the world’s most recognised brand (see case study sections 4.8, 
5.1, 6.1, 7.5, 9.3, 11.3.6  for a detailed history of Sony, MiniDisc, Walkman, and DiscMan, as 
well as more generally Sony’s innovation philosophy). Sony had also attempted to strengthen 
its capacity to capitalise on new technologies too. After the failed BETA format of the 1980s, 
Sony purchased CBS records to become the first consumer electronics company to also 
control content (discussed in detail in case study section 9.3). With the Walkman brand, a 
major stake in content and a promoted internal culture of innovation, Sony were well placed to 
seek the future prior to the first portable digital music players. 
Sony, however, and the consumer electronics industry more generally, faltered with respect to 
portable digital music players. Despite their history, portable digital music players required 
different technologies, and Sony did not have any advantage with the new technology of the 
internet, PC hardware, or software. Particularly, the new players required software, and Sony 
were not a software authority. Their legacy was as a hardware innovator, and their products 
required nominal software. This characteristic became more obvious with the release of more 
players. 
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Whilst it wasn’t entirely clear in 1998, portable digital music players based around PC 
components required strong organised software that made the experience better across both 
the portable player and the PC. Apple’s solution was one that embraced the PC as a central 
device and created effective software to improve the value of the portable music player. Sony 
entirely missed this, releasing players that whilst impressive from a hardware design 
perspective were dysfunctional as a user experience. Sony’s first player received widespread 
consumer derision on account of problematic software and their particular decision to not allow 
the player to play MP3 natively due to copyright concerns. 
The important role of software, and particularly the importance of the relationship between the 
PC and portable music players, appeared more obvious to some PC hardware component 
manufacturers. In June 2000, Creative announced their PC strategy, which identified the PC 
and software as a critical component. In January 2001, Jobs announced Apple’s digital hub 
strategy, describing the relationship as critical. 
The advantage appeared to have shifted to those companies that were natively PC companies, 
and who understood consumer behaviour with PCs. This, of course, wasn’t enough in and of 
itself enough to achieve success (best noted with the failure of Microsoft), but it was soon 
leveraged by Apple for dramatic success. 
Cary Sherman again, giving insight into the complexity of the changing source of innovation 
reflects on how IT companies came to dislodge the role of consumer electronics companies 
during this time: 
Well, we knew that the IT industry was going to be getting in this space, but I 
think we looked at it more as software-enabled delivery systems, not 
necessarily products. So early on, the major labels chose IBM to do a test, an 
experimental delivery system for albums. It was called the Madison Project. 
They did it in San Diego, but they [the labels] went to what was then the 
biggest and best and most highly thought-of computer company [IBM], and 
they worked with IBM for album delivery, and it was going to be full albums, 
and it was going to have album art. It was going to be replicating the physical 
experience, except online. Everybody thought of this as delivering [of music] 
to a computer. So the IBM role was not to create new music players; it was to 
create delivery and distribution systems. Apple coming out with the iPod was 
a game changer, and yes the major labels did get a heads-up because Steve 
Jobs came asking for rights, but I don’t think most of us looked at the IT 
industry as the source of product innovation. IT was going to be service 
innovation or delivery innovation. But it turns out [it came from] the IT industry 
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– well, Apple in particular. Nobody else did the job that Apple did in terms of 
creating new devices. (C. Sherman, personal communication June 27, 2013). 
6.4.1.7.3 Physical retailers and distributors 
During this time, CD retailers, such as independent record stores or, more significantly, large-
scale chain retailers such as Virgin Megastores and Tower Records, had a critical role in the 
transition and were a source of feedback on developments. Much like consumer electronics 
companies, retailers did not have native skills in software. Their skills and resources were 
physical logistics and physical retailing. Despite this, the significance of digital was not 
unknown to these companies. Virgin set up its own Virgin Radio product online very early, and 
it was in retailers such as Tower Record that Todd Rundgren demonstrated his Patronet and 
CD-interactive software in 1994 and 1995 as a forebear to later developments. 
Record retailers appeared to be exploring digital, with for the most part no native understanding 
or competitive advantage with respect to the new digital technology, and they were also now 
at a competitive disadvantage due to their control of physical and intellectual assets that were 
rapidly becoming a limitation. They were “below zero” with respect to their capacity to engage 
in new technologies, due to the need to also maintain their existing technologies; as a result, 
often in Billboard particularly, the effort was assigned to warding off and downplaying the threat 
of new technology in comparison to engaging in the change. Pamela Horowitz, the CEO of 
National Association of Retail Merchandisers, was often vocal in Billboard regarding the risks 
and uncertainties of digital distribution at this time, as well as promoting that the labels needed 
to support retailers on account of how important their relationship had been in the past (see 
for example case study section 8.4). 
Physical retailers ultimately failed, and, corresponding with the popularity of Napster, Kazaa, 
and the growth in revenues of iTunes, Tower Records declared bankruptcy in 2004, and the 
majority of Virgin Megastores were closed by 2007, reflecting a wider decline in music retailing. 
6.4.1.7.4 Summary 
Portable digital music players were not a simple extension of the existing CD industry. Digital 
distribution and portable music players required a complete reconfiguration of the industry in 
ways that were not possible to predict. That is, the emergence of these new complementary 
configurations and industry relationships could not simply be established by analogy or by 
expectation. Much like the technology, these relationships emerged as a process of trial and 
error, as understanding of innovation shifted and key industry partners learnt of where they 
were best placed. This was perhaps more than any other type of change, the most difficult as 
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well as the source of the most resistance. It also led to the record retail industry capitulating, 
the consumer electronics industry losing their status as a major innovator and the computer 
industry emerging as the new source of product innovation. 
6.4.1.8 Cultural feedback 
The final level of socioeconomic variation and selection described in the model chapter was 
that described as culture. The use of the term “culture” is consistent with what is introduced by 
Garud et al. (2013, p. 797) and broadly represents the economic, political, and legal 
environment in which the technology is placed. These conditions have an impact on the design 
criteria and value of the technology. 
Digital music was a confronting technology from a cultural perspective. The availability of MP3 
files on the internet was a powerful technology that challenged the long held and accepted 
cultural value of music. These technologies created a powerful cultural question: Was 
downloading music stealing? 
The previously accepted cultural expectations regarding the price of music as well as the 
requirement to purchase was questioned with the availability of these new technologies. Prior 
to the internet, paying for recorded music from record stores was both an expectation (and 
even a celebrated) cultural experience and norm. With access to Napster, available on 
standard PC hardware in most homes, digital music became an ethical dilemma. 
It was also a complicated time with respect to the conflict between cultural expectations and 
new technological capacities. Jeff Levy is a prime example of this. As a University of Oregon 
student in 1996–1997, and with his dorm having fast internet, Levy began trading files on his 
PC with other members of an Internet Relay Chat group (see case study section 9.2.4). The 
University IT administrator saw the increased bandwidth and reported Levy to local authorities 
for copyright infringement. Levy was prosecuted for copyright infringement by the U.S. 
government for sharing software and music. Levy was found guilty of copyright infringement 
and sentenced to a fine and an extended ban from using the internet. 
This event took place prior to Napster, and for Levy the rise of Napster in 1999 soon became 
a source of anguish and felt sharply unjust. With him and his family having gone through the 
ordeal of being sued by the U.S. government for sharing copyrighted material online, Levy now 
watched news reports of Napster users of the same age brazenly and proudly declaring how 
much music they had pirated. These users on news reports were openly declaring they had 
downloaded more than Levy ever did, to national TV audiences, and where Levy had a criminal 
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record, an internet ban, and a fine for his actions, the reports would end and move on to other 
news with no consequence for those involved. The issue was a complicated moral one. 
Since then, and with the increased availability of easy-to-use cheap music services that offer 
major label material, expectation regarding copyright has been reinstated, and the consumer 
behaviour of pirating appears to have receded from mainstream audiences, although the 
practice requires ongoing enforcement. In retrospect, 1998–2002 has been described as a 
confusing time with regard to this behaviour –  a time where “an entire generation committed 
the same crime” (Witt, 2016). Amidst this lifeworld of 1998–2002, these technologies brought 
significant cultural uncertainty, and this section ends with the behaviour of downloading 
rampant but, prior to iTunes, no clear obvious channel to purchase music legitimately over the 
internet. 
6.4.1.9 Summary of variation and selection 
The variation selection feedback during this time was ferocious on all levels discussed. The 
range of developments was such that digital music transcended a product category to at times 
capture the attention of much of the world media. The above has discussed four alternative 
levels of feedback that had an impact on the development of innovation. The large volume of 
products and new events at this time revealed problems and issues across all of these levels 
that offered feedback for further development. It would soon be Apple, with the iPod, iTunes, 
and the iTunes Music Store, that would address many of the problems that emerged from 
these previous products. 
6.4.2 Marker 2: Accumulation in capacity of the lifeworld continues, and this creates 
further opportunities for exaptation and combination, with components of 
greater capacity becoming available. 
The trial and error that characterised this time brought with it an accumulating amount of 
understanding about better performing products and designs. After the emergence of products 
such as Napster and the large volume of flash-based portable music players, there was a 
clearer sense of problems created by the technology. 
Amidst the trial and error, new capacities emerged too. The creation of the new jukebox 
category of players that utilised laptop computer hard drives was a further example of new 
exaptation through this time, and one that appeared to be counter to the expectations of the 
importance of flash storage held by the consumer electronics industry. The incremental 
improvement in technologies that was discussed in the establishment lifeworld continued, and 
new performance that was previously unavailable could be used for new products and 
services. 
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6.4.3 Summary 
The development lifeworld, recognised as events between 1997 and 2001, is a time of dramatic 
development for portable digital music players and digital music more generally. The large 
volume of events during this time created a trial-and-error process that revealed new 
behaviour, problems, and expectations across a range of socioeconomic criteria. Throughout 
this time, whilst there were many claims to innovation, it remained elusive. Whilst there were 
examples that got close, such as Napster, Kazaa, and to a lesser extent the Diamond Rio, 
each had ultimately revealed new problems and then receded in importance. 
The large amount of failure and experimentation of this time had resulted ultimately in no 
product as a sustained innovation, but it had set the foundation for what was next. This was 
perhaps best encapsulated by an article in the Economist in April 2001, six months before the 
release of the iPod, which offered a critique of the accumulating precedent in digital music to 
that point. Recognising the earlier pioneering expectations of a dramatic revolution in digital 
music that had by this point now also revealed the failures of Napster, the dot-com crash, and 
the increasing uncertainty with respect to whether this digital revolution would occur, the author 
suggested that innovation would require more than simply suggesting that digital music 
innovation was inevitable: 
Just because the Internet and electronic entertainment coexist doesn't mean 
one is the automatic illuminant of the other. The true merit of most supposed 
techno-marvels usually abides in a realm underlying the surface traits, waiting 
for original minds to discover revolutionary uses. (White, 2001) 
Despite the large volume of trial and error during this lifeworld, and the accumulation both in 
understanding of socioeconomic conditions and available technologies, this lifeworld ends with 
major innovation yet to emerge. 
6.5 Innovation lifeworld 
The fourth and final lifeworld is when dramatic innovation is achieved. After previous lifeworld 
conditions have limited a technology to imagination description (prehistory lifeworld), then 
adolescent creation (establishment lifeworld), to development where there is a lot of trial and 
error but innovation remains elusive (development lifeworld), a new design emerges in this 
fourth lifeworld, titled innovation lifeworld, to achieve dramatic success. 
The innovation lifeworld is described with the emergence of a dominant design (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990), which is a single product that comes to achieve widespread adoption, 
capturing the vast majority of value of the innovation of the entire domain, having the effect of 
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disrupting many previous entrepreneurs from the domain (Abernathy, 1979; Sahal, 1981). 
Whilst relying on the accumulated learning and capacity of the previous lifeworld, which 
provides many conditions and technologies critical to the creation of the dominant design, the 
dominant design is an extension of this and requires new insight and advance – what Usher 
refers to as the task of “critical revision and mastery” (Usher, 1954). The design may emerge 
as a result of furthering accumulation where the lifeworld offers new components or new 
performance not possible at previous times. This design, once realised, emerges amidst 
uncertainty and a great deal of alternative designs, but as a process will establish dominance 
over the entire class of products to then become recognised as a dramatic innovation 
becoming difficult to dislodge. 
The iPod became a clear dominant design. Between the release of the first iPod on 23 October 
2001, and the end of this research 31 December 2007, the iPod dominated the portable music 
player market. In 2007, the final year of this study, 52.6 million iPods were sold, responsible 
for 72.4% of all portable music player sales (Krazit, 2007). The iPod was both a consumer and 
cultural phenomenon. 
Within two of years of Apple releasing the iPod along with Macintosh-based library software 
iTunes (iTunes was released first, 10 months prior to the iPod), it created the iTunes Music 
Store, where users could pay to download individual tracks and albums from major label artists. 
The combination of these three – a highly effective portable music player, aligned 
desktop/laptop music library software, and the ability to buy major label content represented a 
complete digital music experience that resonated in the market. By 2003, Apple had also 
bifurcated the iPod from a single product into a range of iPod products, and also released a 
Windows PC version of iTunes, which opened iPod to a much larger market. 
Drawing upon many common technologies, Apple created a product that achieved uncommon 
success. The way in which this design became dominant, as well as its impact, will be 
discussed below. 
6.5.1 Creation 
Apple relied heavily on the state of available technologies to create the iPod. In a technical 
analysis of the components of the iPod, the conclusion was that “much of the underlying iPod 
design was performed by outside companies” (Sherman, 2002). Apple used external suppliers 
for a wide variety of internal components. The battery came from Sony, software came from a 
company called Pixo, the analog-digital converter came from Wolfson electronics, and flash 
memory came from Sharp. A prototype 1.8 inch thick 5 GB hard drive from Toshiba was also 
utilised. The case study describes in detail the large number of external component companies 
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Apple utilised to create the iPod. The use of these varying component suppliers relied upon 
the strategy of combination. When asked if the hard drive was the source of innovation, for 
example, Rubinstein instead identifies that it wasn’t one component but both the availability 
and performance of this wide range of products: 
With these kind of things it’s always the combination of the technology. So 
without firewire you couldn’t have moved the data fast enough. Without the 
hard drive – the size or storage – either you didn’t have the size, or you didn’t 
have the storage capacity right. Without the display technology you couldn’t 
have a good enough display; you’d have a one-line instead of having a 
multiline display. Without the battery technology your battery life would have 
sucked … advancement of integrated silicon, or system on a chip, really 
important. So it really took all of those technologies, plus the software 
technologies, the user interface with the wheel and all that. … So I think it was 
the combination of all of those and such a great form factor, really great UI 
with the wheel, that really created the first product that was for more than just 
geeks. (J. Rubinstein, personal communication, July 9, 2013) 
Rubinstein further explains that the availability of components was dynamic, and that Apple 
had waited for the emergence of particular capabilities: 
Anything we did at Apple we did in a heartbeat, right, we did with a sense of 
urgency, but we never did a product before its time. Or we tried not to. So we 
waited a while till the technologies would really support the kind of product we 
wanted to build. So we waited quite a few months, until I found the 1.8 inch 
hard drive, and during that time displays had matured, battery technology had 
matured, so it was kind of just the right moment in time to go do it. (J. 
Rubinstein, personal communication, July 9, 2013) 
With a short development time and utilising iTunes, which was released in January 2001, the 
iPod was released on 23 October 2001 (see Figure 6.19). 
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Figure 6.19 The first iPod 
6.5.2 Uniqueness 
Whilst there was a strong reliance on the available components from external sources, the 
design of the iPod did not exist ready-made waiting to be discovered. The iPod as a 
combination of components was an achievement for Apple. Apple had a long history of focus 
on industrial design, marketing, and consumer computing products with a superior ease of use 
to competitors. These characteristics manifested in the design of the iPod, and it was a product 
unique to Apple’s particular sensibilities. Whilst Rubinstein notes combination as critical to the 
creation of the iPod, later, he gave focus to this, describing the iPod not as random 
combination, but the choices of combination being the hard work of innovation: 
I think there was a lot of innovation around it. First of all, it was the integration 
of just the right technologies at just the right time, and that’s an art, not a 
science. There is an art form to that. You got to know what to put in, and what 
to not put in. I think we hit the sweet spot on form factor, on battery life, on 
cost. I mean all of those were kind of sweet spots. And then I think our whole 
concept around how the software on the Mac interacted with the software on 
the device, that the Mac made the device much more valuable than it would 
be all on its own. And I think that was very innovative for us. (J. Rubinstein, 
personal communication, July 9, 2013). 
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This research identifies a number of key unique achievements of the iPod in comparison to 
competitive portable music players of the time. These are discussed in detail in the case study 
but are summarised below: 
1. The new Toshiba hard drive gave it the size profile of flash players (it fits in your pocket) 
but had the memory capacity of hard drive players (it holds your entire music library). 
2. Apple optimised the relationship between the portable music player and PC/Macintosh 
library software (the digital hub strategy). 
3. Apple was skilled as an integrated hardware and software manufacturer. Most other IT 
companies were either hardware only (e.g., Dell) or software only (e.g., Microsoft). The 
integration between hardware and software allowed Apple to achieve a far superior 
user experience than other players where portable players and music library software 
were designed separately. 
4. The scroll wheel design was a unique design of Apple’s for portable music players. 
Apple imitated the design from a Bang and Olufsen telephone. It provided a superior 
interface to button scroll menus of all rival portable players. 
5. The iPod was created using premium materials. Most rival players were made of 
plastic. The only other player on the market to use aluminium was the high-end Bang 
and Olufsen MP3 player, which had a significant price premium. 
6. The iPod played all popular music formats. Some rivals, including Microsoft’s music 
library software and Sony’s portable music player both did not easily or natively play 
MP3. 
7. Firewire gave transfer speed an advantage between the player and PC compared to 
players using USB1. Firewire was Apple’s own creation for desktop video and was 
standard for iMacs and iBooks. Using this for the iPod gave them an advantage. Apple 
then transferred to USB when iTunes was released to PC. 
8. The design of the iPod proved iconic (particularly the white headphones), influenced 
by seminal designer Dieter Rams. 
9. Apple spent 10 times more money on marketing compared to any other portable digital 
music player company, and the colourful iPod silhouette marketing campaign also 
proved iconic, winning numerous awards. 
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10. Despite having all of these superior features to other players, Apple’s iPod price was 
comparable to other players (it was not the cheapest or most expensive). This was 
particularly the case with the release of the iPod Mini and Nano, which competed at the 
lower end of the price market. 
11. Apple outcompeted the market on strategy, turning any initial advantage of the first 
model iPod into powerful wide-ranging success. Apple quickly bifurcated the iPod into 
a product line to outflank competitors across the entire portable player market. 
6.5.3 The impact of precedent on Apple’s design 
To create their unique achievement in the iPod, Apple utilised a great deal of accumulated 
understanding from the market. As discussed in previous sections, by the time Apple entered 
the portable music player market, the category had an almost four-year history, with the first 
players released in early 1998, along with more general developments such as Napster, 
Kazaa, MusicNet, and PressPlay. There had been a great deal written in reviews and general 
commentary about the wide variety of players available along with developments of the music 
industry. Many paths had been explored, and there was a banking amount of precedent about 
both the value these products delivered as well as the issues with them. Despite the 
accumulating understanding, at the time Apple entered the market, there was no clear 
dominant product. As Jobs noted in the introductory keynote for the iPod, despite the 
competition, “no one had found the recipe; there is no clear market leader for digital music” 
(Jobs 2001). 
The design of the iPod appeared to identify and avoid many of the mistakes and issues of 
competitors that entered earlier. For example, Apple’s iPod played a range of leading audio 
formats, including MP3, natively. Sony, by contrast, sought to offer a proprietary format that 
complicated the user experience. By 2003, based on market feedback, Sony too had adopted 
this strategy and released a player natively capable of playing MP3. 
More generally, the state of available portable players released prior to the iPod also appear 
to have had a direct impact on the design of the iPod. For example, the scroll wheel interface, 
a defining characteristic of the iPod and acknowledged as a revolutionary user interface by 
Jobs (see case study section 11.4), was conceived by Phill Schiller after using other competitor 
portable music players on the marketplace and finding it frustrating to press a button hundreds 
of times to navigate to a particular song (see case study section 10.5.2). In finding a solution 
to this problem, Schiller suggested the design of the Bang and Olufsen BeoCom telephone, 
which had a scroll wheel interface with a button in the middle to navigate a library of phone 
numbers. 
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Along with identifying and avoiding problems and limitations with existing players, Apple also 
appeared to imitate features and characteristics from technologies that worked and were 
viewed by consumers fondly. For example, the “autosync” process between iTunes and an 
iPod, which made the relationship between player and PC software very easy (“plug, whirr, 
done” was the catch line offered by Jobs), appeared to imitate a similar syncing process of 
Palm Pilot’s handheld organiser, which itself had links to previous Apple software (see case 
study section 10.5.3). Palm Pilot’s autosync feature looked and functioned in a similar manner 
to the iTunes and iPod sync feature. Another example is the software on the iPod. Apple 
utilised a tree search structure for the software on the iPod (meaning that searching for an 
artist led to a menu of their albums, which led to a menu of their songs). This was similar to 
the software design of Creative’s players, to the extent that Creative sued Apple for patent 
infringement for copying this design layout. In 2005 Apple settled with Creative, paying them 
$100 million (case study section 11.3.1). 
More generally, iTunes imitated many features of MusicMatch, the then leader of PC music 
library software. MusicMatch was reviewed as the best PC library software by Walter Mossberg 
prior to the release of iTunes; it avoided the design and functionality problems of Windows 
Music Player and Real Audio (see case study section 9.2.3). MusicMatch offered a complete 
capacity to rip a CD, store it in a library, create playlists, and then burn this to a new CD-R. 
Apple’s iTunes similarly offered this functionality in a simple and effective way. 
Perhaps most notably, Apple’s decision to initially not embrace flash memory and instead use 
the small profile Toshiba hard drive in the iPod was counter to most competition at the time. 
Whilst the generally accepted view within the industry was of the importance of flash as the 
memory standard, clear consumer frustration had emerged with flash players at the time 
because they could only store a maximum of six to 15 songs. In contrast, the jukebox category 
established by the Compaq PJB-100, discussed in the previous lifeworld, had received 
consumer praise on account of the capacity to store over 1,000 songs, but limitations of these 
players were noted to be both their bulk and weight along with battery problems and slow 
transfer speeds (see case study section 9.3). Utilising the 1.8 inch hard drive from Toshiba, 
with its 5 GB memory capacity, allowed Apple to create a much smaller player than any other 
jukebox players while retaining the capacity to hold 1,000 songs. Drawing from existing market, 
Jobs’s promoted marketing headline for the iPod of “1,000 songs in your pocket” was almost 
identical to the marketing headline of Compaq’s PJB-100 player a few years before: “Can you 
carry your entire music collection in your pocket? Yes you can”. But where the PJB-100 player 
didn’t actually fit in a standard-sized pocket and was reviewed as large, utilising the new 
Toshiba hard drive and with thoughtful component design the iPod achieved a much smaller 
form factor, which delivered more value to users. 
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There were also other features that made the iPod superior to other players. Much like 
identifying limitations with existing flash players with respect to storage capacity, Apple was 
also creative in finding ways to improve on characteristics of other jukebox players. For 
example, the iPod utilised a technical design that would switch off the spinning hard drive at 
certain times to save battery and, combined with the more advanced Sony battery, the iPod 
battery lasted 8 to 10 hours, where other players required AA batteries to be replaced every 
two hours – and in some cases more often. Equally, Apple’s proprietary Firewire standard from 
their previous work in desktop video offered far faster transfer speeds from PCs to the player, 
allowing users to transfer songs from iTunes to iPod in a much faster time than competitors. 
The accumulative outcome of this focus on improvement was that Apple delivered a product 
that was similar to other players in concept but far superior in performance on many 
characteristics. 
Whilst Apple didn’t create the portable music player market, it had the focus and the skills to 
deliver a far superior product than competitors. Rubinstein identifies that Apple’s achievement 
with the iPod did not come in trying to create a radically different player in concept but, instead, 
a radically different player in performance. Apple’s dogmatic focus on improvement meant 
taking existing, common concepts, often the same as that used by competitors, and offering a 
new configuration that dramatically improved the user experience. Rubinstein describes this 
focus on making decisions to improve user experience as a key mindset and constant focus 
for Apple at the time, giving another example of it to make the point: 
Absolutely. I mean you know when we did the PC version, you know, the thing 
you always had trouble with PCs is you had to load the drivers and everything, 
right? So we figured out a way, since the iPod was a mass storage device, 
when you plugged it in, it would load the drivers automatically. Instead of 
having to go up someplace else or have a CD or whatever, it would download 
the drivers. It just made sense because if you have a mass storage device 
why would you not do it? So whenever you plugged it in to a PC that didn’t 
have the drivers on it, it would ask if you wanted to load those drivers. I mean 
just logical things like that made it a much better user experience (J. 
Rubinstein, personal communication, July 9, 2013). 
Furthering this focus, Apple established the iTunes Music Store. In the process of doing so, 
Apple was able to achieve an unprecedented licensing agreement with the major labels to offer 
consumers a product that matched their preferred behaviour. 
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Access to competitive licenses of major label content was a source of frustration for previous 
entrepreneurs, and Jobs achieved what no others had done in obtaining agreement by 
negotiating with the labels for landmark usage rights, which allowed users to burn copies of 
purchased tracks (see case study section 11.2). Whilst there were precedents from eMusic 
selling 99-cent songs, no company had achieved such a wide-scale agreement from the major 
labels. Analysing why it was Jobs who achieved this licensing agreement, where all others 
failed, including entrepreneurs and leaders from consumer electronics companies and IT 
companies, offers a number of suggestions: 
1. Jobs had credibility as the CEO of both Apple, which was as worldwide leader in 
personal computing innovation, and Pixar, itself a creative studio of content. Jobs had 
a level of credibility that few other young entrepreneurs or IT companies had. 
2. iTunes offered the labels a margin-based online sales model rather than the 
subscription model of other services, which was more aligned with their history. 
3. The labels were likely more receptive to partner for online digital distribution at this 
stage, based on their own extensive experimentation at this point – they had not 
licensed Napster, created their own failed distribution services, and were under 
increasing pressure for anti-competitive behaviour. 
4. Apple designed a more complete music delivery process than competitors, one that 
was designed in collaboration with the major labels rather than offered to consumers 
first without consultation, which made the labels perhaps more receptive to partnership. 
As an outcome of this negotiation, Apple received unprecedented major label rights, but also 
the design of iTunes and the iPod included a number of piracy controls (or digital rights 
management) where Apple made design trade-offs to find an acceptable outcome for the major 
labels. By 2008, with the labels more comfortable, Jobs pushed for the removal of all Digital 
Rights Management (DRM), and these tracks began to be sold at a premium in iTunes. 
This describes the context of the creation of the iPod, iTunes, and the iTunes Music Store. 
Below describes the effect of the release of the iPod and Apple’s strategy between 2001 and 
2007. 
6.5.4 The “process” of a dominant design 
The iPod became a dominant design eclipsing all other competition by a significant margin. 
However, this outcome was not immediate or obvious at the initial launch in 2001. The iPod’s 
status as a dominant design emerged as a process, driven in part by Apple’s continuing 
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decisions that extended its initial advantage to widespread dominance. These issues will be 
discussed below, beginning with initial reaction. 
At launch, there was a mixed reaction to the iPod. There was a notable range of journalist 
reviews that described the product as superior to other portable players and lauded it for its 
ease of use. However, few reviews described it as the revolution Jobs promoted, and there 
were other reviews that suggested it was not particularly revolutionary at all (see case study 
section 10.5.5). Along with this, there were initial consumer reactions that viewed iPod as not 
particularly innovative. These reviews critiqued its features as too similar to other existing 
players in the market, such as Creative’s line of payers, which were available at a lower price 
(one forum poster offering the iPod as acronym “Idiots Price Our Devices”). The context 
suggested that whilst the player was good, it wasn’t clear that it was a radical innovation. 
In an article titled “The Race to Catch iPod”, the competition of Microsoft and Sony was 
described as credible. It was noted that the iPod had spurred competition, and Sony was 
planning to launch a new iPod competitor called the Network Walkman, which would be 
smaller, lighter, and have a greater capacity than the iPod, being able to hold up to 13,000 
songs (Economist, 2004). 
However, once consumers began to purchase the device and use it, there were also positive 
reviews that described its ease of use, design, and quality as far superior to competitors. The 
iPod quickly established itself as a leading player in the jukebox hard drive player market and 
the market overall. The iPod was selling one in every four portable players on the market and 
was viewed as a success, with Apple selling over 2 million iPods by the end of 2003. It still 
wasn’t entirely clear, though, if Apple could continue this initial success, with recognition of the 
likely response from competition. Mp3newswire founder Richard Menta described in 
December 2003 the task of Apple retaining its 50% market share as “an extremely challenging 
task as competitors get better” (Menta, 2003). In retrospect, 2003 iPod sales were small 
relative to what was to come. 
In 2003 and 2004, Apple brought together the complete experience – Apple offered a lower 
priced iPod Mini, along with the release of iTunes Music Store, and iTunes for Windows. This 
shifted the scale of sales dramatically, as the initial success of the iPod transferred to a mass 
market, the iPod moving digital players beyond early niches. Reflecting this movement, there 
were significant jumps in the scale of iPod sales in 2004, 2005, and 2006, with each year being 
a sharp jump from the previous; for example, the sale in 2005 of 46 million iPods was more 
than the total iPod sales from 2001 to 2004. The graph below in Figure 6.20, which charts iPod 
sales per quarter, further demonstrates the sales increases both yearly and with quarterly 
fluctuation highlighting how sales would increase in December each year. 
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Figure 6.20 iPod unit sales by quarter 
There was a strong focus on incremental improvement by Apple at this time, continually 
releasing updated models with greater storage capacity, superior hardware design, and more 
features (each new iPod model is discussed at length in case study section 11.4). The effect 
of this improvement was vast, with the original iPod classic model, for example, moving from 
an original 5 GB hard drive capacity retailing for $399 in 2001 to a 120 GB capacity retailing 
for $249 in 2007. Comparing the two, the later model iPod is 60 times bigger than the original 
model, whilst also 38% cheaper (see case study section 11.4). 
Apple also pursued an aggressive bifurcation strategy for the iPod between 2004 and 2008, 
shifting it from a single product to a product range. As a range of products with different prices 
and features, the iPod became a product for both niche and mass markets, resulting ultimately 
in Apple’s domination of the entire portable music player market. The timeline of the release 
of the iPod into an iPod product range corresponds to a significant shift in consumer response 
from 2003 onwards, with Figure 6.21 mapping cumulative iPod sales against the release of 
individual iPod models. 
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Figure 6.21 iPod sales overlaid with iPod models 
Jon Rubinstein discusses the reasoning for this aggressive release schedule, along with the 
constant focus on new products, as one of competitive threat: 
We always thought that Sony was going to blow us out of the water. I mean, 
it shocked me year after year after year that Sony didn’t deliver something that 
blew us away. Because by all rights they should have. They had the brand. 
Aside from Sony they had the Walkman brand – they’d sold 300 million 
Walkmans. It should have been a no-brainer for them. But for some reason, 
they never executed. Now, you can’t rely on your competition not executing 
for strategy – that’s a bad strategy. So we always assumed that they were 
going to kick our butt. And so we had a tremendous sense of urgency, very 
fast pace, which is why during the four or five years I ran iPod that we came 
out with so many different versions and three levels, right, and just keep 
iterating on all of them. So it was really important. (J. Rubinstein, personal 
communication, July 9, 2013) 
This proved a powerful strategy that took the success of the iPod beyond any initial advantage 
that was created in the first model. 
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6.5.5 The impact of a dominant design 
The iPod had an impact on competition. After the iPod was released, there was a shakeout of 
competition in the marketplace, with some notable failures. A wide variety of smaller 
companies such as iJam and Evolution all left the market. Most notably, Diamond Audio, the 
creators of the PMP 300, which was viewed as one of the best early players, also capitulated, 
being sold to SonicBlue, and then eventually discontinuing these players. Players from Dell, 
Intel, Samsung, Panasonic, and Phillips did not achieve significant adoption, and the release 
of the iPod relegated these companies to offering cheap commodity players before eventually 
withdrawing from the market. There was also a significant shift in the amount of coverage of 
the digital music domain at this time, with many of the conferences or dedicated news websites 
no longer continuing from 2002 onwards (the mp3.com summit and Webnoize conferences did 
not run, and Wired’s MP3 Rocks the Web website stopped publishing in 2003). 
Despite the changing market, there was still a constant stream of new players at this time, all 
challenging the iPod (see figure 6.22 below for a range of alternatives). The emergence of the 
portable music player market as a mainstream product brought with it continued new 
competitive threats for Apple. Microsoft was perhaps the highest profile new entrant, releasing 
the Zune player. The Zune was similar to the iPod and appeared briefly to gain momentum on 
account of its marketing budget, but consumer response quickly dissipated, and Microsoft 
eventually discontinued the Zune and left the portable music player market. 
This was an ongoing theme for many companies and releases throughout this time. Every six 
months from mid-2004, mp3newswire.net founder Richard Menta would document the new 
portable players, the newest and best offerings from competitors such as Sony, Creative, 
Microsoft, Samsung, and others. Six months later Menta would conclude all had failed to beat 
the iPod. By 2007, not only was it clear how dramatic Apple’s success was, with the iPod 
selling three out of every four portable players in the entire market, but also how successful 
the iPod had been in outflanking the competition to turn an initial advantage into a dramatic 
golden run of success: “Since 2004 we have run our bi-annual iPod Killer Christmas/Summer 
series. During this period we have reported on 215 portable players and in all of that time NOT 
one single iPod Killer has emerged from the bunch” (Menta, 2007). The players themselves 
improved in quality, but none was able to achieve lasting success against the iPod. 
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Figure 6.22 Alternative Portable music players post 2001 
Those that found relative success in the marketplace in this time did so in a number of ways. 
Many companies emerged with similar products to the iPod but competed on geographic 
popularity – players from Creative and iRiver offered similar features to the iPod that were 
popular in particular locations such as Singapore. Another competitor, Sandisk, emerged as 
the second largest competitor in the marketplace on account of its strategic control of flash 
memory (see detailed overview of Sandisk in case study section 11.3.3). Sandisk was the 
creator of flash memory technology, and during this time slowly moved down the production 
chain, first as the owner of technical patents of flash, earning royalties from flash component 
manufacturers, then as a manufacturer itself, creating flash memory components for portable 
players from companies such as Samsung, and then as a creator of their own portable players, 
selling these directly to consumers. The successful achievement of competitive advantage as 
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a result of their vertical integration led Sandisk to claim the second most successful portable 
music player company based on revenues. 
Along with this, other companies continued to pursue niche markets, offering more targeted 
players for children, luxury, novelty, or sports, as documented in Figure 6.23. None of these 
found lasting adoption in the market. 
 
Figure 6.23 Ongoing portable players designed for specific niches  
By 2004, the iPod was beginning to be recognised as a significant achievement, both from 
those within Apple as well as externally (see case study section 11.4). This continued as further 
market demand unfolded. By the end boundary date of the end of 2007, the iPod was being 
recognised as a dramatic, iconic innovation. The iPod won numerous consumer awards, 
including “best gadget of all time” from consumer tech journalism website T3 (Malik, 2007) and 
gadget of the decade from wired.com (Wired, 31 December 2009). Apple had capitalised on 
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available conditions in this innovation lifeworld to create the iPod, and then through a mix of 
strategy decisions built this into a powerful dominant design that captured 75% of the entire 
market. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented events related to portable digital music players in four alternative 
lifeworlds, describing how lifeworld conditions at different times offered varying capacity to 
achieve innovation. Summarising these four lifeworlds and the specific events related to 
portable digital music players, the lifeworld conditions are summarised below: 
Prehistory lifeworld – Imaginative descriptions of portable digital music players emerged from 
entrepreneurs (Kane Kramer’s IXI player) as well as in fiction (the Chippy hoax from a 
children’s TV program), but products remained impossible to build on account of missing 
technological capacity. 
Establishment lifeworld – The first prototypes (the NEC Silicon Chip Audio player and the 
Audio Highway Listen Up Player) followed by the first market-released products emerged (the 
MPMan and the Diamond Rio). These products are described as combinations of pre-existing 
technology, with the lifeworld at the time offering technologies that made these products 
capable as combinations, with many of these required technologies having long trajectories 
prior, often in alternative industries. 
Development lifeworld – With a tangible technical design offered with the MPMan and 
Diamond Rio, there was a dramatic amount of new activity and new entrants. New portable 
digital music players were released from companies in a variety of industries, including the 
consumer electronics, IT component, and PC industries, with the design variations of the 
designs of the MPMan and the Diamond Rio. At the same time, a large number of dramatic 
events occurred more generally in digital music. The internet soon led to the popularity of the 
MP3 and then Napster, along with the popularity of CD burning. The record industry found 
itself under significant duress on account of the threat of piracy, and at this same time CD sales 
were reaching new unprecedented revenues. 
The large amount of new activity created significant trial-and-error processes, which exposed 
problems across a number of socioeconomic criteria, and despite the large amount of activity, 
lasting innovation remained elusive. At the end of this lifeworld, there was no clear market 
leader in portable digital music players, and the domain faced continued uncertainty. 
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Innovation lifeworld – Drawing from the large amount of precedent and navigating through 
many of the problems that impacted previous products and services, Apple released iTunes, 
soon followed by the iPod. This was the first hardware- and software-integrated solution, and 
along with the superior characteristics of the iPod (capacity to hold 1,000 songs, superior 
battery, display, design, marketing), it soon established a competitive advantage in the market. 
Apple then followed this with the creation of the iTunes Music Store, released iTunes on the 
Microsoft platform, and initiated a significant bifurcation strategy to make the iPod a product 
range covering a range of price points and features. With this activity, from 2003 onwards, the 
iPod began to move beyond being a successful niche product to being the dramatic dominant 
design, building the portable music player into a mainstream consumer product. Apple’s 
dominance also led to a large-scale shakeout, as many competitors left the market unable to 
dislodge Apple from their dominant position, with the iPod recognised as a landmark innovation 
and Apple capturing 75% of the market at the close of this research. 
The next chapter, titled Discussion, will address the research questions of this study, exploring 
the significance of the lifeworld, combination and exaptation, and how the dynamics of the 
lifeworld impacted the capacity to achieve innovation in portable digital music player 
technology at different times. 
 
 








This chapter will reflect on the lifeworld concept and will specifically answer the research 
questions. As part of this reflection, this chapter will also describe a number of theoretical 
issues that emerge from the case study.  
The lifeworld model is an attempt to describe the influence of external environment through 
the innovation lifecycle of a particular technology. As discussed in the literature review, 
theoretically, this is in response to the heroic innovation perspective that assigns the 
achievement of innovation exclusively to the unique skills and thoughts of individual 
protagonists with little regard to conditions within which these protagonists are situated. The 
lifeworld concept is also a response to the acknowledged limitations of the theory of 
technological innovation systems, which also has an almost exclusive focus on the internal 
design and characteristics of the system being the source of innovation, rather than wider 
technologies, people, objects and events external to the system. In response to these issues, 
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the lifeworld model attempted to cast a broader view, describing the wider context in which a 
particular technology and people attempting to create a particular technology are situated, 
including things external, not initially or at times obviously relevant to the technology in focus. 
It was suggested, with reference to the importance of the theories of combination and 
exaptation, that these things surrounding the technology can have an influence or perhaps are 
even critical to the creation of the technology as well as achievement of innovation. Exploring 
the lifeworld was the motive of this study.   
The research questions reflect the focus on the lifeworld, and they provide the structure of this 
chapter. To recall the four research questions of this study, they are:  
1. How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in the case study? 
2. How are combination and exaptation relevant in the development of innovation? 
3. What is the relationship between the internal domain and the external lifeworld? 
4. How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
Below, these four questions will be answered in detail, drawing on a range of events from the 
case study as well as a number of wider theories in the innovation literature that offer insight.   
Note that whilst the chapter is structured around the research questions, throughout this 
chapter, a detailed discussion is offered that explores the theoretical issues and implications 
emerging from each question.  
7.1 Research question 1: How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in 
the case study? 
The case study suggests that the external lifeworld is critically important to the development 
of portable digital music player technology. Many of the events that proved critical to the 
development of portable digital music players did not originate for the specific purpose of 
portable digital music players or from the preceding history of development of portable digital 
music players. Events such as Napster (created by a university student), mp3.com (created by 
an entrepreneur watching popular search terms on the internet), Diamond Rio and MPMan 
(created by computer component companies), and the iPod (created by a PC company) are 
all examples of this. These individuals and companies were responsible for events that 
emerged often as dramatic shocks to the record industry and those working on the 
development of portable digital music player technology, unprecedented and unexpected at 
the time of their emergence.  
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Drawing from the case study and the previous chapter, there are a number of detailed 
examples that highlight the role of the lifeworld as significant. First, pragmatically the lifeworld 
as an important source of development and innovation is reflected in the difficulty of 
constructing the event history narrative tracing events prospectively rather than retrospectively. 
Second, the significance of the lifeworld can also be described in the important characteristic 
of uncertainty that defined most development. Both will be discussed below.  
The difficulty of case study construction as an example of the importance of the lifeworld  
The practical process of constructing the event history narrative of this research offers a close 
tangible example of the importance of the lifeworld. The case study is very long and describes 
a significant number of events related to the development of portable digital music players in 
detail.  The event history narrative began with the earliest events and moved forward in time, 
constructing the event history prospectively, as opposed to beginning with the outcome and 
retracing events.  As a result, the construction of the event history narrative offers close 
confirmation of the importance of the lifeworld, as often new important developments did not 
simply extend from the description that was already provided. Instead, new developments 
emerged from entirely new sources that often had no previous recognition in the narrative. For 
example, the case study described developments from Sony in detail over an extended time: 
their creation of the Walkman (case study section 5.1), the CD (case study section 6.1), 
portable CD Discman (case study section 6.3), MiniDisc (case study section 7.5), and their 
strong internal culture of pursuit of innovation (case study section 9.3). With this history, Sony 
was a strong and powerful authority with respect to portable music up until 1998, when the first 
portable digital music players were released. Highlighting the importance of the lifeworld, 
however, despite the case study describing each of these events in detail and describing 
Sony’s innovative capacity in detail, Sony proved not to be the source of inception of the 
portable digital music player technology. To cover this long narrative of events related to Sony’s 
successful history, and more generally the consumer electronics industry, was then to miss 
the start of the portable music player market, which emerged from the companies Diamond, 
Saehan, and Creative, who themselves had a history as computer component manufacturers. 
For thoroughness, Saehan, Diamond, and Creative were also then covered in detail in the 
case study, but soon these were supplanted by new entrants such as Sandisk and Apple, 
which were also then described in detail too. 
The accumulation of new events from the external lifeworld required an almost constant 
resetting of much of the event history narrative of the case study, with new events emerging 
from new sources. Each new event often came from an external source that engaged portable 
digital music technology, from its own unique history and trajectory in a different independent 
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part of the lifeworld. This is represented in Figure 7.1 below, which offers a visual 
representation of how whilst the recording industry and consumer electronics industry were in 
a strong partnership prior to digital downloading and portable music players, it was from the 
internal source of IT companies and computer component companies, as well as software 
entrepreneurs, that new events would emerge. It was the IT industry that emerged from its 
own history in the lifeworld not related to digital music, to intersect the domain of digital music 
and cause both the difficulty of transition as well as ultimately being the key source of 
innovation. 
 
Figure 7.1 How hew developments emerged from the lifeworld 
Whilst there are many examples of process in the case study, including the brief description of 
Sony above, Apple is perhaps the most important example. Apple had a long history as a PC 
manufacturer (and this was covered in a number of case study sections, including 4.5, 9.2,1), 
but prior to 2001 with the release of iTunes and iPod, Apple did not have a significant link to 
digital music. If the event history narrative had concluded any time prior to 2001, Apple’s 
relevance would only draw passing mention, with no clear evidence of a looming capacity to 
achieve dramatic innovation in portable digital music players. In real time, there was no obvious 
sense that the PC or IT industries were the clear source of dramatic innovation, and that it 
would be Apple who capitalised and created these conditions more than any other company.  
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This is a powerful example of the role of the lifeworld, and it is also reflected in the sentiment 
of key protagonists. Apple’s potential for innovation in portable digital music players and digital 
music more generally was not inherently obvious or forecast by anyone within the domain, and 
in expert interviews of this research, reflection described the unexpected nature of Apple’s 
involvement and ultimate achievements. Jeff Patterson, for example, founder of IUMA, one of 
the early popular sources of music on the internet, and an early pioneer deeply engaged in 
digital music prior to Apple, describes how Apple’s engagement was unexpected at the time: 
It was kind of a shock when they [Apple] went that direction [released iTunes and iPod]. 
I think it kind of surprised a lot of people. They were computers for graphic artists, so 
the fact that they came out with this consumer device that was just a music player was 
kind of an odd sort of thing, but then when you look at how it ends up being, how they 
end up moving in to content, and how they then set the precedent for the 99 cent 
download. They had probably a bigger impact on the labels and how they approached 
online music than almost any other company. (Jeff Patterson, personal communication 
June 26, 2013).  
More generally, Cary Sherman, the CEO of the RIAA, also reflected on the expectations of the 
recording industry, who attempted to create innovation in partnership with the consumer 
electronics industry in a similar way to their previous partnerships with cassette and CD 
technologies, and initially viewed the IT industry as having a supplementary role:  
Well we knew that the IT industry was going to be getting in this space, but I think we 
looked at it more as software enabled delivery systems, not necessarily products. So, 
early on, the major labels chose IBM to do a what would you call it, it was a test, an 
experimental delivery system for albums, it was called the Madison Project and they 
did it in San Diego but they went to what was then the biggest and best and most highly 
thought of computer company and they worked with IBM for album delivery and it was 
going to be full albums and it was going to have album art it was going to be replicating 
the physical experience except online. Everybody thought of this as delivering to a 
computer. So the IBM role was not to create new music players, it was to create delivery 
and distribution systems. Apple coming out with the iPod was a game changer and yes 
the major labels did get a heads up because Steve Jobs came asking for rights, but I 
don’t think most of us looked at the IT industry as the source of product innovation. It 
more was going to be service innovation or delivery innovation. But it turns out the IT 
industry [was the source of innovation], well Apple in particular, nobody else did the job 
that Apple did in terms of creating new devices. (C. Sherman, personal communication 
June 27, 2013). 
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For the recording industry, for example, as described in the previous lifeworld analysis chapter, 
the embrace of digital distribution was not simply an extension of their previous industry 
structure and partnerships with external suppliers, but instead required a total reconfiguration 
of relationships with partners, suppliers, and even consumers on account of the new source of 
innovation being from IT companies in the lifeworld.  
Technologies developing external to the domain in focus became critical as a source of new 
events and innovation as they connected to the domain in focus, shifting expectations and the 
source of innovation. This highlights the role of the lifeworld and the experience of the 
researcher writing the event history narrative, as well as those cited protagonists involved in 
the case, confirming that the external environment represented as the lifeworld was a powerful 
and an important determinant of new events and innovation.  
Uncertainty as an example of the importance of the lifeworld 
Another example of the significance of the lifeworld, and how important events emerged not 
exclusively or even predominantly from within the domain but from external sources in the 
lifeworld were the conditions of uncertainty that characterised development.  
For all actors, digital music and portable digital music players constantly developed under 
pervasive conditions of uncertainty, with no one having a clear sense of what was to come 
next, or that ultimately that it would be a product like the iPod that emerged as the successful 
innovation. New events such as Napster, Kazaa, iTunes, and iPod constantly emerged as 
shocks, similar to the kind described by Van de Ven et al. (1999), where ongoing assessment 
and analysis did not account for these coming events prospectively. With these events not 
visible or connected to previous narrative or expectations regarding what was to occur, new 
events that emerged from the lifeworld constantly rendered previous analysis wrong and 
incomplete.   
As a result, the narrative and assessment of the transition was constantly in flux, with new 
events emerging from the lifeworld to be followed by waves of narrative, analysis, and forecast 
describing and making sense of these new events, only for this narrative to often then be totally 
oblivious to the next event and to miss what was to come. For example, there was a general 
positive recognition of the importance of digital music in the record industry from a very early 
stage. In 1994, many key industry figures described digital distribution as a dramatic looming 
change for the record industry, albeit, given the time, with reference to satellite transmission 
or services similar to cable TV. See Table 7.1 which draws from the case study, and also 
chapter 6. 
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Table 7.1 Record label executive insights 1994 
Executive Insight 
Gary Gersh, 
President, Capitol Records: 
The industry “is on the verge of a massive 
revolution that will rewrite the ways we receive 
and relate to all forms of entertainment". He says 
Capitol is using “all of the various technologies” 
to collect information each week to better market 
its records. He says Capitol localises and micro-
markets by cross-referencing the data. The label 
also relies on computer technology for its art 
department (for digital download and 
transmission of art files) and for improved 
communication between field and national staff” 
(Lieb, 1994). 
Michael Schulhof, 
President, Sony Music 
“The executive told retailers it takes a customer 
about one hour to drive to a music store, 
purchase a CD, bring it home, and put it into his 
or her player. The transmission of that same 
recording to the home via fiber optics – so-called 
‘music on demand’ – will take less than five 
seconds” (Jeffrey, 1994, p. 6). 
Peter Cox, 
Managing Director, 
EMI Music Publishing UK 
“The potential is enormous. It’s only a matter of 
time before other people take this on” (Clark-
Meads, 1995, p. 12). 
Danny Goldberg, 
President, Atlantic Records 
“In general, I think these technological advances 
have served the music business wonderfully well 
… Each development in technology has caused 
a growth in our business and expanded music. … 
Suppose everything becomes cyberspace … 
People are still going to have to be experts at 
making things look interesting. There will be 
limitless options, so how will we market ideas? 
People can only look at a small fraction of the 
possibilities, so it will take a lot of strategizing 
about how to expose music” (Lieb, 16 April 1994). 
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These record label executives were prescient with respect to describing the general shifts 
about to occur. However, whilst this recognition described the importance of digital distribution 
at a broad level, with respect to specific products, these forecasts were oblivious to what was 
to come. These forecasts, for example, did not offer any warning of Napster, iPod, or iTunes. 
The uncertainty was pervasive, and there are examples of “missing knowledge” emerging from 
even the progressive perspectives on events. Whilst the record labels were often criticised 
publicly for their slow embrace of digital distribution, even for those who were progressive, the 
uncertainty still appears pervasive. For example, in 1999, only months before Napster was 
released, prominent digital entrepreneur Mark Cuban declared “MP3 doomed”, suggesting that 
the format would not scale and would instead be replaced by streaming services from 
RealNetworks or Microsoft that were going to be dominant (New Media Age, 1999). Whilst 
Cuban was right to suggest the importance of streaming services, there was no mention of 
Napster or peer-to-peer, and his assessment of the death of MP3 occurred only months before 
Napster took MP3 popularity to dramatic new unprecedented levels. 
Another example is found on the Computer Chronicles TV episode titled “MP3 Secrets”, which 
aired on 9 October 2001, exactly two weeks before the first announcement of the iPod. Larry 
Magid, a Los Angeles Times technology reporter, presented a segment that gave an overview 
of the best portable music players available on the market, including the Diamond Rio 500, the 
Nike player, and the Casio WMP 1 wristwatch. The portable music player market was well 
established, and whilst Magid described these players as a significant development, when 
completing the segment, Magid was asked, “What’s going to be next?”, and he highlighted the 
lack of obvious direction emerging out of these early players, despite it being only weeks until 
Apple announced the iPod. Magid focused not on the future importance of portable players but 
instead described the role of MP3 CDs: 
Well the car MP3 players those are already coming, you know so you can 
have it in your car. MP3 is going to explode. And of course the CD! MP3 CD, 
so you can have hundreds of hours, thousands of discs, and the next thing is 
that the music industry may start selling mp3 CDs. (Magid 2001) 
These examples highlight the significant role of the lifeworld, and how events that had already 
occurred were not a reliable reference point for what was to come; instead new events would 
emerge from external sources, and the existing narrative at any given time could not foresee 
what was to come from events that had already occurred. 
This highlights the important role of the lifeworld. Exploring this further, a theoretical concept 
called the “time sequence trap” (McMullen & Dimov, 2013, pp. 1491–1492) offers useful 
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relevance. The time sequence trap is a theory that describes problems related to uncertainty 
and error as a result of the incremental emergence of information and understanding. Those 
involved make best use of what has become available at any particular point in time, but new 
information proves that previous analysis was based on incomplete information, leading to its 
error (McMullen & Dimov, 2013, pp. 1491–1492). New information reveals previous 
assessments to be based on “partial information”, with new information not neatly and simply 
extending previous assessments but instead requiring totally new reconfiguration. McMullen 
and Dimov (2013, pp. 1491–1492) and deBono (1992, pp. 16–17) give a simple example of 
this issue: 
We can play a simple game in which letters are presented one at a time. The 
task is always to form a known word. 
The first letter is A. 
This is followed by T to give the word AT. 
The next letter is R, which is simply added to give RAT. 
The letters represent incoming information and the total available information 
is used to make up a word. 
The next letter is E to give the word RATE. 
The next letter is G, which gets added to give GRATE. 
So far the new information has been easily added on to the existing structures. 
The next letter is T. There is no easy way this can be added on. A new word 
can only be formed by going back and disrupting existing structures to 
reassemble the letters to give TARGET. 
This example highlights that the emergence of new developments required the total 
reconfiguration of previous events and developments, and that at any given time, the best that 
could be done was to make best use of what was available, as opposed to optimise for a later 
development. In the case of the example, the final word of TARGET was not a simple outcome 
or extension of previous work. 
The same occurred in the case study. Developments and events occurred as new technologies 
emerged from the lifeworld, with each event requiring fundamental reconfiguration of existing 
understanding and narrative of the development of digital music and the digital music player 
that occurred prior to the event itself. All parties engaged in development – entrepreneurs, 
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journalists, the record industry, the consumer electronics industry, the IT industry and all others 
– had to constantly reconfigure expectations on account of new events that emerged from the 
lifeworld. Dramatic events would emerge to then render any previous understanding as based 
on partial information, reaffirming the constant presence of uncertainty. 
Significantly, much like the example of the time series trap, the ultimate innovation in the iPod 
did not reveal itself until in full. Instead, the trajectory towards the winning innovation of the 
iPod and iTunes was almost invisible through the entire creation of many of its precedents, 
with it not clear what was to come; it is not obvious that “target” is the final word in the above 
example, much like it wasn’t clear that iTunes and the iPod were going to be successful until 
this success emerged. The iPod and iTunes required a fundamental change in expectations 
from those who had been engaged in digital music and failed previously. 
Navigating the uncertainty and avoiding previous expectations appears a successful trait of 
Apple, and their capacity in this regard may have been due to flexibility. Jon Rubinstein 
describes that at a strategy level, Apple too were navigating the uncertainty, responding to 
events and changes in conditions as they occurred, rather than having a predefined fixed 
expectation about what was to happen. Rubinstein explains Apple’s flexibility: 
We understood the long-term direction we wanted to go. I mean, we had 
thought about all this stuff, we had thought it through, but we didn’t have a 
concrete plan [like] ‘OK, we’re going to do this, then we’re going to that and 
then that’. We navigated through shark-infested waters and found our way to 
the path, and some of it was reactive to what the competition – or what we 
thought the competition – might be doing. Some of it was just necessitated by 
what was going on in the industry and what we could do and not do. And so 
we were trying to be very sensitive to the needs of the music companies, and 
I think we achieved that, and I think that’s why they trusted us. (J. Rubinstein, 
personal communication, July 9, 2013) 
It is this flexibility that perhaps resulted in their ability to capitalise on new emerging conditions 
events as they occurred, rather than being constrained by expectations emerging from 
previous events. Such was the case with Sony, who entered earlier than Apple, released a 
portable player using flash memory, and then dismissed the hard drive portable player early in 
its development. 
 Discussion 253 
 
7.1.2 Summary of research question 1 
With the examples and discussion above, the case study promotes that the role of the lifeworld 
was an important one for a particular technological innovation. New events that proved critical 
to the achievement of innovation in portable digital music players didn’t emerge exclusively 
from the history and activity of those working on the technology already, but instead the source 
of new events, as well as ultimately innovation, in the iPod came from the surrounding lifeworld. 
The study has shown that the concept of the lifeworld as a description of the wider context or 
environment surrounding the technology in focus is an important contributor to innovation.  This 
has theoretical implications for the technological innovation systems functions model, with the 
study finding that the sources of innovation often would emerge from wider sources than what 
could be classified as internal elements of the system of portable digital music players.  
7.2 Research question 2: How is combination and exaptation relevant in the 
development of innovation? 
Along with the role of the lifeworld explored in question 1, question 2 extended this to explore 
the processes and mechanisms of how things in the lifeworld connect to the domain in focus. 
Specifically, this question explored the role and characteristics of combination and exaptation, 
recognised in the technological innovation literature as being important concepts of new 
creation and innovation. 
Consistent with the literature review, where a range of authors were noted to describe 
exaptation as something pervasive to radical innovation (Arthur, 2009, location 848; Constant, 
1980, p. 2; Dew et al., 2004, p. 70; Mokyr, 2002; Rosenberg, 1983, p. 75; Usher, 1954, p. 50), 
this study finds both combination and exaptation central to creation as well as achievement of 
innovation of portable digital music players. The study of the lifeworld quickly seems to surface 
the significance of recombination and exaptation, and combination and exaptation were 
important mechanisms by which individuals drew available things (technologies, concepts, 
people) from the lifeworld and connected them to the use of digital music and portable digital 
music players. 
There are many describable exaptation and combination events in the case study, highlighting 
the pervasiveness of these concepts as mechanisms of new creation. Perhaps again, though, 
the most compelling example and description of the importance of combination was the iPod. 
The iPod as a combination of technologies is described in a detailed way in the case study 
(see case study section 10.5), and confirmed through the direct referencing of the concept of 
combination as the  method of creation of the iPod by one of its principle creators in Jon 
Rubinstein (see personal communication quotes in previous chapter). 
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Exploring the concept of combination and exaptation further, there are a number of key insights 
that emerge from the case study. These insights highlight issues of combination and exaptation 
of particular significance from a theoretical perspective, as well as offering relevant examples 
from the case study that are currently not well described in the theory. 
7.2.1 The role of incremental improvement for combination and exaptation 
An important theme emerging from the case study is that combination and exaptation 
opportunities are not uniformly available at all times, but reliant upon the availability and 
available capacity of technologies.  An important insight emerging from the case study is the 
importance and relationship between incremental improvement in available technologies, and 
the role this has in creating exaptation and new combination opportunities. 
Rather than powerful innovation being only the emergence of new components, instead the 
case study demonstrated that it was the incremental improvement in existing common 
technologies that appeared a critical determinant of new events and ultimately innovation. The 
most dramatic events in the development of digital music, such as the release of Napster and 
iTunes and the iPod, were often made possible by common technologies that recently reached 
new levels of performance. 
This reflects the discussion in the model chapter, which highlighted that new events are a result 
of new levels of performance in existing technologies that enable new combinations rather 
than innovation relying on dramatically unique technologies. Perez (2002) discusses this 
concept, suggesting that emergence of new powerful technologies (described by Perez as 
techno-economic paradigms) are based not only on the presence of new components but 
importantly on the attainment of new performance in existing technologies. Perez suggests 
that it was not only the presence of steel that led to the industrial revolution, but reliable access 
to cheap steel. It was not only microelectronics that led to a computing paradigm, but cheap 
microelectronics that exhibited reliable cost and performance improvement (Perez, 2002; see 
also Freeman, 1991, p. 83). Cost is one performance criteria, but others may be weight, size, 
memory capacity, efficiency, and access. Similar recognition has been noted by other authors 
(see Table 7.2). 
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Table 7.2 Example of required performance of components 
Technology Example of required performance of components 
Steam engine “The compound steam engine had to await cheap, high quality steel. Higher 
pressures (and therefore greater fuel economy) in power generation required 
high-strength, heat resistant alloy steels. Hard alloy steels, in turn, were of limited 
usefulness until appropriate new machine tooling methods were developed for 
working them” (Rosenberg 1982, p. 62). 
Bicycle  “Another new consumer product which owed its rapid growth in the 1890s partly 
to cheap quality steel was the bicycle. The techniques used for their manufacture 
before the 1920s were not yet Fordist mass production techniques, but they were 
certainly high volume production, taking advantage of the new potential of steel 
intensive products” (Freeman & Soete, 1997, location 1370). 
  
The incremental improvement in existing technologies appears to be a key to exaptation and 
innovation. This appears to essentially repeat the meaning of exaptation offered by Levinthal 
(1998) and Adner and Levinthal (2002) and was discussed in the literature review, which 
identified that often the establishment of a radical new technology can be achieved by little 
new technology but instead the application of an existing technology to an entirely different 
domain. Levinthal (1998) and Adner and Levinthal (2002) also highlight that the trajectory of 
existing technologies creates these opportunities: 
A technology undergoes a process of lineage evolutionary development within 
a given domain of application. At some juncture, that technology, or possibly 
set of technologies, is applied to a new domain of application. (Levinthal, 
1998, p. 223) 
The conditions and trajectory that lead to the “juncture” in Levinthal’s description is the focus 
here, though, and there is room for further description of this from the case study. The enabling 
conditions for exaptation of a particular technology appeared dependent upon its incremental 
improvement characteristics and trajectory. As these existing technologies incrementally 
improve, they may reach a performance that presents a “combination threshold” or “exaptation 
threshold”’ as an opportunity for those who recognise it. The incremental improvement that 
eventually gave the PC music listening and library capacity, as well the incremental trajectories 
of components that were utilised in the iPod, will be explored below. 
Whilst by 1997 onwards the PC was a powerful music listening and library tool, this capacity 
was one that emerged with time as a result of the achievement of new thresholds of 
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performance in PC components. The creator of the MP3, Professor Karl Brandenburg, had a 
central view of this, particularly after releasing the MP3 format in 1992. Brandenburg notes 
that for the first two years, nothing happened. It was not until 1995–1997, when PCs with 
sufficiently capable components (such as Intel Pentium processors) became widely available 
and cheap, that the MP3 started to exhibit its powerful impact with respect to digital music 
downloading. Brandenburg recounts: 
At that time [1992–1995], the complexity was still too high [for using a PC for 
music], for widespread application for distribution and so on. It was really once 
every PC was fast enough on one hand and did have the soundcard built in 
on the other hand that this really took off. And that again technically was the 
case in 1995, but really the avalanche was going in 1997. (Professor K. 
Brandenburg, personal communication, May 27, 2013). 
Pursuing this insight offered by Professor Brandenburg, it was the incremental improvement 
in performance/price of known PC components of hard drives, and processing speeds of chips 
that made the PC a powerful music device. Prior to this, the MP3 had found niche use for audio 
feeder links for the broadcast of sporting events, as well as for train and bus station 
announcements, and was not a technology that could be used with PCs. It was only after the 
PC reached capacity to play audio that the power of MP3 established itself as a format that 
had such a profound impact. 
Beyond the increase in performance of known components, it was also the presence of new 
components including sound cards and the CD-RW drive that made the PC a powerful music 
device. The emergence of these new components can be described as exaptation. CD-RW 
drives, for example, emerged as an added capacity from CD-ROM PC hardware and drives, 
and the added capacity to copy CDs was an exaptation of these existing drives. Where 
historically CD replication required complicated, major industrial scale machinery, now with the 
emergence of these CD-RW drives, which reached new levels of affordability by 1997 (under 
$400 for aftermarket purchase and increasingly a standard component of new PCs) PC 
audiences finally had access. Cary Sherman of the RIAA, without referring to the concept of 
exaptation explicitly, describes this example of exaptation from the perspective of the recording 
industry, which brought with it new legal questions: 
The CD audio was not made for computers, it was made for CD equipment 
and basically other people came along and put them into a CD-ROM standard 
so that copying could take place. (C. Sherman, personal communication June 
27, 2013). 
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The insights of Brandenburg and Sherman highlight the presence of exaptation, as well as 
demonstrate that these events relied upon new components, along with incremental 
improvement in known components in hard drive sizes and processor speeds among other 
improving PC components, to support this capacity. 
For Apple too this discussion of incremental improvement in known technologies was important 
in creating the iPod. Rubinstein described how after being shown the prototype 1.8 inch hard 
drive at Toshiba, where Toshiba themselves were not sure what to do with the drive, he 
immediately connected it to the new use as a portable music player. And in describing how the 
iPod was created, Rubinstein focuses in on it as a combination, relying upon a range of 
technologies that had reached a range of reliable performance that at previous times they 
didn’t yet have: 
With these kind of things [creating a new technology] it’s always the 
combination of the technology. So [in the case of iPod] without firewire you 
couldn’t have moved the data fast enough; without the hard drive, the size or 
storage, either you didn’t have the size or you didn’t have the storage capacity 
right; without the display technology you couldn’t have a good enough display, 
you’d have a one line instead of having a multiline display; without the battery 
technology your battery life would have sucked… The advancement of 
integrated silicon, or system on a chip, was really important, so it really took 
all of those technologies, plus the software technologies, the user interface 
with the wheel, and all that, So I think it was the integration of all of those with 
iTunes on the Mac that made it so successful. (J. Rubinstein, personal 
communication, July 9, 2013).  
In a later part of the interview, Rubinstein reinforces the concept of combination, as well as the 
timing of combination – bringing together the right combination of technologies, based on their 
changing performance, and offering a product with a rich mix of innovation performance: 
I think there was a lot of innovation around it [iPod]. First of all it was the 
integration of just the right technologies at just the right time, and that’s an art, 
not a science. There is an art form to that. You got to know what to put in, and 
what to not put in. I think we hit the sweet spot on form factor, on battery life, 
on cost, I mean all of those were kind of sweet spots. And then I think our 
whole concept around how the software on the Mac interacted with the 
software on the device, that the Mac made the device much more valuable 
than it would be all on its own. And I think that was very innovative for us. And 
then the introduction of iTunes, adding the cloud component to it was also 
258 Chapter 7 
 
extremely innovative. And you know our software update mechanisms, I mean 
there was all kinds of things we did that were really sort of key. (J. Rubinstein, 
personal communication, July 9, 2013) 
These examples from the case study highlight that incremental innovation in existing 
technologies appears critical to enabling new combination. Beyond the insights of Levinthal 
(1998) and Adner and Levinthal (1998, 2002), this concept has been noted in innovation theory 
previously. Kodoma (1992) refers to similar ideas in their concept of technology fusion: 
“Technology fusion ‘blends incremental technical improvements from several previously 
separate fields of technology to create products that revolutionize markets’ (Kodama, 1992, p. 
70). This appears to reflect the characteristics of the iPod and the PC as a digital music device, 
as it appears that new levels of performance in existing components made a dramatic 
difference to the capacity to create innovation at the times when innovation emerged. All 
technologies in the case study had their own trajectory, where their cost, performance, 
reliability, and availability, were all dynamically changing. It was the change in the 
characteristics that brought them into a range that made them relevant to digital music and 
then to innovation. 
These issues highlight the complex but ultimately critical relationship that incremental 
improvement, combination, and exaptation had to the creation of new technologies related to 
digital music as well as to the achievement of innovation with respect to the iPod. 
7.2.2 Theoretical ambiguity in exaptation and combination 
The above has highlighted, with reference to the second research question, the important role 
that exaptation and combination had with respect to events in the case study. Furthering this 
exploration, there are also a number of issues related to exaptation and combination that 
emerged from the case study that are currently not well described by the theory. These issues 
will now be discussed and offer a range of potential issues for future theoretical advance of the 
concepts of combination and exaptation. 
7.2.2.1 The difference between technological combination and exaptation is not clear 
The difference between technological combination and exaptation, and the relationship 
between the two concepts is theoretically ambiguous. From the case study, the examples 
above describe where a technology can be a new combination, but with this combination also 
contain new exaptation. The iPod for example, utilised a laptop hard drive that appears an 
exaptation event. But, equally, the iPod was also viewed and described as a combination of 
technologies, where it was not the hard drive alone that was key to the iPod but a range of 
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technologies. In this case, there appears no clear answer theoretically as to whether this event 
is either an exaptation and combination or both. 
This issue can be explained in part in the genesis of the concept of exaptation as a term of 
biological evolution (Gould & Vrba, 1982). In contrast to biology, there is greater role for 
combination in creating cultural artefacts such as technologies. As Arthur (2009) identifies, it 
is possible to create entirely new combinations of technologies at the component level – such 
as combining gasoline engine and bicycle parts to create the motorbike. In contrast, new 
exaptation events in biology occur at the species level, rather than as a unique combination of 
organs. This means that combination activity is more pronounced for technologies compared 
to biological species. This was noted by Basalla (1988), citing the work of anthropologist Alfred 
Kroeber to describe how in exploring the lineage of technologies compared to species, there 
exhibit much more frequent examples of combinations and exaptation, making evolution less 
discreet as a single domain. Kroeber described this as the family tree (see Figure 7.2), 
highlighting on the left biology and on the right the lineage of the cultural artefact that includes 
many more new combination (and by inference, exaptation) events. 
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Figure 7.2 The lineage of biological species (left) compared to cultural artefacts (right) Kroeber (1948) 
This issue of the difference between technological and biological exaptation is not revelatory. 
It is explicitly noted by Levinthal (1998) and Adner and Levinthal (2002) in their description of 
technological exaptation. However, emerging from the case study, there appears to be a need 
to explore and address this issue as a deeper theoretical issue, and providing more theoretical 
clarity to the difference and relationship between technological combination and exaptation 
appears a useful future research direction. 
7.2.2.2 Conceptual exaptation 
Another theoretical issue related to exaptation emerging from the case study are examples of 
“non-technical” exaptation. The theory of technological exaptation currently focuses on 
exaptation as a process related to technological components, applying existing components 
to uses that were previously not intended. However, in the case study, there were examples 
of exaptation that do not fit this technical description but rather represent examples of “concept” 
exaptation. For example, the first MP3 player was named the MPMan by Saehan. The “Man” 
suffix can be viewed as a conceptual exaptation from Sony’s previous history – this suffix was 
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a powerful branding component of Sony’s strong legacy of innovative audio products. 
“Walkman” became a worldwide powerful brand for Sony in the 1980s, and this was followed 
by Sony utilising the suffix extension for their next portable CD product, naming it the 
“Discman”, which too became a powerful global brand. Whilst this wasn’t a technical feature, 
Saehan utilised the “Man” suffix to brand their new portable digital music player as the MPMan.  
Repeating the description of exaptation offered by Levinthal for emphasis here, this appears 
to fit, albeit replacing “technology” with “brand” or more generally “concept”: 
A technology undergoes a process of lineage evolutionary development within 
a given domain of application. At some juncture, that technology, or possibly 
set of technologies, is applied to a new domain of application. (Levinthal, 
1998, p. 223) 
The Walkman and Discman brands represent a lineage of evolutionary development. At the 
juncture of 1998, the “Man” Sony branding convention was then applied to the new portable 
digital music player technology by an independent company in Saehan creating the MPMan, 
which can be described as a conceptual exaptation. Whilst conceptual exaptation is not the 
focus of Levithal (1998) and Adner ahd Levinthal (2002), this appears a possible theoretical 
exploration for the theory. 
7.2.2.3 Failed exaptation examples 
Another area of theoretical exploration possible with respect to technological exaptation is the 
examples of failed exaptation in the case study. Currently in the theoretical literature, research 
describes exaptation almost exclusively as something that leads to successful innovation. For 
example, Adner and Levinthal (2002) uses the example of how Marconi created an exaptation 
event utilising Hertz’s audio research to create a dramatic innovation in ship-to-ship 
communication. More generally, other exaptations (even those that predate the term) 
discussed in the literature review chapter also exclusively focus on successful innovation: 
The earliest steam engines pumped water from mines, the first commercial 
use of radio was for the sending of coded wireless messages between ships 
at sea and from ships to shore, and the first electronic digital computer was 
designed to calculate firing tables for the guns for the United States Army. 
(Basalla, 1988, p. 141)  
These frame exaptation as a mechanism for powerful innovation. 
In the case study, however, there are identifiable exaptation events that did not lead to 
commercially successful innovation. These events, in contrast to the existing theory, whilst 
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appearing as exaptation, did not achieve significant innovation. At best, in some cases, they 
created a niche product; at worst, they soon capitulated and were withdrawn from the market 
entirely. Examples of this include portable digital music player watches such as the Panasonic 
e-Wear range (such as the SV-SD75 in Figure 7.3) and the Casio WMP-1V, described as the 
world’s first wrist audio player. Despite the exaptation of the watch concept, and applying it to 




Figure 7.3 Portable digital music player watches 
Other examples, such as the 2005 Samsung YP W3 player (see Figure 7.4), which was 
presented to look like jewellery, or Oakley’s Thump Sunglass model (see Figure 7.5), which 
included a flash memory portable music player, also failed to achieve significant adoption. 




Figure 7.4 Samsung YP W3 player designed to look like Jewellery 
 
https://goo.gl/fZGzIX 
Figure 7.5 Oakley’s Thump Sunglass portable music player 
These examples do not fit the current description of theory. These examples of watches, 
jewellery, and sunglasses as exaptations released as portable digital music players did not 
lead to successful innovation, with each of these products not achieving the success of the 
iPod. 
To address this theoretically, there appears to be a need to describe exaptation more as a 
“mechanism of creation” as opposed to a “mechanism of innovation”. The difference appears 
semantic but reframes the focus on innovation to be something different, allowing further 
exploration of whether innovation is a particular type of exaptation or perhaps in a particular 
type of context, as suggested by the lifeworld concept. Refining this issue is an area of future 
theoretical advance. 
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7.2.2.4 Multiple concurrent developments in the lifeworld 
The final issue of theoretical ambiguity of combination and exaptation relates to the almost 
simultaneous emergence of multiple adjacent developments and potential directions of 
innovation. 
A key insight from the case study is that portable digital music players did not emerge in 
isolation but instead represent one technology in a dramatic general context of digital music, 
where there were multiple dramatic events and developments occurring at the same time. 
These events were similar enough to be recognised under the general term of events in digital 
music, but distinct enough that the relationship between them was often not entirely clear, and 
often they were competing as alternative directions of the future and innovation itself. 
The volume and diversity of events that emerged at the same time in the case study was 
dramatic and confronting for those involved. CD burning and ripping on consumer PCs, library 
software such as Winamp and MusicMatch, the peer-to-peer music sharing software of 
Napster and Kazaa, flash memory portable players like the Diamond Rio, hard drive jukebox 
players, the Sony MiniDisc, digital cassette format, and online radio and webcasting all 
emerged in a short period between 1997 and 2001, among other events, all as potential 
directions of innovation. It was not a simple choice between the CD and portable digital music 
player but, instead, a multitude of different alternative possible directions competing against 
the CD and other formats. To suggest that it was clear that the portable digital music player 
was the obvious direction of innovation, or even within the category of portable players that it 
was the component design of the iPod that would become the clear eventual source of 
innovation, does not do justice to Apple or those that selected other directions and products. 
Sony most significantly represents the multitude of available directions and the complexity of 
choice that confronted those involved. With their rich history of achievement in portable digital 
music players, Sony were viewed as a powerful authority in portable music, with Sony 
advancing this perspective too, publicly promoting their history and strategic focus on 
innovation. However, in 1998, when the first portable players were being released, Sony 
pursued an entirely different alternative to the new portable digital music player technology, 
focusing on their own MiniDisc format. In 1998, the same year as the first portable players 
were released by Diamond and Saehan, Sony spent their largest ever marketing budget of any 
product in their history to promote the MiniDisc format across the U.S. With the portable digital 
music player continuing to grow, by late 1999 Sony eventually announced and then released 
its own portable digital player. The player when released was derided by consumers on 
account of Sony’s decision to create a proprietary audio format and not allow the device to 
natively play MP3. 
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The ambiguity of choice and the multiple available product directions continued to make 
development hard, with Sony continuing to be an example of the pervasive conditions of 
uncertainty. For example, when hard drive players first emerged, which Apple capitalised on, 
using it for the iPod, Sony decided against entering the product category, remaining committed 
to flash memory and releasing their own branded “Memory Stick” portable music players. In 
2003, just as the effect and success of the iPod as a powerful innovation was becoming clear, 
Keiji Kimura, senior VP at Sony, was asked why Sony hadn’t brought out a hard drive player: 
“We do not have any plans for such a product … But we are studying it”. The dismissal of the 
iPod raised intrigue for the journalist at the time: “Really? No plans? When the world leader in 
consumer electronics takes a pass on the hottest portable music player out there, you have to 
wonder what gives” (Rose, 2003). Again, in this case Sony appeared to select an alternative 
direction to what proved successful. By 2005, with the iPod an obvious innovation, the head of 
Sony’s Computer Entertainment Division, Ken Kutaragi, acknowledged publicly that the 
company had made some major mistakes and admitted they should have released an iPod-
style product themselves (Menta, 2005). 
These failures of Sony’s have been attributed to Sony’s lack of clear credibility as a software 
producer and their conflicted structure as both a major record label and consumer electronics 
company (see case study section 11.3.6), but beyond this, their decisions also demonstrate 
the multitude of possible directions that emerged at the same time with respect to the direction 
of digital music and portable digital music players particularly. There wasn’t one clear direction 
of advance and innovation, but many, with complicated relationships and varying expectations 
between them. 
From the perspective of Apple, selecting from this complex of potential directions appears a 
significant contributor to their innovation success. Beyond creating a superior portable digital 
music player to competitors, one of the strengths of Apple in comparison to other companies 
and actors is that it found a solution that linked many of these adjacent events to achieve a 
product of innovation that wasn’t possible by any one product in isolation.  For example, 
Diamond created the first popular portable music player but had little focus on PC software to 
load songs onto the device. Other companies in contrast focused on software only, such as 
MusicMatch and Microsoft creating PC library software, but often for portable devices that were 
produced independently. This caused a suboptimal consumer experience, to the extent that to 
address the issue Microsoft eventually released their own hardware in the Zune (see case 
study section 11.3.5). 
For Apple, the focus appeared to be more complete, finding the optimal solution across multiple 
emerging technologies, including music library software (iTunes), online music purchasing 
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(iTunes Music Store), and the portable player itself (iPod) expanded to a range with different 
characteristics and price points (iPod Mini, Nano, Shuffle, Touch). This focus on finding the 
optimal solution across all events was something noted by Jon Rubinstein explicitly, giving 
examples beyond the ones mentioned above that demonstrate Apple’s focus on the entire 
solution: 
That was always the concept around the iPod, right, was the combination of 
the cloud, of your Mac, and of the device, and all interconnected together, 
right, and we did Nike plus iPod was the first real man machine consumer 
version of man machine interface, so there was a lot of firsts we did with iPod. 
(J. Rubinstein, personal communication, July 9, 2013) 
In this way, the achievement of radical innovation wasn’t just one key insight – it was linking  a 
number of insights together. That is, the key to innovation was not one key technology, but 
finding a solution that offered a number of these key technologies linked together. The first 
portable music players offered some value to consumers, as too did the first library software 
in Winamp, and Napster and Kazaa, and all other singular products and directions. But it was 
in identifying the relationship between these concepts and linking them together that Apple 
created iTunes, then the iPod, then the iTunes Music Store, to deliver startling consumer value 
compared to all other individual ideas. 
This concept of accumulation of multiple insights as the key to new creation has been noted in 
theory before. Garud and Nayyar (1994), referring to it as “transformative capacity”, similarly 
explains how the video tape recorder can be viewed as a combination of many independent 
developments and avenues of previous exploration, rather one simple trajectory being the 
source of innovation (see Figure 7.6). 
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Figure 7.6 Transformative capacity for the Video Tape-Recorder (Garud and Nayyar. 1994) 
Constant (1980) retracing the history of the turbo jet also described a similar phenomenon. 
The turbojet, much like the home video tape recorder, was a combination of a range of previous 
insights and avenues of development, rather than it being a singular technology in isolation 
(see Figure 7.7). 
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Figure 7.7 Interconnected nature of development of the Turbine Jet (Constant 1980, p. 4) 
For digital music the same appears true. Between 1996 and 2002 particularly, there were a 
range of developments occurring, co-dependent on each other, that made it a particularly 
dramatic time. Events were interconnected and accumulating. Figure 7.8, much like that 
offered by Garud and Nayyar (1994) and Constant (1980), the general context of multiple 
interconnected development of the case study is presented. 
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Figure 7.8 Multiple interconnected events of portable digital music players and digital music explored 
in this study 
Recognising this interconnectedness presents theoretical complexity for the concept of 
combination and exaptation. It certainly promotes their significance, but it also stretches the 
current theoretical description, particularly of exaptation. It isn’t clear that each of these events 
represents an exaptation. Equally, it isn’t clear whether the focus of Apple on finding a 
combination across many events in the domain should be described as an exaptation event or 
a combination process, or something else. The concept of exaptation appears to generally 
seem relevant – Apple was a computer company that came to deliver startling digital music 
innovation. However, whether particular events such as the iPod, iTunes, or the iTunes Music 
Store represent exaptation events is not entirely theoretically clear. 
Equally, whilst the model chapter discussed the concept of parallel technology, with reference 
to a pre-existing strong technology that the new technology would likely compete with, this 
does not represent this dynamic context of development. In the case study, the CD format and 
industry represented as this parallel technology contrasted to portable digital music player 
technology, but in the case study, the distinction between these two technologies didn’t emerge 
in isolation. Instead, there was a dynamic environment with many adjacent events occurring 
at once and, significantly, many alternative potential directions of innovation. Apple achieved 
success by finding alignment across many of these events and directions, where other 
companies failed, often despite finding success in a particular product. Exploring this issue 
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offers potential for further refinement and advance of the concepts of combination and 
exaptation. 
7.2.3 Summary of research question 2 
This concludes the discussion of research question 2, which explored the importance of 
combination and exaptation. The study finds that combination and exaptation proved critical to 
the development of portable digital music players, and they are concepts that describe a range 
of events in the case study. Drawing from the case study, this section also highlighted a 
number of theoretical ambiguities in these existing theories, which provide potential for future 
research. These issues are summarised as follows: 
• A particular combination or exaptation is not possible at all times but instead appears 
to have a relationship with incremental changes in existing technologies. As such, the 
trajectory of existing technologies and the relationship to exaptation and combination 
is an issue that can be further explored in theory. 
• There is a need to further articulate exaptation as a “mechanism of creation” rather 
than exclusively as a source of innovation – the case study presented examples of both 
non-technological exaptation along with failed exaptation, which are currently not 
represented in the theory of exaptation. 
• There were many concurrent developments, each with their own trajectories, which 
presented innovation opportunities as more macro combinations outside of the 
component level, and this too is not well articulated in theory. 
These issues represent current points of theoretical ambiguity with exaptation and combination 
emerging from the case study, and as the case study confirmed that both combination and 
exaptation are critically important concepts to innovation, these issues offer potential for useful 
future research. 
7.3 Research question 3: What is the relationship between the internal domain and 
the external lifeworld? 
As discussed in the previous two questions, the lifeworld was a critical source of new events, 
with these events emerging as shocks to those working within the domain. Whilst many of 
these events would emerge from the external environment, the internal domain represented a 
world of actors, events, and technologies already engaged in digital music and portable digital 
music players and had a critical role in the development of innovation. This third question shifts 
the focus to this internal domain, exploring its role in innovation, and its relationship with the 
lifeworld. 
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This question will describe these issues with reference to the role of accumulation. 
Accumulation is recognised in the literature and from the case study; it presents as an effective 
way to articulate the relationship between the internal domain and the lifeworld. Two key 
aspects of accumulation will be discussed: first, how accumulation occurred within the domain, 
making it dynamic; and second, how internal accumulation offered the lifeworld further base 
for events. 
7.3.1 Accumulation – internal dynamics 
The first two questions discussed in this chapter present events as significantly determined by 
the lifeworld – new events would not emerge exclusively from those within the domain, but 
instead technologies and individuals external to the domain recognised more broadly as the 
lifeworld would connect to the domain to cause dramatic events. 
This section refines the description of the internal domain, and whilst the first two questions 
suggest the external lifeworld was important, the internal domain wasn’t static; over time it 
accumulated a different capacity and understanding of the role of digital technologies and how 
innovation could be achieved. 
The internal domain, record labels, consumer electronics companies, and music retailers, for 
example, would respond to new events, shifting expectations, relationships, and performance 
criteria over time as new events emerged. As events such as Napster, Kazaa, and portable 
digital music players emerged, the record labels and the domain, more generally, dynamically 
responded to and changed to these technologies over time. Whilst the consumer electronics 
industry appeared to miss the start of the portable digital music player market, after the first 
portables were released by Diamond and Saehan, the consumer electronics industry soon 
responded, and new players were released by a range of consumer electronics companies 
that previously sold transistor radios, cassette tapes, and CD players, like Sony, JVC, and 
Zenith. Whilst these companies no longer had a significant advantage on account of the fact 
that new conditions favoured IT component companies, they do represent how the internal 
environment is malleable and adjusts to new events. 
This was perhaps best represented by the record labels themselves. Often lambasted in the 
public domain for their lack of embrace of digital distribution, the record industry over time was 
able to entirely reconfigure its structure and relationships to embrace new digital technology. 
Today, revenues from digital distribution are the record industry’s largest revenue source 
(RIAA, 2016), and they have emerged from what has been a dramatic transformation over the 
past 20 years. What proved important to the record labels’ survival through this time was their 
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capacity to change and shift their own sentiment on new emerging criteria, leading ultimately 
to the full embrace of digital technology and distribution. 
Within the record industry at any given time through this transition, there were a range of 
perspectives, beliefs and experiments occurring with respect to digital music, its likelihood of 
importance, and the urgency to respond to these events – and this was a major determinant 
of innovation. The state of views within the domain regarding the transformation – sentiments, 
expectations, experience – was a key determinant of how new events that emerged from the 
lifeworld were interpreted. And as more events occurred, the record industry, as too the 
consumer electronics industry and all others in the domain, would respond to these issues in 
a more decisive or ultimately innovative way. 
Perhaps this is best represented in the unprecedented licensing agreement achieved by Jobs 
and Apple to establish the iTunes Music Store. Gaining access to legitimate and competitive 
licenses to sell major label songs online was a major limitation and source of failure for early 
entrepreneurs and large companies like Microsoft. In contrast to these previous failures, Jobs 
achieved this licensing agreement working with the labels. 
Explaining why it was Jobs, analysis suggests that he had credibility due to his previous 
experience (see case study section 11.2), but this section will also describe this as an outcome 
of the accumulating and dynamically changing expectations of digital music within the domain. 
By the time Jobs worked with the labels, the labels had the previous experience of SDMI, 
lawsuits, Napster, Senate inquiries, Kazaa, and the closely directed but ultimately failing 
MusicNet and Pressplay software. Whilst the record labels at various times through this 
experimentation had tried varying avenues of advance, the accumulating understanding may 
have made the labels more receptive to licensing in 2001 than they were previously. 
By the time Jobs engaged the record labels, they had a rich history of experimentation in digital 
music distribution, with a range of avenues explored including SDMI, the Madison Project, 
litigation with Napster and Kazaa, a Senate inquiry with regards to licensing, and software 
attempts in MusicNet and Pressplay. When asked whether these earlier events, and in 
particular Napster, had an influence on the agreement with Apple, Cary Sherman, the CEO of 
the RIAA, ponders the effect: 
That’s a good question and I don’t know the answer. I figure it must have had 
an impact because basically the flood gates were opened with Napster and it 
was a total crisis in the industry and there was haemorrhaging, so when 
somebody came along with an end-to-end system that would be a legal 
alternative I think that the companies were far more interested in saying, ‘OK; 
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I’ll try it,’ rather than trying to push their own solutions. Because that was the 
first reaction of the companies was to try and partner with somebody for a 
digital service like an IBM or to develop their own music delivery systems like 
a subscription service through MusicNet or Pressplay. So there might have 
been more of a stubbornness about ‘Well, we can do this ourselves’ but 
because of the panic of what Napster unleashed there was probably more 
receptivity to Steve Jobs coming along and licensing, yes. (C. Sherman, 
personal communication June 27, 2013). 
This highlights the dynamics of the internal domain, and it is one example of many (others for 
example include the expectations of music retailers) of how those within the domain itself would 
change these expectations and configuration on account of accumulating events. Whilst new 
events through this time would often emerge from the lifeworld, the internal domain would shift 
and change on account of these events, making the outcomes that at one time were viewed 
as impossible, such as the licensing of music for online distribution, at a later time possible. 
7.3.2 Accumulation – relationship with lifeworld 
The accumulating state of trial and error in portable digital music players also offered those 
external in the lifeworld a base from which to draw for new players. The role of accumulation 
is such that when entering the market in 2001, Apple did not need to reinvent the portable 
digital music player from scratch. Instead, Apple could draw extensively from preceding 
designs and available component technologies. 
There are many examples of components that were common to Apple’s player as well as other 
portable digital music players. A measure of this was found in the initial consumer reaction to 
the announcement of the iPod. In forums such as MacRumours, some users described the 
iPod as a more expensive imitation of other players such as the Creative Nomad and Diamond 
Rio. Whilst the iPod proved ultimately to be a more effective combination of technologies, 
certainly Apple utilised these existing players in the design of the iPod. A prominent example 
is the navigation software on the iPod. Apple utilised a tree structure, where songs and albums 
were grouped by artist, allowing fast navigation.  This design was not unique and was almost 
identical to software on preceding portable digital music players released by Creative. The 
similarity was most clearly highlighted when Creative sued Apple for patent infringement on 
the design, and which Apple settled out of court for $100 million (see case study section 11.3). 
The accumulating available components from previous players appears important to Apple’s 
attempt. The role of accumulation in the building of technology has also been explored and 
noted as important in theory. Specifically, the concept of “algorithmic compressibility” 
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(Tsoukas, 2005) describes how new design can utilise previous accumulation, drawing from 
previous work and, importantly, with those involved not needing to relearn the work that led to 
previous decisions, or even be particularly familiar with the history of development of that 
component (Tsoukas, 2005). New entrants are free to simply utilise the components as 
outcomes of previous design work to build more sophisticated solutions. Using a familiar 
example of an automatic teller machine, Tsoukas gives a simple explanation of this concept: 
“Any time, for example, you use an automatic teller machine you do not need to understand 
the physics and the engineering principles implicated in its design, as long as you can see the 
results you expect” (Tsoukas, 2005, location 1715). Tuomi similarly describes this with respect 
to using a computer, suggesting that those users who buy a computer do not need extensive 
familiarity with the design process of its internal components, but, instead, those that use 
computers can “simply buy a box that embeds the various competences that are needed to 
make computer programs operational” (Tuomi, 2002, location 580). In the case of the iPod, 
Apple was able to quickly draw from the existing state of understanding that had emerged from 
the large volume of other portable players that had been offered to the market before they 
entered. 
An issue emerging from the case study that is not well described in these theories is that 
previous experimentation within the domain not only provided Apple with a compressed 
algorithm of technological components to use as a set of available outcomes from previous 
experimentation but just as significantly the previous experimentation provided Apple with a 
set of problems to avoid, as well as a set of problems to solve – the reverse salients (Hughes, 
1983) of existing players that could be used for further advance. It was addressing problems 
and limitations in existing players that became the source of much of Apple’s innovativeness. 
For example, Apple’s decision to allow the iPod to play all popular digital music formats, 
including MP3 was received much more successfully by consumers, compared to the previous 
failed effort of Sony to create their own proprietary format and restrict their player only to this 
format, disregarding mp3 and other popular formats.  Sony, who entered the market earlier 
than Apple, released their first player in 1999 with a proprietary software ATRAC3, with their 
player not capable of playing MP3. Sony’s decision to release this proprietary software came 
at a time when the SDMI, the large-scale group tasked to create a secure digital music 
standard, was at peak activity attempting to establish a secure standard that would supersede 
MP3. Sony, viewed as the leader in consumer electronics, and with its own record label, was 
heavily involved in this activity. When Sony’s player was released with its proprietary software 
though, Sony’s player failed in large measure due to this issue – it was heavily criticised by 
consumers, and soon SDMI itself also drew to a close, with MP3 becoming the clear dominant 
standard with the emergence of Napster. Apple’s entry followed this activity, and by the time 
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Apple released the iPod, the earlier ambiguity regarding digital music formats had receded, 
with Apple’s decision to release the iPod as a player that was capable of playing all popular 
audio formats, including MP3, being viewed as something that was no longer particularly 
controversial. It was also clear that it was what consumers wanted. Apple benefitted from the 
problems that Sony’s previous failure had exposed. 
Not only did previous accumulation work in the domain offer Apple a range of components like 
MP3 to simply utilise, consistent with the theory compressed algorithm, but also the wide array 
of available portable digital music players released prior to the iPod offered Apple compressed 
algorithms of problems to solve, rather than just components to use. These players offered 
Apple a clearer target of what to focus on in the search innovation. Rather than start from 
imagination and attempt to create the world’s best portable digital music player, instead, Apple 
could start with existing players, identify limitations, and in finding advances to these limitations 
deliver innovation in the iPod. There are a number of tangible examples of how Apple drew 
from accumulating knowledge from preceding portable players in order to create the iPod, and 
in the original keynote announcement of the iPod, Jobs spent a great deal of effort identifying 
the existing problems with players as a way to frame the announcement of the iPod. 
Beyond this, a prominent example of how Apple utilised existing players to create innovation 
is in the click wheel of the iPod. This iPod feature, one of the most recognisably unique 
characteristics of the iPod, was a component conceived of Apple employee Phill Schiller at an 
early prototype meeting at Apple. Describing the genesis of his idea for the scroll wheel, 
Schiller identifies that he had been using previous players from competitors and found the 
need to press a button hundreds of times to navigate to a particular song very frustrating. 
Schiller identified this as an important problem to solve, and to solve it he drew from an 
alternative design in the BeoCom telephone from Bang and Olufsen, which utilised a jog shuffle 
wheel. It appears the identification of the problem in existing players is what initiated the search 
for a solution. 
The available accumulation of existing players on the market in this case appeared to offer 
Apple more than a set of technical components to utilise, but, just as significantly, a 
“compressed algorithm” for the problems to solve as the focus for innovation. Rather than 
attempting the galactic task of creating the world’s best and most innovative portable music 
player simply by relying on imagination, instead, Apple could use the accumulated 
characteristics of existing players, and more pragmatically find innovative ways to improve 
them. 
The distinction between the accumulation of technical components, in contrast to the 
accumulation of problems to solve within a domain, is not something that is well described in 
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theory. Specifically, exploring the concepts of algorithmic compressibility (Tsoukas, 2005), how 
existing trial and error provides  accumulation of problems to solve, and how these problems 
too represent a compressed algorithm for future experimentation represents a future research 
direction. 
7.3.3 Summary of question 3 
Whilst the first two questions explored the role of the lifeworld, recognising that many dramatic 
events emerged from the lifeworld, this third question explored the relationship between the 
lifeworld and the internal domain. 
Addressing this question, the case study identifies that the internal domain also plays a 
significant role for innovation, and this concept was explored with reference to accumulation. 
The internal domain, frequently spurred by events emerging from the lifeworld, was dynamic 
and continued to change, with ongoing expectations, relationships, preferences, technological 
capabilities, consumer understanding, and use all shifting over time, giving the domain its own 
trajectory. This trajectory made events that were at one time the source of failure (such as 
licensing with the major labels for startups such as Napster), with further experimentation, at a 
later time, a key component of success (leading to the iTunes Music Store). The conditions 
shifted within the domain to make an outcome possible at one time and not another. 
Accumulation also played a critical role in innovation. As the trajectory of the domain advanced 
on account of each new event, product, or experiment, the feedback was utilised for further 
trial and error, utilised by those within the domain, and those entering with new events from 
the lifeworld. In the case of Apple they were able to utilise this context of previous 
experimentation within the domain, which they had no involvement in, to create the iPod by 
utilising many common technologies, as well as utilising these existing players to identify 
problems to solve. 
7.4 Research question 4: How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
The final question draws most extensively from the previous analysis chapter, where events 
of portable digital music players are presented as more than a chronology (as they are 
presented in the event history narrative) and instead reorganised through the lens of four 
alternative lifeworlds, in an attempt to describe how conditions of the lifeworld changed and 
how this impacted the likelihood and achievement of innovation for portable digital music 
players at different times. 
The model chapter presented four alternative lifeworlds which surround a technology at 
different times. These are: (1) prehistory, where the lifeworld makes the technology not yet 
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possible; (2) establishment, where the lifeworld offers enabling conditions for the creation of 
the technology but limited performance; (3) development, where trial and error advances the 
technology but reveals problems of socioeconomic alignment; and (4) innovation, where the 
lifeworld makes the technology an innovation, with the emergence of a dominant design with 
strong socioeconomic alignment. Chapter 3 describes these four lifeworlds, along with a 
number of markers of each lifeworld in detail, but they also are summarised in Table 7.3: 
Table 7.3 Summary of the four lifeworlds 
Prehistory lifeworld The lifeworld is characterised by inadequate technology. The required 
component technology does not exist, making creation impossible. Despite 
this, imaginative description may be found. 
Establishment 
lifeworld 
The lifeworld offers enabling conditions for new creation. There is sufficient 
component technology available, and via exaptation and combination a new 
technology is established. The new technology itself will be limited in 
performance but demonstrates working capacity. 
Development 
lifeworld  
A large volume of trial and error emerges, with a dramatic number of 
entrants. These resulting products reveal problems with technology and 
expose various socioeconomic design criteria, from inputs such as 
consumers, regulations, suppliers, etc. 
Innovation lifeworld A successful design emerges to address problems of preceding designs and 
finds alignment across socio, political, and economic conditions. The 
technology proves difficult to dislodge as a successful innovation, and a large 
number of firm exit the market.  
  
The lifeworld concept draws from the innovation lifecycle literature, which describes that a 
technology must go through a series of phases of development before innovation is achieved 
(Klepper, 1996; Usher, 1954). In contrast to lifecycle models though, which view this 
development from the perspective of the technology or the individuals involved, instead this 
research takes the perspective of the surrounding lifeworld, attempting to describe how the 
conditions surrounding an individual technology change and how this influences or determines 
innovation. 
With respect specifically to the question of this section, “How do the dynamics of the lifeworld 
impact innovation?”, the case study suggests that the opportunities to create a particular 
technological innovation are not evenly distributed, with the surrounding state of the lifeworld 
presented as a major determinant of innovation performance. As the lifeworld changed, this 
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had a direct impact on the capacity of individuals to create a technology as well as achieve 
innovation. The trajectory of the technology was determined in part by the trajectory of the 
surrounding lifeworld, and as the lifeworld changed so too did the likelihood and opportunity 
for innovation. The case study suggested that the successful innovation of portable digital 
music players can be seen to pass through four particular external environments, or lifeworlds, 
before being a commercial success. 
Portable digital music technology began as limited imaginative descriptions with Kane Kramer 
in 1979 and the chippy hoax of 1981, with the prehistory lifeworld of the time constraining these 
technologies to imaginative description or preliminary adolescent description. By 1995 the 
lifeworld had changed, offering establishment conditions as a range of technologies had been 
created based on developments in IT technology. These technologies weren’t initiated on 
behalf of their use in portable digital music players but instead emerged generally in the 
lifeworld. An example of this is the emergence of flash memory, with this new technology being 
used by NEC to create the Silicon Audio player prototype player (similar also to the AT&T 
Flashpak prototype player at a similar time). At the time, other conditions of the lifeworld made 
these technologies little more than isolated prototypes – the price of flash memory ($2,000 for 
eight to 12 song memory) made the NEC Silicon Audio a great news story about the future of 
music but little more than an esoteric concept with little relevance to consumers or retailers. 
By 1998 the lifeworld had changed again, characterised by broad conditions that included a 
number of relevant technologies for digital music. The growth in the consumer internet, MP3, 
PC as a media tool, along with specific component characteristics such as the price of flash 
memory, had all emerged to give the lifeworld different characteristics. Again, many of these 
events were not created for the purposes of digital music players but instead represent the 
broader conditions in the lifeworld that became the basis from which new combinations of 
digital music players were created. Drawing from these conditions, the Diamond Rio and the 
Saehan MPMan were created in this environment, and these two devices spurred a dramatic 
amount of new entry and experimentation from other companies and individuals. 
Post the emergence of the Diamond Rio and the Saehan MPMan, the lifeworld was particularly 
dynamic with related events such as peer-to-peer products in Napster and Kazaa, SDMI, and 
RIAA lawsuits all occurring. This is described in the development lifeworld, where the most 
dramatic design work of the technology occurred, but where innovation remained elusive as 
problems of design emerged across the socioeconomic environment (suppliers, consumers, 
legal, etc.). These were difficult and complex problems to address and resulted in a large range 
of failures. Along with the experimentation, through this time the lifeworld continued to offer 
new technologies. For example, the creation of the jukebox player category emerged as an 
 Discussion 279 
 
alternative to flash memory players. The jukebox player market, initiated by Compaq, who 
created a portable player based around a laptop drive, offered an example of the continuing 
role of the lifeworld throughout this time. This lifeworld ends in the model chapter without the 
achievement of innovation; however, this lifeworld did offer continued accumulation of capacity 
that was soon utilised for innovation. 
The final lifeworld is described as the innovation lifeworld, and this is where Apple as a single 
victor emerged to capitalise on previous experimentation and learning to release the iPod, 
iTunes, and iTunes Music Store as a combination that identified and addressed previous 
deficiencies to become a powerful dominant design. 
A summary of the events that occurred in the four lifeworlds is described in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Summary of four lifeworld case study events 
Prehistory lifeworld Kane Kramer created digital drawings for a portable digital music player. 
However, when Kramer attempted to create the device between 1979 and 
1982, he confronted impossible conditions – most of the required 
technologies did not yet exist, and the ones that did exist were both 
restrictively expensive and not widely distributed. Kramer failed despite 
recognising the idea of a portable digital music player, as the lifeworld did 
not offer capacity to create the device he wanted. 
Establishment 
lifeworld 
New technologies were available by 1995, such as flash memory, as well as 
smaller analog-to-digital audio converters, and file formats such as MPEG 
layer 2 and 3. These were utilised by NEC researchers to create the NEC 
Silicon portable digital music audio prototype. The device remained a 
prototype, out of the consumer price range, with a cost of the memory being 
$2,000 for eight to 12 songs. The innovation potential remained constrained 
and speculative. Incremental improvement trajectories continued to be 
important. 




Flash memory prices reached new levels of affordability, and with the 
emergence of consumer internet, music downloading and the MP3 reached 
dramatic levels of popularity. In 1997, the Diamond Rio and the Saehan 
MPMan initiate the consumer market and spark a large volume of new 
entrants from consumer electronics, IT, and computer component industries. 
There is a dramatic amount of trial and error, with new designs building upon 
the first designs from Diamond and Saehan. Innovation remains elusive for 
those involved, as problems emerge (consumers were frustrated with user 
experience of the devices, issues with licensing of major label content, etc.), 
and expectations of the technology fluctuate. Trial and error doesn’t entirely 
reveal an optimal design, and the achievement of innovation required 
something more. 
Innovation lifeworld The lifeworld continued to offer new technologies not available previously, 
and along with this, the accumulating understanding from the trial of previous 
players offers a rich range of components with higher performance compared 
to earlier times, along with a clearer understanding of problems. Apple 
uniquely recognised and seized these conditions to create the iPod as a 
unique combination of existing technologies, releasing this in conjunction 
with iTunes and then ultimately the iTunes Music Store to create a dramatic 
innovation. 
Between 2001 and 2007, Apple’s strategic decisions build upon initial 
advantage to create a dominant design that by 2007 captures 70% of the 
entire portable music player market. 
  
The lifeworld appears significant throughout all events of the case study. The creation of early 
ideas (Kane Kramer), the first technologies (Diamond Rio and Saehan MPMan), and later 
innovation (iPod) all appear to be in part reliant upon the conditions of the lifeworld that existed 
when they occurred. Whilst these events were the creation of particular individuals or firms, 
each of these events relied on conditions not controlled by the individual concerned. And 
significantly, as the capacity of the lifeworld was not static but instead dynamically changing 
as a process, it offered contrasting capacities to create innovation at different times – the 
lifeworld of 2001 offered enabled conditions of innovation, particularly when compared to the 
impossible conditions that faced Kane Kramer in 1979. 
The insight is that at any given time, if the lifeworld is not rich enough, if it does not offer enough 
enabling technologies, resources, components, etc., the possibilities of innovation are 
constrained, regardless of the innovativeness of the ideas or individuals themselves.  Whilst 
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Kane Kramer had powerful ideas for portable digital music players in 1979 with his drawings, 
which appear similar to the eventual iPod of 2001, the ideas of Kramer were conceived of in a 
lifeworld that made them an impossible technology. 
In contrast by 2001, the lifeworld for portable digital music players had changed, offering Apple 
and all others a much richer environment that made innovation in digital music players possible 
and likely. The lifeworld in and of itself didn’t suggest the product for innovation, but it was the 
act of extracting from and combining from the lifeworld that allowed Apple to create the iPod 
that became the success. Significantly, whilst we consider the iPod as a unique achievement 
of Apple, and anecdotally and in popular books, an achievement credited to the genius of Jobs, 
beyond this, much of the genius of Jobs and Rubinstein may be attributable not to their creation 
of these conditions but their awareness and capacity to recognise the wider lifeworld conditions 
that would allow them to create the innovation. This was something Rubinstein described in 
the interview – that he and Jobs only entered the portable digital music market because the 
conditions now offered them the components to build the type of product they wanted, explicitly 
noting that they had waited for these conditions, after earlier assessing these conditions and 
finding them lacking: 
Anything we did at Apple we did in a heartbeat, right, we did with a sense of 
urgency, but we never did a product before its time. Or we tried not to. So we 
waited a while till the technologies would really support the kind of product we 
wanted to build. So we waited quite a few months, until I found the 1.8 inch 
hard drive, and during that time displays had matured, battery technology had 
matured, so it was kind of just the right moment in time to go do it. (J. 
Rubinstein, personal communication, July 9, 2013) 
This has implications for how we think about innovation. The capacity to achieve a particular 
innovation is not evenly distributed nor based entirely on individual capacity. Firms and 
individuals are not only competing against other firms, but they are also competing against the 
context in which they are placed – success or failure may be as much if not more a result of 
the capacities of the lifeworld they are operating in, compared to any particular competing firm 
or strategy that they can take. In contrast to Apple, in the lifeworld of 1979, Kane Kramer, had 
he all the money in the world, could not have created the iPod, as the lifeworld conditions were 
too limited. 
A similar description was offered by Hank Barry, CEO of Napster. When describing why it was 
Shawn Fanning who created Napster, Barry described a “soup” that appears similar to the 
lifeworld concept here, where there were a range of fertile available technologies that met a 
fertile social context: 
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So you are in a dorm where everybody has broadband access, and you are 
in a mix where you’ve got people with big hard drives, MP3s – by the way, 
there’s no cable TV in the dorms, so you don’t have any cable TV, but you do 
have broadband access. So what are you going to do for fun? What are you 
going to do? And you don’t have any money, all right, you can’t buy any 
records. So in this mix, you have a powerful kind of soup. Bored, no money, 
access to broadband, access to these MP3s.. … you also had MP3 players 
around, so people listening to them [MP3s] but, basically to get them you have 
to take somebody’s hard drive. You have to physically walk it over. (H. Barry, 
personal communication, July 10th 2013). 
This surrounding dynamic context appears different to concepts like “system” or “ecosystem” 
but reflects the choice of the term “lifeworld” for the description of a specific technology: At any 
given time there is a context, with technologies, events, people, things, not obviously or directly 
relevant initially to the domain in focus, but that provide powerful constraints or enabling 
conditions for particular events and technological innovation. 
7.4.1 Summary of question 4 
This research explored the dynamics of the lifeworld, how conditions changed over time and 
how this had an impact on innovation. These dynamics were captured with the description of 
four alternative lifeworlds. Applying this to the case study, the study found that, consistent with 
innovation lifecycle models, there is a clear development process for a particular innovation, 
with variable likelihood of innovation at different times in this process. In contrast to lifecycle 
models though, which view this development from the perspective of the technology or the 
individuals involved, instead this research takes the perspective of the surrounding lifeworld. 
The four alternative lifeworlds recognise that the capacity to achieve innovation is not possible 
at all times, and there emerge brief conditions, external to the individual, which provide a 
context for individual decisions and actions that can be used to create innovation. The 
individual is still the fundamentally important operator, but if you place Steve Jobs in the 
lifeworld of 1979, he would fail at creating a digital music player, much like Kane Kramer did. 
The genius of Jobs and others at Apple perhaps was that they wouldn’t have tried in 1979, 
having an implicit focus on assessing the conditions and context as part of their strategy and 
decisions. 
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7.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has answered the four research questions, exploring the role of the lifeworld.  
There are a number of clear concepts emerging from each question, and these are 
summarised below. 
Research question 1: This suggested that the lifeworld is important to the achievement of a 
specific technological innovation. Critical events to the development of portable digital players 
didn’t emerge exclusively from the history and activity of those working on the technology 
already, but instead the source of new events, as well as ultimately innovation in the iPod came 
from those external in the surrounding lifeworld. 
Research question 2: The study identifies that combination and exaptation proved critical to 
the development of portable digital music players, and they are concepts that describe a range 
of events in the case study. This chapter also presented a number of key issues of theoretical 
ambiguity, which present future research directions for exaptation. 
Research question 3: Whilst the above suggested the lifeworld was important, it was not the 
exclusive source of innovation. The internal domain was still critical, and the research 
discussed the role of accumulation, both in the dynamics of the internal domain as well as how 
those external would draw from previous accumulation within the domain. For Apple’s case, 
they didn’t need to invent everything but could draw from events and technologies that had 
already occurred. 
Research question 4: This final question drew most extensively from the previous analysis 
chapter and describes the development of digital music technology as a process. It suggested 
that the lifeworld was dynamic over time, with the capacity to achieve innovation variable. Four 
alternative lifeworlds were described, exploring how conditions constrained innovation for early 
actors such as Kane Kramer, offered dramatic experimentation conditions with early portable 
players initiated by Diamond Rio and Saehan MPMan, and how post this Apple emerged in a 
lifeworld where innovation was possible. 
This completes the discussion chapter, with the conclusion chapter offered next. 
 









This concluding chapter offers a review of the research in entirety. A summary of the research 
questions and outcomes are provided first, followed by a discussion of the generalisability and 
limitations of the research and the theoretical and practical implications, along with a summary 
of future research directions. 
8.1 Summary of the research 
This research explored the role of the environment in the creation and achievement of 
technological innovation. The environment is presented as the concept of the lifeworld, 
describing the wider context surrounding a particular idea for a technology at any given time. 
Four lifeworlds were offered, similar to the innovation lifecycle, to describe how conditions are 
not static but dynamically changing, offering changing constraints and enabling conditions that 
impact the achievement of a particular innovation. 
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The lifeworld concept provides a way of seeing successful innovation as something other than 
unique individuals with unique ideas. Instead, an idea or an individual is dependent upon more 
than itself for innovation, and the context that surrounds an individual at any given time can be 
seen as a strong determinant of the capacity to achieve innovation.  Beyond similar recognition 
of this concept in innovation systems literature, this research conceptualised the lifeworld as 
wider than a recognisable system, exploring how often important and dramatic events in the 
development of portable digital music players would emerge from sources (technologies, 
people, etc.) in the lifeworld that were previously not obviously relevant or linked to portable 
digital music players. 
With specific reference to the case study, the study found that opportunities for innovation were 
not available at all times throughout the history of portable digital music players, and, 
significantly, through this history it appears the capacity of the lifeworld was a strong source of 
both constraints and later enabling conditions of innovation. Kane Kramer, attempting to create 
a digital music player in 1979, could have had all the money in the world and still would not 
have been able to create a functioning technology, much less innovation. By contrast, Apple 
in 2001, with little direct R&D, quickly created a combination that drew from what was available 
in the lifeworld, including the trial and error of previous failures, to create a product that met 
receptive consumers and led to dramatic worldwide innovation. 
Apple utilised and seized upon available conditions in 2001 to create the iPod, drawing from 
technologies available in the lifeworld to create the iPod that delivered more value to users 
than competing products. As a mark of the significance of the lifeworld concept, the research 
also reveals that Apple was acutely assessing these wider conditions and the availability of 
technologies in its decision to enter the portable digital music player market, only engaging 
when it found conditions to build the product it wanted. 
Related to the lifeworld concept, the research also highlighted the important role of 
combination and exaptation as mechanisms of creation, how things are drawn together from 
the lifeworld to create new technologies, along with the importance of accumulation of trial and 
error and socioeconomic factors that impacted the likelihood of innovation at different times. 
8.2 Research process 
The lifeworld concept was explored using the case study of portable digital music players. 
Using extensive primary and secondary data a detailed chronological event history narrative 
of the case was created. This is presented as the second volume and summarised in chapter 
5.  Following this, these events were analysed through the lens of the lifeworld model of chapter 
3. This analysis is presented in chapter 6, which describes the development of portable digital 
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music players as a process through four alternative lifeworlds. The previous discussion chapter 
addressed the four research questions with outcomes summarised below. 
8.3 Research outcomes 
This research addressed four research questions exploring the wider environment, 
represented as the concept of the lifeworld. The four questions of this research are: 
1. How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in the case study? 
2. How are combination and exaptation relevant in the development of innovation? 
3. What is the relationship between the internal domain and the external lifeworld? 
4. How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
Summarising the discussion chapter, the research questions were answered as follows: 
 1. How significant is the lifeworld to events and innovation in the case study? 
The case study suggested that the lifeworld is important. Prominent events in the case study 
were not exclusively dependent on those within the domain or the preceding history of digital 
music or digital music players, but instead new events emerged from companies, people and 
technologies more broadly from the lifeworld. These external technologies had their own 
preceding trajectory in the lifeworld, that were connected to the domain to create dramatic 
events.   
The most prominent example of this is Apple itself. The event history narrative described many 
prominent and important events in the development of portable digital music players prior to 
2001. Yet, despite the large volume of events, prior to their engagement with the release of 
iTunes and the iPod in 2001, Apple were not significantly involved, and did not play a prominent 
role in development.  If the narrative had stopped prior to 2001, it would have missed the 
defining innovation from Apple. 
Further highlighting the role of the lifeworld, the discussion chapter also described the lifeworld 
with reference to the constant state of uncertainty that characterised development for all 
involved. New events such as Napster, Kazaa, iTunes, and the iPod constantly emerged as 
shocks to those within the domain, similar to those described by Van de Ven et al. (1999), 
where assessment and analysis did not account for these coming events prospectively. 
Discussing this with reference to theory, the discussion chapter utilised the time series trap 
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(McMullen & Dimov, 2013) as particularly useful to promote how the emergence of new 
external events requires the reconfiguration of the internal environment. 
 2. How is combination and exaptation relevant in the development of innovation? 
The study confirms and impresses the importance of combination and exaptation as concepts 
that describe something significant to new technological creation and innovation. Whilst there 
were many examples, most significantly again, the iPod is a powerful example of the role of 
combination and exaptation in new technological creation. In the discussion chapter (drawing 
from case study section 10.5), the iPod was explored and described in detail as a combination. 
The primary interview with Jon Rubinstein, who led the iPod development at Apple, also 
highlighted how Apple were cognisant of combination as the strategy for creation. A number 
of times throughout the interview, Rubinstein stressed that the iPod was a combination of 
available technologies, and along with giving detail of the combination of iPod, Rubinstein also 
offered wider advice regarding new technological creation: “It’s always the combination of the 
technology”.  
With the importance of exaptation and combination in theory and the case study, the discussion 
chapter further explored these concepts, identifying a number of theoretical ambiguities 
emerging from the case study. Summarising these again, they are: 
• With respect to technology, the difference between combination and exaptation is not 
clear. The discussion chapter described the difference between biological exaptation 
and technological exaptation, highlighting that a technological combination can also 
include exaptation, as well as the concept of multiple adjacent developments, where 
the combination can be of independent technologies or ideas. This made identifying 
exaptation events in contrast to combination events as distinct, particularly difficult with 
this issue and one that can be refined further in theory. 
• The role of incremental improvement in existing technologies appears critical to 
creating windows of opportunity for exaptation and combination. The trajectory of 
existing technologies was viewed as important, and often it was a shift in characteristic 
of familiar technologies rather than the emergence of a dramatically new technology 
that made new combinations possible.  
• Finally, the case study presented examples of exaptation that are not well described in 
theory – both exaptation of concepts rather than just technologies, and also examples 
of failed exaptation where exaptation did not lead to significant innovation. These types 
of exaptation are not well described in theory, and exploring these issues suggest a 
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possible avenue of advance for theory, with particular opportunity to articulate 
combination and exaptation as mechanisms of creation rather than exclusively 
mechanisms of innovation.  
With the importance of combination and exaptation emerging from the research, these points 
are viewed as significant future theoretical directions that will be explored in future research 
endeavour. 
 3. What is the relationship between the internal domain and the external lifeworld?   
The third question explored the relationship between the internal domain and the external 
lifeworld. Whilst the first two questions explored the role of the lifeworld, this third question 
recognised that the domain itself also had a critical role in the achievement of innovation, and 
the external lifeworld was not the source of innovation in and of itself. Whilst new events would 
often emerge from actors in the broader lifeworld, these new events too would interact with 
and draw from the existing domain. 
The discussion chapter described the interaction between the internal domain and the lifeworld 
in two concepts. First, it described the role of accumulation. The internal domain was dynamic 
and would respond to events, making different outcomes possible at different times. Second, 
and extending this, the theory of compressed algorithms (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas & Ven 
de Ven, 2013) was used to describe how those external in the lifeworld would draw from the 
accumulation that had occurred in the domain. Rather than having to create concepts from 
scratch, new events could build on previous experimentation. Drawing from the case study, 
the discussion chapter highlighted how previous experimentation with portable digital music 
players not only provided Apple with components to use that they didn’t need to reinvent (MP3, 
downloading, CD burning, technological components such as hard drive, etc.) but just as 
significantly, previous portable music players released to the market offered Apple a set of 
problems to solve – the limitations (or reverse salients; Hughes, 1983) with existing players 
presented a compressed algorithm for Apple, where addressing problems and limitations of 
existing players was the source of innovation, such as the frustration of clicking through menus 
(leading to the creation of the scroll wheel), or that some players required proprietary audio 
formats (where Apple instead made the iPod capable of playing a wide range of formats 
including MP3). It was while addressing problems and limitations in existing players that Apple 
created a player with a much-improved value for consumers. 
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 4.  How do the dynamics of the lifeworld impact innovation? 
The final question of the research investigated the lifeworld as a process. It presented four 
lifeworld stages, exploring how conditions of portable digital music players changed over time, 
and how dynamics of the lifeworld impacted the capacity to create innovation. The case study 
demonstrated that the likelihood of innovation in portable digital music players wasn’t evenly 
distributed, but instead, that the lifeworld offered strong constraints at some times and enabling 
conditions at others. The four lifeworlds of portable digital music players were described as 
follows. 
Prehistory lifeworld (pre–1994): There were a number of early imaginative descriptions of 
portable digital music players, prior to it being possible to create a working technology. The 
most notable attempt was that of Kane Kramer in 1979 who drew his concept IXI Player, and 
established a company in an attempt to create the device. Despite his drawings appearing 
similar to the eventual look of the iPod, and with Kramer able to create audio limiting patents 
on digital audio, Kramer failed. The study explored this as a failure in part due to the 
characteristics of the lifeworld at the time. Kramer faced extreme limitations of technology, with 
the lifeworld not yet having sufficient availability of required technology. In a recent interview, 
Kramer himself also noted that the limitations extended beyond the obvious technology, with 
consumers not comfortable with the idea, acknowledging that even if he could have created 
the player in 1979, it would be of no use as there were not yet any digital music files to play on 
the device, with the majority of studios still recording to magnetic tape. 
Establishment lifeworld (1994–1997): The dynamically changing lifeworld continued to 
accumulate capacity, and in 1994 NEC announced a prototype portable digital music player. 
Drawing from technologies available at the time, particularly flash memory, and audio format 
MPEG layer 2, NEC announced the new prototype player. The technologies of the time also 
limited the device to only ever being a prototype: The cost of the memory was $2000 for the 
eight to 12 song prototype, resulting in it being far outside the consumer range, with NEC 
deciding not to pursue the player. 
Development lifeworld (1997–2001): These years are significant years in the development 
of portable digital music players, and digital music more generally. In 1997 and 1998 the first 
portable music players in the Diamond Rio and Saehan MPMan were released to the public. 
Soon, this initiated a large volume of new entrants, as companies released players based 
around similar designs. The large volume of new players created a significant process of trial 
and error as preferences of the lifeworld were revealed, with many elements (support 
industries such as the recording industry, legal precedent) offering favour to the competing 
technology of compact disc. The technology of portable players was still immature relative to 
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what would soon be possible, and consumer use of these players revealed frustrations, such 
as the constraints of memory (cost/capacity) and battery life. At the same time as this 
experimentation in portable players, a number of dramatic events occurred in digital music 
more generally. The availability of PCs with sound cards, fast enough processors, and 
affordable internet, along with CD burners led to events such as mp3.com, Napster, Kazaa, 
and music software such as MusicMatch. This time was characterised by a large amount of 
intrigue, experimentation, description and analysis of events and forecasts, as well as failure 
of many products. The development lifeworld ends with lasting innovation still elusive, but with 
the large volume of activity offering accumulating conditions that would soon be capitalised on. 
Innovation lifeworld (2001–2008): Apple released the iPod in 2001, and it grew to become a 
powerful dominant design. With iTunes also released in 2001, the iPod initially found success 
relative to the other players available in the market. By 2004, Apple had bifurcated the iPod 
from a single product to a product range, established the iTunes Music Store, and released 
iTunes on the Windows platform. With these developments, iPod moved from initial success 
in the product niche, to powerful worldwide phenomenon, with Apple capitalising and creating 
the shift of portable digital music players from niche to mass market product.  
Whilst the iPod is credited to Apple as a unique achievement, the lifeworld presented Apple 
opportunities for innovation that were not available at previous times, such that it is possible to 
say that Apple would not have succeeded in creating the iPod if they had tried at any time 
previous to 2001. For example, the lifeworld offered new exaptation opportunities to Apple in 
2001, with Apple utilising a new 1.8 inch prototype laptop hard drive from Toshiba to create 
the iPod that wasn’t previously available. The availability of these conditions was outside the 
control of Apple, and the study finds that the enabling conditions of the lifeworld were a large 
contributor to Apple’s success. 
However, the study also found that Apple was significant in identifying and creating these 
conditions. The iPod was not an obvious exclusive extension of previous players, but Apple 
created a unique combination drawing from available technologies and understanding in the 
domain, as well as their own unique sensibilities and experience. This created a unique product 
that delivered superior value to consumers. Whilst the lifeworld offered conditions that made 
dramatic innovation possible in 2001 compared to previous or later times, the study also found 
that Apple’s performance was unique with respect to recognising and seizing these conditions 
The lifeworld was dynamic, and offered varying capacity to achieve innovation at different 
times. The concept appears to have merit, and the exploration of the wider environment in 
which ideas and technologies are conceived useful. The limitations of the research, and the 
lifeworld concept will now be discussed. 
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8.4 Limitations of the research 
The lifeworld model was an attempt to describe something inherently difficult: how the things 
surrounding an idea for a technology (events, other technologies, individuals, etc.), not initially 
or at times obviously relevant to it, can impact its development and performance as an 
innovation. This is an intrinsically difficult research phenomenon to explore. Adding to the 
complexity, the research also acknowledged the importance of viewing innovation as a 
process, and attempted to explore this lifeworld as a process – how it changed over time, and 
how this leads to differences between conditions that enable and constrain innovation. 
Whilst ultimately the research achieves the goal of exploring this lifeworld and offers some 
useful theoretical and practical implications, there are a number of limitations that will be 
discussed. These relate to the lifeworld concept, methodological decisions, and also the aims 
and criteria of this research as PhD research. These will each be discussed below. 
8.4.1 Limitations of the lifeworld concept 
One limitation and risk of this research is that the lifeworld concept may appear contrived and 
viewed simply as an idiosyncratic collection of ideas, which then through selective case study 
application have been artificially confirmed as significant. 
This is not the intent or outcome of the research, and the researcher prioritised not a set of 
ideas, but instead the exploration process of existing theory as well as the events of the case. 
In presenting the lifeworld concept, it draws extensively from the lifecycle theory and the 
prominent process theory of technology. The model is framed with the term “lifeworld”, due to 
their appearing no entirely suitable terminology to describe the context for individual 
technology, despite there being an abundance of words that are close in meaning – words 
such as ecosystem, system, context all appear useful words but were not viewed as entirely 
effective in contrast to lifeworld. Beneath the term “lifeworld”, all of the model, as too the 
preceding literature review that framed the importance of exploring it, are based on existing 
useful theories of innovation and particularly technological innovation. 
Beyond the theory, with respect to the case, the researcher has not been selective in the 
construction of the case to confirm the importance of concepts. Instead, the researcher 
presented the case study first as a detailed chronology of events. The event history narrative 
was constructed in detail independent of any theory, and the vastness of the event history 
narrative presented as a second volume is a large measure of the researcher’s commitment 
to this task. An important motivator for the exploration to begin was a decision to respond to 
the historical genius model of innovation, which through selectivity of case material often 
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presents events as outcomes of individuals exclusively (e.g., literature review discussion on 
individual genius). Whilst it would have been much faster to complete this research by simply 
running a data search related to Steve Jobs, instead this research undertook a more detailed 
process of documenting and exploring the significant amount of failures, incidental events, and 
accumulating context that preceded the iPod just as much as the success of the iPod itself. 
For these reasons, whilst the lifeworld concept may be critiqued because of its lack of 
uniqueness to this research, the aim of this model, to explore the wider environment that 
constrains and impacts innovation, appears important. And rather than the conclusion of this 
research being that the lifeworld model is an effective way to describe innovation, instead, the 
ambition of it is pragmatic – when thinking about innovation, issues like combination, 
exaptation, and the lifeworld are things that should be considered. 
8.4.2 Process research complexities and limitations 
This research is process research, with four alternative lifeworlds to describe how conditions 
change over time. This is a limitation of the research, and there are a number of issues related 
to the recognition of four alternative lifeworlds that must be addressed. 
Offering four alternative lifeworlds is an attempt to describe the lifeworld as a process, how 
external conditions change over time and how this impacts the achievement of a particular 
technological innovation. Process research like this has its own epistemological foundation 
that is inherently complex as discussed in the methodology chapter. It starts with recognition 
that everything is in flux, and using methodological tools attempts to explore, recognise, and 
describe the temporal process of change that leads to events. 
Phase models, which describe process by way of a series of markers for particular stages, are 
a common and accepted technique in process research (see the table in Methodology) and 
innovation research, and have received empirical support (Stubbart & Knight, 2006). However, 
phase models receive criticism on account of the risk of oversimplification and 
misrepresentation they bring to complex phenomena (Van Lente, Hekkert, Smits & van 
Waveren, 2003, p. 260). This criticism of phase models is that they, like the bed of Procrustes, 
make an overwhelmingly complex phenomenon fit a rigidly defined standard (Taleb 2016), 
potentially dangerously misrepresenting both the phenomenon as well as level of possible 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
This is a risk of reductionism, and one that is common of phase models, including this research. 
The use of four alternative lifeworlds similar to phases of innovation lifecycle models is 
acknowledged as this limitation. Whilst it is drawn from theory, the lifeworld concept may not 
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have the capacity to fully represent the complex phenomena or process that it is attempting to 
describe. In response, the perspective of the researcher is that the case study promoted a 
particular perspective on this – there is a need for strong conviction with respect viewing 
innovation as a process, but for this conviction to be weakly held with respect to the ultimate 
ability of the four lifeworlds to capture this process in completeness. There may be more 
effective ways to articulate this concept, which offer greater clarity of process, and that capture 
more detail offering more value. 
Related to this, another limitation is the number of lifeworlds recognised. Much like the criticism 
of innovation phase models (Pinch, 2010), the selection of four lifeworlds is acknowledged to 
be somewhat arbitrary based on the perspective of the process. The model presented four 
alternative lifeworlds to reflect the different phases of innovation lifecycle models such as 
Usher’s (1954). The description of four lifeworlds was drawn from theory, but ultimately all 
process models that attempt to describe a lifecycle make decisions about how to articulate that 
process in stages, and the result is that there is no clear or obvious ‘standard’ number of 
phases. Abernathy and Utterback (1978), for example, describe a new technological 
innovation development in three phases: A “fluid phase”, “transition phase”, and a “specific 
phase”. Perez (2001) describes the process of how technologies become embedded in the 
economy as a four-phase process: Phase one is “irruption”, phase two “frenzy”, phase three 
“synergy”, and phase four “maturity”. Rogers (1983) identifies five different categories of 
consumers in the diffusion process: Innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, 
and laggards. Ogburn (1950) describes innovation from the perspective of the individual as a 
four-phase process: (1) Invention, (2) accumulation, (3) diffusion, and (4) adjustment (Ogburn, 
1950, p. 393). This is similar to Usher (1954), who also offers a four-phase model, including 
(1) perception of an incomplete problem, (2) setting the stage, (3) act of insight, and (4) critical 
revision and full mastery. The number of phases in each model appears arbitrary when viewed 
as a collective group of theory. Some models offer three phases (Abernathy, & Utterback, 
1978; Geels, 2002), others four (Christensen, 1997; Meijer, Hekkert, Faber & Smits, 2006, p. 
220; Perez, 2007, 2010; Usher, 1954), others five or more (Rogers, 1983; Suárez, 2004). 
Whilst the presentation of these phases in each model is well justified, there does not appear 
to be any consistency with respect to the number of phases or agreement with respect to how 
many phases is useful. 
These differences can perhaps be attributed to the difference in focus of each theory. Similar 
to what Giddens (1984) described in his theory of structuration in sociology, differences in the 
unit of analysis make some of these theories cover similar concepts in widely differing ways. 
Some theories provide wide coverage of the process of technological change from inception 
to maturity, whereas others only focus on a specific stage of the process. For example, Perez’s 
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(2004) theory of technological economic paradigms provides description from a gestation 
phase through to technological maturity. Others too such as the linear model of innovation, 
technological paradigm (Dosi, 1983), technological regime/trajectory (Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
and the multilevel perspective (Geels, 2002; Rip & Kemp, 1998) similarly describe the process 
from initiation to maturity. In contrast some theories describe process by avoiding phases, and 
by almost exclusively focusing on a particular segment of the process. For example, Arthur 
(1989) focuses entirely on technological lock which creates windows of entry, and Anderson 
and Tushman (1990) focus on market-based assets that have an effect closer to maturity 
states. This multitude of different perspectives on process don’t reduce the validity of viewing 
things as a process, but instead highlight the difficulty of the research. 
Reflecting more specifically on this issue for this research, the lack of standardised number of 
phases, as well as the criticism related to the use of phases appears related to the complexity 
of describing process, and the need to rely upon reductionism as an important tool for this 
description, rather than being a point of critique regarding validity. Capturing and describing 
process in motion is particularly difficult, and as Dennett (1996) suggests, reductionism is valid 
and important as long as researchers do not over represent the descriptive capacity of the 
theory. 
8.4.3 Methodological limitations 
Along with the above reflections on the nature of the lifeworld concept, there are a number of 
methodological limitations that will be discussed below with respect to the case study of 
portable digital music players. 
8.4.3.1 Generalisability 
This research of portable digital music players is a single in-depth case study.  Whilst this is a 
popular methodology, and one which has produced a number of seminal references in the 
innovation literature (e.g., Christensen, 1997; Constant, 1980; David, 1980; Gilfillan, 1935; 
Hughes, 1983; Van de Ven et al. 1999), the single case methodology is recognised 
methodologically as one that comes with risks of limited generalisability (Yin, 2013). 
As discussed in the methodology section, the difficulty of generalisability is an issue that affects 
all innovation research due to the innate characteristic of each innovation being unique in some 
way, and it is suggested that this in part is why detailed single case studies have been so 
useful in the innovation literature, rather than the search for the single grand abstraction that 
describes all innovation. However, a noted limitation is that the conclusions emerge from this 
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case study alone. This research is specific in what it describes, and its utility to other cases is 
something that will take specific analysis beyond the generalisable contributions noted below. 
8.4.3.2 Data 
A strength of this research is the amount of reliable data that was used. The Internet Archive 
was a powerful data source, which has relevance for future innovation research endeavours. 
The sheer volume of data, though, was laborious, and future research may also look to more 
advanced methodological tools such as concept mapping and software tools that offer 
quantitative insight. 
8.4.3.3 PhD research 
The final methodological limitation is the purpose of the research itself. This research is a PhD 
thesis and was constructed under the limitations and constraints of the thesis format and the 
PhD process itself. Often unlike significant research for journal publication, I constructed this 
thesis by myself, outside of a community of researchers in the theoretical domain of 
technological innovation. If there are erroneous interpretations of existing theory, then these 
should be viewed as naivety as opposed to arrogance. This research represents my own 
apprenticeship in both the theory as well as detailed case study methodology. 
8.5 Contribution to knowledge 
This research has explored the role of the environment, recognised as the concept of the 
lifeworld. It has identified that the lifeworld in which an idea is placed is critical to the 
achievement of innovation. Below is a summary of both the practical and theoretical 
contributions to knowledge, as well as future research directives. 
8.5.1 Practical implications 
In the introduction, this research began by describing the practical problem that was to be 
explored: Below the surface of iPod’s success, there were a large volume of other 
entrepreneurs and individuals who conceived of and pursued the same ideas prior to Apple.  
How was it that Apple succeeded when there were so many talented entrepreneurs and 
industry experts exploring these similar ideas for digital music players and failed? These 
individuals and companies had many of the same ideas that Apple used to become innovative, 
and they had them long before Apple did. So, should Kane Kramer, or Michael Robertson, or 
the creators of the Diamond Rio, or any other preceding entrepreneurs or companies prior to 
Apple that explored the same ideas be viewed as the innovators?  
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With the research complete, it seems futile to argue that Apple weren’t the clear innovators in 
portable digital music players and digital music distribution more generally. They completely 
dominated the market, delivering a product that outperformed anything previous to it, and all 
portable digital music players after it, to be only superseded by another of their own products 
in the iPhone. Apple should be viewed, in the popular sense they already are, as the great 
innovators of the domain and the era more generally.  
The study does suggest though that there is need to qualify the attribution of this success to 
the singular genius of Jobs. The perspective of Jobs as the heroic genius who had unique 
ideas others didn’t appears wrong, and disregards the significant contribution and work of 
those who preceded Apple. There is clear evidence, promoted even by Jon Rubinstein, that 
Apple relied heavily on the available conditions of 2001, including many of the previous 
technologies, ideas and failures that preceded their engagement.    
Instead of attributing the success of Apple to unique ideas, their achievement appears 
dependent upon the particular context of the time. Using combination to draw from the 
environment, Apple both created and realised conditions that made innovation possible in 
portable digital music players in 2001 compared to previous times when these conditions were 
not yet possible. Recognising and seizing upon these conditions appears the genius of Jobs, 
Rubinstein and others at Apple, who describe waiting for these conditions as a deliberate 
strategy.  
This awareness of the context, how dynamic conditions had changed to offer potential for 
innovation in 2001 not possible at previous times, appears critical to the achievement of 
innovation for Apple and has implication for others too. The lifeworld model demonstrated that 
the idea of a portable digital music player had a long history, with many who attempted to bring 
it to life as an innovation. Through this history, almost all others faced constraints that made 
innovation in portable digital music players impossible. In contrast, Apple engaged at a time 
when the conditions enabled innovation, and with little direct R&D Apple were able to capitalise 
on these primed conditions to create powerful innovation.  
The lifeworld concept demonstrated that the constraints and enabling conditions are external 
to those who try, leading to the implication that if Apple had attempted to create the iPod in 
1969 like Kramer’s failed IXI player, or in 1994 like the Silicon Audio player from NEC 
researchers, or in 1997 like Saehan or Diamond, Apple too in all of these contexts would have 
failed. The genius of Apple, under the leadership of Jobs and Rubinstein, was that they 
wouldn’t have tried to create the iPod at these earlier times. 
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8.5.2 Theoretical implications and future research 
Whilst the use of the term “lifeworld” may remain idiosyncratic to this study, the concept of 
what it is attempting to describe appears important – that the conditions surrounding an idea 
for a technology at times present extreme constraints to the achievement of innovation, and at 
other times make the same innovation likely. It is something different to an innovation system 
or an ecosystem, and the lifeworld concept along with the case study explores how events 
would often emerge not from previous direct activity of those working on the technology of 
portable digital music players, but instead the interaction of wider technologies that existed 
more generally in the lifeworld. Important technologies that were critical to the development of 
portable digital music players often had a history of being applied to other domains with initially 
at least no clear or obvious relevance to the domain of portable digital music players. This 
highlights the importance of the lifeworld concept and it is this which the concept attempts to 
illuminate.  
The model also describes the lifeworld as a process. How, like innovation lifecycle models, 
conditions are dynamic, creating temporal differences in the capacity to create technology as 
well as innovation. The prehistory lifeworld described conditions which did not allow for the 
creation of the technology. Establishment and development lifeworlds provided conditions that 
enabled the creation of portable digital music player technology, but did not allow for the 
creation of innovation. Innovation lifeworld, offered powerful enabling conditions for innovation, 
resulting in the emergence of a dominant design. Exploring these ideas with reference to 
answering the research questions also brought with it a range of insights in the discussion 
chapter, which highlighted the following theoretical issues:  
• Uncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of new technological development. With 
reference to the time sequence trap, uncertainty was explored as a characteristic that 
highlighted the importance of the lifeworld, how new events would emerge from 
external sources, rather than the existing narrative exclusively. 
• Combination and exaptation are important mechanisms of creation. The discussion 
chapter provided a number of directives with respect to future research exploration of 
these concepts. 
• Trial and error (represented as the large volume of new portable digital music player 
products preceding Apple) was a critical process by which socioeconomic criteria were 
exposed.  
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• Accumulation of selection feedback offered a basis for further experimentation. With 
reference to the concept of compressed algorithm, accumulation provided Apple not 
only with a range of components to use, but also a range of problems to solve.   
• Viewing innovation as a process has merit, and the case study provides strong support 
to the recognition that capacity to achieve a particular innovation is not absolute, but 
relative to the context and conditions of the lifeworld at any given stage.   
Along with the concept of the lifeworld itself, these themes represent a range of theoretical 
implications and future research directions which the researcher intends to explore. 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarised the research, giving an overview of the research process, presenting 
the findings, discussing the limitations, and finally identifying the contribution to knowledge 
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